International organizations as teachers of norms:the United Nations Educational,Scientific,and Cutural Organization and science policy Martha Finnemore The structure of states is continually evolving.Since their establishment in Europe some five hundred years ago and particularly since World War I,states have grown in terms of both the variety of tasks they perform and the organizational apparatuses with which they perform these tasks. The research outlined below investigates the causes underlying this process of state change in the case of one recently adopted set of state bureaucracies, those designed to coordinate scientific research.In the last fifty years science policymaking organizations have sprung up in virtually all developed countries and in most developing ones.Most explanations for the appearance of these new pieces of state machinery found in the political science or economics literatures describe this development as demand-driven,that is,some domestic group perceives a problem to which a science policy bureaucracy is the solution. Social groups such as producers of science (e.g.,scientists)or consumers of science (e.g.,technology-intensive businesses)may come to perceive that state coordination and direction of a growing science establishment are in their interest.State officials may come to perceive that the intimate relation- ship between science and security makes control of science in the national interest.Depending on the perspective adopted,one would predict differ- ent configurations of science bureaucracies serving different interests,but in all cases,the impetus for creating those organizations would be a demand by state or societal actors that the government should direct and control science. This study quantitatively tests these demand-driven hypotheses by compar- ing a variety of indicators of state conditions that have been argued to prompt demand with the timing of adoption of science policy bureaucracies.The I am grateful to Laura Helvey,Peter Katzenstein,Steve Krasner,Forrest Maltzman,Rose McDermott,John Meyer,John Odell,Francisco Ramirez,Nina Tannenwald,Kurt Weyland,and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Intemational Organization 47,4,Autumn 1993,pp.565-597 1994 by The I0 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cutural Organization and science policy Martha Finnemore The structure of states is continually evolving. Since their establishment in Europe some five hundred years ago and particularly since World War I, states have grown in terms of both the variety of tasks they perform and the organizational apparatuses with which they perform these tasks. The research outlined below investigates the causes underlying this process of state change in the case of one recently adopted set of state bureaucracies, those designed to coordinate scientific research. In the last fifty years science policymaking organizations have sprung up in virtually all developed countries and in most developing ones. Most explanations for the appearance of these new pieces of state machinery found in the political science or economics literatures describe this development as demand-driven, that is, some domestic group perceives a problem to which a science policy bureaucracy is the solution. Social groups such as producers of science (e.g., scientists) or consumers of science (e.g., technology-intensive businesses) may come to perceive that state coordination and direction of a growing science establishment are in their interest. State officials may come to perceive that the intimate relationship between science and security makes control of science in the national interest. Depending on the perspective adopted, one would predict different configurations of science bureaucracies serving different interests, but in all cases, the impetus for creating those organizations would be a demand by state or societal actors that the government should direct and control science. This study quantitatively tests these demand-driven hypotheses by comparing a variety of indicators of state conditions that have been argued to prompt demand with the timing of adoption of science policy bureaucracies. The I am grateful to Laura Helvey, Peter Katzenstein, Steve Krasner, Forrest Maltzman, Rose McDermott, John Meyer, John Odell, Francisco Ramirez, Nina Tannenwald, Kurt Weyland, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. International Organization 47, 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 565-597 © 1994 by The 10 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
566 International Organization results provide little support for any of the demand-driven hypotheses. Consequently,an alternative explanation is investigated.Early in the diffusion of this bureaucratic innovation,several international organizations took up science policy as a cause and promoted it among member states.The article traces the process whereby one of these international organizations,the United Nations Educational,Scientific,and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), "taught"states the value and utility of science policy organizations. I argue that the creation of this teaching mission,whereby UNESCO would supply the organizational innovation to states,was a reflection of a new norm elaborated within the international community.This norm held that coordina- tion and direction of science are necessary tasks of the modern state and that a science policy bureaucracy having certain well-specified characteristics was the appropriate means to fulfill those tasks.States created science bureaucracies,with UNESCO's help,to comply with the new norm about states'responsibility for science.Thus,the organizational innovation was supplied to states from outside,from an international organization,rather than being the product of any characteristics internal to or inherent in the state itself. The article makes contributions to three different theoretical debates ongoing in the field.First,the findings outlined above lend support to constructivist or reflective theoretical approaches that treat states as social entities,shaped in part by international social action.State policies and structures in this case are influenced by changing intersubjective understand- ings about the appropriate role of the modern state. However,in most cases the causes of those changed understandings lie not at the national level but at the systemic level:it is an international organization that persuades states to adopt these changes.Thus,a second contribution of this article is to demonstrate the role of international organizations as principals,rather than agents,in international politics. Finally,the article raises questions about the nature and role of epistemic communities.While many of the UNESCO officials involved in this reorganiza- tion of international science had scientific credentials,their reasons for acting had more to do with their status as international bureaucrats than with their professional socialization or principled beliefs about science.This suggests that the "epistemic"aspect of groups may not always be their most important feature and that caution is warranted in ascribing causal status to specialized knowledge when explaining political behavior. 1.For purposes of this article a"norm"is defined as a rulelike prescription which is both clearly perceptible to a community of actors and which makes behavioral claims upon those actors. Although comments of McElroy were influential in formulating this definition,McElroy's own definition differs significantly from mine;see Robert McElroy,Moraliry and American Foreign Policy:The Role of Moral Norms in International Affairs(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1992)
