International organizations as teachers of norms:the United Nations Educational,Scientific,and Cutural Organization and science policy Martha Finnemore The structure of states is continually evolving.Since their establishment in Europe some five hundred years ago and particularly since World War I,states have grown in terms of both the variety of tasks they perform and the organizational apparatuses with which they perform these tasks. The research outlined below investigates the causes underlying this process of state change in the case of one recently adopted set of state bureaucracies, those designed to coordinate scientific research.In the last fifty years science policymaking organizations have sprung up in virtually all developed countries and in most developing ones.Most explanations for the appearance of these new pieces of state machinery found in the political science or economics literatures describe this development as demand-driven,that is,some domestic group perceives a problem to which a science policy bureaucracy is the solution. Social groups such as producers of science (e.g.,scientists)or consumers of science (e.g.,technology-intensive businesses)may come to perceive that state coordination and direction of a growing science establishment are in their interest.State officials may come to perceive that the intimate relation- ship between science and security makes control of science in the national interest.Depending on the perspective adopted,one would predict differ- ent configurations of science bureaucracies serving different interests,but in all cases,the impetus for creating those organizations would be a demand by state or societal actors that the government should direct and control science. This study quantitatively tests these demand-driven hypotheses by compar- ing a variety of indicators of state conditions that have been argued to prompt demand with the timing of adoption of science policy bureaucracies.The I am grateful to Laura Helvey,Peter Katzenstein,Steve Krasner,Forrest Maltzman,Rose McDermott,John Meyer,John Odell,Francisco Ramirez,Nina Tannenwald,Kurt Weyland,and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Intemational Organization 47,4,Autumn 1993,pp.565-597 1994 by The I0 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyInternational organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and science policy Martha Finnemore The structure of states is continually evolving. Since their establishment in Europe some five hundred years ago and particularly since World War I, states have grown in terms of both the variety of tasks they perform and the organizational apparatuses with which they perform these tasks. The research outlined below investigates the causes underlying this process of state change in the case of one recently adopted set of state bureaucracies, those designed to coordinate scientific research. In the last fifty years science policymaking organizations have sprung up in virtually all developed countries and in most developing ones. Most explanations for the appearance of these new pieces of state machinery found in the political science or economics literatures describe this development as demand-driven, that is, some domestic group perceives a problem to which a science policy bureaucracy is the solution. Social groups such as producers of science (e.g., scientists) or consumers of science (e.g., technology-intensive businesses) may come to perceive that state coordination and direction of a growing science establishment are in their interest. State officials may come to perceive that the intimate relation￾ship between science and security makes control of science in the national interest. Depending on the perspective adopted, one would predict differ￾ent configurations of science bureaucracies serving different interests, but in all cases, the impetus for creating those organizations would be a demand by state or societal actors that the government should direct and control science. This study quantitatively tests these demand-driven hypotheses by compar￾ing a variety of indicators of state conditions that have been argued to prompt demand with the timing of adoption of science policy bureaucracies. The I am grateful to Laura Helvey, Peter Katzenstein, Steve Krasner, Forrest Maltzman, Rose McDermott, John Meyer, John Odell, Francisco Ramirez, Nina Tannenwald, Kurt Weyland, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. International Organization 47, 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 565-597 © 1994 by The 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology