《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）Revisionism Reconsidered. Exports and American Intervention in World War I

Revisionism Reconsidered:Exports and American Intervention in World War I Benjamin O.Fordham Abstract Why did the United States intervene in World War I,breaking with its long tradition of noninvolvement in European political and military conflicts?Dur- ing the 1920s and 1930s,many"revisionist"historians argued that American efforts to protect its trade with the Allies ultimately led to intervention.The logic of the revisionist position closely parallels the contemporary liberal case that interdepen- dence promotes peace but arrives at different conclusions about the relationship between trade and conflict.Historians have largely abandoned this economic inter- pretation of American intervention,but data on the impact of the wartime export boom on the United States suggest that it should be reconsidered.The export boom was so large that it would have been difficult to ignore,and its progress corresponds to the timing of important decisions leading to American belligerency.An analysis of congressional voting on war-related measures also suggests that export income helped shape politicians'views of the war. Looking backward today on these endless disputes between our government and the belligerents over neutral rights,it seems hard to understand how we could have attached so much importance to them.They irritated both bellig- erents and burdened our relations with them,and I find it hard to believe they involved our national honor. -George F.Kennan! I would like to thank Katherine Barbieri,John Coogan,David Clark,Jeffry Frieden,Jack Levy, Brian Lai,Timothy McKeown,David Painter,Strom Thacker,and participants in the world politics workshop at Binghamton University,the political economy workshop at Harvard University,and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin,Madison,for their many comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article.Lisa Martin and several anonymous reviewers at International Organization also made many valuable suggestions.I am especially grateful to Thomas Walker,whose good-natured skepticism prompted me to write this paper.An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.Any remaining errors and misinterpretations are my responsibility. 1.Kennan1951,64. International Organization 61,Spring 2007,pp.277-310 2007 by The IO Foundation. D0L:10.1017/S0020818307070105

Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I Benjamin O+ Fordham Abstract Why did the United States intervene in World War I, breaking with its long tradition of noninvolvement in European political and military conflicts? Dur￾ing the 1920s and 1930s, many “revisionist” historians argued that American efforts to protect its trade with the Allies ultimately led to intervention+ The logic of the revisionist position closely parallels the contemporary liberal case that interdepen￾dence promotes peace but arrives at different conclusions about the relationship between trade and conflict+ Historians have largely abandoned this economic inter￾pretation of American intervention, but data on the impact of the wartime export boom on the United States suggest that it should be reconsidered+ The export boom was so large that it would have been difficult to ignore, and its progress corresponds to the timing of important decisions leading to American belligerency+ An analysis of congressional voting on war-related measures also suggests that export income helped shape politicians’ views of the war+ Looking backward today on these endless disputes between our government and the belligerents over neutral rights, it seems hard to understand how we could have attached so much importance to them+ They irritated both bellig￾erents and burdened our relations with them, and I find it hard to believe they involved our national honor+ —George F+ Kennan1 I would like to thank Katherine Barbieri, John Coogan, David Clark, Jeffry Frieden, Jack Levy, Brian Lai, Timothy McKeown, David Painter, Strom Thacker, and participants in the world politics workshop at Binghamton University, the political economy workshop at Harvard University, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for their many comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article+ Lisa Martin and several anonymous reviewers at International Organization also made many valuable suggestions+ I am especially grateful to Thomas Walker, whose good-natured skepticism prompted me to write this paper+ An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association+ Any remaining errors and misinterpretations are my responsibility+ 1+ Kennan 1951, 64+ International Organization 61, Spring 2007, pp+ 277–310 © 2007 by The IO Foundation+ DOI: 10+10170S0020818307070105

278 International Organization Why did the United States intervene in World War I?The immediate impetus behind the decision to declare war is clear enough,but its deeper roots are more puzzling.In defiance of American threats,Germany launched a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917.President Woodrow Wilson was not eager for war but both contemporary observers and subsequent historians gen- erally agree that failure to carry out his earlier threats would have caused an unacceptable loss of prestige and credibility.On the other hand,as Kennan's com- ments suggest,the reasons Wilson made the threats that led to war in 1917 are far less obvious.The risk of war was apparent at the time.As early as mid-1915, many observers,including Wilson's secretary of state,William Jennings Bryan, worried that the president's response to the German submarine campaign could eventually lead to intervention.The submarine threat to American lives does not offer a very convincing explanation on its own.German submarine activity had cost only 236 American lives by April 1917,all but fourteen embarked on ships flying the flags of belligerent states.2 From the perspective of 7 December 1941, or 11 September 2001-not to mention the 53,402 American combat deaths sus- tained after intervention-these losses are not especially large.They hardly seem sufficient to explain the abandonment of the long-standing American policy of avoiding entanglement in conflicts among the European powers. Debate among historians about American intervention has focused on filling this explanatory gap.Some have stressed broader strategic considerations,particularly the need to prevent Germany from dominating the European continent or eroding British control of the seas.3 Others have argued that Wilson's policies arose from his ideological commitments to democracy and international law.Still others have focused on the psychology of Wilson and his closest advisers to explain his choices.5 One potential explanation is almost universally dismissed by contemporary his- torians of U.S.foreign relations:that the war-induced boom in exports to the Allies prompted the Wilson administration to take a strong stand against German sub- marine warfare,ultimately leading to intervention.This explanation was widely accepted during the interwar period and provided the intellectual justification for the neutrality legislation of the 1930s.Largely for this reason,it became deeply unfashionable after Pearl Harbor.Today,the "revisionist"historians who advanced this line of argument during the 1920s and 1930s,when they are remembered at all,tend to be lumped together with the isolationist politicians who resisted Amer- ican intervention in World War II.This article will make a case for reconsidering their argument about the influence of economic interests on American involve- ment in the war.The economic explanation offered by most academic revisionists was subtler and more convincing than the conspiracy theories about influential 2.Grattan1929,163. 3.See,for example,Buehrig 1955;May 1959;Kennedy 2001;and Hannigan 2002. 4.See,for example,Ambrosius 1991;Calhoun 1986;Knock 1992;and Smith 1994. 5.See,for example,Devlin 1975;and George and George 1964