566 International Organization results provide little support for any of the demand-driven hypotheses. Consequently, an alternative explanation is investigated. Early in the diffusion of this bureaucratic innovation, several international organizations took up science policy as a cause and promoted it among member states. The article traces the process whereby one of these international organizations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), "taught" states the value and utility of science policy organizations. I argue that the creation of this teaching mission, whereby UNESCO would supply the organizational innovation to states, was a reflection of a new norm elaborated within the international community.1 This norm held that coordination and direction of science are necessary tasks of the modern state and that a science policy bureaucracy having certain well-specified characteristics was the appropriate means to fulfill those tasks. States created science bureaucracies, with UNESCO's help, to comply with the new norm about states' responsibility for science. Thus, the organizational innovation was supplied to states from outside, from an international organization, rather than being the product of any characteristics internal to or inherent in the state itself. The article makes contributions to three different theoretical debates ongoing in the field. First, the findings outlined above lend support to constructivist or reflective theoretical approaches that treat states as social entities, shaped in part by international social action. State policies and structures in this case are influenced by changing intersubjective understandings about the appropriate role of the modern state. However, in most cases the causes of those changed understandings lie not at the national level but at the systemic level: it is an international organization that persuades states to adopt these changes. Thus, a second contribution of this article is to demonstrate the role of international organizations as principals, rather than agents, in international politics. Finally, the article raises questions about the nature and role of epistemic communities. While many of the UNESCO officials involved in this reorganization of international science had scientific credentials, their reasons for acting had more to do with their status as international bureaucrats than with their professional socialization or principled beliefs about science. This suggests that the "epistemic" aspect of groups may not always be their most important feature and that caution is warranted in ascribing causal status to specialized knowledge when explaining political behavior. 1. For purposes of this article a "norm" is defined as a rulelike prescription which is both clearly perceptible to a community of actors and which makes behavioral claims upon those actors. Although comments of McElroy were influential in formulating this definition, McElroy's own definition differs significantly from mine; see Robert McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Moral Norms in International Affairs (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992)
UNESCO 567 The development of science policy The relationship between states and science by no means begins with the establishment of formal state science policy bureaucracies.2 National acad- emies and royal societies of science,many of which enjoyed some amount of state sponsorship and whose members were in frequent contact with govern- ment officials,date back to the seventeenth century.Similarly,state-sponsored universities often housed scientists and their activities.However,state sponsor- ship of the sciences in this early period was understood to be analogous to state sponsorship of the arts;greatness and accomplishment in arts and sciences reflected state power rather than being a means to achieve power.Further, patronage of this kind usually entailed minimal direction and control.Acad- emies and universities may (or may not)have benefited from state funding,but they were not part of the state apparatus and were left free to pursue their work with a minimum of state interference. The modern concept of science policy differs on both these issues.It understands science as a means to national power and consequently seeks to bring science activity under the control of the state.Most often this has entailed the creation of a new piece of state apparatus dedicated explicitly to this task. The first effort to do this was made by the British in 1915 when they established the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to wean British science and industry from continental,especially German,innovations,expertise,and technical equipment during World War I.3 A few Commonwealth members mimicked the British lead and established similar organizations,but it was not until after World War II that science policy bureaucracies became widespread. Before 1955 only a handful of countries(fourteen)had such entities;by 1975 eighty-nine countries did.This research seeks to explain how and why the state interest in and use of science changed in this way. 2.The history of states'changing attitudes toward science obviously is much more complex than the overview presented here.For more on this subject,see Joseph Ben David,"The Scientific Role: The Conditions of Its Establishment in Europe,"Minerva 4(Autumn 1965),pp.15-54;A.Hunter Dupre,Science in the Federal Govemment:A History of Policies and Activities to 1940(Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press,1957);Philip Gummett,Scientists in Whitehall (Manchester, England:Manchester University Press,1980);Ros Herman,The European Scientific Community (Harlow,England:Longman Press,1986);Eric Hutchinson,"Scientists as an Inferior Class:The Early Years of the DSIR,"Minerva 8(July 1970),pp.396-411;Daniel Kevels,The Physicists:The History of a Scientific Community in Moder America (New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1978);Frank Pfetsch,"Scientific Organization and Science Policy in Imperial Germany,1871-1914:The Founding of the Imperial Institute of Physics and Technology,"Minerva 8(October 1970),pp. 557-80;Jarlath Royane,Science in Govemment (London:Edward Arnold,1984);Ian Varcoe, "Scientists,Government,and Organized Research in Great Britain,1914-1916:The Early History of the DSIR,"Minerva 8(April 1970),pp.192-216;and Robert Wuthnow,"The World Economy and the Institutionalization of Science in Seventeenth Century Europe,"in Albert Bergesen,ed., Studies of the Modem World-System (New York:Academic Press,1980),pp.57-76. 3.Peter Alter,The Reluctant Patron:Science and the State in Britain,1850-1920 (Oxford:Berg, 1987),pp.201f
