202 International Organization sophisticated warships.15 On land,the individualsoldier was the basic unit of a state's military strength.The standardization and mass production of weaponry meant that individual soldiers could now be outfitted much more cheaply,and increases in the accuracy,range,and firepower of their weapons made them much more lethal,and vulnerable,in combat,thus requiring the use of large forces to absorb combat casual- ties.16 As a consequence,hardware comprised a relatively small component of a state's landward military power before 1914;more important was the sheer number of soldiers a state could field in battle.17 Finally,the substitutability between these factors was limited.Ships,not sailors, were the key ingredient of naval power.Adding extra personnel to a ship once it was fully staffed simply would not increase its war-fighting abilities.On shore,it was muscle,not machines,that mattered most.The ability to substitute capital for labor was sharply limited by the fact that Europe's armies had not yet solved the problem of battlefield mobility. We can now predict that the expanding world economy will generate three pattems of shifting economic constraints on the European great powers(see Figure 4).First, Britain,France,and Germany will confront a general tightening of economic con- straints on their security.Each will experience growing difficulties in mobilizing those resources most critical to military competition-capital and labor-into the military.They will also find the peasantry(the intensive users of land)to be a shrink- ing source of military labor as labor-intensive export sectors attract lower wage labor out of land-intensive agriculture.Second,Austria-Hungary will experience a mixed movement of constraints:increasing difficulties in mobilizing labor but a growing ease in mobilizing capital.It,too,will find the peasantry to be a fleeting source of military labor.Third,Russia will also experience a mixed movement of constraints: increasing difficulties in mobilizing both labor and the peasantry (the holders and intensive users of Russia's other abundant resource-land)into the military and an increasing ability to mobilize capital.s And,although both Austria-Hungary and Russia will experience a growing ease in mobilizing capital for security purposes,the continental geographic positions of these states,the critical importance of land-based armies to their security,and the limited ability to substitute capital for labor in land warfare imply that the net effect of an expanding world economy will be to tighten the economic constraints on the security of these capital-poor states as well. Keeping in mind that these changing constraints will manifest themselves in differ- ent ways under different institutional settings,I submit that these hypotheses capture succinctly the changing political economy of security in pre-World War I Europe.I will consider,first,whether the predicted patterns of shifting constraints are evident in the security politics of the great powers and,second,whether and how these shifting constraints may have affected European security. 15.See McNeil 1982;Sumida 1989;and Stevenson 1996,10,n.15. 16.Posen1993,83-84. 17.See Stevenson 1996,62;and Herrmann 1996,228. 18.By World War I,most of Russia's productive agricultural land was in the hands of the peasantry. Lieven 1983.18.sophisticatedwarships.15 On land, the individualsoldier was the basic unit of a state’s military strength. The standardization and mass production of weaponry meant that individualsoldiers could now be outŽ tted much more cheaply, and increases in the accuracy, range, and Ž repower of their weapons made them much more lethal, and vulnerable, in combat, thus requiring the use of large forces to absorb combat casual￾ties.16 As a consequence, hardware comprised a relatively small component of a state’s landward military power before 1914; more important was the sheer number of soldiers a state could Ž eld in battle.17 Finally, the substitutability between these factors was limited. Ships, not sailors, were the key ingredient of naval power. Adding extra personnel to a ship once it was fully staffed simply would not increase its war-Ž ghting abilities. On shore, it was muscle, not machines, that mattered most. The ability to substitute capital for labor was sharply limited by the fact that Europe’s armies had not yet solved the problem of battleŽ eld mobility. We can now predict that the expandingworld economy will generate three patterns of shifting economic constraints on the European great powers (see Figure 4). First, Britain, France, and Germany will confront a general tightening of economic con￾straints on their security. Each will experience growing difficulties in mobilizing those resources most critical to military competition—capital and labor—into the military. They will also Ž nd the peasantry (the intensive users of land) to be a shrink￾ing source of military labor as labor-intensive export sectors attract lower wage labor out of land-intensive agriculture. Second, Austria-Hungary will experience a mixed movement of constraints: increasing difficulties in mobilizing labor but a growing ease in mobilizing capital. It, too, will Ž nd the peasantry to be a  eeting source of military labor. Third, Russia will also experience a mixed movement of constraints: increasing difficulties in mobilizing both labor and the peasantry (the holders and intensive users of Russia’s other abundant resource—land) into the military and an increasing ability to mobilize capital.18 And, although both Austria-Hungary and Russia will experience a growing ease in mobilizing capitalfor security purposes, the continentalgeographic positions of these states, the critical importance of land-based armies to their security, and the limited ability to substitute capital for labor in land warfare imply that the net effect of an expanding world economy will be to tighten the economic constraints on the security of these capital-poorstates as well. Keeping in mind that these changing constraintswill manifest themselvesin differ￾ent ways under different institutionalsettings, I submit that these hypotheses capture succinctly the changing political economy of security in pre–World War I Europe. I will consider, Ž rst, whether the predicted patterns of shifting constraints are evident in the security politics of the great powers and, second, whether and how these shifting constraints may have affected European security. 15. See McNeil 1982; Sumida 1989; and Stevenson 1996, 10, n.15. 16. Posen 1993, 83–84. 17. See Stevenson 1996, 62; and Herrmann 1996, 228. 18. By World War I, most of Russia’s productive agricultural land was in the hands of the peasantry. Lieven 1983, 18. 202 International Organization