上海交通大学：《台湾研究》课程教学资源_阅读材料_U.S Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait

Issues Studies 43,no.2 (June 2007):217-236. RESEARCH NOTE U.S Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan strait LIN GANG The U.S.strategy of "creative ambiguity"regarding the American response to potential military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan has helped to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait for many years.This strategy is associated with Washington's traditional policy of "dual deter- rence and dual reassurance."designed to prevent any unilateral change in the status quo that might be initiated by Taipei's movement toward de jure independence or a military attack on the island by Beijing.Taiwan's prog- ress toward political democratization since the mid-1980s,however,has created a Taiwanese identity on the island and increased the likelihood of awar between the PRC and Taiwan.As political tension across the Taiwan Strait has heightened in recent years,calls are growing in U.S.academic and policy circles for a subtle shift from strategic ambiguiry toward strategic "double clarity,"a feature of which would be a conditional com- mitment to Taiwan's security.However,this policy option has not yet been accepted by policymakers in the United States. KEYwoRDs:strategic ambiguity;strategic clarity;China's unification;Tai- wanese independence:Taiwan's security. LIN GANG ()(Ph.D.,Pennsylvania State University,1997)is Professor of Political Sci- ence in the School of International and Public Affairs,Jiao Tong University,Shanghai,and a member of the Taiwan Research Base of the "985"Project at Xiamen University ("985 程"二期度門大學臺灣研究創新基地成員).He served as a program associate in the Asia Program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center(1999-2005)and as president of the Association of Chinese Political Studies(1998-99),and taught at the American Uni- versity and Johns Hopkins University.This research is sponsored by the Shanghai Pujiang Program(上海市浦江人才計畫).Dr.Lin can be reached at. Institute of International Relations,National Chengchi University,Taipei,Taiwan(ROC). June 2007 217

June 2007 217 Issues & Studies © 43, no. 2 (June 2007): 217-236. RESEARCH NOTE U.S Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait LIN GANG The U.S. strategy of "creative ambiguity" regarding the American response to potential military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan has helped to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait for many years. This strategy is associated with Washington's traditional policy of "dual deter￾rence and dual reassurance," designed to prevent any unilateral change in the status quo that might be initiated by Taipei's movement toward de jure independence or a military attack on the island by Beijing. Taiwan's prog￾ress toward political democratization since the mid-1980s, however, has created a Taiwanese identity on the island and increased the likelihood of a war between the PRC and Taiwan. As political tension across the Taiwan Strait has heightened in recent years, calls are growing in U.S. academic and policy circles for a subtle shift from strategic ambiguity toward strategic "double clarity," a feature of which would be a conditional com￾mitment to Taiwan's security. However, this policy option has not yet been accepted by policymakers in the United States. KEYWORDS: strategic ambiguity; strategic clarity; China's unification; Tai￾wanese independence; Taiwan's security. LIN GANG (林岡) (Ph.D., Pennsylvania State University, 1997) is Professor of Political Sci￾ence in the School of International and Public Affairs, Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, and a member of the Taiwan Research Base of the "985" Project at Xiamen University ("985工 程"二期廈門大學臺灣研究創新基地成員). He served as a program associate in the Asia Program at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center (1999-2005) and as president of the Association of Chinese Political Studies (1998-99), and taught at the American Uni￾versity and Johns Hopkins University. This research is sponsored by the Shanghai Pujiang Program (上海市浦江人才計畫). Dr. Lin can be reached at . © Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC)

ISSUES STUDIES *茶* A thorny issue for policymakers and experts in the People's Republic of China(PRC),Taiwan,and the United States is how to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.A re- lated subject is Washington's role in maintaining the status quo and its policy orientation.Several books published recently have shed fresh light on U.S.policies and strategies in managing the Taiwan Strait crisis. In Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice:American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations,Alan Romberg analyzes the Taiwan issue from the macro perspective of U.S.-China relations.According to Rom- berg,the United States neither challenges nor endorses Beijing's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan-there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. The United States is not concerned about the ultimate shape of cross-Strait relations,as long as the process determining Taiwan's future is peaceful and the solution is agreed upon by people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Romberg warns that,inattentive to the history and nuances of the normal- ization of U.S.-China relations,American leaders have unintentionally generated a crisis-and could do so again.Washington,therefore,must carefully handle its unofficial relations with Taiwan,including U.S.arms sales to the island. Nancy Tucker contends in Dangerous Strait:The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis that Washington should maintain its traditional policy of strategic ambiguity toward any possible crisis involving the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.Her main argument is that no one can predict all possible con- tingencies,and that by attempting to define what the United States will do under specific circumstances,policymakers will encourage both sides to probe the American position and limit U.S.options in a complex crisis. Since American domestic politics,as much as circumstances in the Strait, will determine Washington's reaction to a future crisis,no president will want to be constrained by decisions made in the past.Similarly,the U.S. Alan D.Romberg,Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice:American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington,D.C.:Henry L.Stimson Center,2003),225,231. 218 June 2007