UNESCO 567 The development of science policy The relationship between states and science by no means begins with the establishment of formal state science policy bureaucracies.2 National academies and royal societies of science, many of which enjoyed some amount of state sponsorship and whose members were in frequent contact with government officials, date back to the seventeenth century. Similarly, state-sponsored universities often housed scientists and their activities. However, state sponsorship of the sciences in this early period was understood to be analogous to state sponsorship of the arts; greatness and accomplishment in arts and sciences reflected state power rather than being a means to achieve power. Further, patronage of this kind usually entailed minimal direction and control. Academies and universities may (or may not) have benefited from state funding, but they were not part of the state apparatus and were left free to pursue their work with a minimum of state interference. The modern concept of science policy differs on both these issues. It understands science as a means to national power and consequently seeks to bring science activity under the control of the state. Most often this has entailed the creation of a new piece of state apparatus dedicated explicitly to this task. The first effort to do this was made by the British in 1915 when they established the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to wean British science and industry from continental, especially German, innovations, expertise, and technical equipment during World War I.3 A few Commonwealth members mimicked the British lead and established similar organizations, but it was not until after World War II that science policy bureaucracies became widespread. Before 1955 only a handful of countries (fourteen) had such entities; by 1975 eighty-nine countries did. This research seeks to explain how and why the state interest in and use of science changed in this way. 2. The history of states' changing attitudes toward science obviously is much more complex than the overview presented here. For more on this subject, see Joseph Ben David, "The Scientific Role: The Conditions of Its Establishment in Europe," Minerva 4 (Autumn 1965), pp. 15-54; A. Hunter Dupre, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and Activities to 1940 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Philip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1980); Ros Herman, The European Scientific Community (Harlow, England: Longman Press, 1986); Eric Hutchinson, "Scientists as an Inferior Class: The Early Years of the DSIR," Minerva 8 (July 1970), pp. 396-411; Daniel Kevels, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Frank Pfetsch, "Scientific Organization and Science Policy in Imperial Germany, 1871-1914: The Founding of the Imperial Institute of Physics and Technology," Minerva 8 (October 1970), pp. 557-80; Jarlath Royane, Science in Government (London: Edward Arnold, 1984); Ian Varcoe, "Scientists, Government, and Organized Research in Great Britain, 1914-1916: The Early History of the DSIR," Minerva 8 (April 1970), pp. 192-216; and Robert Wuthnow, "The World Economy and the Institutionalization of Science in Seventeenth Century Europe," in Albert Bergesen, ed., Studies of the Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 57-76. 3. Peter Alter, The Reluctant Patron: Science and the State in Britain, 1850-1920 (Oxford: Berg, 1987), pp. 201ff
568 International Organization For purposes of this study I define science policy bureaucracies as organs of the state that have as their primary mission the tasks of coordinating, organizing,and planning scientific and technological activities at a national level.I exclude from my definition the following types of organizations:(1) nonstate organizations(such as scientists'professional societies);(2)organiza- tions dealing with only one branch of science (such as the National Weather Service or medical and health organizations);(3)educational organizations whose primary mission is to train scientific and technical personnel rather than coordinate activities broadly;and (4)research organizations whose primary mission is to conduct research rather than to make policy.This definition is based on UNESCO's definition used in compiling its world directories of national science policymaking bodies and so ensures that the UNESCO activities chronicled below and my analysis concern the same phenomena.4 Demand-driven explanations for science policy organizations Most explanations for the creation of new state bureaucracies trace the cause to some change in material conditions that reconfigures the interests of actors within the state.Functionalists might regard such an objective change to be sufficient as well as necessary for the new bureaucracy to appear.Others less sanguine about the efficacy of political systems in meeting all needs or fulfilling all functions would regard change in material conditions only as a necessary condition and look to the process by which demands are voiced and,once voiced,are realized for sufficient conditions.Even in this latter set of explanations,however,some material change must prompt the demand- making process. Thus in most explanations there is some prerequisite condition associated with the creation of new state bureaucracies.5 Three kinds of prerequisites have been argued to be relevant.The first are what I call issue-specific conditions. Here,it is the situation in the issue-area particularly relevant to the new 4.The first of these directories appeared during the 1960s.See United Nations Educational, Scientific,and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),World Directory of National Science Policy- making Bodies,3 vols.(Paris:UNESCO,1966-68).Volume 1 covered Europe and North America; volume 2,Asia and Oceania;and volume 3,Latin America.A second directory was published in 1984.See UNESCO,World Directory of National Science Policy-making Bodies,Science Policy Studies and Documents Series,vol.59 (UNESCO:Paris,1984).A second edition of this 1984 directory was published in 1990.See UNESCO,World Directory of National Science Policy-making Bodies,Science Policy Studies and Documents Series,vol.71 (Paris:UNESCO,1990).I have made several refinements to the UNESCO definitions.For further explanation,see the appendix. 5.I have borrowed the term"prerequisite"from Collier and Messick's analysis of the spread of social security across states.See David Collier and Richard Messick,"Prerequisites versus Diffusion:Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption,"American Political Science Review 69 (December 1975),pp.1299-315
