《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Institutions and International Political Economy）The Promise of Institutionalist Theory

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The Promise of Robert O.Keohane and Institutionalist Theory Lisa L.Martin n his usual direct way, John J.Mearsheimer has sharpened the theoretical issues dividing realist from institutionalist theory,and for this service we are grateful.We are also pleased that he has read the institutionalist literature so thoroughly.He correctly asserts that liberal institutionalists treat states as rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced,and that institutional- ists only expect interstate cooperation to occur if states have significant com- mon interests.Hence institutionalist theory does not espouse the Wilsonian concept of collective security-which Charles and Clifford Kupchan refer to as "ideal collective security"-critiqued so well by I.L.Claude thirty years ago. Nor does institutionalism embrace the aspirations to transform international relations put forward by some critical theorists.Like realism,institutionalist theory is utilitarian and rationalistic.2 However,Professor Mearsheimer's version of realism has some rather seri- ous flaws.Among them are its penchant for assertions that turn out to be incorrect;its propensity to privilege its own viewpoint,so that in the absence of decisive evidence either way it invariably seems to prevail;its failure to explicate the conditions for the operation of its generalizations;and its logical contradictions,escaped only through verbal sleight-of-hand.We will begin by pointing out such errors from his own recent articles in this journal,then Robert O.Keohane is Stanfield Professor of International Peace,Harvard University,and author of After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy(Princeton University Press, 1984).Lisa L.Martin is John L.Loeb Associate Professor of Government,Harvard University,and author of Coercive Cooperation:Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton University Press, 1992). The authors thank Marc Busch,Chris Gelpi,Andrew Moravcsik,and Celeste Wallander for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay. 1.Inis L.Claude,Power and International Relations (New York:Random House,1962).Mearsheimer relies heavily on Claude's critique in his own discussion of collective security. 2.See Richard K.Ashley,"The Poverty of Neorealism,"International Organization,Vol.38,No.2 (Spring 1984),pp.225-286.Ashley included Robert O.Keohane as one of the "neorealists"whose "orrery of errors"he rejected.The fact that Mearsheimer criticized institutionalism and critical theory in the same article should not,therefore,lead readers to believe that there is an intellectual affinity between these two schools of thought.However,the work of "constructivist"theorists such as Alexander Wendt eloquently makes a number of arguments that many institutionalists would accept. International Security,Vol.20,No.1(Summer 1995),pp.39-51 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 39

The Promise of Robert 0. Keohane Ins t Institutionalist Theory Th~eory ~~~and Lisa L. Martin In his usual direct way, John J. Mearsheimer has sharpened the theoretical issues dividing realist from institutionalist theory, and for this service we are grateful. We are also pleased that he has read the institutionalist literature so thoroughly He correctly asserts that liberal institutionalists treat states as rational egoists operating in a world in which agreements cannot be hierarchically enforced, and that institutionalists only expect interstate cooperation to occur if states have significant common interests. Hence institutionalistheory does not espouse the Wilsonian concept of collective security-which Charles and Clifford Kupchan refer to as "ideal collective security"-critiqued so well by I.L. Claude thirty years ago.1 Nor does institutionalism embrace the aspirations to transform international relations put forward by some critical theorists. Like realism, institutionalist theory is utilitarian and rationalistic.2 However, Professor Mearsheimer's version of realism has some rather serious flaws. Among them are its penchant for assertions that turn out to be incorrect; its propensity to privilege its own viewpoint, so that in the absence of decisive evidence either way it invariably seems to prevail; its failure to explicate the conditions for the operation of its generalizations; and its logical contradictions, escaped only through verbal sleight-of-hand. We will begin by pointing out such errors from his own recent articles in this journal, then Robert 0. Keohane is Stanfield Professor of International Peace, Harvard University, and author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984). Lisa L. Martin is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University, and author of Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton University Press, 1992). The authors thank Marc Busch, Chris Gelpi, Andrew Moravcsik, and Celeste Wallander for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay. 1. Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). Mearsheimer relies heavily on Claude's critique in his own discussion of collective security. 2. See Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 225-286. Ashley included Robert 0. Keohane as one of the "neorealists" whose "orrery of errors" he rejected. The fact that Mearsheimer criticized institutionalism and critical theory in the same article should not, therefore, lead readers to believe that there is an intellectual affinity between these two schools of thought. However, the work of "constructivist" theoristsuch as Alexander Wendt eloquently makes a number of arguments that many institutionalists would accept. International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51 ? 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 39

