54 International Organization French Ideas and the Origins of the EU Western Europe first developed uniquely strong international institutions in the 1950s.At the end of that decade,six governments committed to deep and broad cooperation in the EEC,including the delegation of considerable powers to"supra- national"agents in the EEC's executive commission and court. Experts agree that French choices were particularly important to the EEC's birth. All three of the major supranational projects of the 1950s-the ECSC,the failed European Defense Community (EDC),and the EEC-took shape because govern- ments that preferred other European projects conceded to the French.When the French proposed the ECSC in 1950,the British refused to join any supranational plan.German and Benelux leaders,though skeptical of supranationality and reluc- tant to proceed without Britain,eventually followed the French lead.23 When the French proposed the EDC as a similar framework for West German rearmament,all the other Europeans argued for a simpler plan within NATO.France's ECSC partners(Germany,Benelux,Italy)eventually agreed to negotiate EDC but quickly dropped it when the French tured against it in 1954.24 While the EEC itself was not a French proposal-originating with ultra-Europeanist Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen-it was partly crafted to appeal to the French.Beyen notwithstand- ing,most Benelux and German leaders preferred trade liberalization in the broader and institutionally weak format championed by the British.They hesitantly sup- ported Beyen's EEC plan because they feared the French would only accept liberalization within a"little Europe"with elaborate economic safeguards.25 In sum, no one contests that without French insistence on institutionally strong,geograph- ically limited institution building in the 1950s no such framework would have resulted. Two alternatives to my account,however,see this French position as strongly determined by nonideational factors.For structuralists,objective economic and geopolitical constraints selected French strategies.Historians like Milward and William Hitchcock argue that France needed a new basis for controlling and cooperating with a resurgent West Germany in 1950;the ECSC's supranational oversight of basic industries was the straightforward solution.26 Similar concerns about overseeing German military power pushed the French to the EDC.The incentives of this larger delegation of sovereignty were less clear,however,and the EDC died.But soon economic interests,transmitted through interest groups, refocused the French on an institutionally strong "little Europe."Weak French business feared British plans for broad trade liberalization,preferring a smaller and more managed trade pact.Growing farm surpluses led French farmers to insist that 23.See Kersten 1988:Milward 1988;Ludlow 1997,17:and Buhrer 1995 24.See Fursdon 1980:and de la Gorce 1979.91-159. 25.See Asbeek-Brusse 1997,157:Milward 1992.192:Griffiths 1990:and Bouwman 1995,141. 26.Milward emphasizes French economic needs for the ECSC:Hitchcock emphasizes geopolitics. See Milward 1984:and Hitchcock 1998.French Ideas and the Origins of the EU Western Europe first developed uniquely strong international institutions in the 1950s. At the end of that decade, six governments committed to deep and broad cooperation in the EEC, including the delegation of considerable powers to “supra￾national” agents in the EEC’s executive commission and court. Experts agree that French choices were particularly important to the EEC’s birth. All three of the major supranational projects of the 1950s—the ECSC, the failed European Defense Community (EDC), and the EEC—took shape because govern￾ments that preferred other European projects conceded to the French. When the French proposed the ECSC in 1950, the British refused to join any supranational plan. German and Benelux leaders, though skeptical of supranationality and reluc￾tant to proceed without Britain, eventually followed the French lead.23 When the French proposed the EDC as a similar framework for West German rearmament, all the other Europeans argued for a simpler plan within NATO. France’s ECSC partners (Germany, Benelux, Italy) eventually agreed to negotiate EDC but quickly dropped it when the French turned against it in 1954.24 While the EEC itself was not a French proposal—originating with ultra-Europeanist Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen—it was partly crafted to appeal to the French. Beyen notwithstand￾ing, most Benelux and German leaders preferred trade liberalization in the broader and institutionally weak format championed by the British. They hesitantly sup￾ported Beyen’s EEC plan because they feared the French would only accept liberalization within a “little Europe” with elaborate economic safeguards.25 In sum, no one contests that without French insistence on institutionally strong, geograph￾ically limited institution building in the 1950s no such framework would have resulted. Two alternatives to my account, however, see this French position as strongly determined by nonideational factors. For structuralists, objective economic and geopolitical constraints selected French strategies. Historians like Milward and William Hitchcock argue that France needed a new basis for controlling and cooperating with a resurgent West Germany in 1950; the ECSC’s supranational oversight of basic industries was the straightforward solution.26 Similar concerns about overseeing German military power pushed the French to the EDC. The incentives of this larger delegation of sovereignty were less clear, however, and the EDC died. But soon economic interests, transmitted through interest groups, refocused the French on an institutionally strong “little Europe.” Weak French business feared British plans for broad trade liberalization, preferring a smaller and more managed trade pact. Growing farm surpluses led French farmers to insist that 23. See Kersten 1988; Milward 1988; Ludlow 1997, 17; and Bu¨hrer 1995. 24. See Fursdon 1980; and de la Gorce 1979, 91–159. 25. See Asbeek-Brusse 1997, 157; Milward 1992, 192; Griffiths 1990; and Bouwman 1995, 141. 26. Milward emphasizes French economic needs for the ECSC; Hitchcock emphasizes geopolitics. See Milward 1984; and Hitchcock 1998. 54 International Organization