568 International Organization For purposes of this study I define science policy bureaucracies as organs of the state that have as their primary mission the tasks of coordinating, organizing, and planning scientific and technological activities at a national level. I exclude from my definition the following types of organizations: (1) nonstate organizations (such as scientists' professional societies); (2) organizations dealing with only one branch of science (such as the National Weather Service or medical and health organizations); (3) educational organizations whose primary mission is to train scientific and technical personnel rather than coordinate activities broadly; and (4) research organizations whose primary mission is to conduct research rather than to make policy. This definition is based on UNESCO's definition used in compiling its world directories of national science policymaking bodies and so ensures that the UNESCO activities chronicled below and my analysis concern the same phenomena.4 Demand-driven explanations for science policy organizations Most explanations for the creation of new state bureaucracies trace the cause to some change in material conditions that reconfigures the interests of actors within the state. Functionalists might regard such an objective change to be sufficient as well as necessary for the new bureaucracy to appear. Others less sanguine about the efficacy of political systems in meeting all needs or fulfilling all functions would regard change in material conditions only as a necessary condition and look to the process by which demands are voiced and, once voiced, are realized for sufficient conditions. Even in this latter set of explanations, however, some material change must prompt the demandmaking process. Thus in most explanations there is some prerequisite condition associated with the creation of new state bureaucracies.5 Three kinds of prerequisites have been argued to be relevant. The first are what I call issue-specific conditions. Here, it is the situation in the issue-area particularly relevant to the new 4. The first of these directories appeared during the 1960s. See United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Directory of National Science Policymaking Bodies, 3 vols. (Paris: UNESCO, 1966-68). Volume 1 covered Europe and North America; volume 2, Asia and Oceania; and volume 3, Latin America. A second directory was published in 1984. See UNESCO, World Directory of National Science Policy-making Bodies, Science Policy Studies and Documents Series, vol. 59 (UNESCO: Paris, 1984). A second edition of this 1984 directory was published in 1990. See UNESCO, World Directory of National Science Policy-making Bodies, Science Policy Studies and Documents Series, vol. 71 (Paris: UNESCO, 1990). I have made several refinements to the UNESCO definitions. For further explanation, see the appendix. 5. I have borrowed the term "prerequisite" from Collier and Messick's analysis of the spread of social security across states. See David Collier and Richard Messick, "Prerequisites versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption," American Political Science Review 69 (December 1975), pp. 1299-315
UNESCO 569 organization that prompts its creation.Applied to science,this argument links the creation of a state science policymaking apparatus to the growth and strength of the domestic science community.An argument of just this type has been made by David Dickson to explain the origins of science policymaking in the United States.6 In Dickson's view the growth of the domestic science establishment prompted the creation of a state science policy apparatus in two ways.On the one hand state actors saw a science policy bureaucracy as an opportunity to direct and control this new activity.On the other hand scientists saw such an organization as a potential conduit for state aid and coordination. This thesis would predict adoption of science policy organizations to be highly correlated with domestic levels of science activity,for example,with the number of scientists in the country and the amount of research and develop- ment (R&D)spending. The next two types of conditions apply to consumers rather than producers of science.Development or modemization levels are argued to prompt the creation of science policy entities through the actions of the economic consumers of science,particularly industry.The idea here is that as a state's economy develops,it will become more technology-intensive and so require more scientific support.Economic actors therefore put pressure on the state to organize and supply this support;a new science policy organization is the result.In many mixed economies,these actors may be state economic actors; what is important for this analysis is that the purpose of demand-making is economic.According to this thesis,indicators of economic development,such as per capita gross domestic product(GDP),should predict the creation of a science policy organization. Security conditions are argued to prompt the creation of science policy bureaucracies through the actions of military consumers of science.In the modern era of warfare,scientific prowess has been clearly linked to technologi- cal and hence to military success.Thus states perceiving threats to their power and/or security will be pushed to find new and more effective technologies to meet those threats.Militaries in these states will demand that the state organize and support the scientific establishment for reasons of national defense. The timing of science bureaucracy creation in Britain(during World War I) and in the United States (immediately following World War II)has led a number of scholars to draw causal connections between security concerns and science policy.Sanford Lakoff,Jean-Jacques Salomon,and Harvey Sapolsky all point to these wars as well as to another perceived security threat-the launching of Sputnik-as the catalysts for government interest in harnessing science to achieve national objectives in the United States and Europe.Having organized science to meet security threats during wartime with apparent 6.David Dickson,The New Politics of Science (New York:Pantheon,1984),pp.25ff
