上海交通大学：《台湾研究》课程教学资源_阅读材料_Party Politics

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Divergence or Convergence:The Transition of Party System in Taiwan Lin Gang Shanghai Jiao Tong University I.Introduction Taiwan's "nine-in-one"elections on November 29,2014 have revealed the changing sign of the two-party system on the island from an asymmetric toward a symmetric power relationship.The ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT),which still controls both executive and legislative branches at the top level,has no longer maintained the majority local executives of Taiwan's 22 metropolises,counties and cities.Should the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)come back to power through the 2016 presidential election,Taiwan's party system may demonstrate a symmetric power relationship between the two main parties,featured by periodical power turnover. Theoretically,Taiwan's two-party system is shaped by both the electoral system and social cleavages.The electoral system,featuring mainly single-member-district plurality formula for legislative election,is favorable to symmetric two-party system and convergence of party politics in terms of policy platform and inner-party organizations. Taiwanese society featuring cumulative cleavages,however,is conducive to divergent party system.Since political democratization started in 1986,social cleavages have been transformed gradually from ethnic conflicts among people with different provincial backgrounds (the so-called Taiwanese who came to the island before 1945 and the so-called mainlanders who came after 1945)and ideological disputes around the direction and pace of political reform on the island to the cumulative cleavages on the issues of national identity,economic growth,social distribution,and environmental protection. While in the United States and many other democratic societies,the ideologically left-right issue is the main watershed distinguishing different parties,the fundamental conflict in Taiwan is over how to handle its relations with the mainland:should Taiwan be attached to the mainland or detached from the mainland in the future?Meanwhile,as a long-time ruling party on Taiwan except for the period of 2000-2008,the KMT takes economic growth as its priority while neglecting,more or less,a balanced regional development and social distribution.The DPP,on the other hand,has more connections with middle-and-small entrepreneurs,middle and working classes,as well as the southern part of Taiwan. This essay attempts to explore the transition of the party system in Taiwan through two dimensions:the evolution of power relations between the two parties from asymmetry to symmetry and the nature of party politics from divergence to convergence.Power relations are measured by votes,elected positions,regional distribution of political powers, and party identification among the general public,while the nature of party politics is observed from the distance between the two parties in terms of ideologies,social cleavage and policies.This essay assumes that one important precondition for a convergent party system is a symmetric power relationship between the ruling and opposition parties. Without periodical power turnover between different parties,the opposition party will be

1 Divergence or Convergence: The Transition of Party System in Taiwan Lin Gang Shanghai Jiao Tong University I. Introduction Taiwan’s “nine-in-one” elections on November 29, 2014 have revealed the changing sign of the two-party system on the island from an asymmetric toward a symmetric power relationship. The ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), which still controls both executive and legislative branches at the top level, has no longer maintained the majority local executives of Taiwan’s 22 metropolises, counties and cities. Should the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) come back to power through the 2016 presidential election, Taiwan’s party system may demonstrate a symmetric power relationship between the two main parties, featured by periodical power turnover. Theoretically, Taiwan’s two-party system is shaped by both the electoral system and social cleavages. The electoral system, featuring mainly single-member-district plurality formula for legislative election, is favorable to symmetric two-party system and convergence of party politics in terms of policy platform and inner-party organizations. Taiwanese society featuring cumulative cleavages, however, is conducive to divergent party system. Since political democratization started in 1986, social cleavages have been transformed gradually from ethnic conflicts among people with different provincial backgrounds (the so-called Taiwanese who came to the island before 1945 and the so-called mainlanders who came after 1945) and ideological disputes around the direction and pace of political reform on the island to the cumulative cleavages on the issues of national identity, economic growth, social distribution, and environmental protection. While in the United States and many other democratic societies, the ideologically left-right issue is the main watershed distinguishing different parties, the fundamental conflict in Taiwan is over how to handle its relations with the mainland: should Taiwan be attached to the mainland or detached from the mainland in the future? Meanwhile, as a long-time ruling party on Taiwan except for the period of 2000-2008, the KMT takes economic growth as its priority while neglecting, more or less, a balanced regional development and social distribution. The DPP, on the other hand, has more connections with middle-and-small entrepreneurs, middle and working classes, as well as the southern part of Taiwan. This essay attempts to explore the transition of the party system in Taiwan through two dimensions: the evolution of power relations between the two parties from asymmetry to symmetry and the nature of party politics from divergence to convergence. Power relations are measured by votes, elected positions, regional distribution of political powers, and party identification among the general public, while the nature of party politics is observed from the distance between the two parties in terms of ideologies, social cleavage and policies. This essay assumes that one important precondition for a convergent party system is a symmetric power relationship between the ruling and opposition parties. Without periodical power turnover between different parties, the opposition party will be

marginalized and may therefore resort to extra-systematic confrontation with the ruling party,thus making political compromise and consensual party politics impossible. Symmetric power relations between the ruling and opposition parties,however,cannot guarantee consensual party politics,as a divergent party system may result from other factors,such as social cleavages,different supporters of the main parties,as well as parties' traditional ideologies and policy platforms. II.Toward a Balanced Two Party System Party politics in Taiwan is associated with the birth of the DPP in 1986,with the KMT as the dominant ruling party until 2000.The splits of KMT in 1993 and 2000 have not only produced three new parties,the Chinese New Party (CNP),the People First Party (PFP)and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU),but also contributed to the DPP's dominance of executive power between 2000 and 2008.Still,the DPP administration was constrained by the majority Pan Blue camp (The KMT,CNP and PFP)in Taiwan's legislature during this period.Since 2008,the KMT has dominated both executive and legislative branches.In general,power relations between the two parties have been asymmetric at the top level,and are likely to change in the near future. A.Party System at the Local Level At the local level,power relations between the KMT and DPP are more balanced. From 1989 to 2014,Taiwan had conducted elections for city mayors and county magistrates seven times,and elections for Taipei and Kaohsiung metropolitan mayors six times.In 2010,Taipei County was upgraded as New Taipei City,Kaohsiung County became part of Kaohsiung City,Taichung County and Tainan County became part of new cities of Taichung and Tainan,respectively.In 2014,Taoyuan County was also upgraded as Taoyuan City.These six metropolises have about 69%of Taiwanese population and enjoy much more financial resources than the other 16 cities and counties.During the 2014 "nine-in-one"elections,the DPP not only maintained Kaohsiung and Tainan mayoral seats and took away Taipei,Taoyuan and Taichung mayoralties from the hands of the KMT,but also won the majority of local executive posts,thus increasing greatly the likelihood of the DPP's coming back to power in 2016(Table 1 2).1 Table 1 Vote and Seat Shares in Mayoral and Magisterial Elections(1989-2014) Year Seat KMT DPP PFP CNP Other Vote% Seat Vote% Seat Vote%Seat Vote% Seat Vote% Seat 1989 23 56.1 16 30.1 6 13.8 1 1993 23 47.5 15 41.0 6 3.1 0 8.4 2 1994 2 35.7 42.2 21.0 0 1.1 0 1997 23 42.1 8 43.2 12 1.4 0 13.1 3 1998 2 50.1 46.9 3.0 0 0.8 0 Although Mr.Ko Wen-je ran for Taiwan mayoral seat as a nonpartisan in 2014,he was actually endorsed by the DPP, which did not nominate a candidate for Taipei mayoral election

