II 6,6-4,5|2,4 II|5,43,31,2 I4,22,10,0 Figure(2): A Pure Common interest Game with Reciprocity The cooperation outcome, with a payoff of 6 units for each player, remains the dominant strategy even with the imposition of a reciprocity constraint, and there is no incentive for either party to deviate from this outcome This amounts to the notion termed, in the economics literature,"perfect incentive alignment. This game's payoff structure excludes the possibility of opportunistic behavior. One could think of this ideal environment as the result of optimal contract enforcement mechanisms, institutional safeguards, relationships involving trust and reputation, or any other device which renders adversarial possibilities non advantageous or inaccessible to the players Generally speaking, solutions to this class of games are not troublesome, since all players gain by cooperating. Perfect incentive alignment guarantees that the spontaneous equilibrium of the sEe Parisi, Taxomony, supra note 4 and Schelling, supra note I See generally, Cooter and Ulen, supra note 5 for a discussion of the interaction of game theory and the law. They use game theory as an analytical toot to discuss contract law. ld. at 184-1989 See Parisi, Taxomony, supra note 4 and Schelling, supra note 5. 10See generally, Cooter and Ulen, supra note 5 for a discussion of the interaction of game theory and the law. They use game theory as an analytical toot to discuss contract law. Id. at 184-198. 5 Figure (2): A Pure Common Interest Game with Reciprocity The cooperation outcome, with a payoff of 6 units for each player, remains the dominant strategy even with the imposition of a reciprocity constraint, and there is no incentive for either party to deviate from this outcome. This amounts to the notion termed, in the economics literature, “perfect incentive alignment.”9 This game’s payoff structure excludes the possibility of opportunistic behavior. One could think of this ideal environment as the result of optimal contract enforcement mechanisms, institutional safeguards, relationships involving trust and reputation, or any other device which renders adversarial possibilities non advantageous or inaccessible to the players.10 Generally speaking, solutions to this class of games are not troublesome, since all players gain by cooperating. Perfect incentive alignment guaranteesthat the spontaneous equilibrium of the