ISSUES & STUDIES 218 June 2007 * * * A thorny issue for policymakers and experts in the People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and the United States is how to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. A re￾lated subject is Washington's role in maintaining the status quo and its policy orientation. Several books published recently have shed fresh light on U.S. policies and strategies in managing the Taiwan Strait crisis. In Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations, Alan Romberg analyzes the Taiwan issue from the macro perspective of U.S.-China relations. 1 According to Rom￾berg, the United States neither challenges nor endorses Beijing's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan— there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. The United States is not concerned about the ultimate shape of cross-Strait relations, aslong asthe process determining Taiwan'sfuture is peaceful and the solution is agreed upon by people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Romberg warns that, inattentive to the history and nuances of the normal￾ization of U.S.-China relations, American leaders have unintentionally generated a crisis— and could do so again. Washington, therefore, must carefully handle its unofficial relations with Taiwan, including U.S. arms sales to the island. Nancy Tucker contends in Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis that Washington should maintain its traditional policy of strategic ambiguity toward any possible crisis involving the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Her main argument is that no one can predict all possible con￾tingencies, and that by attempting to define what the United States will do under specific circumstances, policymakers will encourage both sides to probe the American position and limit U.S. options in a complex crisis. Since American domestic politics, as much as circumstances in the Strait, will determine Washington's reaction to a future crisis, no president will want to be constrained by decisions made in the past. Similarly, the U.S. 誌 1Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 225, 231

U.S.Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait military establishment will want to be free to utilize force in the national interest during a possible war.Tucker maintains that the United States should take an open position toward the scenario of China's reunification- Washington should have no objection if both sides of the Strait choose peaceful unification.3 In Untying the Knot:Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait,Richard Bush recognizes that a political dispute between the PRC and Taiwan could escalate into war,but this worst-case scenario is avoidable if the political knot can be untied.According to Bush,the fundamental problem is that political leaders in Beijing and Taipei,due to domestic constraints,mistrust each other's motives and lack the political will to strike a deal.Bush argues that Washington has eschewed any formal role as mediator,even though Beijing and Taipei have different expectations of Washington. However,the United States may act as intellectual facilitator between the two sides and interpret the views of one side to the other,in order to reduce their misperception of each other.He proposes that the two sides accept some type of confederation that would satisfy the minimum objectives of each side-Beijing would get a form of unification and Taiwan would preserve its claim that its government retains sovereignty within a national union.3 One common line running through the literature above is that the United States is not concerned about the ultimate shape of cross-Strait relations,as long as it is achieved peacefully.From the perspective of geopolitics,Taiwan's peaceful separation from mainland China might maximize U.S.national interests.However,due to Beijing's strong oppo- sition to Taiwan independence,this scenario is unlikely to happen.The best choice for the United States,therefore,seems to be maintenance of the PNancy Bernkopf Tucker,Dangerous Strait:The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press,2005),205-7. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,"If Taiwan Chooses Unification,Should the United States Care?" The Washington Quarterly 25,no.3 (Summer 2002):15-28. Richard Bush,Untying the Knot:Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,2005),chap.1. SIbid.,chap.10. June 2007 219

