then on, the regulations of the various protestant Churches and the secular laws of the advancing national states led to increasing divergence, although the direction of the changes was essentially the same. The end of uniformity did not mean the end of the dominance of the ecclesiastical concepts of the Middle Ages. Although the Protestant countries rejected the sacral character of marriage and the principle of its indissolubility, most of the canon heritage survived. As Glendon puts it: [SEcular government simply took over much of the ady-made set of the canon law. 32 With the differentiation within the Church and the Enlightenment, ideological pluralism increased, and it became more and more difficult for the state to justify the canonical concepts it had taken over. The unity of ideology and belief. so typical for the Middle Ages, was now gone. Canonical concepts such as marriage as a monogamous union for life, the unacceptability of concubinage, the prohibition of consensu divorce and the exclusion of illegit imate children from the family structure, gradually lost their self-evidence. Nonetheless, they were upheld for a considerable time, much longer than other medieval political and religious dogmas. Subject to serious discussion for the first time during the French Revolution, they again ruled almost uncontested for a long time thereafter They remained an inseparable part of the status quo. In the absence of a rational explanation (apart from an appeal to religion), these concepts were partly accepted as self-evident because of an unawareness that they had not always existed they were partly seen as features of a highly developed civilisation. They only came seriously under fire towards the end of the 19th century One of the possible reasons for this late liberalisation of family law is the remarkable time difference between the progress of liberal ideas about public life and the progress of the same ideas about life in the private sphere. The ideas of the Enlightenment were primarily focused on the rights and freedoms of the individ ual as a citizen, not of the individual as nal private person. The family remained part of the private domain where individualism, perso freedom and equal ity were acknowledged much later. AsO Donovan observes: Read ings of the major social contract theorists from Hobbes to Rousseau confirm that the family is taken as natural, as pre-given. Marriage, foundation of family, ensures the subord ination of women, which is presented as inevitable. The free individuals who contact in the social contract are male 33 On the same grounds, Okin doubts the universalism of Kant's ethic. Kants use of gender-neutral terms serves, in her eyes, only to cover the fact that he did not extrapolate his conclusions to women. 34 The same applies to classical liberalism.35 Although Locke was one of the first to defend the contractual nature of marriage, he thought it to be self-evident that women and children fell under the authority of men. 36 Only in the 19th century did mill explicitly apply liberal ideas to women. But even he remained reticent about one of the most prominent dilemmas of that time: the admissibility of consensual divorce. 37 Feminist writers 5ODonovan(1993), p.88 4okin(1989)p.91 SSee Freeman(1994), pp 23-25 36In Locke's view, because in the absence of consensus between husband and wife the last determ ination (i.e the rule) should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the mans share as the abler and stronger'; Locke (1970),p.157 37Mill(1974), p 33. See also the introduction to this book by w.R. Carr,p.vithen on, the regulations of the various Protestant Churches and the secular laws of the advancing national states led to increasing divergence, although the direction of the changes was essentially the same. The end of uniformity did not mean the end of the dominance of the ecclesiastical concepts of the Middle Ages. Although the Protestant countries rejected the sacral character of marriage and the principle of its indissolubility, most of the canon heritage survived. As Glendon puts it: ‘[S]ecular government simply took over much of the ready-made set of the canon law.’32 With the differentiation within the Church and the Enlightenment, ideological pluralism increased, and it became more and more difficult for the state to justify the canonical concepts it had taken over. The unity of ideology and belief, so typical for the Middle Ages, was now gone. Canonical concepts such as marriage as a monogamous union for life, the unacceptability of concubinage, the prohibition of consensual divorce and the exclusion of illegitimate children from the family structure, gradually lost their self-evidence. Nonetheless, they were upheld for a considerable time, much longer than other medieval political and religious dogmas. Subject to serious discussion for the first time during the French Revolution, they again ruled almost uncontested for a long time thereafter. They remained an inseparable part of the status quo. In the absence of a rational explanation (apart from an appeal to religion), these concepts were partly accepted as self-evident because of an unawareness that they had not always existed; they were partly seen as features of a highly developed civilisation. They only came seriously under fire towards the end of the 19th century. One of the possible reasons for this late liberalisation of family law is the remarkable time difference between the progress of liberal ideas about public life and the progress of the same ideas about life in the private sphere. The ideas of the Enlightenment were primarily focused on the rights and freedoms of the individual as a citizen, not of the individual as a private person. The family remained part of the private domain where individualism, personal freedom and equality were acknowledged much later. As O’Donovan observes: ‘Readings of the major social contract theorists from Hobbes to Rousseau confirm that the family is taken as natural, as pre-given. Marriage, foundation of family, ensures the subordination of women, which is presented as inevitable. The free individuals who contact in the social contract are male.’33 On the same grounds, Okin doubts the universalism of Kant’s ethic. Kant’s use of ‘gender-neutral terms’ serves, in her eyes, only to cover the fact that he did not extrapolate his conclusions to women.34 The same applies to classical liberalism.35 Although Locke was one of the first to defend the contractual nature of marriage, he thought it to be self-evident that women and children fell under the authority of men.36 Only in the 19th century did Mill explicitly apply liberal ideas to women. But even he remained reticent about one of the most prominent dilemmas of that time: the admissibility of consensual divorce.37 Feminist writers 32Glendon (1989), p. 31. 33O’Donovan (1993), p. 88. 34Okin (1989), p. 91. 35See Freeman (1994), pp. 23-25. 36In Locke’s view, because in the absence of consensus between husband and wife ‘the last determination (i.e., the rule) should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man’s share as the abler and stronger’; Locke (1970), p. 157. 37Mill (1974), p. 33. See also the introduction to this book by W.R. Carr, p. vii