Why did the United States intervene in World War I? The immediate impetus behind the decision to declare war is clear enough, but its deeper roots are more puzzling+ In defiance of American threats, Germany launched a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917+ President Woodrow Wilson was not eager for war but both contemporary observers and subsequent historians gen￾erally agree that failure to carry out his earlier threats would have caused an unacceptable loss of prestige and credibility+ On the other hand, as Kennan’s com￾ments suggest, the reasons Wilson made the threats that led to war in 1917 are far less obvious+ The risk of war was apparent at the time+ As early as mid-1915, many observers, including Wilson’s secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, worried that the president’s response to the German submarine campaign could eventually lead to intervention+ The submarine threat to American lives does not offer a very convincing explanation on its own+ German submarine activity had cost only 236 American lives by April 1917, all but fourteen embarked on ships flying the flags of belligerent states+ 2 From the perspective of 7 December 1941, or 11 September 2001—not to mention the 53,402 American combat deaths sus￾tained after intervention—these losses are not especially large+ They hardly seem sufficient to explain the abandonment of the long-standing American policy of avoiding entanglement in conflicts among the European powers+ Debate among historians about American intervention has focused on filling this explanatory gap+ Some have stressed broader strategic considerations, particularly the need to prevent Germany from dominating the European continent or eroding British control of the seas+ 3 Others have argued that Wilson’s policies arose from his ideological commitments to democracy and international law+ 4 Still others have focused on the psychology of Wilson and his closest advisers to explain his choices+ 5 One potential explanation is almost universally dismissed by contemporary his￾torians of U+S+ foreign relations: that the war-induced boom in exports to the Allies prompted the Wilson administration to take a strong stand against German sub￾marine warfare, ultimately leading to intervention+ This explanation was widely accepted during the interwar period and provided the intellectual justification for the neutrality legislation of the 1930s+ Largely for this reason, it became deeply unfashionable after Pearl Harbor+ Today, the “revisionist” historians who advanced this line of argument during the 1920s and 1930s, when they are remembered at all, tend to be lumped together with the isolationist politicians who resisted Amer￾ican intervention in World War II+ This article will make a case for reconsidering their argument about the influence of economic interests on American involve￾ment in the war+ The economic explanation offered by most academic revisionists was subtler and more convincing than the conspiracy theories about influential 2+ Grattan 1929, 163+ 3+ See, for example, Buehrig 1955; May 1959; Kennedy 2001; and Hannigan 2002+ 4+ See, for example, Ambrosius 1991; Calhoun 1986; Knock 1992; and Smith 1994+ 5+ See, for example, Devlin 1975; and George and George 1964+ 278 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 279 "merchants of death"that publicists and politicians promoted during the interwar period.It also bears directly on recent scholarly debates about the effect of trade on international conflict.An analysis of data on the wartime export boom and congressional voting on war-related measures offers substantial evidence that eco- nomic factors influenced political actors'positions on the war. This article proceeds in four sections.The first reviews the revisionist argument and its relationship to current scholarship on trade and conflict.The second eval- uates the plausibility of the revisionists'claims by examining data on the aggre- gate economic impact of the war on the United States before intervention.The third section tests the influence of economic considerations on the positions of political actors more rigorously using congressional roll-call votes on war-related measures.A final section summarizes and concludes. Trade,Conflict,and American Intervention in World War I The revisionists'theoretical claims are important not only for understanding Amer- ican intervention in World War I,but also for what they suggest about recent research concerning the impact of trade on interstate conflict.Most of this work concludes that trade increases cooperation and reduces the probability of militarized conflict between trading partners.As Oneal and Russett state,"militarized dis- putes are most likely when states are unhampered by important external economic relations and when their importance is declining."7The revisionist argument does not suggest that contemporary liberals are wrong but rather that their argument is incomplete.As liberals would expect,the benefits of trade induced the United States to avoid conflict with its major trading partners during World War I.However,it also led the United States to issue threats and ultimately to go to war to protect this source of national income against third parties.The same economic incen- tives that limit conflict between trading partners may lead to the expansion of mil- itary conflict in other cases. As Mansfield and Pollins point out in their review of this literature,the princi- pal theoretical mechanism proposed to account for this relationship concerns the opportunity cost of trade-disrupting conflict.s As Polachek states in his seminal contribution to contemporary research on the topic,"mutual dependence makes conflict more costly,thereby increasing the incentives toward cooperation,and hence toward peace."Conflictual foreign policies may make trade difficult or imposs- ible.The economic actors who benefit from trade thus tend to oppose such policies. 6.See,for example,Polachek 1980;and Oneal and Russett 1997. 7.Oneal and Russett 1997,288. 8.Mansfield and Pollins 2003.3. 9.Polachek 1980.56