UNESCO 569 organization that prompts its creation. Applied to science, this argument links the creation of a state science policymaking apparatus to the growth and strength of the domestic science community. An argument of just this type has been made by David Dickson to explain the origins of science policymaking in the United States.6 In Dickson's view the growth of the domestic science establishment prompted the creation of a state science policy apparatus in two ways. On the one hand state actors saw a science policy bureaucracy as an opportunity to direct and control this new activity. On the other hand scientists saw such an organization as a potential conduit for state aid and coordination. This thesis would predict adoption of science policy organizations to be highly correlated with domestic levels of science activity, for example, with the number of scientists in the country and the amount of research and development (R&D) spending. The next two types of conditions apply to consumers rather than producers of science. Development or modernization levels are argued to prompt the creation of science policy entities through the actions of the economic consumers of science, particularly industry. The idea here is that as a state's economy develops, it will become more technology-intensive and so require more scientific support. Economic actors therefore put pressure on the state to organize and supply this support; a new science policy organization is the result. In many mixed economies, these actors may be state economic actors; what is important for this analysis is that the purpose of demand-making is economic. According to this thesis, indicators of economic development, such as per capita gross domestic product (GDP), should predict the creation of a science policy organization. Security conditions are argued to prompt the creation of science policy bureaucracies through the actions of military consumers of science. In the modern era of warfare, scientific prowess has been clearly linked to technological and hence to military success. Thus states perceiving threats to their power and/or security will be pushed to find new and more effective technologies to meet those threats. Militaries in these states will demand that the state organize and support the scientific establishment for reasons of national defense. The timing of science bureaucracy creation in Britain (during World War I) and in the United States (immediately following World War II) has led a number of scholars to draw causal connections between security concerns and science policy. Sanford Lakoff, Jean-Jacques Salomon, and Harvey Sapolsky all point to these wars as well as to another perceived security threat—the launching of Sputnik—as the catalysts for government interest in harnessing science to achieve national objectives in the United States and Europe. Having organized science to meet security threats during wartime with apparent 6. David Dickson, The New Politics of Science (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 25ff
570 International Organization success,these wartime institutions were then redeployed by states to meet peacetime objectives.7 Robert Gilpin makes a more detailed and broader security argument based on his investigations of French science.8 He argues that France's creation of science policy organizations was the direct result of a perceived threat to French influence and independence from a preponderance of U.S.power immediately following World War II.At one level,this threat was understood militarily and led the French to use their science community to upgrade their defense establishment,notably to establish a separate nuclear strike force.But threats to influence and security in the French view were not limited to the military sphere.The French were also concerned about loss of economic dominance.U.S.economic strength following World War II was viewed with trepidation,and direct U.S.investment in France was viewed as a form of imperialism by a foreign power.During that time the French spoke of a "technology gap"that they must bridge by harnessing French science in the service of French industry to protect French economic independence and integrity.9 Security understood in this sweeping way,as any threat to influence and independence,could operate in so many arenas that developing tidy objective indicators to test for its presence is probably impossible.10 The narrower arguments about security threats understood in a military context are some- what easier to uncover.If armed conflict or the threat of armed conflict is critical,indicators of perceived military threat,such as defense spending as a percentage of GNP,should be correlated with the creation of science policy organizations.States perceiving military threats should be among the first to adopt science policy;conversely,relatively secure states should be clustered among the late adopters. Testing the demand-driven explanations Each of these explanations posits a material condition that then sparks a demand for the state to adopt new tasks and to create new bureaucracies to carry out those tasks.While it would be impractical to investigate the actual 7.See the following chapters in Ina Spiegel-Rosing and Derek de Solla Price,eds.,Science, Technology and Society:A Cross-disciplinary Perspective (London:Sage,1977):Jean-Jacques Salomon,"Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy,"pp.43-70;Sanford Lakoff,"Scientists,Technologists,and Political Power,"pp.355-92;and Harvey Sapolsky, "Science,Technology,and Military Policy,"pp.443-72. 8.Robert Gilpin,France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1968). 9.Ibid. 10.For example,in the French case,threats to influence and independence extended to cultural matters and led France to pursue a number of foreign policy initiatives aimed at preserving and extending French language and culture in other states