U.S. Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait June 2007 219 military establishment will want to be free to utilize force in the national interest during a possible war. 2 Tucker maintains that the United States should take an open position toward the scenario of China's reunification— Washington should have no objection if both sides of the Strait choose peaceful unification. 3 In Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Richard Bush recognizes that a political dispute between the PRC and Taiwan could escalate into war, but this worst-case scenario is avoidable if the political knot can be untied. According to Bush, the fundamental problem is that political leaders in Beijing and Taipei, due to domestic constraints, mistrust each other's motives and lack the political will to strike a deal. 4 Bush argues that Washington has eschewed any formal role as mediator, even though Beijing and Taipei have different expectations of Washington. However, the United States may act as intellectual facilitator between the two sides and interpret the views of one side to the other, in order to reduce their misperception of each other. He proposes that the two sides accept some type of confederation that would satisfy the minimum objectives of each side— Beijing would get a form of unification and Taiwan would preserve its claim that its government retains sovereignty within a national union. 5 One common line running through the literature above is that the United States is not concerned about the ultimate shape of cross-Strait relations, as long as it is achieved peacefully. From the perspective of geopolitics, Taiwan's peaceful separation from mainland China might maximize U.S. national interests. However, due to Beijing's strong oppo￾sition to Taiwan independence, this scenario is unlikely to happen. The best choice for the United States, therefore, seems to be maintenance of the 2Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 205-7. 3Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?" The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 15-28. 4Richard Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), chap. 1. 5 Ibid., chap. 10

ISSUES STUDIES status quo-an ambivalent and intermediate point between unification and independence.On the one hand,Washington adheres to the one-China policy and denies that Taiwan is a sovereign state,as reflected in Presi- dent Bill Clinton's "three no's"statement during his 1998 trip to China and former Secretary of State Colin Powell's remark that "Taiwan is not in- dependent"during his October 2004 trip to Beijing.On the other hand,it implicitly challenges"PRC claims to sovereignty and reveal[s]the limits on the degree to which the United States can subscribe to those claims."7 This is displayed by Washington's opposition to any PRC military attack on Taiwan and its insistence that the island's future should be resolved peacefully and accepted by the Taiwanese people.Quite apart from Wash- ington's ambiguous definition of the status quo,it is also interpreted differ- ently by the PRC and Taiwan,depending on whether China is one country or whether Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state.Given this political dispute between the two sides regarding the definition of the status quo,it is difficult to imagine that they could reach an interim peace agree- ment before finally deciding Taiwan's future.The status quo,therefore,is unstable by nature.However,it is regarded as a feasible policy option by the United States. The next choice is to accept China's peaceful unification.From a geopolitical perspective,it is difficult to imagine that Washington is really happy to see the two sides moving toward peaceful unification.A unified China might have implications for current Washington-Taipei political, economic,and military relations,and result in the United States being marginalized in relation to the Taiwan issue.However,if the status quo is unsustainable,this option might be better than a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait which would force the United States to make a reluctant 6The"three no's"refers to the U.S.policy that states:"We don't support independence for Tai- wan,or two Chinas,or one Taiwan,one China.And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement."For Colin Powell's remarks,see Anthony Yuen,"Interview with Secretary of State Colin L.Powell,"Beijing, October 25,2004,http://usinfo.state.gov/p/eap/Archive/2004/Oct/-277540.htm (accessed November 15,2004). Romberg,Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice,7. 220 June 2007

ISSUES & STUDIES 220 June 2007 status quo— an ambivalent and intermediate point between unification and independence. On the one hand, Washington adheres to the one-China policy and denies that Taiwan is a sovereign state, as reflected in Presi￾dent Bill Clinton's "three no's" statement during his 1998 trip to China and former Secretary of State Colin Powell's remark that "Taiwan is not in￾dependent" during his October 2004 trip to Beijing. 6 On the other hand, it implicitly challenges "PRC claims to sovereignty and reveal[s] the limits on the degree to which the United States can subscribe to those claims." 7 This is displayed by Washington's opposition to any PRC military attack on Taiwan and its insistence that the island's future should be resolved peacefully and accepted by the Taiwanese people. Quite apart from Wash￾ington's ambiguous definition of the status quo, it is also interpreted differ￾ently by the PRC and Taiwan, depending on whether China is one country or whether Taiwan is already an independent sovereign state. Given this political dispute between the two sidesregarding the definition of the status quo, it is difficult to imagine that they could reach an interim peace agree￾ment before finally deciding Taiwan's future. The status quo, therefore, is unstable by nature. However, it is regarded as a feasible policy option by the United States. The next choice is to accept China's peaceful unification. From a geopolitical perspective, it is difficult to imagine that Washington is really happy to see the two sides moving toward peaceful unification. A unified China might have implications for current Washington-Taipei political, economic, and military relations, and result in the United States being marginalized in relation to the Taiwan issue. However, if the status quo is unsustainable, this option might be better than a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait which would force the United States to make a reluctant 6The "three no's" refersto the U.S. policy thatstates: "We don'tsupport independence for Tai￾wan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan, one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement." For Colin Powell's remarks, see Anthony Yuen, "Interview with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell," Beijing, October 25, 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/p/eap/Archive/2004/Oct/-277540.htm (accessed November 15, 2004). 7Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, 7

