318 WORLD POLITICS income,social stability,political power,and economic growth-to the degree of openness for the movement of goods.The relationship be- tween these interests and openness depends upon the potential eco- nomic power of any given state.Potential economic power is opera- tionalized in terms of the relative size and level of economic development of the state.The second step in the argument is to relate different distributions of potential power,such as multipolar and hege- monic,to different international trading structures.The most impor- tant conclusion of this theoretical analysis is that a hegemonic distribu- tion of potential economic power is likely to result in an open trading structure.That argument is largely,although not completely,sub- stantiated by empirical data.For a fully adequate analysis it is neces- sary to amend a state-power argument to take account of the impact of past state decisions on domestic social structures as well as on inter- national economic ones.The two major organizers of the structure of trade since the beginning of the nineteenth century,Great Britain and the United States,have both been prevented from making policy amendments in line with state interests by particular societal groups whose power had been enhanced by earlier state policies. THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT:STATE INTERESTS,STATE POWER,AND INTERNATIONAL TRADING STRUCTURES Neoclassical trade theory is based upon the assumption that states act to maximize their aggregate economic utility.This leads to the conclusion that maximum global welfare and Pareto optimality are achieved under free trade.While particular countries might better their situations through protectionism,economic theory has generally looked askance at such policies.In his seminal article on the optimal tariff, Harry Johnson was at pains to point out that the imposition of succes- sive optimal tariffs could lead both trading partners to a situation in which they were worse off than under competitive conditions.'Neo- classical theory recognizes that trade regulations can also be used to correct domestic distortions and to promote infant industries,but these are exceptions or temporary departures from policy conclusions that lead logically to the support of free trade. 1 Johnson,"Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation,"in Harry Johnson,International Trade and Economic Growth (Cambridge:Harvard University Press 1967),31-61. 2 See,for instance, Everett Hagen,"An Economic Justification of Protectionism," Ouarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.72 (November 1958),496-514;Harry Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions,"in Robert Baldwin and others,Trade,Growth and the Balance of Payments:Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler (Chicago:Rand McNally 1965),3-34;and Jagdish Bhagwati,Trade, Tarifis,and Growth (Cambridge:MIT Press 1969),295-308.318 WORLD POLITICS income, social stability, political power, and economic growth-to the degree of openness for the movement of goods. The relationship be￾tween these interests and openness depends upon the potential eco￾nomic power of any given state. Potential economic power is opera￾tionalized in terms of the relative size and level of economic development of the state. The second step in the argument is to relate different distributions of potential power, such as multipolar and hege￾monic, to different international trading structures. The most impor￾tant conclusion of this theoretical analysis is that a hegemonic distribu￾tion of potential economic power is likely to result in an open trading structure. That argument is largely, although not completely, sub￾stantiated by empirical data. For a fully adequate analysis it is neces￾sary to amend a state-power argument to take account of the impact of past state decisions on domestic social structures as well as on inter￾national economic ones. The two major organizers of the structure of trade since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Great Britain and the United States, have both been prevented from making policy amendments in line with state interests by particular societal groups whose power had been enhanced by earlier state policies. Neoclassical trade theory is based upon the assumption that states act to maximize their aggregate economic utility. This leads to the conclusion that maximum global welfare and Pareto optimality are achieved under free trade. While particular countries might better their situations through protectionism, economic theory has generally looked askance at such policies. In his seminal article on the optimal tariff, Harry Johnson was at pains to point out that the imposition of succes￾sive optimal tariffs could lead both trading partners to a situation in which they were worse off than under competitive conditions.' Neo￾classical theory recognizes that trade regulations can also be used to correct domestic distortions and to promote infant industries,' but these are exceptions or temporary departures from policy conclusions that lead logically to the support of free trade. 1Johnson, "Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation," in Harry Johnson, Znternational Trade and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1967), 31-61. See, for instance, Everett Hagen, "An Economic Justification of Protectionism," Quarterly lournal of Economics, Vol. 72 (November 1958), 496-514; Harry Johnson, "Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions," in Robert Baldwin and others, Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Honor of Gottfried Haberler (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965), 3-34; and Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade, Tarifls, and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press 1969), 295-308