American Political Science Review (2018)112.4,1050-1066 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000424 American Political Science Association 2018 Examining a Most Likely Case for Strong Campaign Effects:Hitler's Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party,1927-1933 PETER SELB University of Konstanz SIMON MUNZERT Hertie School of Governance itler's rise to power amidst an unprecedented propaganda campaign initiated scholarly interest in campaign effects.To the surprise of many,empirical studies often found minimal effects.The predominant focus of early work was on U.S.elections,though.Nazi propaganda as the archety- pal and,in many ways,most likely case for strong effects has rarely been studied.We collect extensive data about Hitler's speeches and gauge their impact on voter support at five national elections preceding the dictatorship.We use a semi-parametric difference-in-differences approach to estimate effects in the face of potential confounding due to the deliberate scheduling of events.Our findings suggest that Hitler's speeches,while rationally targeted,had a negligible impact on the Nazis'electoral fortunes.Only the 1932 presidential runoff,an election preceded by an extraordinarily short,intense,and one-sided campaign, yielded positive effects.This study questions the importance of charismatic leaders for the success of populist movements. "I am conscious that I have no equal in the art of sway- [the national parliament]against the Catholic and Marx- ing the masses."-Adolf Hitler in a reported conversa ist deputies.If out-voting them takes longer than out- tion(1932-34)with early copartisan Hermann Rauschning shooting them,at least the results will be guaranteed by (1939).The authenticity of these records has been chal- their own constitution." 4号元 lenged:see Janssen (1985). Hitler was released on parole at the end of 1924 PROLOGUE and caused the ban on the NSDAP to be lifted by affirming his party's new loyalty to the constitution. n November 11.1923.almost ten years before His previous assertions notwithstanding.Hitler held a the Nazi seizure of power,Adolf Hitler was ar- rabble-rousing public speech at the party's relaunch on rested and subsequently sentenced to five years February 27 1925 in Munich.The regional authorities' in prison for his leading role in the Beer Hall Putsch, reaction came swiftly:five forthcoming public appear- a failed coup d'etat against the national government. ances were cancelled immediately,and,on March 9,the While detained,Hitler ordered the banned and disinte- Bavarian cabinet issued a two-year gag order against grating National Socialist German Workers'Party(Na- Hitler (Rosch 2002,56-68).Many other regional gov- tionalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei,NSDAP) ernments,including those of Prussia,Saxony,Hesse to transform from a subversive battle group to a viable Oldenburg,Anhalt,Hamburg,and Lubeck,followed political party(Stachura 1980).As Hitler put it in a per- (Bruppacher 2012,159-72).Although the NSDAP was 685:50190 sonal conversation with Nazi fundraiser Kurt Ludecke not banned once again,party organs and meetings (quoted in Pridham 1973,27): were subject to increased surveillance.According to police reports,turnout at NSDAP meetings and rallies "Instead of working to achieve power by an armed coup, declined markedly in the subsequent period(Rosch we shall have to hold our noses and enter the Reichstag 2002,208-10),and the NSDAP's poor results at the state elections in Saxony,Mecklenburg-Schwerin,and Peter Selb is a Professor of Survey Research,University of Konstanz. Thuringia reinforced the view that "the NSDAP with Department of Politics and Public Administration,P.O.Box 85,D. a Hitler free to speak in public would cause no fu- 78457 Konstanz,Germany(peter.selb@uni.kn). ture concern to the authorities"(Pridham 1973,77). Simon Munzert is a Lecturer of Political Data Science,Hertie On March 6,1927 the Bavarian government revoked School of Governance,Friedrichstr.180,D-10117 Berlin,Germany (munzert@hertie-school.org). its gag order,and Adolf Hitler would take up his un- We are grateful to Johannes Haussler and Sascha Gobel for their precedented campaign activities.In the period of time superb research assistance;Fred Hockney for his proof-reading and between the repeal of the speaking ban on March 6, language editing;Birgit Jacob and Hannah Laumann for their edit. 1927 and the eve of the Reichstag election of March 5, ing:Christian Spinner,who sounded out the terrain in his Bachelor's 1933,Hitler had 455 public appearances,with a gross es- thesis;Juirgen W.Falter,Jonas MeBner,Dieter Ohr,and Paul Thurner. timated attendance of at least 4.5 million.In only four who provided their data;the participants of the research colloquium of the Graduate School of Decision Sciences at the University of years,the NSDAP evolved from a radical fringe group, Konstanz;the panel on media and politics at the EPSA Conference garnering less than 3%of the vote at the 1928 Re- 2016 in Brussels:Alexander De Juan.Thomas Gschwend,Moritz ichstag election,into the most popular German party, Marbach,and the reviewers for valuable comments;and the responsi- ble editor for his enduring support during a long and controversial re- view process.Replication files are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse:https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3KOQWQ We estimated attendance figures from available police reports and imputed missing values from press releases when necessary.For data Received:September 13,2016:revised:September 11,2017;accepted: sources,estimation procedures,and detailed descriptive statistics,see June 24,2018.First published online:August 7,2018. Appendix C. 1050American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 1050–1066 