2 marginalized and may therefore resort to extra-systematic confrontation with the ruling party, thus making political compromise and consensual party politics impossible. Symmetric power relations between the ruling and opposition parties, however, cannot guarantee consensual party politics, as a divergent party system may result from other factors, such as social cleavages, different supporters of the main parties, as well as parties’ traditional ideologies and policy platforms. II. Toward a Balanced Two Party System Party politics in Taiwan is associated with the birth of the DPP in 1986, with the KMT as the dominant ruling party until 2000. The splits of KMT in 1993 and 2000 have not only produced three new parties, the Chinese New Party (CNP), the People First Party (PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), but also contributed to the DPP’s dominance of executive power between 2000 and 2008. Still, the DPP administration was constrained by the majority Pan Blue camp (The KMT, CNP and PFP) in Taiwan’s legislature during this period. Since 2008, the KMT has dominated both executive and legislative branches. In general, power relations between the two parties have been asymmetric at the top level, and are likely to change in the near future. A. Party System at the Local Level At the local level, power relations between the KMT and DPP are more balanced. From 1989 to 2014, Taiwan had conducted elections for city mayors and county magistrates seven times, and elections for Taipei and Kaohsiung metropolitan mayors six times. In 2010, Taipei County was upgraded as New Taipei City, Kaohsiung County became part of Kaohsiung City, Taichung County and Tainan County became part of new cities of Taichung and Tainan, respectively. In 2014, Taoyuan County was also upgraded as Taoyuan City. These six metropolises have about 69% of Taiwanese population and enjoy much more financial resources than the other 16 cities and counties. During the 2014 “nine-in-one” elections, the DPP not only maintained Kaohsiung and Tainan mayoral seats and took away Taipei, Taoyuan and Taichung mayoralties from the hands of the KMT, but also won the majority of local executive posts, thus increasing greatly the likelihood of the DPP’s coming back to power in 2016 (Table 1 & 2).1 Table 1 Vote and Seat Shares in Mayoral and Magisterial Elections (1989-2014) Year Seat KMT DPP PFP CNP Other Vote% Seat Vote% Seat Vote% Seat Vote% Seat Vote% Seat 1989 23 56.1 16 30.1 6 / / 13.8 1 1993 23 47.5 15 41.0 6 / 3.1 0 8.4 2 1994 2 35.7 1 42.2 1 / 21.0 0 1.1 0 1997 23 42.1 8 43.2 12 / 1.4 0 13.1 3 1998 2 50.1 1 46.9 1 / 3.0 0 0.8 0 1 Although Mr. Ko Wen-je ran for Taiwan mayoral seat as a nonpartisan in 2014, he was actually endorsed by the DPP, which did not nominate a candidate for Taipei mayoral election

County Yunlin KMT KMT KMT KMT DPP DPP DPP County Chiayi NP NP NP NP KMT KMT DPP City Chiayi KMT KMT KMT DPP DPP DPP DPP County Pingtung DPP KMT DPP DPP DPP DPP DPP County Hualian KMT KMT KMT KMT KMT NP NP County Taitung KMT KMT KMT PFP NP KMT KMT County Penghu KMT DPP KMT KMT KMP KMT DPP County Kinmon KMT KMT KMT CNP CNP KMT NP Mazu KMT KMT KMT PFP PFP KMT KMT Source:Central Election Commission,Taiwan From Table 1,it can be seen that the KMT and the DPP usually obtained more than 85%of votes during mayoral and magisterial elections,except for the year of 1994,when the CNP candidate for Taipei's mayoralty received 30%of the votes(21%if we calculate on the total votes for Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections)and the year of 2001 when the KMT-supported CNP candidate for Taipei County's magisterial seat gained significant votes.Among 167 mayoralties and magistracies elected over the past quarter of a century the two main parties received 149 positions(89.2%),and other small parties and nonparty candidates obtained 18 only (10.8%).As for the two main parties,the KMT obtained much more position than the DPP(87 versus 62).The KMT's clear majority came mainly from city mayoral and county magisterial elections in the early years.As for the metropolitan mayoral elections,the two parties divided the mayoralties evenly from the very beginning-each obtained four seats between 1994 and 2006.During the 2010 mayoral elections,the KMT managed to maintain three seats out of five while the DPP maintained two.The votes the KMT got that year(44.5%)should not be taken at its face value,as the votes of independent candidate for Kaohsiung mayoralty Yang Chiu-hsing (Yang Qiuxing)came mainly from the KMT supporters but were not taken into account in the official figures.Without the factor of independent Yang,the KMT and the DPP might have then obtained similar vote shares. The KMT's advantage over the DPP in city mayoral and county magisterial elections began to change in 1997,when the DPP received a little more votes but much more executive positions than the KMT.2 The KMT again enjoyed supremacy in the 2005 and 2009 local elections,but ended up with a great defeat in 2014.During the 2014 elections, the KMT obtained only one metropolitan mayoralty (New Taipei)and five county 2 Dafydd Fell,Government and Politics in Taiwan (London&New York:Roudledge,2012),p.60

