454 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY reans into clearer focus.Integrating Korean sources with the English-language literature,those accounts have focused attention on the peninsular origins of the war and the interaction between the great powers and the local actors,between international politics and local politics.On a third front,Soviet involvement,the first volume of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs opened up some intriguing insights in 1970,and the 1990 volume has offered some supplementary details.But in general,our view on the Kremlin remained limited in the age of glasnost,and little has yet changed now in the age of Boris Yeltsin.3 The Chinese role has,at least until recently,been only marginally better under- stood.Whether and when the Chinese might release illuminating material on the war has been a subject of occasional,generally pessimistic comment.But the Chinese are making their own contribution to our understanding of the war,helping us to move beyond the point researchers relying heavily on the contemporary public record had carried us.5 Thanks to new material China's intrusion into the narrative need no longer be accompanied by a relentless rain of speculation and misinformation.We can now correct misconceptions by nonspecialists intent on a more global view of the war,s subject undocu- mented claims to critical scrutiny,?and begin to nail down such vital but elu- 3 See John Merrill,review article,Journal of Korean Studies 3(1981):181-91,for a helpful appraisal of Nikita S.Khrushchev,Khrushchev Remembers,Strobe Talbott,trans.and ed.,2 vols. (Boston:Little,Brown,1970 and 1974).See also Khrushchev Remembers:The Glasnost Tapes, Jerrold L.Schecter with Vyacheslav V.Luchkov,trans.and eds.(Boston:Little,Brown,1990),143- 47.For recent revelations,perhaps a harbinger,see the Reuters report from Moscow,"Ex-North Korea Envoy Says Kim Started War,"New York Times,6 July 1990;and N.Anin (pseud.),"How the War in Korea Started,"Newsreview,13 July 1991,31,and 20 July 1991,29,and 27 July 1991, 30.Milton Leitenberg was kind enough to supply me with a copy of the latter item. 4 For example,Max Hastings writing in 1987 suggested that the Chinese records are either lost or forever sealed."It may never be possible to piece together the precise decision-making process in Peking that led to the order to enter Korea.Almost all the key participants are dead,and among the living there is no reliable body of records to enable even those who wish to establish the objective truth about recent Chinese political history to do so."Hastings,The Korean War(New York:Simon Schuster,1987),132.Edwin P.Hoyt,The Day the Chinese Attacked:Korea,1950(New York: McGraw-Hill,1990),144,is similarly pessimistic. 5 Allen S.Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu:The Decision to Enter the Korean War (originally published 1960,Stanford,CA:Stanford University Press,1968),a meticulous reconstruction of Chinese signalling from June to November 1950,is the best known and most influential of these works based primarily on the public record. 6 Take for example the basic error of making Lin Biao the commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea in Joseph C.Goulden,Korea:The Untold Story of the War (New York:Times Books, 1982),309;and Clay Blair,The Forgotten War:America in Korea,1950-53 (New York:Times Books, 1987),390,396. 7 See for example the imaginative treatment of Chinese decision making in October and November 1950 in Russell Spurr,Enter the Dragon:China's Undeclared War against the U.S.in Korea,1950- 5/(New York:Newmarket Press,1988).Spurr fails to indicate precisely how the interviews in China on which he relies so heavily support his narrative.Hoyt,The Day the Chinese Attacked,a somewhat better grounded account,also dispenses with precise documentation.454 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY reans into clearer focus. Integrating Korean sources with the English-language literature, those accounts have focused attention on the peninsular origins of the war and the interaction between the great powers and the local actors, between international politics and local politics. On a third front, Soviet involvement, the first volume of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs opened up some intriguing insights in 1970, and the 1990 volume has offered some supplementary details. But in general, our view on the Kremlin remained limited in the age of glasnost, and little has yet changed now in the age of Boris Yeltsin.3 The Chinese role has, at least until recently, been only marginally better under￾stood. Whether and when the Chinese might release illuminating material on the war has been a subject of occasional, generally pessimistic comment.4 But the Chinese are making their own contribution to our understanding of the war, helping us to move beyond the point researchers relying heavily on the contemporary public record had carried US.5 Thanks to new material China's intrusion into the narrative need no longer be accompanied by a relentless rain of speculation and misinformation. We can now correct misconceptions by nonspecialists intent on a more global view of the war,6 subject undocu￾mented claims to critical scrutiny,7 and begin to nail down such vital but elu- 3 See John Merrill, review article, Journal of Korean Studies 3 (1981): 181-91, for a helpful appraisal of Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., 2 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970 and 1974). See also Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov, trans. and eds. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 143- 47. For recent revelations, perhaps a harbinger, see the Reuters report from Moscow, "Ex-North Korea Envoy Says Kim Started War," New York Times, 6 July 1990; and N. Anin (pseud.), "How the War in Korea Started," Newsreview, 13 July 1991, 31, and 20 July 1991, 29, and 27 July 1991, 30. Milton Leitenberg was kind enough to supply me with a copy of the latter item. 4For example, Max Hastings writing in 1987 suggested that the Chinese records are either lost or forever sealed. "It may never be possible to piece together the precise decision-making process in Peking that led to the order to enter Korea. Almost all the key participants are dead, and among the living there is no reliable body of records to enable even those who wish to establish the objective truth about recent Chinese political history to do so." Hastings, The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 132. Edwin P. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked: Korea, 1950 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 144, is similarly pessimistic. 5 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (originally published 1960, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), a meticulous reconstruction of Chinese signalling from June to November 1950, is the best known and most influential of these works based primarily on the public record. 6 Take for example the basic error of making Lin Biao the commander of the Chinese "volunteers" in Korea in Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), 309; and Clay Blair, TheForgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53 (New York: Times Books, 1987), 390, 396. 7See for example the imaginative treatment of Chinese decision making in October and November 1950 in Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War against the U.S. in Korea, 1950- 51 (New York: Newmarket Press, 1988). Spurr fails to indicate precisely how the interviews in China on which he relies so heavily support his narrative. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked, a somewhat better grounded account, also dispenses with precise documentation