570 International Organization success, these wartime institutions were then redeployed by states to meet peacetime objectives.7 Robert Gilpin makes a more detailed and broader security argument based on his investigations of French science.8 He argues that France's creation of science policy organizations was the direct result of a perceived threat to French influence and independence from a preponderance of U.S. power immediately following World War II. At one level, this threat was understood militarily and led the French to use their science community to upgrade their defense establishment, notably to establish a separate nuclear strike force. But threats to influence and security in the French view were not limited to the military sphere. The French were also concerned about loss of economic dominance. U.S. economic strength following World War II was viewed with trepidation, and direct U.S. investment in France was viewed as a form of imperialism by a foreign power. During that time the French spoke of a "technology gap" that they must bridge by harnessing French science in the service of French industry to protect French economic independence and integrity.9 Security understood in this sweeping way, as any threat to influence and independence, could operate in so many arenas that developing tidy objective indicators to test for its presence is probably impossible.10 The narrower arguments about security threats understood in a military context are somewhat easier to uncover. If armed conflict or the threat of armed conflict is critical, indicators of perceived military threat, such as defense spending as a percentage of GNP, should be correlated with the creation of science policy organizations. States perceiving military threats should be among the first to adopt science policy; conversely, relatively secure states should be clustered among the late adopters. Testing the demand-driven explanations Each of these explanations posits a material condition that then sparks a demand for the state to adopt new tasks and to create new bureaucracies to carry out those tasks. While it would be impractical to investigate the actual 7. See the following chapters in Ina Spiegel-Rosing and Derek de Solla Price, eds., Science, Technology and Society: A Cross-disciplinary Perspective (London: Sage, 1977): Jean-Jacques Salomon, "Science Policy Studies and the Development of Science Policy," pp. 43-70; Sanford Lakoff, "Scientists, Technologists, and Political Power," pp. 355-92; and Harvey Sapolsky, "Science, Technology, and Military Policy," pp. 443-72. 8. Robert Gilpin, France in the Age of the Scientific State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968). 9. Ibid. 10. For example, in the French case, threats to influence and independence extended to cultural matters and led France to pursue a number of foreign policy initiatives aimed at preserving and extending French language and culture in other states
UNESCO 571 demand-making process over a large number of countries having very different political systems,it is quite simple to check for the existence of conditions said to be prerequisite to those demands.The test reported here compiled and analyzed quantitative indicators of domestic conditions that might prompt creation of a science policy bureaucracy in a sample of forty-four countries chosen to be globally representative in terms of both geography and develop- ment levels.As suggested in the foregoing discussion,these were percentage of GDP spent on R&D;proportion of scientists and engineers in the population; per capita GDP;and percentage of gross national product(GNP)spent on defense.A complete description of the indicators used and the method of compiling them can be found in the appendix. Testing a global sample of states raises issues about comparability among the units of analysis,particularly comparability of developing and industrialized states.Cameroon and the United States,for example,are so different on so many measures that one may question whether the units of analysis are sufficiently alike to make comparison appropriate and meaningful. In this case,comparability of the units is ensured by the research questions being asked.The hypotheses being tested concern the behavior of states as a political and organizational form:What prompts states to adopt new tasks and construct new apparatuses to carry out those tasks?The hypotheses do not carry with them caveats about degrees of stateness,state capacity,or other potentially limiting characteristics.Instead they make arguments about the behavior of states qua states.Cameroon and the United States may be very different states,but they are both states nonetheless.In fact the article will suggest that what is going on in this case is a redefinition of the state as a political and organizational form;that is,a redefinition of what is necessary and appropriate behavior for a state. Figures 1-4 show the distribution of values for each of the indicators of state conditions at the time science policy bureaucracies were created in the countries studied.A quick look at figures reveals that none of the patterns corresponds to the expected patterns described above.If any of these conditions were both necessary and sufficient,there would be a large cluster of adoptions on the histogram at that necessary and sufficient value.Instead,the adoptions appear to occur at a very wide range of values for all four of the variables.No single value of any variable appears likely as a necessary and sufficient condition for adoption. In fact,countries adopted these science bureaucracies at wildly different levels of each of these domestic conditions.Some elaboration from the raw data will make the extremely wide range of variation in values even clearer: (1)Countries created these bureaucracies when they had as few as nine scientists employed in R&D(e.g.,Congo)or as many as half a million (e.g.,the United States and the Soviet Union). (2)R&D spending as a percentage of GDP ranged from 0.01 percent at the time of adoption (Bangladesh)to 1.5 percent(France). (3)Per capita GDP in constant U.S.dollars ranged from a low of $118/year
UNESCO 571 demand-making process over a large number of countries having very different political systems, it is quite simple to check for the existence of conditions said to be prerequisite to those demands. The test reported here compiled and analyzed quantitative indicators of domestic conditions that might prompt creation of a science policy bureaucracy in a sample of forty-four countries chosen to be globally representative in terms of both geography and development levels. As suggested in the foregoing discussion, these were percentage of GDP spent on R&D; proportion of scientists and engineers in the population; per capita GDP; and percentage of gross national product (GNP) spent on defense. A complete description of the indicators used and the method of compiling them can be found in the appendix. Testing a global sample of states raises issues about comparability among the units of analysis, particularly comparability of developing and industrialized states. Cameroon and the United States, for example, are so different on so many measures that one may question whether the units of analysis are sufficiently alike to make comparison appropriate and meaningful. In this case, comparability of the units is ensured by the research questions being asked. The hypotheses being tested concern the behavior