Hitler's Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party with more than 37%of the national vote in July 1932 portrayal of early Nazi propaganda by later broadcast- effectively paving the way for the Nazi takeover in ing director and Goebbels'deputy Eugen Hadamovsky March 1933 (1933.44): "All the means of public opinion were denied to Hitler INTRODUCTION His newspapers were banned,he was denied use of the ra- After observing the influence Hitler seemed to wield dio,his brochures and leaflets were confiscated.He had no through the use of propaganda,refugee-scholar Paul choice but to reach the masses directly through constantly Lazarsfeld fielded a panel survey in Erie County,Ohio growing mass rallies." during the run-up to the 1940 U.S.presidential elec- Ohr(1997)collects data on local party events in Hes- tion.This marked the beginning of modern research into campaign effects (Hillygus 2010).The study's sian communities and finds that in the period between findings were surprising-they did not substantiate the 1930 national and the 1931 regional parliamentary Lazarsfeld's motivating concern that campaigns could elections,there is a positive relationship in the changes of municipal Nazi vote shares.Wernette (1974)also arbitrarily manipulate the public.Instead,the pres- codes local Nazi election activities during the run-up idential campaign was found to merely activate the voters'predispositions (Lazarsfeld,Berelson,and to the 1930 Reichstag election from a national news- Gaudet 1948).Subsequent studies came to simi- paper and finds a positive correlation with changes in lar conclusions (Berelson,Lazarsfeld,and McPhee municipal Nazi vote shares in the period 1928-1930. 1954;Campbell,Converse,and Miller 1960)and en- Ciolek-Kumper (1976)focuses on Hitler appearances trenched the minimal effects paradigm that would and-roughly-compares changes in ward-level Nazi dominate mass communication research for decades vote shares at the regional election in Lippe on January (Klapper 1960;Bennett and Iyengar 2008).In a way, 15,1933 relative to the preceding Reichstag election in November 1932.She finds no evidence of the effective- however,the bulk of early empirical work focused on a least likely case.As Iyengar and Simon(2000,151) ness of Hitler's intense campaign efforts.Plockinger (1999)looks at differences between local-and regional- note,identifiable net effects should be limited to highly unbalanced campaigns in which one candidate has a level Nazi vote shares at the July and November 1932 clear resource or skills advantage-a condition that Reichstag elections in Bavaria but does not find any de- viations between municipalities visited by Hitler and is rarely met in U.S.presidential campaigns (also see Gelman and King 1993).Hitler's campaign,by con- those that were not.Though inventive,the latter stud- trast,far exceeded any of his rivals'efforts;the ma- ies are limited in their geographic and temporal scope. nipulative techniques employed were novel and so- They also potentially suffer from causality issues,which received much less attention at the time these studies phisticated,and the use of modern technology,such were conducted than they do today. as aircraft and loudspeakers,guaranteed Hitler an un- In this study,we revisit the question of how effective paralleled geographic penetration and public attention (Paul 1990).Tentative evidence for strong effects is early Nazi propaganda was in garnering electoral sup- indeed compelling:the numerous gag orders already port in Weimar Germany.Our substantive focus is on speak volumes about the authorities'beliefs in Hitler's Hitler's public speeches as the Nazis'chief campaign tool at that time.We rely on extensive original data agitational potency,there were signs of electoral stag- nation and organizational decay when the bans were that has superior geographic and temporal scope and resolution.We draw on the campaign resource alloca- 8 in force,the unparalleled campaign activities that fol- lowed their repeal coincided with a steep electoral rise tion literature and use a semi-parametric difference-in- for the Nazi party,and plenty of reports from contem- differences estimation strategy to account for often ig- nored endogeneity problems in the assessment of local porary witnesses further corroborate the importance of campaign effects.In doing so,we also provide rare in- Hitler's campaign for the Nazis'success (Abel 1965). sight into the campaign strategy of the Nazi party.We Only a handful of studies have thus far attempted discuss the limitations of our study and provide several to systematically assess the effectiveness of early Nazi robustness checks.Finally,we consider the implications propaganda.2 Most recently,Adena and her colleagues (2015)measure local exposure to radio broadcasting of our findings for current research into campaign and using a method for predicting the spatial attenuation leader effects of radio signals.They find that exposure was negatively ESTIMATING CAMPAIGN EFFECTS: 四 related to NSDAP support before the Nazi seizure of PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES power and positively related soon afterward as the party assumed control over the mass media.In line with Campaign effects on voting behavior and election re- this finding,the authors also provide evidence that ra- sults are notoriously difficult to detect in a campaign dio content before 1933 was largely pro-government realm characterized by the selective exposure of vot- and against the Nazis.These results corroborate the ers to a diffuse stream of countervailing campaign mes- sages.Only since the late 1980s has the paradigmatic view of minimal campaign effects been challenged by 2Voigtlander and Voth(2014,2015)examine the effectiveness of scholars using novel data and sophisticated method- Nazi propaganda under the dictatorship (the years 1933-1945)using ologies such as laboratory experiments(Iyengar and novel data and empirical strategies. Kinder 1987),rolling surveys (Johnston et al.1992), 1051Hitler’s Speeches and the Rise of the Nazi Party with more than 37% of the national vote in July 1932, effectively