International Security 20:1 40 examine his major claims about institutionalism.We consider the illusory divide between security and economic issues,the muddled question of"rela- tive gains,"and empirical work(admittedly in its early stages)that provides evidence of the significance of international institutions.We conclude that institutions sometimes matter,and that it is a worthy task of social science to discover how,and under what conditions,this is the case. The Fallacious Logic of Realism Five years ago Professor Mearsheimer forecast the imminent decline of NATO: "It is the Soviet threat that holds NATO together.Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent,whereupon the defensive alliance it headed for forty years may disintegrate."3 At the same time,he predicted that "the EC is likely [due to the end of the Cold War]to grow weaker,not stronger with time."4 Yet now that both NATO and the European Community,now the European Union (EU),are expanding their memberships,and hardly in decline,he abandons specificity for the equally false but more difficult to falsify generalization that "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability in a post-Cold War world."5 Professor Mearsheimer demands proof that international institutions matter. Yet he begins his article by reminding us that major governments recently have been emphasizing the value of international institutions;he could have added that they invest significant material and reputational resources in NATO,the EU,and also in organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT,recently strengthened to create the World Trade Organization) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).Not all international institutions command such resources from governments,but some do.How are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions,if such institutions are lacking in sig- nificance?Mearsheimer suggests that the answer lies in an ideological blind- ness of American policymakers,whose hostility toward realism drives them to the more congenial institutionalist framework (pp.47-49).It is difficult to 3.John J.Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instability in Europe after the Cold War,"International Security,Vol.15,No.1 (Summer 1990),p.52. 4.John J.Mearsheimer,"Correspondence:Back to the Future,Part II,"International Security,Vol. 15,No.2Fa1990),p.199. 5.John J.Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International Institutions,"International Security,Vol. 19,No.3(Winter 1994/95),p.7.Subsequent references to this article are in parentheses in the text

International Security 20:1 | 40 examine his major claims about institutionalism. We consider the illusory divide between security and economic issues, the muddled question of "relative gains," and empirical work (admittedly in its early stages) that provides evidence of the significance of international institutions. We conclude that institutionsometimes matter, and that it is a worthy task of social science to discover how, and under what conditions, this is the case. The Fallacious Logic of Realism Five years ago Professor Mearsheimer forecast the imminent decline of NATO: "It is the Soviet threat that holds NATO together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance it headed for forty years may disintegrate."3 At the same time, he predicted that "the EC is likely [due to the end of the Cold War] to grow weaker, not stronger with time."4 Yet now that both NATO and the European Community, now the European Union (EU), are expanding their memberships, and hardly in decline, he abandons specificity for the equally false but more difficulto falsify generalization that "institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability in a post-Cold War world."5 Professor Mearsheimer demands proof that international institutions matter. Yet he begins his article by reminding us that major governments recently have been emphasizing the value of international institutions; he could have added that they invest significant material and reputational resources in NATO, the EU, and also in organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, recently strengthened to create the World Trade Organization) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Not all international institutions command such resources from governments, but some do. How are we to account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international institutions, if such institutions are lacking in significance? Mearsheimer suggests that the answer lies in an ideological blindness of American policymakers, whose hostility toward realism drives them to the more congenial institutionalist framework (pp. 47-49). It is difficult to 3. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), p. 52. 4. John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondemnce: Back to the Future, Part II," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), p. 199. 5. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 7. Subsequent references to this article are in parentheses in the text