“merchants of death” that publicists and politicians promoted during the interwar period+ It also bears directly on recent scholarly debates about the effect of trade on international conflict+ An analysis of data on the wartime export boom and congressional voting on war-related measures offers substantial evidence that eco￾nomic factors influenced political actors’ positions on the war+ This article proceeds in four sections+ The first reviews the revisionist argument and its relationship to current scholarship on trade and conflict+ The second eval￾uates the plausibility of the revisionists’ claims by examining data on the aggre￾gate economic impact of the war on the United States before intervention+ The third section tests the influence of economic considerations on the positions of political actors more rigorously using congressional roll-call votes on war-related measures+ A final section summarizes and concludes+ Trade, Conflict, and American Intervention in World War I The revisionists’ theoretical claims are important not only for understanding Amer￾ican intervention in World War I, but also for what they suggest about recent research concerning the impact of trade on interstate conflict+ Most of this work concludes that trade increases cooperation and reduces the probability of militarized conflict between trading partners+ 6 As Oneal and Russett state, “militarized dis￾putes are most likely when states are unhampered by important external economic relations and when their importance is declining+” 7 The revisionist argument does not suggest that contemporary liberals are wrong but rather that their argument is incomplete+ As liberals would expect, the benefits of trade induced the United States to avoid conflict with its major trading partners during World War I+ However, it also led the United States to issue threats and ultimately to go to war to protect this source of national income against third parties+ The same economic incen￾tives that limit conflict between trading partners may lead to the expansion of mil￾itary conflict in other cases+ As Mansfield and Pollins point out in their review of this literature, the princi￾pal theoretical mechanism proposed to account for this relationship concerns the opportunity cost of trade-disrupting conflict+ 8 As Polachek states in his seminal contribution to contemporary research on the topic, “mutual dependence makes conflict more costly, thereby increasing the incentives toward cooperation, and hence toward peace+” 9 Conflictual foreign policies may make trade difficult or imposs￾ible+ The economic actors who benefit from trade thus tend to oppose such policies+ 6+ See, for example, Polachek 1980; and Oneal and Russett 1997+ 7+ Oneal and Russett 1997, 288+ 8+ Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 3+ 9+ Polachek 1980, 56+ Exports and American Intervention in World War I 279

280 International Organization State leaders have reasons to heed these concerns both because they need to sus- tain economic growth and because commercial interests often wield substantial domestic political power. Support for the liberal argument about trade and conflict is broad but not uni- versal.Some critics reject entirely the claim that conflict is less likely between trading partners.0 However,most question the causal logic of the liberal argu- ment about the opportunity costs of conflict without necessarily rejecting the empirical association between trade and peace.Simmons points out that the opportunity-cost argument assumes that traders influence state decisions,a condi- tion that will not hold in every case.Morrow and Gartzke,Li,and Boehmer suggest that trade may have contradictory effects on the likelihood of conflict by reducing a state's willingness to fight but also affecting its estimate of its trading partner's resolve in a military confrontation.2 Instead,the pacifying effect of trade may stem from its effect on states'abilities to send costly signals about their resolve. Mansfield and Pevehouse and Bearce argue that the institutional arrangements set up to govern international trade,rather than the effect of interdependence on the opportunity cost of conflict,account for trade's pacifying effects.13 The theoretical argument of the interwar revisionists differs from most contem- porary critiques of liberal claims about trade and conflict in that it rejects neither their empirical claims about peaceful relations among trading partners nor the causal logic of the opportunity-cost argument.Instead,it focuses on the effect of com- mercial relationships on the behavior of third states.As Levy has pointed out, relatively little attention has been paid to this issue in the contemporary litera- ture.4 This omission is surprising because the imperative to protect trade against interference from third states or nonstate actors follows from the same opportunity- cost argument that motivates most contemporary claims about the liberal peace. Moreover,this line of argument has been discussed in other contexts.For exam- ple,Gallagher and Robinson argued that the expansion of the British Empire dur- ing the mid-Victorian era was mainly a response to events in the periphery that threatened British trade.5 British decision makers preferred "informal empire," and moved toward formal colonial rule only when local authorities were unwill- ing or unable to maintain the peace and order necessary for commerce.Similarly, in his account of the development of European states,Tilly listed the protection of commercial interests operating under its authority as a basic function.16 The fact that the state receives a portion of the income from commercial activity gives it a stake in continued trade. 10.See,for example,Barbieri 2002;and Ripsman and Blanchard 1996. 11.Simmons 2003. 12.See Morrow 1999:and Gartzke.Li.and Boehmer 2001. 13.See Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000:and Bearce 2003. 14.Levy2003,139. 15.Gallagher and Robinson 1953. 16.Tilly1985

