criticised Mill because his striving for female equality still mainly concerned public life Private life and the family remained largely on the periphery of his attention. 3& Feminist criticism of liberalism usually focused on the fact that the inequality of women was generally neglected. But when things went wrong, the family was a cage for two Conservatism in family and private life was perhaps more to the detriment of women than of men, but it did affect men too. The man was equally deprived of the possibility of escaping a broken marriage or to legitimise children born out of wed lock The long-stand ing disregard of the family and the private sphere by liberal philosophy was part of the ideological background of the phenomenon that med ieval concepts prevailed much longer in family law than in society in general. It also probably forms at least a part of place in the countries that were most influenced by classical liberal philosopy o d not take the explanation for the fact that the first and most radical reforms of family law d Also illustrative of the late liberalisation of family and private life is the development of the ideas about the place of romantic love. In days gone by, the family was the domain of duties, not of feelings. Affection was desirable but not necessary. With the growth of prosperity and the change of the social function of the family, which no longer formed the basic economic unit, 4o the pressure imposed by duties diminished and more room was given to personal freedom. For the first time in history, romantic love entered the family. Before that time, the place for romantic love was normally envisaged outside the family. The courtly love of the troubadours was not directed towards one's own spouse. Tristan and isolde Lancelot en Guinevere were lovers, not spouses. Only in the 19th century did romantic love raise its banner within the family. The literature of that century shows a wide range of desperate conflicts between romantic love and one of the central canonical dogmas the inadmissibility of consensual divorce. Galsworthy's Forsyte Saga, Flaubert's L Education sentimentale and Tolstoys Anna Karenina and The Living dead are just a few well-known examples. This conflict raged for 150 years until only in the 1960s, with the acceptance of consensual divorce, love became the true basis for the family With individualism and personal freedom invading the family, the ideas concerning its social function and its whole image changed The family came to be regarded as a union based on love, its primary purpose being to serve the happiness of its members. This change from a transpersonal to a personalistic approach is, to my mind the most important transformation that has occurred in family law over the last two centuries. The essence of transpersonalism is the sacrificing of the interests of individuals to abstract values. This attitude was typical of med ieval society but in the private sphere it has dominated well into modern times. Family law was one of its last resorts. An everyday example of the endurance of transpersonalism can be found in the words of the Dutch Minister of Justice delivered in 1947, who stated that"It ] he acceptance of a monogamous marriage as the socially recognised form of cohabitation of man and woman, logically brings about that a difference must be made between children in and out of wed lock. Not because the legislator does not have any compassion with these indeed innocent children.. but because the interest of society as a whole in the preservation of the respect for the institution of marriage, has priority over the individual interests of those persons 41. The abstract interests of society as envisaged in this 38O'Donovan(1985), p. 8 39See also Willekens(1997), p. 77 40 Willekens(1997),pp.80-83 4 Asser/Wiarda(1957), pp 496-497(my translation; emphasis added)criticised Mill because his striving for female equality still mainly concerned public life. Private life and the family remained largely on the periphery of his attention.38 Feminist criticism of liberalism usually focused on the fact that the inequality of women was generally neglected. But when things went wrong, the family was a cage for two. Conservatism in family and private life was perhaps more to the detriment of women than of men, but it did affect men too. The man was equally deprived of the possibility of escaping a broken marriage or to legitimise children born out of wedlock. The long-standing disregard of the family and the private sphere by liberal philosophy was part of the ideological background of the phenomenon that medieval concepts prevailed much longer in family law than in society in general. It also probably forms at least a part of the explanation for the fact that the first and most radical reforms of family law did not take place in the countries that were most influenced by classical liberal philosophy.39 Also illustrative of the late liberalisation of family and private life is the development of the ideas about the place of romantic love. In days gone by, the family was the domain of duties, not of feelings. Affection was desirable but not necessary. With the growth of prosperity and the change of the social function of the family, which no longer formed the basic economic unit,40 the pressure imposed by duties diminished and more room was given to personal freedom. For the first time in history, romantic love entered the family. Before that time, the place for romantic love was normally envisaged outside the family. The courtly love of the troubadours was not directed towards one’s own spouse. Tristan and Isolde, Lancelot en Guinevere were lovers, not spouses. Only in the 19th century did romantic love raise its banner within the family. The literature of that century shows a wide range of desperate conflicts between romantic love and one of the central canonical dogmas: the inadmissibility of consensual divorce. Galsworthy’s Forsyte Saga, Flaubert’s L’Éducation sentimentale and Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina and The Living Dead are just a few well-known examples. This conflict raged for 150 years until only in the 1960s, with the acceptance of consensual divorce, love became the true basis for the family. With individualism and personal freedom invading the family, the ideas concerning its social function and its whole image changed. The family came to be regarded as a union based on love, its primary purpose being to serve the happiness of its members. This change from a transpersonal to a personalistic approach is, to my mind, the most important transformation that has occurred in family law over the last two centuries. The essence of transpersonalism is the sacrificing of the interests of individuals to abstract values. This attitude was typical of medieval society, but in the private sphere it has dominated well into modern times. Family law was one of its last resorts. An everyday example of the endurance of transpersonalism can be found in the words of the Dutch Minister of Justice delivered in 1947, who stated that ‘[t]he acceptance of a monogamous marriage as the socially recognised form of cohabitation of man and woman, logically brings about that a difference must be made between children in and out of wedlock . . . Not because the legislator does not have any compassion with these indeed innocent children . . . but because the interest of society as a whole in the preservation of the respect for the institution of marriage, has priority over the individual interests of those persons’ 41. The abstract interests of society as envisaged in this 38O’Donovan (1985), p. 8. 39See also Willekens (1997), p. 77. 40Willekens (1997), pp. 80-83. 41Asser/Wiarda (1957), pp. 496-497 (my translation; emphasis added)