U.S.Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait choice between standing by and stepping in.As Richard Bush proposed above,some type of confederation would accommodate Beijing's pursuit of unification and Taiwan's claim to independent sovereignty within a na- tional union.This view accords with Tucker's argument that the United States has no reason to block China's unification process if it is acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait.In the words of Thomas Christensen,if Taiwan wanted to accommodate the mainland,Washington could do little to prevent it.8 The worst-case scenario for the United States is to entangle itself in a war caused by Taipei's movement toward de jure independence or Beijing's determination to unify China by force.A war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is not in Washington's interest as it would then face a dilemma in decision-making.Some neo-conservatives in the United States may believe that Washington should do its best to protect a democratic Taiwan and let Taiwanese freely decide their future,including a formal declaration of independence if that is what they want.Other hard-liners on the right may want to play the "Taiwan card"to provoke a war across the Strait and therefore stop the momentum of China's "peaceful rise."How- ever,these extreme viewpoints do not represent the mainstream American voice.Given the significantly divided opinions among politicians and the public in the United States regarding whether the United States should withdraw from Iraq soon,it is difficult to imagine that the United States as a whole is willing to fight another war with the PRC simply for the sake of Taiwan independence. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Strategic Ambiguity In an effort to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait,the United States long ago adopted a strategy of "creative ambiguity"regarding its Thomas Christensen,"The Contemporary Security Dilemma:Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," The Washington Quarterly 25,no.4(Autumn 2002):7-21 at 16. June 2007 221

U.S. Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait June 2007 221 choice between standing by and stepping in. As Richard Bush proposed above, some type of confederation would accommodate Beijing's pursuit of unification and Taiwan's claim to independent sovereignty within a na￾tional union. This view accords with Tucker's argument that the United States has no reason to block China's unification process if it is acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the words of Thomas Christensen, if Taiwan wanted to accommodate the mainland, Washington could do little to prevent it. 8 The worst-case scenario for the United States is to entangle itself in a war caused by Taipei's movement toward de jure independence or Beijing's determination to unify China by force. A war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is not in Washington's interest as it would then face a dilemma in decision-making. Some neo-conservatives in the United States may believe that Washington should do its best to protect a democratic Taiwan and let Taiwanese freely decide their future, including a formal declaration of independence if that is what they want. Other hard-liners on the right may want to play the "Taiwan card" to provoke a war across the Strait and therefore stop the momentum of China's "peaceful rise." How￾ever, these extreme viewpoints do not represent the mainstream American voice. Given the significantly divided opinions among politicians and the public in the United States regarding whether the United States should withdraw from Iraq soon, it is difficult to imagine that the United States as a whole is willing to fight another war with the PRC simply for the sake of Taiwan independence. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Strategic Ambiguity In an effort to maintain peace across the Taiwan Strait, the United States long ago adopted a strategy of "creative ambiguity" regarding its 8Thomas Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 7-21 at 16

ISSUES STUDIES Table 1 Washington's Possible Responses to a War between the PRC and Taiwan under Different Circumstances A war provoked by Beijing A war provoked by Taipei Interference More likely Less likely Hands-off Less likely More likely likely response to any military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.The Taiwan Relations Act(TRA)implies that "were the PRC to attempt to settle the Taiwan question by force,"the United States would react accordingly, even though the Act does not"legally mandate that the United States come to the rescue of Taiwan if it is attacked."President George W.Bush once declared that he saw the United States as having a clear obligation to defend Taiwan and that the United States was willing "to do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself"under Beijing's military attack.However, whether and to what degree the United States would get involved in a military conflict provoked by Beijing's attempt to unify China by force is unclear.At the other end of the spectrum,even if a Strait war was provoked by Taiwan's ambition for formal independence,one cannot exclude the possibility that the United States might still provide military support to Taiwan.Washington's possible responses-interference or hands-off- to a war provoked by either side of the Taiwan Strait are illustrated in table 1. Washington's ambiguous strategy toward a possible war across the Taiwan Strait is associated with the traditional U.S.policy of"dual deter- rence and dual reassurance."According to Kenneth Lieberthal,this policy has sent different signals to Beijing and Taipei: Luncheon address by U.S.Senator Craig Thomas at a Woodrow Wilson Center conference on "U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War,"May 9,2000.See Gang Lin,ed., U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War,Asia Program Special Report (Wash- ington,D.C.:Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,August 2000),9. 10Brian Knowlton,"Analysts See Comments as a Toughening of American Position,"Inter- national Herald Tribune,April 25,2001. 222 June 2007