State leaders have reasons to heed these concerns both because they need to sus￾tain economic growth and because commercial interests often wield substantial domestic political power+ Support for the liberal argument about trade and conflict is broad but not uni￾versal+ Some critics reject entirely the claim that conflict is less likely between trading partners+ 10 However, most question the causal logic of the liberal argu￾ment about the opportunity costs of conflict without necessarily rejecting the empirical association between trade and peace+ Simmons points out that the opportunity-cost argument assumes that traders influence state decisions, a condi￾tion that will not hold in every case+ 11 Morrow and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer suggest that trade may have contradictory effects on the likelihood of conflict by reducing a state’s willingness to fight but also affecting its estimate of its trading partner’s resolve in a military confrontation+ 12 Instead, the pacifying effect of trade may stem from its effect on states’ abilities to send costly signals about their resolve+ Mansfield and Pevehouse and Bearce argue that the institutional arrangements set up to govern international trade, rather than the effect of interdependence on the opportunity cost of conflict, account for trade’s pacifying effects+ 13 The theoretical argument of the interwar revisionists differs from most contem￾porary critiques of liberal claims about trade and conflict in that it rejects neither their empirical claims about peaceful relations among trading partners nor the causal logic of the opportunity-cost argument+ Instead, it focuses on the effect of com￾mercial relationships on the behavior of third states+ As Levy has pointed out, relatively little attention has been paid to this issue in the contemporary litera￾ture+ 14 This omission is surprising because the imperative to protect trade against interference from third states or nonstate actors follows from the same opportunity￾cost argument that motivates most contemporary claims about the liberal peace+ Moreover, this line of argument has been discussed in other contexts+ For exam￾ple, Gallagher and Robinson argued that the expansion of the British Empire dur￾ing the mid-Victorian era was mainly a response to events in the periphery that threatened British trade+ 15 British decision makers preferred “informal empire,” and moved toward formal colonial rule only when local authorities were unwill￾ing or unable to maintain the peace and order necessary for commerce+ Similarly, in his account of the development of European states, Tilly listed the protection of commercial interests operating under its authority as a basic function+ 16 The fact that the state receives a portion of the income from commercial activity gives it a stake in continued trade+ 10+ See, for example, Barbieri 2002; and Ripsman and Blanchard 1996+ 11+ Simmons 2003+ 12+ See Morrow 1999; and Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001+ 13+ See Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; and Bearce 2003+ 14+ Levy 2003, 139+ 15+ Gallagher and Robinson 1953+ 16+ Tilly 1985+ 280 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 281 Although academic revisionists of the interwar period came to different conclu- sions about the impact of trade on conflict,the logic of their argument about the U.S.role in World War I closely resembles the contemporary liberal opportunity- cost argument.Unfortunately,these historians have often been lumped together with those who contended that arms manufacturers and the bankers who financed them brought about U.S.intervention to reap the benefits of wartime military spend- ing and the munitions trade,as well as to facilitate repayment of their loans to Allied governments.Writers such as Engelbrecht and Hanighen,authors of the memorably titled Merchants of Death,helped to publicize this line of argument.7 Perhaps the most important of those who took this position was Senator Gerald Nye(R-N.D.),whose hearings on the role of the munitions industry in promoting American entry into the war led to the adoption of the neutrality legislation of the 1930s.Nye claimed that Americans had been duped into supporting a war in which they were "fighting to save the skins of American bankers who had bet too boldly on the outcome of the war and had two billions of dollars of loans to the Allies in jeopardy."Nye's investigation sought to sustain this position by uncov- ering evidence that bankers and industrialists financed groups that favored inter- vention,and that they were able to influence decision making within the Wilson administration. Most academic revisionists rejected this line of argument.9 Indeed,Charles Beard,perhaps the best-known academic revisionist,sought to discredit this"devil theory of war"in his 1936 book of that name.20 The causal process proposed by Beard and others,such as Grattan,Millis,Birdsall,and Tansill,resembled that suggested by contemporary liberals more than it does the merchants-of-death hypothesis.21 Although they did not use the term,the revisionist argument focused on the opportunity cost of lost trade to the American economy.The revisionists claimed that the wartime boom in exports to the Allied powers made this cost very large.They held that much of the American economy benefited from trade with the Allied powers,not just a narrow set of bankers and munitions makers.In one of the earliest revisionist accounts focused principally on the United States, Grattan listed a wide range of goods not directly related to military action that were exported in large quantities to the Allied powers.22 Beard argued forcefully that efforts to blame narrow special interests for promoting the war were misguided 17.Engelbrecht and Hanighen 1935. 18.Buehrig1955,95. 19.The most important exception to this generalization is Harry Elmer Barnes,who wrote a pref- ace to Merchants of Death.Although Barnes was more careful than many who adopted this line of argument,the chapter of his 1926 book devoted to American intervention emphasizes the role of busi- ness interests and pro-British politicians in American intervention.Barnes's stress on lobbying and the discretion available to the Wilson administration more closely resembles the merchants of death hypoth- esis than the argument of most other academic revisionists. 20.Beard1936. 21.See Grattan 1929;Millis 1935;Birdsall 1939;and Tansill 1938. 22.Grattan1929.132

Although academic revisionists of the interwar period came to different conclu￾sions about the impact of trade on conflict, the logic of their argument about the U+S+ role in World War I closely resembles the contemporary liberal opportunity￾cost argument+ Unfortunately, these historians have often been lumped together with those who contended that arms manufacturers and the bankers who financed them brought about U+S+ intervention to reap the benefits of wartime military spend￾ing and the munitions trade, as well as to facilitate repayment of their loans to Allied governments+ Writers such as Engelbrecht and Hanighen, authors of the memorably titled Merchants of Death, helped to publicize this line of argument+ 17 Perhaps the most important of those who took this position was Senator Gerald Nye ~R-N+D+!, whose hearings on the role of the munitions industry in promoting American entry into the war led to the adoption of the neutrality legislation of the 1930s+ Nye claimed that Americans had been duped into supporting a war in which they were “fighting to save the skins of American bankers who had bet too boldly on the outcome of the war and had two billions of dollars of loans to the Allies in jeopardy+” 18 Nye’s investigation sought to sustain this position by uncov￾ering evidence that bankers and industrialists financed groups that favored inter￾vention, and that they were able to influence decision making within the Wilson administration+ Most academic revisionists rejected this line of argument+ 19 Indeed, Charles Beard, perhaps the best-known academic revisionist, sought to discredit this “devil theory of war” in his 1936 book of that name+ 20 The causal process proposed by Beard and others, such as Grattan, Millis, Birdsall, and Tansill, resembled that suggested by contemporary liberals more than it does the merchants-of-death hypothesis+ 21 Although they did not use the term, the revisionist argument focused on the opportunity cost of lost trade to the American economy+ The revisionists claimed that the wartime boom in exports to the Allied powers made this cost very large+ They held that much of the American economy benefited from trade with the Allied powers, not just a narrow set of bankers and munitions makers+ In one of the earliest revisionist accounts focused principally on the United States, Grattan listed a wide range of goods not directly related to military action that were exported in large quantities to the Allied powers+ 22 Beard argued forcefully that efforts to blame narrow special interests for promoting the war were misguided 17+ Engelbrecht and Hanighen 1935+ 18+ Buehrig 1955, 95+ 19+ The most important exception to this generalization is Harry Elmer Barnes, who wrote a pref￾ace to Merchants of Death+ Although Barnes was more careful than many who adopted this line of argument, the chapter of his 1926 book devoted to American intervention emphasizes the role of busi￾ness interests and pro-British politicians in American intervention+ Barnes’s stress on lobbying and the discretion available to the Wilson administration more closely resembles the merchants of death hypoth￾esis than the argument of most other academic revisionists+ 20+ Beard 1936+ 21+ See Grattan 1929; Millis 1935; Birdsall 1939; and Tansill 1938+ 22+ Grattan 1929, 132+ Exports and American Intervention in World War I 281