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory 41 square this assertion of a collective delusion with the dominant role of realist theory in policy discussions,or with realism's own precepts about the forces that drive state behavior.In light of states'investments in international insti- tutions,it is fair to turn Mearsheimer's question around:could we not legiti- mately demand evidence either that leaders of governments are deluded or that NATO and the EU are designed to deceive unsophisticated observers? Mearsheimer assumes that his view is privileged,in the sense that we must accept realism unless overwhelmingly convincing evidence is presented for an alternative view;but the fact that states invest in international institutions make this stance quite problematic. Institutionalism and realism differ in a number of other respects,one of the most significant of which concerns how they approach social science.A central fault of Mearsheimer's realism as a scientific theory-rather than as rhetoric- is that the conditions for the operation of its "grim picture of world politics" (p.9)typically are not well-specified.Realism is replete with global generali- zations,lacking qualifications about the conditions under which they may be valid.Let us consider two examples from Mearsheimer's own article.First, Mearsheimer writes that "states in a realist world...must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation"(p.12, emphasis added).But he later admits that this proposition may be false when the threat of aggressive war is low-for instance,when defensive technologies (such as secure second-strike nuclear forces)are prevalent (pp.23-25).Second, in Mearsheimer's realist world,"every state would like to be the most formi- dable military power in the system"(p.12).But since no one thinks that Switzerland,Argentina,or contemporary Britain actually seeks to become "the most formidable military power,"what Mearsheimer presumably means to argue is that states with sufficient capabilities always pursue this goal.Even this statement is often false:for example,the United States during the interwar period could reasonably have expected to become the most powerful state in the world,but did not seek such a position.Confronted with such contradic- tions and anomalies,realism typically retreats from universal rhetoric to post hoc and ad hoc qualifications,taking into account geography,history,percep- tions,and domestic politics. Institutionalism,in contrast,seeks to state in advance the conditions under which its propositions apply.Our theory may therefore have less appeal to those who require simple"truths,"but purportedly scientific theories should specify the conditions under which the theory is expected to hold a priori.As Mearsheimer indicates,when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation,we do not expect cooperation to occur,nor the institutions

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory | 41 square this assertion of a collective delusion with the dominant role of realist theory in policy discussions, or with realism's own precepts about the forces that drive state behavior. In light of states' investments in international institutions, it is fair to turn Mearsheimer's question around: could we not legitimately demand evidence either that leaders of governments are deluded or that NATO and the EU are designed to deceive unsophisticated observers? Mearsheimer assumes that his view is privileged, in the sense that we must accept realism unless overwhelmingly convincing evidence is presented for an alternative view; but the fact that states invest in international institutions make this stance quite problematic. Institutionalism and realism differ in a number of other respects, one of the most significant of which concerns how they approach social science. A central fault of Mearsheimer's realism as a scientific theory-rather than as rhetoricis that the conditions for the operation of its "grim picture of world politics" (p. 9) typically are not well-specified. Realism is replete with global generalizations, lacking qualifications about the conditions under which they may be valid. Let us consider two examples from Mearsheimer's own article. First, Mearsheimer writes that "states in a realist world . . . must be motivated primarily by relative gains concerns when considering cooperation" (p. 12, emphasis added). But he later admits that this proposition may be false when the threat of aggressive war is low-for instance, when defensive technologies (such as secure second-strike nuclear forces) are prevalent (pp. 23-25). Second, in Mearsheimer's realist world, "every state would like to be the most formidable military power in the system" (p. 12). But since no one thinks that Switzerland, Argentina, or contemporary Britain actually seeks to become "the most formidable military power," what Mearsheimer presumably means to argue is that states with sufficient capabilities always pursue this goal. Even this statement is often false: for example, the United States during the interwar period could reasonably have expected to become the most powerful state in the world, but did not seek such a position. Confronted with such contradictions and anomalies, realism typically retreats from universal rhetoric to post hoc and ad hoc qualifications, taking into account geography, history, perceptions, and domestic politics. Institutionalism, in contrast, seeks to state in advance the conditions under which its propositions apply. Our theory may therefore have less appeal to those who require simple "truths," but purportedly scientific theories should specify the conditions under which the theory is expected to hold a priori. As Mearsheimer indicates, when state elites do not foresee self-interested benefits from cooperation, we do not expect cooperation to occur, nor the institutions

