STATE POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE By STEPHEN D.KRASNER* INTRODUCTION I N recent years,students of international relations have multina- tionalized,transnationalized,bureaucratized,and transgovernment- alized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic con- struct.Nowhere is that trend more apparent than in the study of the politics of international economic relations.The basic conventional as- sumptions have been undermined by assertions that the state is trapped by a transnational society created not by sovereigns,but by nonstate actors.Interdependence is not seen as a reflection of state policies and state choices (the perspective of balance-of-power theory),but as the result of elements beyond the control of any state or a system created by states. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading.It may explain developments within a particular international economic structure,but it cannot explain the structure itself.That structure has many institu- tional and behavioral manifestations.The central continuum along which it can be described is openness.International economic struc- tures may range from complete autarky (if all states prevent move- ments across their borders),to complete openness (if no restrictions exist).In this paper I will present an analysis of one aspect of the international economy-the structure of international trade;that is, the degree of openness for the movement of goods as opposed to cap- ital,labor,technology,or other factors of production. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century,this structure has gone through several changes.These can be explained,albeit imperfectly,by a state-power theory:an approach that begins with the assumption that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to maximize national goals.The first step in this argument is to relate four basic state interests-aggregate national *I would like to thank Robert Art,Peter Gourevitch,Samuel Huntington,Robert Keohane,Rachel MeCulloch,Joseph Nye,Ronald Rogowski,and Robert W.Tucker for their comments.My greatest intellectual debt,and one not adequately refected in the footnotes,is to Robert Gilpin.Completion of this paper was made possible by support from the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.STATE POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE By STEPHEN D. KRASNERX INrecent years, students of international relations have multina￾tionalized, transnationalized, bureaucratized, and transgovernment￾alized the state until it has virtually ceased to exist as an analytic con￾struct. Nowhere is that trend more apparent than in the study of the politics of international economic relations. The basic conventional as￾sumptions have been undermined by assertions that the state is trapped by a transnational society created not by sovereigns, but by nonstate actors. Interdependence is not seen as a reflection of state policies and state choices (the perspective of balance-of-power theory), but as the result of elements beyond the control of any state or a system created by states. This perspective is at best profoundly misleading. It may explain developments within a particular international economic structure, but it cannot explain the structure itself. That structure has many institu￾tional and behavioral manifestations. The central continuum along which it can be described is openness. International economic struc￾tures may range from complete autarky (if all states prevent move￾ments across their borders), to complete openness (if no restrictions exist). In this paper I will present an analysis of one aspect of the international economy-the structure of international trade; that is, the degree of openness for the movement of goods as opposed to cap￾ital, labor, technology, or other factors of production. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, this structure has gone through several changes. These can be explained, albeit imperfectly, by a state-power theory: an approach that begins with the assumption that the structure of international trade is determined by the interests and power of states acting to maximize national goals. The first step in this argument is to relate four basic state interests-aggregate national +I would like to thank Robert Art, Peter Gourevitch, Samuel Huntington, Robert Keohane, Rachel McCulloch, Joseph Nye, Ronald Rogowski, and Robert W. Tucker for their comments. My greatest intellectual debt, and one not adequately reflected in the footnotes, is to Robert Gilpin. Completion of this paper was made possible by support from the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University