ISSUES & STUDIES 222 June 2007 likely response to any military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) impliesthat "were the PRC to attempt to settle the Taiwan question by force," the United States would react accordingly, even though the Act does not "legally mandate that the United States come to the rescue of Taiwan if it is attacked." 9 President George W. Bush once declared that he saw the United States as having a clear obligation to defend Taiwan and that the United States was willing "to do whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself" under Beijing's military attack. 10 However, whether and to what degree the United States would get involved in a military conflict provoked by Beijing's attempt to unify China by force is unclear. At the other end of the spectrum, even if a Strait war was provoked by Taiwan's ambition for formal independence, one cannot exclude the possibility that the United States might still provide military support to Taiwan. Washington's possible responses— interference or hands-off— to a war provoked by either side of the Taiwan Strait are illustrated in table 1. Washington's ambiguous strategy toward a possible war across the Taiwan Strait is associated with the traditional U.S. policy of "dual deter￾rence and dual reassurance." According to Kenneth Lieberthal, this policy has sent different signals to Beijing and Taipei: 9Luncheon address by U.S. Senator Craig Thomas at a Woodrow Wilson Center conference on "U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War," May 9, 2000. See Gang Lin, ed., U.S.-China Relations since the End of the Cold War, Asia Program Special Report (Wash￾ington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2000), 9. 10Brian Knowlton, "Analysts See Comments as a Toughening of American Position," Inter￾national Herald Tribune, April 25, 2001. Table 1 Washington's Possible Responses to a War between the PRC and Taiwan under Different Circumstances Interference Hands-off A war provoked by Beijing A war provoked by Taipei More likely Less likely Less likely More likely

U.S.Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait [It]has signaled that Beijing cannot count on the United States'standing by if China attacks Taiwan and has signaled to Taiwan that it cannot count on U.S forces to defend it regardless of the circumstances that precipitate the fighting. Washington has also assured Beijing that it will not change its one-China policy unilaterally and assured Taiwan that it will not sell out the island's interests. The "dual deterrence and dual reassurance"policy was designed to prevent any unilateral change of the status quo initiated by Beijing or Taipei.The signals of deterrence sent to the two sides,however,were contradictory. The deterring message for Beijing was that it has to be prepared to fight the United States in a Strait war under any circumstances.As Con- doleezza Rice put it during President Bush's 2000 campaign,the United States should deter any trouble across the Taiwan Strait and make it in- conceivable for China to use force.12 Some American policymakers and analysts suggested that Beijing should refrain from rushing into action if Taipei were to make a formal declaration of independence,but should in- stead rely on Washington to push Taipei back into the "one-China"box.To save its own face,Kenneth Lieberthal has suggested,the PRC should ac- cept a definition of Taiwanese independence according to international law.That is,as long as "every single major country in the world not only recognizes Beijing as China's legitimate government but also shares the view...that Taiwan is not independent',"Beijing does not need to take military action against independence activities on Taiwan. The deterring message for Taipei is that it should not count on the United States to defend Taiwan,not to mention go to war with the PRC for the sake of Taiwan's independence.Washington has made it clear to Taipei that it is Taipei's responsibility to defend the island.Taipei's long delay in purchasing U.S.weapons,which were offered by President Bush as early as spring 2001,has made at least some Americans wonder whether Taiwan Kenneth Lieberthal,"Preventing a War over Taiwan,"Foreign Affairs 84,no.2(March/ April2005):53-63at55. 2Condoleeza Rice,"Campaign 2000:Promoting the National Interest,"Foreign Affairs 79 no.1 (January/February 2000),http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5-p10/;and condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html (accessed May 20, 2007). 3Lieberthal,"Preventing a War over Taiwan."59. June 2007 223