282 International Organization because the entire economy was implicated."In the pursuit of peace,people are doing things that have a direct bearing on war."23 For the revisionists,the opportunity cost of lost trade greatly influenced the Wilson administration's foreign policy choices,ultimately involving the United States on the Allied side in spite of President Wilson's efforts to remain neutral. The revisionists pointed out that the value of trade with the Allied powers under- cut the credibility of the administration's efforts to enforce American neutral rights against British violations.The British navy effectively prevented the export even of noncontraband items to Germany and its allies.Although the administration protested British actions,it shrank from threatening the munitions embargo that some members of Congress demanded.24 Indeed,the administration steadily lifted its restrictions on American lending to finance trade with the Allies. At the same time,the value of wartime trade prompted the administration to take a hard line on German submarine warfare.Because the British blockade of Germany permitted little trade between the United States and Germany during the war,there was no economic stake to inhibit American action against German vio- lations of neutral rights.The administration ultimately settled on a strategy of threat- ening American intervention to persuade the Germans to accept rules of engagement that would not undermine American trade.This approach carried an obvious risk of war,but it was largely successful until January 1917,when the Germans elected to gamble that they could do more damage to the Allies through unrestricted sub- marine warfare than they would suffer through American belligerency.As Bird- sall summarized the American path to war,"the administration yielded to pressures no administration is likely to withstand.The alternative policy of strict adherence to its earlier standards of neutrality meant economic depression on a national scale."25 This line of argument tended to undercut efforts to blame the Wilson adminis- tration for involving the United States in the war.During the interwar period,some proponents of neutrality blamed the administration's pro-Allied sympathies for the decision to intervene.26 In contrast,the academic revisionist position did not depend on any special argument about Wilson's intentions or sympathies.For Beard,the effort to blame particular politicians was simply another variant of the"devil theory of war."Like Birdsall,Beard stressed that politicians simply responded in a pre- dictable way to overwhelming societal pressure to protect American trade.27 Aca- demic revisionists did not argue that Wilson sought to maximize American profits 23.Beard1936,21. 24.Coogan argues persuasively that because the United States failed to enforce its rights equally against all the belligerent powers,it was not really "neutral"in terms of the legal definition prevailing at the time;see Coogan 1981 and 1994.Although Coogan stops short of attributing the U.S.position to the value of trade with the Allies,he points out that "non-belligerent non-neutrality provide a tre- mendous boon for American political and economic interests";Coogan 1994,81. 25.Birdsall1939.225. 26.See,for example,Borchard and Lage 1940,34-37,57,82. 27.Beard1936.22-23