paving the way for the Nazi takeover in March 1933. INTRODUCTION After observing the influence Hitler seemed to wield through the use of propaganda, refugee-scholar Paul Lazarsfeld fielded a panel survey in Erie County, Ohio during the run-up to the 1940 U.S. presidential elec￾tion. This marked the beginning of modern research into campaign effects (Hillygus 2010). The study’s findings were surprising—they did not substantiate Lazarsfeld’s motivating concern that campaigns could arbitrarily manipulate the public. Instead, the pres￾idential campaign was found to merely activate the voters’ predispositions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). Subsequent studies came to simi￾lar conclusions (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, and Miller 1960) and en￾trenched the minimal effects paradigm that would dominate mass communication research for decades (Klapper 1960; Bennett and Iyengar 2008). In a way, however, the bulk of early empirical work focused on a least likely case. As Iyengar and Simon (2000, 151) note, identifiable net effects should be limited to highly unbalanced campaigns in which one candidate has a clear resource or skills advantage—a condition that is rarely met in U.S. presidential campaigns (also see Gelman and King 1993). Hitler’s campaign, by con￾trast, far exceeded any of his rivals’ efforts; the ma￾nipulative techniques employed were novel and so￾phisticated, and the use of modern technology, such as aircraft and loudspeakers, guaranteed Hitler an un￾paralleled geographic penetration and public attention (Paul 1990). Tentative evidence for strong effects is indeed compelling: the numerous gag orders already speak volumes about the authorities’ beliefs in Hitler’s agitational potency, there were signs of electoral stag￾nation and organizational decay when the bans were in force, the unparalleled campaign activities that fol￾lowed their repeal coincided with a steep electoral rise for the Nazi party, and plenty of reports from contem￾porary witnesses further corroborate the importance of Hitler’s campaign for the Nazis’ success (Abel 1965). Only a handful of studies have thus far attempted to systematically assess the effectiveness of early Nazi propaganda.2 Most recently, Adena and her colleagues (2015) measure local exposure to radio broadcasting using a method for predicting the spatial attenuation of radio signals. They find that exposure was negatively related to NSDAP support before the Nazi seizure of power and positively related soon afterward as the party assumed control over the mass media. In line with this finding, the authors also provide evidence that ra￾dio content before 1933 was largely pro-government and against the Nazis. These results corroborate the 2 Voigtländer and Voth (2014, 2015) examine the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda under the dictatorship (the years 1933–1945) using novel data and empirical strategies. portrayal of early Nazi propaganda by later broadcast￾ing director and Goebbels’ deputy Eugen Hadamovsky (1933, 44): “All the means of public opinion were denied to Hitler. His newspapers were banned, he was denied use of the ra￾dio, his brochures and leaflets were confiscated. He had no choice but to reach the masses directly through constantly growing mass rallies.” Ohr (1997) collects data on local party events in Hes￾sian communities and finds that in the period between the 1930 national and the 1931 regional parliamentary elections, there is a positive relationship in the changes of municipal Nazi vote shares. Wernette (1974) also codes local Nazi election activities during the run-up to the 1930 Reichstag election from a national news￾paper and finds a positive correlation with changes in municipal Nazi vote shares in the period 1928–1930. Ciolek-Kümper (1976) focuses on Hitler appearances and—roughly—compares changes in ward-level Nazi vote shares at the regional election in Lippe on January 15, 1933 relative to the preceding Reichstag election in November 1932. She finds no evidence of the effective￾ness of Hitler’s intense campaign efforts. Plöckinger (1999) looks at differences between local- and regional￾level Nazi vote shares at the July and November 1932 Reichstag elections in Bavaria but does not find any de￾viations between municipalities visited by Hitler and those that were not. Though inventive, the latter stud￾ies are limited in their geographic and temporal scope. They also potentially suffer from causality issues, which received much less attention at the time these studies were conducted than they do today. In this study, we revisit the question of how effective early Nazi propaganda was in garnering electoral sup￾port in Weimar Germany. Our substantive focus is on Hitler’s public speeches as the Nazis’ chief campaign tool at that time. We rely on extensive original data that has superior geographic and temporal scope and resolution. We draw on the campaign resource alloca￾tion literature and use a semi-parametric difference-in￾differences estimation strategy to account for often ig￾nored endogeneity problems in the assessment of local campaign effects. In doing so, we also provide rare in￾sight into the campaign strategy of the Nazi party. We discuss the limitations of our study and provide several robustness checks. Finally, we consider the implications of our findings for current research into campaign and leader effects. ESTIMATING CAMPAIGN EFFECTS: PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES Campaign effects on voting behavior and election re￾sults are notoriously difficult to detect in a campaign realm characterized by the selective exposure of vot￾ers to a diffuse stream of countervailing campaign mes￾sages. Only since the late 1980s has the paradigmatic view of minimal campaign effects been challenged by scholars using novel data and sophisticated method￾ologies such as laboratory experiments (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), rolling surveys (Johnston et al. 1992), 1051 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:56:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000424