U.S. Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait June 2007 223 [It] has signaled that Beijing cannot count on the United States' standing by if China attacks Taiwan and has signaled to Taiwan that it cannot count on U.S. forces to defend it regardless of the circumstances that precipitate the fighting. Washington has also assured Beijing that it will not change its one-China policy unilaterally and assured Taiwan that it will not sell out the island's interests. 11 The "dual deterrence and dual reassurance" policy was designed to prevent any unilateral change of the status quo initiated by Beijing or Taipei. The signals of deterrence sent to the two sides, however, were contradictory. The deterring message for Beijing was that it has to be prepared to fight the United States in a Strait war under any circumstances. As Con￾doleezza Rice put it during President Bush's 2000 campaign, the United States should deter any trouble across the Taiwan Strait and make it in￾conceivable for China to use force. 12 Some American policymakers and analysts suggested that Beijing should refrain from rushing into action if Taipei were to make a formal declaration of independence, but should in￾stead rely on Washington to push Taipei back into the "one-China" box. To save its own face, Kenneth Lieberthal has suggested, the PRC should ac￾cept a definition of Taiwanese independence according to international law. That is, as long as "every single major country in the world not only recognizes Beijing as China's legitimate government but also shares the view ... that 'Taiwan is not independent'," Beijing does not need to take military action against independence activities on Taiwan. 13 The deterring message for Taipei is that it should not count on the United States to defend Taiwan, not to mention go to war with the PRC for the sake of Taiwan's independence. Washington has made it clear to Taipei that it is Taipei's responsibility to defend the island. Taipei's long delay in purchasing U.S. weapons, which were offered by President Bush as early as spring 2001, has made at least some Americans wonder whether Taiwan 11Kenneth Lieberthal, "Preventing a War over Taiwan," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 2 (March/ April 2005): 53-63 at 55. 12Condoleeza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5-p10/; and condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html (accessed May 20, 2007). 13Lieberthal, "Preventing a War over Taiwan." 59

ISSUES STUDIES is really serious about its own security.Moreover,Taipei's efforts at pro- moting legal independence over the years have increased Washington's concerns about being dragged into a war with the PRC. The U.S.tactic of"strategic ambiguity"regarding Washington's obli- gation to come to the defense of Taiwan has helped to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait for some years.The rationale for Washington sending contradictory messages to the two sides is an assumption that war planners on both sides have to prepare for the worst-case scenario and take Washington's messages for them seriously.4 As long as Beijing takes the likelihood of U.S.military intervention in a Strait conflict seriously, and Taipei does not expect Washington to protect Taiwanese independence, the status quo can be maintained.However,the conflicting messages Washington sends privately to Beijing and Taipei,respectively,may create misperceptions of the American position among people on the two sides. On the one hand,Beijing may be misled by Washington's message for Taipei that it must rely on its own efforts to defend the island,and may thus underestimate the possibility of an American military intervention in a future war between the PRC and Taiwan.On the other hand,Taipei may be too encouraged by Washington's message to Beijing that the United States will intervene in a Strait war under any circumstances,and therefore take rash actions to promote Taiwan's independence. In addition to the island's misperception that Washington will defend it against the PRC's military action under any circumstances,any assertion of Taiwan's independent sovereignty or underestimation of the danger from across the Strait is associated with domestic factors in Taiwan.Taiwan's progress toward political democratization since the mid-1980s has created a growing Taiwanese identity on the island.This provided impetus for Taiwan's ambitious former president,,Lee Teng-hui(李登輝)，to break out of the diplomatic blockade erected by the PRC and expand Taiwan's international space.Lee then bluntly announced his"two-state theory"( 國論)，while his successor Chen Shui--bian(陳水扁)has made efforts to 1Author's interview with Richard Bush,August 25,2005,Washington,D.C. 224 June 2007