because the entire economy was implicated+ “In the pursuit of peace, people are doing things that have a direct bearing on war+” 23 For the revisionists, the opportunity cost of lost trade greatly influenced the Wilson administration’s foreign policy choices, ultimately involving the United States on the Allied side in spite of President Wilson’s efforts to remain neutral+ The revisionists pointed out that the value of trade with the Allied powers under￾cut the credibility of the administration’s efforts to enforce American neutral rights against British violations+ The British navy effectively prevented the export even of noncontraband items to Germany and its allies+ Although the administration protested British actions, it shrank from threatening the munitions embargo that some members of Congress demanded+ 24 Indeed, the administration steadily lifted its restrictions on American lending to finance trade with the Allies+ At the same time, the value of wartime trade prompted the administration to take a hard line on German submarine warfare+ Because the British blockade of Germany permitted little trade between the United States and Germany during the war, there was no economic stake to inhibit American action against German vio￾lations of neutral rights+ The administration ultimately settled on a strategy of threat￾ening American intervention to persuade the Germans to accept rules of engagement that would not undermine American trade+ This approach carried an obvious risk of war, but it was largely successful until January 1917, when the Germans elected to gamble that they could do more damage to the Allies through unrestricted sub￾marine warfare than they would suffer through American belligerency+ As Bird￾sall summarized the American path to war, “the administration yielded to pressures no administration is likely to withstand+ The alternative policy of strict adherence to its earlier standards of neutrality meant economic depression on a national scale+” 25 This line of argument tended to undercut efforts to blame the Wilson adminis￾tration for involving the United States in the war+ During the interwar period, some proponents of neutrality blamed the administration’s pro-Allied sympathies for the decision to intervene+ 26 In contrast, the academic revisionist position did not depend on any special argument about Wilson’s intentions or sympathies+ For Beard, the effort to blame particular politicians was simply another variant of the “devil theory of war+” Like Birdsall, Beard stressed that politicians simply responded in a pre￾dictable way to overwhelming societal pressure to protect American trade+ 27 Aca￾demic revisionists did not argue that Wilson sought to maximize American profits 23+ Beard 1936, 21+ 24+ Coogan argues persuasively that because the United States failed to enforce its rights equally against all the belligerent powers, it was not really “neutral” in terms of the legal definition prevailing at the time; see Coogan 1981 and 1994+ Although Coogan stops short of attributing the U+S+ position to the value of trade with the Allies, he points out that “non-belligerent non-neutrality provide a tre￾mendous boon for American political and economic interests”; Coogan 1994, 81+ 25+ Birdsall 1939, 225+ 26+ See, for example, Borchard and Lage 1940, 34–37, 57, 82+ 27+ Beard 1936, 22–23+ 282 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 283 from the war,but only that he was constrained by the need to protect a substantial part of the American economy,regardless of his personal feelings about its ori- gins.This position is compatible with later evidence that he was eager to remain neutral even after breaking diplomatic relations with Germany in February 1917.28 The need to preserve American honor and credibility may have led him to carry out his threat to declare war,but the need to preserve American trade with the Allies led him to make the threats that put these concerns in jeopardy in the first place.9 Because the administration had so little real policy discretion,lobbying and agi- tation by bankers and munitions makers is also superfluous in the academic revi- sionist account.Contact between the Wilson administration and economic actors with important stakes in the war undeniably took place,but it had little causal importance.The House of Morgan was intimately involved in the British effort to obtain a wide range of exports from the United States.From January 1915 through the American entry into the war,the Morgan Bank arranged financing and acted as the primary purchasing agent for the British government,and eventually its allies as well.30 Beard and Tansill used the records published by the Nye Commit- tee in 1935 to show that Morgan representatives had successfully asked the admin- istration to lift its restrictions on lending to belligerent states.However,what made these contacts successful was not the Morgan representatives'extraordinary influ- ence,but the fact that they pointed out genuine economic stakes that the adminis- tration could not ignore.Without expanded American lending after Allied financial resources were exhausted,further trade would not have been possible.The eco- nomic importance of the trade,not the political influence of the lenders,carried the day with the Wilson administration.Indeed,Beard suggested that Wilson might well have acted as he did even if the letters published by the Nye committee had never been sent."They did not have to 'see'him personally about the issue.Since President Wilson was a man of intelligence and knowledge,it is reasonably cer- tain that he was then aware of the economic dilemma before him."31 Trade with Allies played an indispensable role in the revisionist explanation for American intervention,but revisionists did not focus exclusively on this consider- ation.Their differences from other historians writing at the same time come across more starkly in later historiographical essays than in the actual narrative histories. For example,revisionists such as Birdsall pointed out the importance of strategic interaction between German and American decision making in the run-up to the war,something contemporary critics of the revisionists,such as Charles Seymour, emphasized.32 American decisions about trade with the Allies contributed to the German decision to gamble on unrestricted submarine warfare,which led in turn to the U.S.declaration of war.Conversely,although Seymour denied that the 28.See,for example,Link 1965,291-97,391-400. 29.See,for example,May 1959,416-18. 30.Burk1985,6. 31.Beard1936.97. 32.Birdsall1939.218

from the war, but only that he was constrained by the need to protect a substantial part of the American economy, regardless of his personal feelings about its ori￾gins+ This position is compatible with later evidence that he was eager to remain neutral even after breaking diplomatic relations with Germany in February 1917+ 28 The need to preserve American honor and credibility may have led him to carry out his threat to declare war, but the need to preserve American trade with the Allies led him to make the threats that put these concerns in jeopardy in the first place+ 29 Because the administration had so little real policy discretion, lobbying and agi￾tation by bankers and munitions makers is also superfluous in the academic revi￾sionist account+ Contact between the Wilson administration and economic actors with important stakes in the war undeniably took place, but it had little causal importance+ The House of Morgan was intimately involved in the British effort to obtain a wide range of exports from the United States+ From January 1915 through the American entry into the war, the Morgan Bank arranged financing and acted as the primary purchasing agent for the British government, and eventually its allies as well+ 30 Beard and Tansill used the records published by the Nye Commit￾tee in 1935 to show that Morgan representatives had successfully asked the admin￾istration to lift its restrictions on lending to belligerent states+ However, what made these contacts successful was not the Morgan representatives’ extraordinary influ￾ence, but the fact that they pointed out genuine economic stakes that the adminis￾tration could not ignore+ Without expanded American lending after Allied financial resources were exhausted, further trade would not have been possible+ The eco￾nomic importance of the trade, not the political influence of the lenders, carried the day with the Wilson administration+ Indeed, Beard suggested that Wilson might well have acted as he did even if the letters published by the Nye committee had never been sent+ “They did not have to ‘see’ him personally about the issue+ Since President Wilson was a man of intelligence and knowledge, it is reasonably cer￾tain that he was then aware of the economic dilemma before him+” 31 Trade with Allies played an indispensable role in the revisionist explanation for American intervention, but revisionists did not focus exclusively on this consider￾ation+ Their differences from other historians writing at the same time come across more starkly in later historiographical essays than in the actual narrative histories+ For example, revisionists such as Birdsall pointed out the importance of strategic interaction between German and American decision making in the run-up to the war, something contemporary critics of the revisionists, such as Charles Seymour, emphasized+ 32 American decisions about trade with the Allies contributed to the German decision to gamble on unrestricted submarine warfare, which led in turn to the U+S+ declaration of war+ Conversely, although Seymour denied that the 28+ See, for example, Link 1965, 291–97, 391– 400+ 29+ See, for example, May 1959, 416–18+ 30+ Burk 1985, 6+ 31+ Beard 1936, 97+ 32+ Birdsall 1939, 218+ Exports and American Intervention in World War I 283