4 County Yunlin County KMT KMT / KMT / KMT / DPP / DPP / DPP Chiayi City NP NP / NP / NP / KMT / KMT / DPP Chiayi County KMT KMT / KMT / DPP / DPP / DPP / DPP Pingtung County DPP KMT / DPP / DPP / DPP / DPP / DPP Hualian County KMT KMT / KMT / KMT / KMT / NP / NP Taitung County KMT KMT / KMT / PFP / NP / KMT / KMT Penghu County KMT DPP / KMT / KMT / KMP / KMT / DPP Kinmon KMT KMT / KMT / CNP / CNP / KMT / NP Mazu KMT KMT / KMT / PFP / PFP / KMT / KMT Source: Central Election Commission, Taiwan. From Table 1, it can be seen that the KMT and the DPP usually obtained more than 85% of votes during mayoral and magisterial elections, except for the year of 1994, when the CNP candidate for Taipei’s mayoralty received 30% of the votes (21% if we calculate on the total votes for Taipei and Kaohsiung mayoral elections) and the year of 2001 when the KMT-supported CNP candidate for Taipei County’s magisterial seat gained significant votes. Among 167 mayoralties and magistracies elected over the past quarter of a century the two main parties received 149 positions (89.2%), and other small parties and nonparty candidates obtained 18 only (10.8%). As for the two main parties, the KMT obtained much more position than the DPP (87 versus 62). The KMT’s clear majority came mainly from city mayoral and county magisterial elections in the early years. As for the metropolitan mayoral elections, the two parties divided the mayoralties evenly from the very beginning—each obtained four seats between 1994 and 2006. During the 2010 mayoral elections, the KMT managed to maintain three seats out of five while the DPP maintained two. The votes the KMT got that year (44.5%) should not be taken at its face value, as the votes of independent candidate for Kaohsiung mayoralty Yang Chiu-hsing (Yang Qiuxing) came mainly from the KMT supporters but were not taken into account in the official figures. Without the factor of independent Yang, the KMT and the DPP might have then obtained similar vote shares. The KMT’s advantage over the DPP in city mayoral and county magisterial elections began to change in 1997, when the DPP received a little more votes but much more executive positions than the KMT.2 The KMT again enjoyed supremacy in the 2005 and 2009 local elections, but ended up with a great defeat in 2014. During the 2014 elections, the KMT obtained only one metropolitan mayoralty (New Taipei) and five county 2 Dafydd Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan (London & New York: Roudledge, 2012), p.60

magistracies.Even if we consider Hualian County Magistrate Fu Kun-chi (Fu Kunqi)and Quemoy County Magistrate Chen Fu-hai as pro-KMT figures,people living in the Blue area only account for 26.78%of the total population.Moreover,the gap of vote shares between the KMT and the DPP in 2014 local executive elections is actually much bigger than the official figure of 7%.It is safe to say that the DPP-supported independent candidate for Taipei mayoralty Ko Wen-je (Ke Wenzhe)received significant votes from the Green camp (at least 75%),while votes cast in Hualian and Quemoy for two independent and elected candidates basically belong to the Blue camp.In balance,the DPP's vote share would be 11.2%higher than the KMT in the local executive elections. The KMT usually enjoyed majority seats in metropolitan,city and county councils The first change occurred in 2002,when the DPP won 14 seats in Kaohsiung council, while the KMT and the PFP had 12 and 7 seats respectively.More meaningful change happened in the 2010 metropolitan council elections,when the KMT and the DPP each obtained 130 seats of the five councils.During the 2014 elections,among 907 seats of 22 local councils,the KMT won 386 while the DPP got 291.The vote shares of the two parties,however,were quite close (36.86%vs.37.08%).Among 360 seats of the six metropolitan councils,the DPP won 167 while the KMT maintained 151.By contrast, among 547 seats of 16 city and county councils,the KMT won 235 and the DPP obtained 124.At the township chief and township council level,the KMT still enjoys clear majority over the DPP.Similar advantages exist at the village and neighborhood level as well. In a nutshell,the evaporation of the KMT's supremacy over the DPP started at the metropolis mayoral elections,continued with elections for city mayoralties and county magistracies,and ended with metropolitan council elections.The periodical changes of electoral outcomes at the local executive level have harbingered the transition from asymmetric to symmetric power relations between the two parties at the lower and higher levels. B.Party System at the Top Level Despite the shift of power at the local level,power relations between the KMT and DPP are still asymmetric on top,particularly in the legislature.From 1993 to 2000,Taiwan had three relevant parties in legislature:the KMT as the dominant party,the DPP as the middle sized one,and the Chinese New Party as the smallest player.During the 2001 and 2004 legislative elections,the DPP became the biggest party,with more than 33%of votes and about 40%of seats,while the KMT dropped into the second largest party,being followed by the PFP,the TSU and the CNP.However,the Pan Blue camp consisting of the KMT,the PFP and the CNP was still bigger than the Pan Green camp combining the DPP and the TSU (Table 3). The drastic confrontation in legislature dominated by the Pan Blue camp after 2000 resulted in a comprehensive reform on Taiwan's electoral system.This reform initiated in the summer of 2004 but not implemented until January 2008 made three significant changes.First,the number of legislators was cut in half because of social reaction against poor performance of the legislature as well as the administration.Second,the electoral date for legislators was postponed from the scheduled December 2007 to January 2008, resulting in a four-years term for legislators.Third and most importantly,the majority