International Security 20:1 42 that facilitate cooperation to develop.When states can jointly benefit from cooperation,on the other hand,we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions.Institutions can provide information,reduce transaction costs,make commitments more credible,establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur,institutionalist theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid.It is in this sense that institutionalism claims to subsume realism. Realism's proclivity for bold,unqualified generalizations not only generates anomalies but gets its proponents into logical difficulties.Mearsheimer holds that "institutions have no independent effect on state behavior"(p.7);that NATO is an institution (p.13);and that NATO played a role in preventing World War III and helping the West win the Cold War (pp.13-14).These propositions sound like a classically fallacious syllogism,until one recognizes that there is an escape clause:"NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War,and it was that balance of power,not NATO per se,that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent"(p.14).But liberal institutionalists,who see institu- tions as rooted in the realities of power and interest,do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable conditions.What we argue is that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities.Institutions are important "independently"only in the ordi- nary sense used in social science:controlling for the effects of power and interests,it matters whether they exist.They also have an interactive effect, meaning that their impact on outcomes varies,depending on the nature of power and interests.Mearsheimer is forced to admit the truth of institutional effects with regard to NATO,although for rhetorical purposes he shifts his ground to attack a view that we do not hold:that institutions can prevent war regardless of the structure in which they operate. Hence Mearsheimer's version of realism is replete with analytical problems. However,it is not our duty here to correct realism's copy-book.In the rest of this brief response,therefore,we focus on the promise of institutionalist theory, and the research directions that we hope will help to realize that promise. Political Economy vs.Security and the Issue of Relative Gains Although Mearsheimer has provided an admirable summary of several aspects of institutionalist theory,his version of our argument requires correction on

International Security 20:1 | 42 that facilitate cooperation to develop. When states can jointly benefit from cooperation, on the other hand, we expect governments to attempt to construct such institutions. Institutions can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity. By seeking to specify the conditions under which institutions can have an impact and cooperation can occur, institutionalist theory shows under what conditions realist propositions are valid. It is in this sense that institutionalism claims to subsume realism. Realism's proclivity for bold, unqualified generalizations not only generates anomalies but gets its proponents into logical difficulties. Mearsheimer holds that "institutions have no independent effect on state behavior" (p. 7); that NATO is an institution (p. 13); and that NATO played a role in preventing World War III and helping the West win the Cold War (pp. 13-14). These propositions sound like a classically fallacious syllogism, until one recognizes that there is an escape clause: "NATO was basically a manifestation of the bipolar distribution of power in Europe during the Cold War, and it was that balance of power, not NATO per se, that provided the key to maintaining stability on the continent" (p. 14). But liberal institutionalists, who see institutions as rooted in the realities of power and interest, do not argue that NATO could have maintained stability under any imaginable conditions. What we argue is that institutions make a significant difference in conjunction with power realities. Institutions are important "independently" only in the ordinary sense used in social science: controlling for the effects of power and interests, it matters whether they exist. They also have an interactive effect, meaning that their impact on outcomes varies, depending on the nature of power and interests. Mearsheimer is forced to admit the truth of institutional effects with regard to NATO, although for rhetorical purposes he shifts his ground to attack a view that we do not hold: that institutions can prevent war regardless of the structure in which they operate. Hence Mearsheimer's version of realism is replete with analytical problems. However, it is not our duty here to correct realism's copy-book. In the rest of this brief response, therefore, we focus on the promise of institutionalist theory, and the research directions that we hope will help to realize that promise. Political Economy vs. Security and the Issue of Relative Gains Although Mearsheimer has provided an admirable summary of several aspects of institutionalistheory, his version of our argument requires correction on