284 International Organization significance of the submarine attacks was principally economic,he conceded that economic interests ruled out serious action to enforce American neutral rights against the British through trade sanctions. Such an embargo would have blighted the prosperity not merely of munitions makers and bankers,but all of our industries,small and large,thrown back our laboring classes into unemployment,and ruined the farmers.There would have been so many protests to Congress from the various sections of the coun- try that the maintenance of such restrictions is inconceivable.33 Assessing the Revisionist Argument However interesting the theoretical implications of the revisionist argument,the historiography of U.S.intervention in World War I offers little support for it.The claim that American trade with the Allied powers pulled the country into World War I was widely dismissed after World War II.The fate of the revisionist argu- ment is almost certainly linked to the highly visible political stand that prominent revisionists like Charles Beard took against American entry into World War II.34 Even during the 1960s and 1970s,when economic interpretations of the Cold War were common,there was little resurgence in support for the revisionist interpreta- tion of American intervention in 1917.At the conclusion of his careful and bal- anced history of the revisionists,Cohen acknowledged that "[t]oday,when the revisionist interpretation of American intervention is in disrepute,the revisionist studies of America's road to war from 1914 to 1917 are considered of little use to students of American diplomatic history."35 The revisionist position receives little attention in reviews of recent writing on the topic,which are generally focused on the relative importance of ideological and strategic concerns in Wilson's thinking.36 Although the incorrectness of the revisionist position is conventional wisdom, specific efforts to debunk their central arguments are difficult to find.One prob- lem is that the revisionists'most important claims concerned the size of the eco- nomic stake and the tendency of major political actors to support the economic interests of their constituents rather than the motives and actions of particular indi- viduals.These claims are not easy to test using the documentary record of Amer- ican decision making.To be sure,there is archival evidence indicating that the Wilson administration was aware of the economic pressures that the revisionists emphasized.However,the principal testable implications of their argument con- 33.Seymour1964,172. 34.Cohen1967. 35.Ibid.,240.Examples of historians'dismissals of the revisionist argument include Cooper 1969, 7;as well as Stromberg 1977,441,who quips that"[o]nce the essential accessory of the well-equipped mind,the 'economic interpretation'has become as antiquated as monophonic recording";and Bemis 1947,55,who blames the revisionists for the American failure to respond to the Nazi threat in the 1930s. 36.See,for example,Kennedy 2001;and Steigerwald 2000

significance of the submarine attacks was principally economic, he conceded that economic interests ruled out serious action to enforce American neutral rights against the British through trade sanctions+ Such an embargo would have blighted the prosperity not merely of munitions makers and bankers, but all of our industries, small and large, thrown back our laboring classes into unemployment, and ruined the farmers+ There would have been so many protests to Congress from the various sections of the coun￾try that the maintenance of such restrictions is inconceivable+ 33 Assessing the Revisionist Argument However interesting the theoretical implications of the revisionist argument, the historiography of U+S+ intervention in World War I offers little support for it+ The claim that American trade with the Allied powers pulled the country into World War I was widely dismissed after World War II+ The fate of the revisionist argu￾ment is almost certainly linked to the highly visible political stand that prominent revisionists like Charles Beard took against American entry into World War II+ 34 Even during the 1960s and 1970s, when economic interpretations of the Cold War were common, there was little resurgence in support for the revisionist interpreta￾tion of American intervention in 1917+ At the conclusion of his careful and bal￾anced history of the revisionists, Cohen acknowledged that “@t#oday, when the revisionist interpretation of American intervention is in disrepute, the revisionist studies of America’s road to war from 1914 to 1917 are considered of little use to students of American diplomatic history+” 35 The revisionist position receives little attention in reviews of recent writing on the topic, which are generally focused on the relative importance of ideological and strategic concerns in Wilson’s thinking+ 36 Although the incorrectness of the revisionist position is conventional wisdom, specific efforts to debunk their central arguments are difficult to find+ One prob￾lem is that the revisionists’ most important claims concerned the size of the eco￾nomic stake and the tendency of major political actors to support the economic interests of their constituents rather than the motives and actions of particular indi￾viduals+ These claims are not easy to test using the documentary record of Amer￾ican decision making+ To be sure, there is archival evidence indicating that the Wilson administration was aware of the economic pressures that the revisionists emphasized+ However, the principal testable implications of their argument con- 33+ Seymour 1964, 172+ 34+ Cohen 1967+ 35+ Ibid+, 240+ Examples of historians’ dismissals of the revisionist argument include Cooper 1969, 7; as well as Stromberg 1977, 441, who quips that “@o#nce the essential accessory of the well-equipped mind, the ‘economic interpretation’ has become as antiquated as monophonic recording”; and Bemis 1947, 55, who blames the revisionists for the American failure to respond to the Nazi threat in the 1930s+ 36+ See, for example, Kennedy 2001; and Steigerwald 2000+ 284 International Organization

Exports and American Intervention in World War I 285 cerned the volume of trade,and thus the political consequences of ignoring it,as well as the tendency of major political actors to take positions that support the economic interests of their constituents.These general patterns are easier to test through statistical analysis than by searching the archival record.The remainder of this section will examine the dimensions of the export boom,and whether or not political leaders'positions on neutrality and intervention reflected their con- stituents'interests in it. The Export Boom and American Decision Making A first step in assessing the revisionist argument is to examine the impact of the wartime export boom on the American economy.Neither the revisionists of the 1930s nor any of their critics presented much more than a few aggregate trade statistics.These sufficed to show that American exports to the Allies increased substantially during the war but did not put this increase in the perspective of historical trading patterns or the size of the U.S.economy.Was the export boom really large enough to have had the political effects the revisionists claimed? Figure 1 shows the export and import share of U.S.gross national product(GNP) from 1869 through 2004.The export boom associated with World War I is easy to 14- Wartime peak in 1916: Total trade,17.1%of GNP 12 Exports,11.9%of GNP Imports 0 Exports 1869187818871896190519141923193219411950195919681977198619952004 Year Sources:GNP,1869-1928:Balke and Gordon,1989;1929-2004:U.S.Department of Commerce.Exports and Imports,1869-1966:NBER Macrohistory Database,series m7023 and m7028:1967-2004:U.S.Department of Commerce. FIGURE 1.Trade and the American economy,1869-2004