5 magistracies. Even if we consider Hualian County Magistrate Fu Kun-chi (Fu Kunqi) and Quemoy County Magistrate Chen Fu-hai as pro-KMT figures, people living in the Blue area only account for 26.78% of the total population. Moreover, the gap of vote shares between the KMT and the DPP in 2014 local executive elections is actually much bigger than the official figure of 7%. It is safe to say that the DPP-supported independent candidate for Taipei mayoralty Ko Wen-je (Ke Wenzhe) received significant votes from the Green camp (at least 75%), while votes cast in Hualian and Quemoy for two independent and elected candidates basically belong to the Blue camp. In balance, the DPP’s vote share would be 11.2% higher than the KMT in the local executive elections. The KMT usually enjoyed majority seats in metropolitan, city and county councils. The first change occurred in 2002, when the DPP won 14 seats in Kaohsiung council, while the KMT and the PFP had 12 and 7 seats respectively. More meaningful change happened in the 2010 metropolitan council elections, when the KMT and the DPP each obtained 130 seats of the five councils. During the 2014 elections, among 907 seats of 22 local councils, the KMT won 386 while the DPP got 291. The vote shares of the two parties, however, were quite close (36.86% vs. 37.08%). Among 360 seats of the six metropolitan councils, the DPP won 167 while the KMT maintained 151. By contrast, among 547 seats of 16 city and county councils, the KMT won 235 and the DPP obtained 124. At the township chief and township council level, the KMT still enjoys clear majority over the DPP. Similar advantages exist at the village and neighborhood level as well. In a nutshell, the evaporation of the KMT’s supremacy over the DPP started at the metropolis mayoral elections, continued with elections for city mayoralties and county magistracies, and ended with metropolitan council elections. The periodical changes of electoral outcomes at the local executive level have harbingered the transition from asymmetric to symmetric power relations between the two parties at the lower and higher levels. B. Party System at the Top Level Despite the shift of power at the local level, power relations between the KMT and DPP are still asymmetric on top, particularly in the legislature. From 1993 to 2000, Taiwan had three relevant parties in legislature: the KMT as the dominant party, the DPP as the middle sized one, and the Chinese New Party as the smallest player. During the 2001 and 2004 legislative elections, the DPP became the biggest party, with more than 33% of votes and about 40% of seats, while the KMT dropped into the second largest party, being followed by the PFP, the TSU and the CNP. However, the Pan Blue camp consisting of the KMT, the PFP and the CNP was still bigger than the Pan Green camp combining the DPP and the TSU (Table 3). The drastic confrontation in legislature dominated by the Pan Blue camp after 2000 resulted in a comprehensive reform on Taiwan’s electoral system. This reform initiated in the summer of 2004 but not implemented until January 2008 made three significant changes. First, the number of legislators was cut in half because of social reaction against poor performance of the legislature as well as the administration. Second, the electoral date for legislators was postponed from the scheduled December 2007 to January 2008, resulting in a four-years term for legislators. Third and most importantly, the majority

seats were elected from 73 single-member districts,with a much smaller portion of seats being produced by proportional representation party votes that cross the 5%threshold. Such a winner-takes-all game not only marginalized smaller parties psychologically,but also created mechanically a big gap between vote and seat shares (38.2%vs.23.9%)of the DPP in the 2008 legislative election.3 Such a game continued in 2012 when the KMT obtained 56.5%of seats with 48.2%of district votes and 44.6%of party votes,and the DPP gained only 35.4%of seats despite 43.8%percent of district votes.Meanwhile,the two tiny parties,the PFP and the TSU crossed the 5%threshold of party votes and gained three seats each.However,because the reduced gap between the KMT and the DPP in seat shares,the effective number of parliamentary parties in 2012 (2.23)is closer to the standard value (2.0)for the two party system than the figure in 2008(1.73),should we employ the definition and calculative formula proposed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (Ns=1/>vs ).4 The electoral outcomes before and since 2008 have demonstrated the effectiveness of institutional variables in shaping Taiwan's two-party system in the legislative system.The KMT and the DPP now have 56.6%and 35.4%of seats respectively,while the PFP or the TSU has less than 3%of seats,which may vanish in the 2016 legislative election due to the decreasing influence of PFP's chairman James Soong and TSU's spiritual leader Lee Teng-hui.Among the 73 district seats,the KMT enjoys 44 while the DPP has 27.Despite the big difference of seat shares of the two parties,the gap of their vote shares is not so big (48.2%vs.43.8%for district votes).Should party votes gained by the PFP and the TSU be converted respectively to the KMT and the TSU during next legislative election,their seat shares ratio might be 9:8.District seat shares may be drawn closer as well if the DPP can get more votes next time. The gap between vote and seat shares of the two parties is the mechanical function of the single-member-district system.Another function of the system is favoring the incumbents.During the 2012 legislative election,60 district members ran for reelections and 45 won the campaigns,accounting for 61.6%of district seats.Among the 73 districts, 19(26%)experienced power turnovers from one party to another.As a result,district seats owned by the DPP increased from 13 in 2008 to 27 in 2012.If similar changes happen again in 2016,the KMT would no longer maintain or even lose its majority position (64 versus 40 seats)in the current legislative organ. Table 3 Vote and Seat Shares in Legislative Elections(1992-2012) Year 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008 2012 Total seats 161 164 225 225 225 113 113 KMT Vote% 52.7% 46.1% 46.4% 28.6% 32.8% 53.5%(51.2%) 48.2%(44.6%) Seat% 58.4% 51.8% 55.1% 30.2% 35.1 71.9% 56.6% DPP Vote% 31.4% 33.2% 29.6% 33.4% 35.7% 38.2%(36.9%) 43.8%(34.6%) Seat% 31.7% 32.9% 31.1% 38.7% 39.6% 23.9% 35.4% 3 Maurice Duverger has made a conceptual distinction between psychological and mechanical effectiveness of single-member-district plurality system on the number of relevant parliamentary parties.See Maurice Duverger,Political Parties (London:Lowe &Brydone Ltd,1964),pp.224-226. 4 Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera,"Effective Number of Parties:A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies,Vol.12,No.12(1979),pp.3-27. 6