ISSUES & STUDIES 224 June 2007 is really serious about its own security. Moreover, Taipei's efforts at pro￾moting legal independence over the years have increased Washington's concerns about being dragged into a war with the PRC. The U.S. tactic of "strategic ambiguity" regarding Washington's obli￾gation to come to the defense of Taiwan has helped to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait for some years. The rationale for Washington sending contradictory messages to the two sides is an assumption that war planners on both sides have to prepare for the worst-case scenario and take Washington's messages for them seriously. 14 As long as Beijing takes the likelihood of U.S. military intervention in a Strait conflict seriously, and Taipei does not expect Washington to protect Taiwanese independence, the status quo can be maintained. However, the conflicting messages Washington sends privately to Beijing and Taipei, respectively, may create misperceptions of the American position among people on the two sides. On the one hand, Beijing may be misled by Washington's message for Taipei that it must rely on its own efforts to defend the island, and may thus underestimate the possibility of an American military intervention in a future war between the PRC and Taiwan. On the other hand, Taipei may be too encouraged by Washington's message to Beijing that the United States will intervene in a Strait war under any circumstances, and therefore take rash actions to promote Taiwan's independence. In addition to the island's misperception that Washington will defend it against the PRC's military action under any circumstances, any assertion of Taiwan's independent sovereignty or underestimation of the danger from across the Strait is associated with domestic factors in Taiwan. Taiwan's progress toward political democratization since the mid-1980s has created a growing Taiwanese identity on the island. This provided impetus for Taiwan's ambitious former president, Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), to break out of the diplomatic blockade erected by the PRC and expand Taiwan's international space. Lee then bluntly announced his "two-state theory" (兩 國論), while his successor Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has made efforts to 14Author's interview with Richard Bush, August 25, 2005, Washington, D.C

U.S.Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait make Taiwan into a normal state through a new constitution and public referenda,and by abolishing the National Unification Council(國家統一 委員會)and the Guidelines for National Unification(國家統一網領).To be sure,some nuance does exist between the consciousness of Taiwanese national identity and the desire for Taiwan independence.As Shelley Rigger observes,a Taiwanese cultural identity does not equate to support for independence,and neither are assertions of Taiwan's statehood (po- litical identity or citizenship)necessarily indicative of a desire for formal separation from the mainland.However,a growing Taiwanese national identity on the island does lead to a greater demand for maintaining Tai- wan's independent sovereignty and less inclination for China's reunifica- tion.It is mainly because of Beijing's opposition to Taiwan's de jure inde- pendence that the awareness of Taiwanese national identity has yet to fully transform itself into greater support for independence.From the Chinese perspective,a formal declaration of Taiwan's independence and insistence on independent sovereignty are basically two sides of the same coin Faced with the growing sense of Taiwanese identity on the island and the swift change of regime,Beijing has sometimes doubted the feasibility of peaceful unification.Throughout the 1980s,military means were con- sidered as a way of forcing Taipei into talks with Beijing on China's re- unification.In March 1990,Beijing made it clear that it would only resort to military means in two circumstances:to prevent Taiwan's independence and to oppose any foreign armed intervention in Taiwan.7 Since the be- ginning of 2000,Beijing has shifted back to its old position in the 1980s 5Shelley Rigger,"Disaggregating the Concept of National Identity,"in The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity,Asia Program Special Report #114 (Washington,D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,August 2003),17-21. 16For example,the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)Hu Yaobang (said on May 10,1985,that the PRC could not renounce the use of force against Taiwan,as this would make Taipei even more unwilling to hold peace talks with the main- land.See Lu Keng )An Interview with Hu Yaobang (New York:Sino Daily Express, 1985).12-13 7Remarks made by CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin (when he was interviewed by a delegation from the Association for China's Reunification ()See Renmin ribao (人民日報，People's Daily),March12,1990. June 2007 225

U.S. Strategies in Maintaining Peace across the Taiwan Strait June 2007 225 make Taiwan into a normal state through a new constitution and public referenda, and by abolishing the National Unification Council (國家統一 委員會) and the Guidelines for National Unification (國家統一綱領). To be sure, some nuance does exist between the consciousness of Taiwanese national identity and the desire for Taiwan independence. As Shelley Rigger observes, a Taiwanese cultural identity does not equate to support for independence, and neither are assertions of Taiwan's statehood (po￾litical identity or citizenship) necessarily indicative of a desire for formal separation from the mainland. 15 However, a growing Taiwanese national identity on the island does lead to a greater demand for maintaining Tai￾wan's independent sovereignty and less inclination for China's reunifica￾tion. It is mainly because of Beijing's opposition to Taiwan's de jure inde￾pendence that the awareness of Taiwanese national identity has yet to fully transform itself into greater support for independence. From the Chinese perspective, a formal declaration of Taiwan's independence and insistence on independent sovereignty are basically two sides of the same coin. Faced with the growing sense of Taiwanese identity on the island and the swift change of regime, Beijing has sometimes doubted the feasibility of peaceful unification. Throughout the 1980s, military means were con￾sidered as a way of forcing Taipei into talks with Beijing on China's re￾unification. 16 In March 1990, Beijing made it clear that it would only resort to military means in two circumstances: to prevent Taiwan's independence and to oppose any foreign armed intervention in Taiwan. 17 Since the be￾ginning of 2000, Beijing has shifted back to its old position in the 1980s 15Shelley Rigger, "Disaggregating the Concept of National Identity," in The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity, Asia Program Special Report #114 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2003), 17-21. 16For example, the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) said on May 10, 1985, that the PRC could not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, as this would make Taipei even more unwilling to hold peace talks with the main￾land. See Lu Keng (陸鏗), An Interview with Hu Yaobang (New York: Sino Daily Express, 1985), 12-13. 17Remarks made by CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin (江澤民) when he was interviewed by a delegation from the Association for China's Reunification (統聯). See Renmin ribao (人民日報, People's Daily), March 12, 1990