cerned the volume of trade, and thus the political consequences of ignoring it, as well as the tendency of major political actors to take positions that support the economic interests of their constituents+ These general patterns are easier to test through statistical analysis than by searching the archival record+ The remainder of this section will examine the dimensions of the export boom, and whether or not political leaders’ positions on neutrality and intervention reflected their con￾stituents’ interests in it+ The Export Boom and American Decision Making A first step in assessing the revisionist argument is to examine the impact of the wartime export boom on the American economy+ Neither the revisionists of the 1930s nor any of their critics presented much more than a few aggregate trade statistics+ These sufficed to show that American exports to the Allies increased substantially during the war but did not put this increase in the perspective of historical trading patterns or the size of the U+S+ economy+ Was the export boom really large enough to have had the political effects the revisionists claimed? Figure 1 shows the export and import share of U+S+ gross national product ~GNP! from 1869 through 2004+ The export boom associated with World War I is easy to FIGURE 1. Trade and the American economy, 1869–2004 Exports and American Intervention in World War I 285

286 International Organization TABLE 1.The destination of American exports,1910-20 Allied Powers Central Powers Other destinations Year Volume Share Volume Share Volume Share 1910-13 average $1.330 63% $318 15% $522 25% 1914 1,472 62 361 15 567 24 1915 2.277 82 29 / 486 18 1916 4.569 83 0 943 17 1917 5,156 83 0 0 1,139 18 1918 5,135 84 0 0 1,169 19 1919 5.701 2 163 , 2,434 1 1920 5,235 64 356 2,919 35 Source:U.S.Department of Commerce 1921. Notes:The volume of exports is given in millions of current dollars.The Central Powers are Germany,Austria- Hungary,Bulgaria,and Turkey.The Allied Powers are Great Britain,France,Russia,Italy,Belgium,Rumania,Grecce, and Japan.Exports to colonies are included with the metropolitan state.Although not all these states were members of these alliances in every year,all are included for all years for the sake of continuity. locate.It is enormous in relation to the economy as a whole.Merchandise exports constituted nearly 12 percent of gross national product in 1916,roughly double their share in 1914,and more than in any other year for which data are available. This generalization includes even the globalization of the past thirty years,although the United States currently brings in substantially more imports,as well as main- taining an extensive trade in services,something for which no early-twentieth- century data are available.The export boom was also associated with the longest economic expansion since the Civil War,lasting forty-four months from Decem- ber 1914 to August 1918.37 The size of the export boom demonstrates the plausi- bility of the revisionist argument.It is difficult to believe that any president's assessment of the submarine threat would be unaffected by the fact that it men- aced such a substantial part of the American economy.Subsequent economic events, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s,are universally regarded as seminal events that triggered strong political responses,even though they involved a smaller share of the economy. The great majority of these exports went to the Allies,especially Britain.As Table 1 indicates,the share of American exports going to the Allies rose from 63 percent before the war to more than 80 percent during the war.By November 1916,40 percent of British military expenditures were taking place in the United States.38 At the same time,British control of the seas allowed them to reduce Amer- ican trade with the Central Powers to almost nothing. 37.National Bureau of Economic Research 2006. 38.Burk1984.5

locate+ It is enormous in relation to the economy as a whole+ Merchandise exports constituted nearly 12 percent of gross national product in 1916, roughly double their share in 1914, and more than in any other year for which data are available+ This generalization includes even the globalization of the past thirty years, although the United States currently brings in substantially more imports, as well as main￾taining an extensive trade in services, something for which no early-twentieth￾century data are available+ The export boom was also associated with the longest economic expansion since the Civil War, lasting forty-four months from Decem￾ber 1914 to August 1918+ 37 The size of the export boom demonstrates the plausi￾bility of the revisionist argument+ It is difficult to believe that any president’s assessment of the submarine threat would be unaffected by the fact that it men￾aced such a substantial part of the American economy+ Subsequent economic events, such as the oil shocks of the 1970s, are universally regarded as seminal events that triggered strong political responses, even though they involved a smaller share of the economy+ The great majority of these exports went to the Allies, especially Britain+ As Table 1 indicates, the share of American exports going to the Allies rose from 63 percent before the war to more than 80 percent during the war+ By November 1916, 40 percent of British military expenditures were taking place in the United States+ 38 At the same time, British control of the seas allowed them to reduce Amer￾ican trade with the Central Powers to almost nothing+ 37+ National Bureau of Economic Research 2006+ 38+ Burk 1984, 5+ TABLE 1. The destination of American exports, 1910–20 Allied Powers Central Powers Other destinations Year Volume Share Volume Share Volume Share 1910–13 average $1,330 63% $318 15% $522 25% 1914 1,472 62 361 15 567 24 1915 2,277 82 29 1 486 18 1916 4,569 83 2 0 943 17 1917 5,156 83 0 0 1,139 18 1918 5,135 84 0 0 1,169 19 1919 5,701 72 163 2 2,434 31 1920 5,235 64 356 4 2,919 35 Source: U+S+ Department of Commerce 1921+ Notes: The volume of exports is given in millions of current dollars+ The Central Powers are Germany, Austria￾Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey+ The Allied Powers are Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Rumania, Greece, and Japan+ Exports to colonies are included with the metropolitan state+ Although not all these states were members of these alliances in every year, all are included for all years for the sake of continuity+ 286 International Organization