6 seats were elected from 73 single-member districts, with a much smaller portion of seats being produced by proportional representation party votes that cross the 5% threshold. Such a winner-takes-all game not only marginalized smaller parties psychologically, but also created mechanically a big gap between vote and seat shares (38.2% vs. 23.9%) of the DPP in the 2008 legislative election.3 Such a game continued in 2012 when the KMT obtained 56.5% of seats with 48.2% of district votes and 44.6% of party votes, and the DPP gained only 35.4% of seats despite 43.8% percent of district votes. Meanwhile, the two tiny parties, the PFP and the TSU crossed the 5% threshold of party votes and gained three seats each. However, because the reduced gap between the KMT and the DPP in seat shares, the effective number of parliamentary parties in 2012 (2.23) is closer to the standard value (2.0) for the two party system than the figure in 2008 (1.73), should we employ the definition and calculative formula proposed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (Ns = 1/∑ vs 2).4 The electoral outcomes before and since 2008 have demonstrated the effectiveness of institutional variables in shaping Taiwan’s two-party system in the legislative system. The KMT and the DPP now have 56.6% and 35.4% of seats respectively, while the PFP or the TSU has less than 3% of seats, which may vanish in the 2016 legislative election due to the decreasing influence of PFP’s chairman James Soong and TSU’s spiritual leader Lee Teng-hui. Among the 73 district seats, the KMT enjoys 44 while the DPP has 27. Despite the big difference of seat shares of the two parties, the gap of their vote shares is not so big (48.2% vs. 43.8% for district votes). Should party votes gained by the PFP and the TSU be converted respectively to the KMT and the TSU during next legislative election, their seat shares ratio might be 9:8. District seat shares may be drawn closer as well if the DPP can get more votes next time. The gap between vote and seat shares of the two parties is the mechanical function of the single-member-district system. Another function of the system is favoring the incumbents. During the 2012 legislative election, 60 district members ran for reelections and 45 won the campaigns, accounting for 61.6% of district seats. Among the 73 districts, 19 (26%) experienced power turnovers from one party to another. As a result, district seats owned by the DPP increased from 13 in 2008 to 27 in 2012. If similar changes happen again in 2016, the KMT would no longer maintain or even lose its majority position (64 versus 40 seats) in the current legislative organ. Table 3 Vote and Seat Shares in Legislative Elections (1992-2012) Year 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008 2012 Total seats 161 164 225 225 225 113 113 KMT Vote% 52.7% 46.1% 46.4% 28.6% 32.8% 53.5%(51.2%) 48.2%(44.6%) Seat% 58.4% 51.8% 55.1% 30.2% 35.1 71.9% 56.6% DPP Vote% 31.4% 33.2% 29.6% 33.4% 35.7% 38.2%(36.9%) 43.8%(34.6%) Seat% 31.7% 32.9% 31.1% 38.7% 39.6% 23.9% 35.4% 3 Maurice Duverger has made a conceptual distinction between psychological and mechanical effectiveness of single-member-district plurality system on the number of relevant parliamentary parties. See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London:Lowe﹠Brydone Ltd,1964), pp.224-226. 4 Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 12, No. 12 (1979), pp. 3-27

NP Vote 13.0% 7.1% 2.6% 0.1% 0%(3.95%) 0.08%(1.49%) Seat% 12.8% 4.89% 0.4% 0.4% 0 0 PFP Vote 18.6% 13.9% 0.29%(0%) 1.33%(5.49%) Seat% 20.4% 15.1% 0.88% 2.65% TSU Vote 7.8% 7.8% 0.96%(3.53%) 0%(8.96%) Seat% 5.8% 5.3% 0 2.65% Source:Central Election Commission.Taiwan.Figures in parenthesis are the percentages of party votes. Taiwan started direct presidential election in 1996.For the first two elections,more than two candidates ran for the presidency and candidates of the two main parties received 75.1%of votes in 1996 and 62.4%of votes in 2000.Since 2004,presidential election has mainly become a game for the KMT and the DPP only.This suggests again that the plurality system is in favor of a two-party system.One can expect this two-party game to repeat in 2016 and the DPP may come back to power.As mentioned above,the KMT nowadays controls only one metropolis and five counties,with 26.78%of the total population.Over the past three presidential elections,party candidate tended to get more votes in districts under the same party's control.For example,during the 2004 presidential election,the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won majority votes in Green districts except for Taipei and Nantou counties,while the KMT candidate Lien Chan also obtained majority votes in Blue districts except for Taichung and Yunlin counties.During the 2008 presidential election,the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu)won majority votes in all Blue districts,the DPP candidate Hsieh Chang-ting obtained majority votes in all five Green counties,while getting slightly fewer votes than Ma in Taiwan and Kaohsiung cities which were also under the DPP's control.During the 2012 election,Ma Ying-jeou again won majority votes in all Blue districts except for Chiayi (Jiayi)City,and the DPP's Tsai Ing-wen(Cai Yingwen)won majority votes in Green districts without any exception.3 Given the DPP held less than one third of the population during the 2008 and 2012 elections,one cannot help but speculate that the party is very likely to win the 2016 presidential election,as it holds more than two thirds of the population in the wake of the 2014 elections.6 Furthermore,the KMT's actual vote share in the 2014 local executive elections has been unprecedentedly far behind the DPP's(11.2%),which makes it difficult for the KMT to catch up in the forthcoming presidential election.In the past presidential elections,the DPP dropped about 3%(2008 and 2012)or 5%(2000)vote share from that in previous local executive elections.Unless the DPP drops more than 5.6%vote share in the 2016 election,it would not lose the battle to the KMT. Table 4 Vote Shares of Different Parties in Presidential Elections(%) 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 KMT 54.00 23.10 49.89 58.45 51.60 DPP 21.13 39.30 50.11 41.45 45.63 Others 14.90a 36.84c 2.77c s Lin Gang,A Stdy on Party Politics in Taiwan [Taiwan diqu zhengdang zhengzhi yanjiu](Chinese Social Sciences Press,2014,pp.148-49. Including population of Taipei Metropolis which is under the leadership of the pro-DPP Mayor Ko Wen-je

7 NP Vote / 13.0% 7.1% 2.6% 0.1% 0%(3.95%) 0.08%(1.49%) Seat% / 12.8% 4.89% 0.4% 0.4% 0 0 PFP Vote / / / 18.6% 13.9% 0.29%(0%) 1.33%(5.49%) Seat% / / / 20.4% 15.1% 0.88% 2.65% TSU Vote / / / 7.8% 7.8% 0.96%(3.53%) 0%(8.96%) Seat% / / / 5.8% 5.3% 0 2.65% Source: Central Election Commission, Taiwan. Figures in parenthesis are the percentages of party votes. Taiwan started direct presidential election in 1996. For the first two elections, more than two candidates ran for the presidency and candidates of the two main parties received 75.1% of votes in 1996 and 62.4% of votes in 2000. Since 2004, presidential election has mainly become a game for the KMT and the DPP only. This suggests again that the plurality system is in favor of a two-party system. One can expect this two-party game to repeat in 2016 and the DPP may come back to power. As mentioned above, the KMT nowadays controls only one metropolis and five counties, with 26.78% of the total population. Over the past three presidential elections, party candidate tended to get more votes in districts under the same party’s control. For example, during the 2004 presidential election, the DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won majority votes in Green districts except for Taipei and Nantou counties, while the KMT candidate Lien Chan also obtained majority votes in Blue districts except for Taichung and Yunlin counties. During the 2008 presidential election, the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou (Ma Yingjiu) won majority votes in all Blue districts, the DPP candidate Hsieh Chang-ting obtained majority votes in all five Green counties, while getting slightly fewer votes than Ma in Taiwan and Kaohsiung cities which were also under the DPP’s control. During the 2012 election, Ma Ying-jeou again won majority votes in all Blue districts except for Chiayi (Jiayi) City, and the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen (Cai Yingwen) won majority votes in Green districts without any exception.5 Given the DPP held less than one third of the population during the 2008 and 2012 elections, one cannot help but speculate that the party is very likely to win the 2016 presidential election, as it holds more than two thirds of the population in the wake of the 2014 elections.6 Furthermore, the KMT’s actual vote share in the 2014 local executive elections has been unprecedentedly far behind the DPP’s (11.2%), which makes it difficult for the KMT to catch up in the forthcoming presidential election. In the past presidential elections, the DPP dropped about 3% (2008 and 2012) or 5% (2000) vote share from that in previous local executive elections. Unless the DPP drops more than 5.6% vote share in the 2016 election, it would not lose the battle to the KMT. Table 4 Vote Shares of Different Parties in Presidential Elections (%) 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 KMT 54.00 23.10 49.89 58.45 51.60 DPP 21.13 39.30 50.11 41.45 45.63 Others 14.90a 36.84c / / 2.77c 5 Lin Gang, A Study on Party Politics in Taiwan [Taiwan diqu zhengdang zhengzhi yanjiu] (Chinese Social Sciences Press, 2014, pp.148-49. 6 Including population of Taipei Metropolis which is under the leadership of the pro-DPP Mayor Ko Wen-je