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000424 © American Political Science Association 2018 Examining a Most Likely Case for Strong Campaign Effects: Hitler’s Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party, 1927–1933 PETER SELB University of Konstanz SIMON MUNZERT Hertie School of Governance Hitler’s rise to power amidst an unprecedented propaganda campaign initiated scholarly interest in campaign effects. To the surprise of many, empirical studies often found minimal effects. The predominant focus of early work was on U.S. elections, though. Nazi propaganda as the archety￾pal and, in many ways, most likely case for strong effects has rarely been studied.We collect extensive data about Hitler’s speeches and gauge their impact on voter support at five national elections preceding the dictatorship. We use a semi-parametric difference-in-differences approach to estimate effects in the face of potential confounding due to the deliberate scheduling of events. Our findings suggest that Hitler’s speeches, while rationally targeted, had a negligible impact on the Nazis’ electoral fortunes. Only the 1932 presidential runoff, an election preceded by an extraordinarily short, intense, and one-sided campaign, yielded positive effects. This study questions the importance of charismatic leaders for the success of populist movements. “I am conscious that I have no equal in the art of sway￾ing the masses.” —Adolf Hitler in a reported conversa￾tion (1932-34) with early copartisan Hermann Rauschning (1939). The authenticity of these records has been chal￾lenged; see Janssen (1985). PROLOGUE On November 11, 1923, almost ten years before the Nazi seizure of power, Adolf Hitler was ar￾rested and subsequently sentenced to five years in prison for his leading role in the Beer Hall Putsch, a failed coup d’état against the national government. While detained, Hitler ordered the banned and disinte￾grating National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Na￾tionalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) to transform from a subversive battle group to a viable political party (Stachura 1980).As Hitler put it in a per￾sonal conversation with Nazi fundraiser Kurt Lüdecke (quoted in Pridham 1973, 27): “Instead of working to achieve power by an armed coup, we shall have to hold our noses and enter the Reichstag Peter Selb is a Professor of Survey Research, University of Konstanz, Department of Politics and Public Administration, P.O. Box 85, D- 78457 Konstanz, Germany (peter.selb@uni.kn). Simon Munzert is a Lecturer of Political Data Science, Hertie School of Governance, Friedrichstr. 180, D-10117 Berlin, Germany (munzert@hertie-school.org). We are grateful to Johannes Häussler and Sascha Göbel for their superb research assistance; Fred Hockney for his proof-reading and language editing; Birgit Jacob and Hannah Laumann for their edit￾ing; Christian Spinner, who sounded out the terrain in his Bachelor’s thesis; Jürgen W. Falter, Jonas Meßner,Dieter Ohr, and Paul Thurner, who provided their data; the participants of the research colloquium of the Graduate School of Decision Sciences at the University of Konstanz; the panel on media and politics at the EPSA Conference 2016 in Brussels; Alexander De Juan, Thomas Gschwend, Moritz Marbach, and the reviewers for valuable comments; and the responsi￾ble editor for his enduring support during a long and controversial re￾view process. Replication files are available at the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3KOQWQ. Received: September 13, 2016; revised: September 11, 2017; accepted: June 24, 2018. First published online: August 7, 2018. [the national parliament] against the Catholic and Marx￾ist deputies. If out-voting them takes longer than out￾shooting them, at least the results will be guaranteed by their own constitution.” Hitler was released on parole at the end of 1924 and caused the ban on the NSDAP to be lifted by affirming his party’s new loyalty to the constitution. His previous assertions notwithstanding, Hitler held a rabble-rousing public speech at the party’s relaunch on February 27, 1925 in Munich. The regional authorities’ reaction came swiftly: five forthcoming public appear￾ances were cancelled immediately, and, on March 9, the Bavarian cabinet issued a two-year gag order against Hitler (Rösch 2002, 56–68). Many other regional gov￾ernments, including those of Prussia, Saxony, Hesse, Oldenburg, Anhalt, Hamburg, and Lübeck, followed (Bruppacher 2012, 159–72). Although the NSDAP was not banned once again, party organs and meetings were subject to increased surveillance. According to police reports, turnout at NSDAP meetings and rallies declined markedly in the subsequent period (Rösch 2002, 208–10), and the NSDAP’s poor results at the state elections in Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Thuringia reinforced the view that “the NSDAP with a Hitler free to speak in public would cause no fu￾ture concern to the authorities” (Pridham 1973, 77). On March 6, 1927, the Bavarian government revoked its gag order, and Adolf Hitler would take up his un￾precedented campaign activities. In the period of time between the repeal of the speaking ban on March 6, 1927 and the eve of the Reichstag election of March 5, 1933,Hitler had 455 public appearances,with a gross es￾timated attendance of at least 4.5 million.1 In only four years, the NSDAP evolved from a radical fringe group, garnering less than 3% of the vote at the 1928 Re￾ichstag election, into the most popular German party, 1 We estimated attendance figures from available police reports and imputed missing values from press releases when necessary. For data sources, estimation procedures, and detailed descriptive statistics, see Appendix C. 1050 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000424