B Divergent Preference Games This class of games encompasses positive sum games with multiple Nash equilibria, where the different equilibria are the result of differences in preferences, and not strategic behavior. These games are characterized by mixed conflict-coordination motives. In the literature, these games are often called Battle of the Sexes games. 3 Coordination problems in such games could be solved by permitting sequential decision-making or pre-commitment strategies. In situations where the players engage in games repeatedly, a norm of fairness may be sufficient to address the problem of a sub optimal conflictual outcome, if the discount rates of the parties are sufficiently small For a one-time game, a pay-off matrix for a Divergent Preference game could look like this II 0,0|0,0 I0,02,30,0 I0,00,0 Figure(3): Divergent Preference Game In this case, there are three Nash equilibria, along the diagonal, with no single dominant outcome \See Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 413See Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 4. 7 B. Divergent Preference Games This class of games encompasses positive sum games with multiple Nash equilibria, where the different equilibria are the result of differences in preferences, and not strategic behavior. These games are characterized by mixed conflict-coordination motives. In the literature, these games are often called Battle of the Sexes games.13 Coordination problems in such games could be solved by permitting sequential decision-making or pre-commitmentstrategies.In situations where the players engage in games repeatedly, a norm of fairness may be sufficient to address the problem of a sub￾optimal conflictual outcome, if the discount rates of the parties are sufficiently small. For a one-time game, a pay-off matrix for a Divergent Preference game could look like this: Figure (3): Divergent Preference Game In this case, there are three Nash equilibria, along the diagonal, with no single dominant outcome