9.98b 0.76d Votes Turnout 76.04 82.69 80.28 76.33 74.38 Source:Central Electoral Commission in Taiwan (http://www.cec.gov.tw) *In the table,a refers the votes for Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun,b refers to the votes for Chen Lv-an and Wang Chang-qing,c refers to is the votes for James Soong,d refers to the combined votes for the other two groups of candidates headed by Hsu Hsin-liang and Lee Au respectively 3.Regional Disparities and Party Identification in Evolution Geographically,Taiwan's asymmetric party politics was reflected in the popular term of"Northern Blue and Southern Green."This term originated from the 2005 city mayoral and county magisterial elections when the DPP maintained the leaderships of Tainan city, and Taiwan,Kaohsiung,Pingdong,Chiayi and Yunlin counties (in addition to the Kaohsiung mayoralty the party won in 1998 and 2002),all of which except for Yunlin geographically belong to the southern part of Taiwan.Meanwhile,the KMT controlled north and most parts of central Taiwan.This situation began to change in the 2009 local elections,when the DPP obtained the magistracy of Yilan County,which is located actually at the northeast part of the island.However,because districts under DPP's control are mainly in the south,the so-called Northern Blue and Southern Green phenomenon was not fundamentally changed until 2014,when the Green map expanded from the South to the North,crossing not only the Chuoshui (Zhuoshui)Creek and Daan Creek,but also Tanshui(Danshui)River and the Keelung(Jilong)River at the northern part of Taiwan The term of Northern Blue and Southern Green is still valid in describing the current seat distribution between the two parties in the legislature.Among 32 single-member legislative districts to the north of Taichung,the DPP has only 4 seats,while among the 20 districts to the south of Yunlin,the DPP has 16 seats.In central Taiwan,including Taichung,Changhua(Zhanghua),Nantou and Yunlin,the DPP maintains 5 seats out of 16. The geographic political map is very likely to change as well after the 2016 legislative election,given the fact that the DPP nowadays controls many districts in central and northern parts of Taiwan,in addition to that in the South. Party preference of the Blue or Green among Taiwanese people has also changed in recent years.In the past,much more people identified themselves with the Blue parties (the KMT,PFP and CNP)than with the Green parties(the DPP and TSU).According to a longitudinal survey conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in June 2014,however,slightly more interviewees identified themselves with the DPP than with the KMT(more than 2%)for the first time.7 This is attributable to the March 18th Sunflower Student Movement against the KMT administration's decision to sign the Service Trade Agreement with the mainland.The students intentionally used the word "sunflower"to boycott their perceived "black box"process of policymaking on the part of the Ma administration.Similar surveys conducted by Taiwan Indicators Survey Research suggests that more interviewees identified themselves with the DPP than with the KMT as early as October 2013,which was attributable to an inner-party power struggle then between Ma Ying-jeou and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng.According to this series of surveys,the Sunflower Movement has increased the number of people 7 Accessed at http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/main.php

8 9.98b 0.76d / / / Votes Turnout 76.04 82.69 80.28 76.33 74.38 Source：Central Electoral Commission in Taiwan（http://www.cec.gov.tw）. * In the table, a refers the votes for Lin Yang-kang and Hau Pei-tsun, b refers to the votes for Chen Lv-an and Wang Chang-qing, c refers to is the votes for James Soong, d refers to the combined votes for the other two groups of candidates headed by Hsu Hsin-liang and Lee Au respectively. 3. Regional Disparities and Party Identification in Evolution Geographically, Taiwan’s asymmetric party politics was reflected in the popular term of “Northern Blue and Southern Green.” This term originated from the 2005 city mayoral and county magisterial elections when the DPP maintained the leaderships of Tainan city, and Taiwan, Kaohsiung, Pingdong, Chiayi and Yunlin counties (in addition to the Kaohsiung mayoralty the party won in 1998 and 2002), all of which except for Yunlin geographically belong to the southern part of Taiwan. Meanwhile, the KMT controlled north and most parts of central Taiwan. This situation began to change in the 2009 local elections, when the DPP obtained the magistracy of Yilan County, which is located actually at the northeast part of the island. However, because districts under DPP’s control are mainly in the south, the so-called Northern Blue and Southern Green phenomenon was not fundamentally changed until 2014, when the Green map expanded from the South to the North, crossing not only the Chuoshui (Zhuoshui) Creek and Daan Creek, but also Tanshui (Danshui) River and the Keelung (Jilong) River at the northern part of Taiwan. The term of Northern Blue and Southern Green is still valid in describing the current seat distribution between the two parties in the legislature. Among 32 single-member legislative districts to the north of Taichung, the DPP has only 4 seats, while among the 20 districts to the south of Yunlin, the DPP has 16 seats. In central Taiwan, including Taichung, Changhua (Zhanghua), Nantou and Yunlin, the DPP maintains 5 seats out of 16. The geographic political map is very likely to change as well after the 2016 legislative election, given the fact that the DPP nowadays controls many districts in central and northern parts of Taiwan, in addition to that in the South. Party preference of the Blue or Green among Taiwanese people has also changed in recent years. In the past, much more people identified themselves with the Blue parties (the KMT, PFP and CNP) than with the Green parties (the DPP and TSU). According to a longitudinal survey conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in June 2014, however, slightly more interviewees identified themselves with the DPP than with the KMT (more than 2%) for the first time.7 This is attributable to the March 18th Sunflower Student Movement against the KMT administration’s decision to sign the Service Trade Agreement with the mainland. The students intentionally used the word “sunflower” to boycott their perceived “black box” process of policymaking on the part of the Ma administration. Similar surveys conducted by Taiwan Indicators Survey Research suggests that more interviewees identified themselves with the DPP than with the KMT as early as October 2013, which was attributable to an inner-party power struggle then between Ma Ying-jeou and Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng. According to this series of surveys, the Sunflower Movement has increased the number of people 7 Accessed at http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/main.php

