together part of a unified consciousness at that time Diachronic unity: Person-stages x and y are parts of the same person iff x and y are together part of an extended consciousness, we might think of this as a kind of extended psychological continuity Aiming for an account of diachronic (personal)identity using Locke's insight, consider Memory Criterion(basic form): x and y are stages of the same person iff y remembers x's experiences, thoughts, feelings, etc (either directly or indirectly ) or vv.( Call this"memory linked".) Circularity Problem: this criterion will work only if we insist that the memories be"genuine", not just"seeming memories". But the best account of genuine memories seems to rely on the very notion we' re trying to define. Roughly x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x's experiences, etc But to cash out"really remembering"we need y really remembers x's experiences, etc, iff y seems to remember them, and x and y are stages of the same This is circular Reply: There is a better account of"really remembering"that avoids this y really remembers x s experiences, etc, iff y seems to remember them, and y's memories of x's experiences are caused"in the right way What is"the right way"? Perhaps, "some especially reliable way"? This suggests a new version of the memory criterion that avoids the circularity problem Memory Criterion(causal continuity version or " MCcc"):x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x's experiences, etc.(the memories are caused"in the right way")either directly or indirectly(Call this real-memory linked".) The MCecv appears to allow for immortality because it is possible for God (or some other mechanism) to take all your memories on your deathbed and imprint them in another body in the afterlife The "consciousness"in this other body seems to have all of your memories; if the mechanism(be it God or some other) is sufficiently reliable, then by mcccv you exist in the afterlife. HOWEVER, why can, t such a mechanism imprint the memories in more than one body? Would there then be two of you in the afterlife? Duplication Problem: on the causal continuity version of MC it is possible that person stage x is memory linked with two different stages y and z(e. g, in different bodies)that are not memory linked, so that one person-stage would have two different futures. This is impossible. If G is the same person as A, and g is the same person as b, then a must be the same ersontogether part of a unified consciousness at that time. Diachronic unity: Person-stages x and y are parts of the same person iff x and y are together part of an extended consciousness; we might think of this as a kind of extended psychological continuity. Aiming for an account of diachronic (personal) identity using Locke's insight, consider: Memory Criterion (basic form): x and y are stages of the same person iff y remembers x's experiences, thoughts, feelings, etc. (either directly or indirectly), or vv. (Call this "memory linked".) Circularity Problem: this criterion will work only if we insist that the memories be "genuine", not just "seeming memories". But the best account of genuine memories seems to rely on the very notion we're trying to define. Roughly: x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x's experiences, etc. But to cash out "really remembering" we need: y really remembers x's experiences, etc., iff y seems to remember them, and x and y are stages of the same person. This is circular. Reply: There is a better account of "really remembering" that avoids this: y really remembers x's experiences, etc., iff y seems to remember them, and y's memories of x's experiences are caused "in the right way". What is "the right way"? Perhaps, "some especially reliable way"? This suggests a new version of the memory criterion that avoids the circularity problem: Memory Criterion (causal continuity version or "MCccv"): x and y are stages of the same person iff y really remembers x's experiences, etc. (the memories are caused "in the right way") either directly or indirectly. (Call this "real-memory linked".) The MCccv appears to allow for immortality because it is possible for God (or some other mechanism) to take all your memories on your deathbed and imprint them in another body in the afterlife. The "consciousness" in this other body seems to have all of your memories; if the mechanism (be it God or some other) is sufficiently reliable, then by MCccv you exist in the afterlife. HOWEVER, why can't such a mechanism imprint the memories in more than one body? Would there then be two of you in the afterlife? Duplication Problem: on the causal continuity version of MC it is possible that person stage x is memory linked with two different stages y and z (e.g., in different bodies) that are not memory linked, so that one person-stage would have two different futures. This is impossible. If G is the same person as A, and G is the same person as B, then A must be the same person as B