of states as a political and organizational form: What prompts states to adopt new tasks and construct new apparatuses to carry out those tasks? The hypotheses do not carry with them caveats about degrees of stateness, state capacity, or other potentially limiting characteristics. Instead they make arguments about the behavior of states qua states. Cameroon and the United States may be very different states, but they are both states nonetheless. In fact the article will suggest that what is going on in this case is a redefinition of the state as a political and organizational form; that is, a redefinition of what is necessary and appropriate behavior for a state. Figures 1-4 show the distribution of values for each of the indicators of state conditions at the time science policy bureaucracies were created in the countries studied. A quick look at figures reveals that none of the patterns corresponds to the expected patterns described above. If any of these conditions were both necessary and sufficient, there would be a large cluster of adoptions on the histogram at that necessary and sufficient value. Instead, the adoptions appear to occur at a very wide range of values for all four of the variables. No single value of any variable appears likely as a necessary and sufficient condition for adoption. In fact, countries adopted these science bureaucracies at wildly different levels of each of these domestic conditions. Some elaboration from the raw data will make the extremely wide range of variation in values even clearer: (1) Countries created these bureaucracies when they had as few as nine scientists employed in R&D (e.g., Congo) or as many as half a million (e.g., the United States and the Soviet Union). (2) R&D spending as a percentage of GDP ranged from 0.01 percent at the time of adoption (Bangladesh) to 1.5 percent (France). (3) Per capita GDP in constant U.S. dollars ranged from a low of $118/year
572 International Organization 24 22 20 18- 16- 14 12- 10 6 2 0 0.0-0.30.3-0.60.6-0.90.9-1.21.2-1.51.5-1.81.8-2.12.1-2.42.4+ Percentage of gross domestic product spent on R&D FIGURE 1.Research and development(R&D)spending at the time of science policy adoption (Pakistan)to a high of more than $9,000/year(Denmark)at the time these bureaucracies were created. (4)Defense spending as a percentage of GNP ranged from 0.7 percent (Mexico,Sri Lanka)to more than 10 percent at the time of adoption(France, Iraq,Jordan,and the Soviet Union). The range of variation on the defense variable is more than a factor of ten; the range of variation on all of the other variables is a factor of one hundred or more.Ranges of variation this large do not readily suggest any causal connection between sufficient state conditions and the adoption of science bureaucracies. Similarly,Figures 1-4 provide little support for the necessary condition hypothesis,that is,that there is some minimum threshold value of these variables that triggers demand for the bureaucracy.If such a value existed,we should see very few (or no)adoptions at the low end of the value range for one or more of these variables;all values would be spread across the upper end of the range at or above the necessary condition level. Again,the far-flung distribution of values revealed in these figures and elaborated in the text above does not readily support this proposition.Rather than clustering at the upper end of the value ranges,there seems to be a concentration of values at the low end,particularly on the science variables. This is clearly not a bunching that would support the existence of a necessary
572 International Organization 24—i 22- 20 — 18 — 16 — 14— 6 — 4 — 0.0-0.3 0.3-0.6 0.6-0.9 0.9-1.2 1.2-1.5 1.5-1.8 1.8-2.1 2.1-2.4 2.4+ Percentage of gross domestic product spent on R&D FIGURE l. Research and development (R&D) spending at the time of science policy adoption (Pakistan) to a high of more than $9,000/year (Denmark) at the time these bureaucracies were created. (4) Defense spending as a percentage of GNP ranged from 0.7 percent (Mexico, Sri Lanka) to more than 10 percent at the time of adoption (France, Iraq, Jordan, and the Soviet Union). The range of variation on the defense variable is more than a factor of ten; the range of variation on all of the other variables is a factor of one hundred or more. Ranges of variation this large do not readily suggest any causal connection between sufficient state conditions and the adoption of science bureaucracies. Similarly, Figures 1-4 provide little support for the necessary condition hypothesis, that is, that there is some minimum threshold value of these variables that triggers demand for the bureaucracy. If such a value existed, we should see very few (or no) adoptions at the low end of the value range for one or more of these variables; all values would be spread across the upper end of the range at or above the necessary condition level. Again, the far-flung distribution of values revealed in these figures and elaborated in the text above does not readily support this proposition. Rather than clustering at the upper end of the value ranges, there seems to be a concentration of values at the low end, particularly on the science variables. This is clearly not a bunching that would support the existence of a necessary
UNESCO 573 24- 22 18- 16- 12- 4- 2、 0 0.0-0.20.2-0.40.4-0.60.6-0.80.8-1.01.0-1.21.2-1.41.4-1.61.6+ Scientists and engineers per 1,000 population FIGURE 2.Proportion of scientists and engineers in the population at the time of science policy adoption and sufficient condition,since the bunching in each case is accompanied by a large number of data points at the high end of each scale.Instead,it appears to be a strong negation of any necessary-but-not-sufficient-condition argument.If arriving at some minimum threshold level of these variables is supposed to trigger demand for a science policy bureaucracy,that threshold must be so low as to have very little explanatory power. In fact a large number of small,poor,technologically unsophisticated,and militarily unthreatened countries created these bureaucracies in the 1950s and 1960s.It is this group that accounts for the clustering of data points at the low end of Figures 1-4.Guatemala,for example,created its Consejo Nacional de Investigacionnes Cientificas y Tecnicas in 1966 when it reported having only fourteen scientists employed in R&D jobs,spent only 0.01 percent of GDP on research,had a GDP per capita of $806,and,since it faced no serious military threats,spent only 1.07 percent of GNP on defense.Cameroon and the Congo were equally unlikely candidates for a science bureaucracy. 11.The Congo created its Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique in 1963 when it reported having only nine scientists engaged in R&D jobs and when spending on R&D was only 0.11 percent of GDP.Measured in U.S.dollars,GDP per capita was only $253 that year,and military spending accounted for only 2.04 percent of GNP.Cameroon created its Office National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique in 1965 when it reported employing only eighty scientists in research jobs and spending only 0.16 percent of its GDP on research.Per capita GDP was $334 for that year,and the country spent only 2.3 percent of its GNP on defense