who identified themselves with the DPP,but people's preference to the two parties remains about the same,as can be seen from Table 5. Table 5 Party Identifications Flux Party KMT PFP Blue DPP TSU Green Neutral Reject* Survey Date D(%) 22.3 1.1 5.0 24.4 0.9 4.1 38.4 4.1 Oct.2013 D(%) 21.8 0.9 5.1 23.7 0.9 4.9 40.0 2.9 Dec.2013 D(%) 22.0 0.7 4.6 27.4 0.7 5.1 37.9 1.7 March 2014 D(%) 20.7 0.8 4.7 23.3 1.0 5.5 41.5 2.6 April 2014 D(%) 23.2 0.8 5.7 22.2 0.8 5.3 39.4 2.8 May 2014 ID(%) 25.0 1.1 5.5 23.5 0.5 4.7 37.6 2.3 June 2014 D(%) 23.5 1.0 5.0 23.7 0.6 4.5 39.4 2.5 July 2014 ID(%) 22.2 0.9 5.2 21.2 0.6 5.1 42.5 2.6 Aug.2014 D(%) 22.2 0.8 4.8 19.6 0.5 5.3 44.7 2.2 Sept.2014 D(%) 20.3 1.0 5.0 19.8 0.7 5.5 45.6 2.3 Oct.2014 D(%) 19.6 1.2 5.1 21.4 0.6 5.2 44.7 2.5 Nov.2014 D(%) 21.8 0.9 5.1 23.7 0.9 4.9 40.0 2.9 Dec.2014 Source:http://www.tisr.com.tw.In the survey questionnaires,inclining to pan-Blue or pan-Green is constructed as another category slightly different from that of pro-Blue or pro-Green Rejecting to answer the question. The two main parties have different images among the Taiwanese people.According to a survey conducted by the Center for Taiwan Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University in October 2014,more interviewees believed that the KMT was more capable than the DPP in promoting economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait (51.3%versus 14.2%),while slightly more people trusted that the DPP was more capable than the KMT in protecting the Taiwanese interest (28.9%versus 26.2%). Although the Ma administration had achieved great progress in advancing cross-strait relations and Taiwanese economic growth,people were not satisfied with his performance. While 14.0%of interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the Ma administration, 72.9%felt unsatisfied.Only 2.0%said they were very satisfied,but 44.6%said they were very unsatisfied.Even among supporters of the KMT,43.9%(as opposed to 45.5%) expressed their unhappiness with Ma's performance.The Ma administration's perceived poor performance has contributed to the shift of people's preference of the ruling KMT. III.From a Divergent toward a Convergent Party System? Several factors have contributed to the divergent features of the Taiwanese party system,while other factors suggest it may change from divergence to convergence.This section starts with an analysis of institutional factors,followed by discussions on social cleavages and public opinions.Finally,ideologies and policy platforms of the two main parties will be explored to demonstrate the possible change from a divergent toward a convergent party system in the future Taiwan

9 who identified themselves with the DPP, but people’s preference to the two parties remains about the same, as can be seen from Table 5. Table 5 Party Identifications Flux Party KMT PFP Blue DPP TSU Green Neutral Reject* Survey Date ID (%) 22.3 1.1 5.0 24.4 0.9 4.1 38.4 4.1 Oct. 2013 ID (%) 21.8 0.9 5.1 23.7 0.9 4.9 40.0 2.9 Dec. 2013 ID (%) 22.0 0.7 4.6 27.4 0.7 5.1 37.9 1.7 March 2014 ID (%) 20.7 0.8 4.7 23.3 1.0 5.5 41.5 2.6 April 2014 ID (%) 23.2 0.8 5.7 22.2 0.8 5.3 39.4 2.8 May 2014 ID (%) 25.0 1.1 5.5 23.5 0.5 4.7 37.6 2.3 June 2014 ID (%) 23.5 1.0 5.0 23.7 0.6 4.5 39.4 2.5 July 2014 ID (%) 22.2 0.9 5.2 21.2 0.6 5.1 42.5 2.6 Aug. 2014 ID (%) 22.2 0.8 4.8 19.6 0.5 5.3 44.7 2.2 Sept. 2014 ID (%) 20.3 1.0 5.0 19.8 0.7 5.5 45.6 2.3 Oct. 2014 ID (%) 19.6 1.2 5.1 21.4 0.6 5.2 44.7 2.5 Nov. 2014 ID (%) 21.8 0.9 5.1 23.7 0.9 4.9 40.0 2.9 Dec. 2014 Source: http://www.tisr.com.tw. In the survey questionnaires, inclining to pan-Blue or pan-Green is constructed as another category slightly different from that of pro-Blue or pro-Green * Rejecting to answer the question. The two main parties have different images among the Taiwanese people. According to a survey conducted by the Center for Taiwan Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University in October 2014, more interviewees believed that the KMT was more capable than the DPP in promoting economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait (51.3% versus 14.2%), while slightly more people trusted that the DPP was more capable than the KMT in protecting the Taiwanese interest (28.9% versus 26.2%). Although the Ma administration had achieved great progress in advancing cross-strait relations and Taiwanese economic growth, people were not satisfied with his performance. While 14.0% of interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the Ma administration, 72.9% felt unsatisfied. Only 2.0% said they were very satisfied, but 44.6% said they were very unsatisfied. Even among supporters of the KMT, 43.9% (as opposed to 45.5%) expressed their unhappiness with Ma’s performance. The Ma administration’s perceived poor performance has contributed to the shift of people’s preference of the ruling KMT. III. From a Divergent toward a Convergent Party System? Several factors have contributed to the divergent features of the Taiwanese party system, while other factors suggest it may change from divergence to convergence. This section starts with an analysis of institutional factors, followed by discussions on social cleavages and public opinions. Finally, ideologies and policy platforms of the two main parties will be explored to demonstrate the possible change from a divergent toward a convergent party system in the future Taiwan