ISSUES STUDIES from time to time.In the 2000 White Paper on the Taiwan issue,Beijing stated that if Taipei refused talks on unification indefinitely,the PRC would resort to tough measures,including military means,against Taiwan.This position was restated in a statement of May 17,2004,which provided only two options-either war or peace-for Taipei to choose from.The PRC's Anti-secession Law,published in March 2005,maintains that Beijing will employ non-peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue if all favorable conditions for peaceful unification have disappeared.If Beijing uses military means to settle the Taiwan issue or Taipei continues to pursue de jure independence and eventually crosses Beijing's red lines,Washington will have to make an unpleasant choice between fighting Beijing and abandoning Taipei. In analyzing the security dilemma faced by the two sides of the Tai- wan Strait,Richard Bush observes that it is Taipei's potential to take political action to gain legal independence that has created insecurity in Beijing and prompted the latter to make military preparations,which in turn have increased Taipei's insecurity.s Thomas Christensen notes that because the Taiwan issue is not primarily about territorial conquest,but about coercion and political identity,the thresholds of credible deterrent capabilities are very high,as are the obstacles to credible reassurance.As he says,"PRC weapons systems designed to deter Taiwan's independence can also appear capable of compelling Taiwan to agree to unification against Taipei's will."Meanwhile,"U.S.and Taiwanese efforts to deter such forced unification can easily appear to Beijing as efforts to create protective conditions for Taiwan's independence."Ironically,while Tai- pei is politically on the offensive and militarily defensive,Beijing is politi- cally defensive and militarily on the offensive.Faced with such a security dilemma,the two sides of the Taiwan Strait consider each other as revision- ist and compete for U.S.sympathy and support in the complicated debate over what is,or what should be,the status quo. 18See Bush,Untying the Knot,chap.5. 19Christensen,"The Contemporary Security Dilemma,"13. 226 June 2007

ISSUES & STUDIES 226 June 2007 from time to time. In the 2000 White Paper on the Taiwan issue, Beijing stated that if Taipei refused talks on unification indefinitely, the PRC would resort to tough measures, including military means, against Taiwan. This position was restated in a statement of May 17, 2004, which provided only two options— either war or peace— for Taipei to choose from. The PRC's Anti-secession Law, published in March 2005, maintains that Beijing will employ non-peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue if all favorable conditions for peaceful unification have disappeared. If Beijing uses military means to settle the Taiwan issue or Taipei continues to pursue de jure independence and eventually crosses Beijing's red lines, Washington will have to make an unpleasant choice between fighting Beijing and abandoning Taipei. In analyzing the security dilemma faced by the two sides of the Tai￾wan Strait, Richard Bush observes that it is Taipei's potential to take political action to gain legal independence that has created insecurity in Beijing and prompted the latter to make military preparations, which in turn have increased Taipei's insecurity. 18 Thomas Christensen notes that because the Taiwan issue is not primarily about territorial conquest, but about coercion and political identity, the thresholds of credible deterrent capabilities are very high, as are the obstacles to credible reassurance. As he says, "PRC weapons systems designed to deter Taiwan's independence can also appear capable of compelling Taiwan to agree to unification against Taipei's will." Meanwhile, "U.S. and Taiwanese efforts to deter such forced unification can easily appear to Beijing as efforts to create protective conditions for Taiwan's independence." 19 Ironically, while Tai￾pei is politically on the offensive and militarily defensive, Beijing is politi￾cally defensive and militarily on the offensive. Faced with such a security dilemma, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait consider each other as revision￾ist and compete for U.S. sympathy and support in the complicated debate over what is, or what should be, the status quo. 18See Bush, Untying the Knot, chap. 5. 19Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma," 13