UNESCO 573 24—I 22— 20 — 18 — 16 — 55 14— £ 6 — 4 — 2 — 0.0-0.2 0.2-0.4 0.4-0.6 0.6-0.8 0.8-1.0 1.0-1.2 1.2-1.4 1.4-1.6 1.6+ Scientists and engineers per 1,000 population FIGURE 2. Proportion of scientists and engineers in the population at the time of science policy adoption and sufficient condition, since the bunching in each case is accompanied by a large number of data points at the high end of each scale. Instead, it appears to be a strong negation of any necessary-but-not-sufficient-condition argument. If arriving at some minimum threshold level of these variables is supposed to trigger demand for a science policy bureaucracy, that threshold must be so low as to have very little explanatory power. In fact a large number of small, poor, technologically unsophisticated, and militarily unthreatened countries created these bureaucracies in the 1950s and 1960s. It is this group that accounts for the clustering of data points at the low end of Figures 1-4. Guatemala, for example, created its Consejo Nacional de Investigacionnes Cientificas y Tecnicas in 1966 when it reported having only fourteen scientists employed in R&D jobs, spent only 0.01 percent of GDP on research, had a GDP per capita of $806, and, since it faced no serious military threats, spent only 1.07 percent of GNP on defense. Cameroon and the Congo were equally unlikely candidates for a science bureaucracy.11 11. The Congo created its Conseil National de la Recherche Scientifique in 1963 when it reported having only nine scientists engaged in R&D jobs and when spending on R&D was only 0.11 percent of GDP. Measured in U.S. dollars, GDP per capita was only $253 that year, and military spending accounted for only 2.04 percent of GNP. Cameroon created its Office National de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique in 1965 when it reported employing only eighty scientists in research jobs and spending only 0.16 percent of its GDP on research. Per capita GDP was $334 for that year, and the country spent only 2.3 percent of its GNP on defense
574 International Organization 24- 22- 20 18- 16 14- 12- 10- 6 4- 2- 0-750750-15001500-3.0003.0004.5004.500-6.0006.000-7.5007500-9.0009,000+ GDP per capita in constant SUS(1980) FIGURE 3.Gross domestic product (GDP)per capita at the time of science policy adoption At the same time,the histograms do show that some countries create science bureaucracies at reasonably high levels of all the indicator variables.Signifi- cantly,the first instances of this science bureaucracy creation occur among this group,suggesting that demand-driven explanations may fit some of the earliest adopters of science policy.Britain,the first adopter,clearly created its Department of Science and Industrial Research in 1915 for security reasons to counter German advances in chemicals and machinery that were directly supporting the German war effort.12 The establishment of the National Science Foundation in the United States in 1950 was explicitly related to concerns about military and industrial competitiveness and was strongly influenced by the creation of the atom bomb.13 French science policymaking,as chronicled by 12.Alter,The Reluctant Patron.See also Roy McLeod and E.Kay Andrews,"The Origins of the D.S.I.R.:Reflections on Ideas and Men,1915-1916,"Public Administration,vol.48,no.1,1970,pp. 23-48;and Ian Varcoe,"Scientists,Government,and Organized Research in Great Britain 1914-1916,"pp.192-216.The United Kingdom is not included in the quantitative analysis above because science data for that country for 1915 are unavailable. 13.Dickson,The New Politics of Science.See also J.Merton England,A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation's Formative Years,1945-1957 (Washington,D.C.:National Science Foundation,1982);N.Dupree,Science in the Federal Government;Bruce Smith,American Science Policy Since World War II (Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1990);and U.S. Congress,House Committee on Science and Technology,Task Force on Science Policy,A History of Science Policy in the United States,1940-1985,Science Policy Study Background Report,no.1, 99th Congress,2d sess.,1986,serial R
574 International Organization 8 3 24 22 20 18 16 14— I 8 - 6 — 4 — 2 — 0 0-750 750-1,500 1,500-3,000 3,000-4,500 4,500-6,000 6,000-7,500 7,500-9,000 9,000+ GDP per capita in constant $US (1980) FIGURE 3. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at the time of science policy adoption At the same time, the histograms do show that some countries create science bureaucracies at reasonably high levels of all the indicator variables. Significantly, the first instances of this science bureaucracy creation occur among this group, suggesting that demand-driven explanations may fit some of the earliest adopters of science policy. Britain, the first adopter, clearly created its Department of Science and Industrial Research in 1915 for security reasons to counter German advances in chemicals and machinery that were directly supporting the German war effort.12 The establishment of the National Science Foundation in the United States in 1950 was explicitly related to concerns about military and industrial competitiveness and was strongly influenced by the creation of the atom bomb.13 French science policymaking, as chronicled by 12. Alter, The Reluctant Patron. See also Roy McLeod and E. Kay Andrews, "The Origins of the D.S.I.R.: Reflections on Ideas and Men, 1915-1916," Public Administration, vol. 48, no. 1,1970, pp. 23-48; and Ian Varcoe, "Scientists, Government, and Organized Research in Great Britain 1914-1916," pp. 192-216. The United Kingdom is not included in the quantitative analysis above because science data for that country for 1915 are unavailable. 13. Dickson, The New Politics of Science. See also J. Merton England, A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation's Formative Years, 1945-1957 (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1982); N. Dupree, Science in the Federal Government; Bruce Smith, American Science Policy Since World War II (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Technology, Task Force on Science Policy, A History of Science Policy in the United States, 1940-1985, Science Policy Study Background Report, no. 1, 99th Congress, 2d sess., 1986, serial R