24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally haslar October 17. 2001 al Identity ll Problem of synchronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two simultaneous person-events events in the life of the same person? Problem of diachronic identity for persons under what conditions are two person-stages stages in the life of a single person. In particular, what makes a particular person-stage a continuation of me as I am right now? Background desiderata: an account of personal identity should allow for the possibility of anticipation and memory, i.e., of individual psychological connections between different person stages. It should also allow us to justify our practices of recognizing and identifying persons Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same soul Or, in the terminology of stages Person-stage x is part of the same person as person-stage y iff there is a(single)soul S that is present in both x and Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body Or, in the terminology of stages Person-stage x is part of the same person as person-stage y iff x and y are person-stages linked by bodily continuity(where bodily continuity is understood in terms of the continuity of a living human body) Sams criticisms of the body criterion 1) If I were my body, then I would have no special access to myself, e. g, in order to know I am present in a situation, like everyone else, I would have to determine whether my body is present. But it seems that we do have special access to ourselves: when I wake up in the morning I can tell that I exist and am the same person who went to sleep before I have ny information about the existence or condition of my body. So the body criterion does not do justice to our practices of self-recognition and self-identification ii) It is possible to be the same person without the same body. Although it may not be physically possible for persons to switch bodies, it is certainly conceivable that you could wake up in the morning in your roommate's body(and vice versa), or in a non-human body. But if this is conceivable, then the body criterion doesn 't capture what it is to be the same person over time, i.e., our concept of person Locke' s idea: continuity of consciousness Synchronic unity: Person-events e and e occurring simultaneously are parts of the same person-stage iffe and e'are24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger October 17, 2001 Personal Identity II Problem of synchronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two simultaneous person-events events in the life of the same person? Problem of diachronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two person-stages stages in the life of a single person. In particular, what makes a particular person-stage a continuation of me as I am right now? Background desiderata: an account of personal identity should allow for the possibility of anticipation and memory, i.e., of individual psychological connections between different person stages. It should also allow us to justify our practices of recognizing and identifying persons. Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same soul. Or, in the terminology of stages: Person-stage x is part of the same person as person-stage y iff there is a (single) soul S that is present in both x and y. Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body. Or, in the terminology of stages: Person-stage x is part of the same person as person-stage y iff x and y are person-stages linked by bodily continuity (where bodily continuity is understood in terms of the continuity of a living human body). Sam's criticisms of the body criterion: i) If I were my body, then I would have no special access to myself, e.g., in order to know I am present in a situation, like everyone else, I would have to determine whether my body is present. But it seems that we do have special access to ourselves: when I wake up in the morning I can tell that I exist and am the same person who went to sleep before I have any information about the existence or condition of my body. So the body criterion does not do justice to our practices of self-recognition and self-identification. ii) It is possible to be the same person without the same body. Although it may not be physically possible for persons to switch bodies, it is certainly conceivable that you could wake up in the morning in your roommate's body (and vice versa), or in a non-human body. But if this is conceivable, then the body criterion doesn't capture what it is to be the same person over time, i.e., our concept of person. Locke's idea: continuity of consciousness Synchronic unity: Person-events e and e' occurring simultaneously are parts of the same person-stage iff e and e' are