game will occur at an optimizing point Whether the incentive-alignment is endogenous or exogenously determined by existing laws or norms, there is no need for additional intervention in either situation Real life situations of common interest games are common, but hard to illustrate with international law examples, because, unlike other strategic situations, common interest situations are self-enforcing and rarely emerge to engage the attention of international actors and policymakers as levant international legal issues. As long as interests of all parties converge, no dispute will arise that needs resolution by resort to a treaty or other legal instruments Nonetheless, situations do develop that ultimately reflect features of a common interest game. An example of this is the custom in international law regarding the Continental Shelf that developed following the Truman Proclamation of 1945. This is discussed in greater detail below, however the punch line is that it was in the interest of all coastal states to cooperate with the United States on the matter, even though the proclamation was inconsistent with existing international law I Similarly, pure coordination problems are characterized by the perfect convergence of the players' interests and by the additional feature of multiple equilibria. The convergence of individual and collective inter fosters an optimal outcome on the basis of a mere coordination of self-interested strategies. It has been arguecests processes of legal and social order. The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in a coordination game creates difficulties for decentralized solutions. For example, if everyone in a country needs to coordinate on a basic set of traffic conventions, such as driving on the same side of the road, the emergence of spontaneous )but heterogeneous in a modern society. Ironically, however, the most universal traffic rules are those for water navigation, which Quired clusters of traffic customs would consolidate local equilibria that do not possess the features of universality red emerged through spontaneous rule-making processes. For an interesting historical background, see JOHN H WIGMORE, THE MARITIME LEGAL SYSTEM, (1928), see generally, NICHOLAS J. HEALY DAVID J. SHARPE, ADMIRALTY CASES AND MATERIALS, (2nd ed, 1986): IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed, 1990); THOMAS J SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, (1987). The issue of reciprocity in the Law of the Sea is discussed further infra Part IIIC See discussion infra Part Ill.A. The discussion is based largely on Brownlie, supra note 11, and MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES (1999). The incentive alignment is among the coastal states; in effect, non-coastal states are treated as non-participants 611 Similarly, pure coordination problems are characterized by the perfect convergence of the players’ interests and by the additional feature of multiple equilibria. The convergence of individual and collective interests fosters an optimal outcome on the basis of a mere coordination of self-interested strategies. It has been argued, however, that the solution to coordination problems may be delayed if it relies exclusively on decentralized processes of legal and social order. The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in a coordination game creates difficulties for decentralized solutions. For example, if everyone in a country needs to coordinate on a basic set of traffic conventions, such as driving on the same side of the road, the emergence of spontaneous ) but heterogeneous ) clusters of traffic customs would consolidate local equilibria that do not possess the features of universality required in a modern society. Ironically, however, the most universal traffic rules are those for water navigation, which emerged through spontaneous rule-making processes. For an interesting historical background, see JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE MARITIME LEGAL SYSTEM, (1928); see generally, NICHOLAS J. HEALY & DAVID J. SHARPE, ADMIRALTY CASES AND MATERIALS, (2nd ed., 1986); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed., 1990); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, (1987). The issue of reciprocity in the Law of the Sea is discussed further infra Part III.C. 12See discussion infra Part III.A. The discussion is based largely on Brownlie, supra note 11, and MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES (1999). The incentive alignment is among the coastal states; in effect, non-coastal states are treated as non-participants. 6 game will occur at an optimizing point.11 Whether the incentive-alignment is endogenous or exogenously determined by existing laws or norms, there is no need for additional intervention in either situation. Real life situations of common interest games are common, but hard to illustrate with international law examples, because, unlike other strategic situations, common interest situations are self-enforcing and rarely emerge to engage the attention of international actors and policymakers as relevant international legal issues. As long as interests of all parties converge, no dispute will arise that needs resolution by resort to a treaty or other legal instruments. Nonetheless, situations do develop that ultimately reflect features of a common interest game. An example of thisisthe custom in international law regarding the Continental Shelf that developed following the Truman Proclamation of 1945.12 This is discussed in greater detail below; however the punch line is that it wasin the interest of all coastalstatesto cooperate with the United States on the matter, even though the Proclamation was inconsistent with existing international law