A.Institutional Design and Its Implications It is well known that power disparities between the KMT and the opposition DPP had induced the latter to combine rational debate with emotional boycott in the legislature before 2000.When the DPP unexpectedly obtained the presidency in 2000(because of the split of the KMT),it could not ensure majority votes in the legislature.Nevertheless,Chen Shui-bian could appoint his executive team members without the approval of the majority Blue legislators,due to the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and legislature.The Blue legislators,therefore,had strong sentiments and the capacity to boycott the DPP administration.Political confrontation in the legislature during 2000-2008 vividly demonstrated such institutional handicaps in Taiwan's party politics.After 2008,the Green legislators followed the suit.The KMT's overwhelming majority in the legislature since 2008,in addition to its control of the presidency,has failed to produce efficient governance as well.8 This deviation is less to do with the minority DPP's confrontational strategies and more to do with the acute inner-party power struggle between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng,who does not fully endorse Ma's policy direction.In other words,the DPP's weak position within the legislature has been neutralized by severe power struggle within the ruling KMT.Thus,the opposition DPP could still successfully block policy proposals of the Ma administration, and resort to street demonstrations whenever it felt necessary. If the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and parliament can be resolved through institutional reform toward the parliamentary system,as KMT new chairman Chu Li-luan (Zhu Lilun)proposed,the sentimental confrontation between minority government and majority opposition legislators can be mitigated significantly.Taiwan's current "president parliamentary" system initiated by the 1997 constitutional revision authorizes the elected president to nominate the chief executive (xingzhengyuan zhang)as well as cabinet members without approval of the legislative branch.In exchange,the two leaders (president and his appointed chief executive)have only limited veto power against decisions (including resolutions,laws,budgets and treaties)made by the legislature,which can reconfirm its decisions by simple majority,rather than crossing the two-thirds threshold as before.This institutional disadvantage may be minimized if the ruling party controls both presidential and parliamentary powers.However,under the so-called "divided government"when different parties control the two branches,the opposition party in the legislature can easily boycott policy proposals of the administration by simple majority.This poor institutional design cannot resolve political gridlock as the president has no right to unilaterally dissolve the legislature,and the legislators do not want to take a risk of being dismissed for a snap reelection by casting a no confidence vote on the chief executive.10 Thus,the opposition legislators could only constrain the administration in policy area,contributing to inefficient governance. From a long-term perspective,Taiwan's electoral system may encourage a balanced s Shelley Rigger,Why Taiwan Matters(New York:Rowman&Littlefield Publishers,Inc,2011),p.89. Wu Yu-shan,"Semi-Presidentialism-Easy to Choose,Difficult to Operate:The Case of Taiwan,"in Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup,eds.,Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe:A Comparative Studies(London:Routledge),pp.201-18. 10 Dafydd Fell,Government and Politics in Taiwan (London&New York:Roudledge,2012),pp.52-53. 10

10 A. Institutional Design and Its Implications It is well known that power disparities between the KMT and the opposition DPP had induced the latter to combine rational debate with emotional boycott in the legislature before 2000. When the DPP unexpectedly obtained the presidency in 2000 (because of the split of the KMT), it could not ensure majority votes in the legislature. Nevertheless, Chen Shui-bian could appoint his executive team members without the approval of the majority Blue legislators, due to the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and legislature. The Blue legislators, therefore, had strong sentiments and the capacity to boycott the DPP administration. Political confrontation in the legislature during 2000-2008 vividly demonstrated such institutional handicaps in Taiwan’s party politics. After 2008, the Green legislators followed the suit. The KMT’s overwhelming majority in the legislature since 2008, in addition to its control of the presidency, has failed to produce efficient governance as well.8 This deviation is less to do with the minority DPP’s confrontational strategies and more to do with the acute inner-party power struggle between Ma Ying-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng, who does not fully endorse Ma’s policy direction. In other words, the DPP’s weak position within the legislature has been neutralized by severe power struggle within the ruling KMT. Thus, the opposition DPP could still successfully block policy proposals of the Ma administration, and resort to street demonstrations whenever it felt necessary. If the problematic institutional design of power relations between the elected presidency and parliament can be resolved through institutional reform toward the parliamentary system, as KMT new chairman Chu Li-luan (Zhu Lilun) proposed, the sentimental confrontation between minority government and majority opposition legislators can be mitigated significantly. Taiwan’s current “president parliamentary” system initiated by the 1997 constitutional revision authorizes the elected president to nominate the chief executive (xingzhengyuan zhang) as well as cabinet members without approval of the legislative branch.9 In exchange, the two leaders (president and his appointed chief executive) have only limited veto power against decisions (including resolutions, laws, budgets and treaties) made by the legislature, which can reconfirm its decisions by simple majority, rather than crossing the two-thirds threshold as before. This institutional disadvantage may be minimized if the ruling party controls both presidential and parliamentary powers. However, under the so-called “divided government” when different parties control the two branches, the opposition party in the legislature can easily boycott policy proposals of the administration by simple majority. This poor institutional design cannot resolve political gridlock as the president has no right to unilaterally dissolve the legislature，and the legislators do not want to take a risk of being dismissed for a snap reelection by casting a no confidence vote on the chief executive.10 Thus, the opposition legislators could only constrain the administration in policy area, contributing to inefficient governance. From a long-term perspective, Taiwan’s electoral system may encourage a balanced 8 Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), p.89. 9 Wu Yu-shan, “Semi-Presidentialism—Easy to Choose, Difficult to Operate: The Case of Taiwan,” in Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup, eds., Semi-Presidentialism outside Europe: A Comparative Studies (London: Routledge), pp.201-18. 10 Dafydd Fell, Government and Politics in Taiwan (London & New York: Roudledge, 2012), pp.52-53

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