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory 43 two major points.First,Mearsheimer asserts that institutionalist theory is based on "the assumption that international politics can be divided into two realms- security and political economy-and that liberal institutionalism mainly ap- plies to the latter"(pp.15-16).Although some institutionalists have made this assertion,it is not the predominant view of the institutionalist literature,and we certainly do not accept it.Secondly,in contrast to Mearsheimer's assertion, our focus is not exclusively on "cheating."Situations of coordination,in which cheating is not a problem but distributional issues are serious,are equally important,although they were underemphasized (but not absent)in the early institutionalist literature. THE PURPORTED SECURITY VS.POLITICAL ECONOMY DIVIDE Mearsheimer's assertion that institutionalism employs a "neat dividing line" to separate political economy from security issues is surprising,in view of the attention that he devotes to the volume edited by Kenneth Oye,Cooperation Under Anarchy.A major argument of Cooperation Under Anarchy is that institu- tionalist theory can be applied to both security and political economy issues. As Robert Axelrod and Robert O.Keohane wrote: It has often been noted that military-security issues display more of the char- acteristics associated with anarchy than do political-economic ones.Charles Lipson,for instance,has recently observed that political-economic relationships are typically more institutionalized than military-security ones.This does not mean,however,that analysis of these two sets of issues requires two separate analytical frameworks.Indeed,one of the major purposes of the present col- lection is to show that a single framework can throw light on both [emphasis added]. We share Mearsheimer's view that there is no clean analytical line between economic and security issues,although we do not base our view on the overarching role of relative gains.Institutionalist theory should be highly applicable to security issues because its argument revolves around the role of institutions in providing information.This argument is pertinent to realist secu- rity arguments,which often rely on worst-case analysis.Realists contend that in an uncertain,anarchic world,states must assume the worst,particularly about others'intentions,when making policy choices.Worst-case analysis 6.Robert Axelrod and Robert O.Keohane,"Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy:Strategies and Institutions,in Kenneth A.Oye,ed.,Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton:Princeton University Press,,1986),p.227

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory | 43 two major points. First, Mearsheimer asserts that institutionalist theory is based on "the assumption that international politics can be divided into two realmssecurity and political economy-and that liberal institutionalism mainly applies to the latter" (pp. 15-16). Although some institutionalists have made this assertion, it is not the predominant view of the institutionalist literature, and we certainly do not accept it. Secondly, in contrast to Mearsheimer's assertion, our focus is not exclusively on "cheating." Situations of coordination, in which cheating is not a problem but distributional issues are serious, are equally important, although they were underemphasized (but not absent) in the early institutionalist literature. THE PURPORTED SECURITY VS. POLITICAL ECONOMY DIVIDE Mearsheimer's assertion that institutionalism employs a "neat dividing line" to separate political economy from security issues is surprising, in view of the attention that he devotes to the volume edited by Kenneth Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy. A major argument of Cooperation Under Anarchy is that institutionalist theory can be applied to both security and political economy issues. As Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane wrote: It has often been noted that military-security issues display more of the characteristics associated with anarchy than do political-economic ones. Charles Lipson, for instance, has recently observed that political-economic relationships are typically more institutionalized than military-security ones. This does not mean, however, that analysis of these two sets of issues requires two separate analytical frameworks. Indeed, one of the major purposes of the present collection is to show that a single framework can throw light on both [emphasis added].6 We share Mearsheimer's view that there is no clean analytical line between economic and security issues, although we do not base our view on the overarching role of relative gains. Institutionalist theory should be highly applicable to security issues because its argument revolves around the role of institutions in providing information. This argument is pertinent to realist security arguments, which often rely on worst-case analysis. Realists contend that in an uncertain, anarchic world, states must assume the worst, particularly about others' intentions, when making policy choices. Worst-case analysis 6. Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed.,'Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 227

International Security 20:1 44 implies following policies that do not maximize expected utility for the sake of avoiding terrible outcomes.But if one can secure more information,it may be possible to follow policies that more nearly maximize utility.Realist writers from Kautilya on have stressed the significance of information (intelligence);if institutions can provide useful information,realists should see them as sig- nificant.The logic of institutionalist theory is directly applicable to security problems as realists define them. Hence,if Mearsheimer meant to offer us a "loophole"through which to escape his criticism-that institutionalist theory is only applicable to non-secu- rity issues-we emphatically refuse to avail ourselves of his generosity.On the contrary,we hope that,to use Axelrod's phrase,institutionalist theory will gradually "invade"the study of security issues,helping to explain variation in institutional form without denying the validity of many realist insights into power and interests. RELATIVE GAINS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The conclusions we draw from the "relative gains"debate are different from those of Professor Mearsheimer.It is true that when only two states exist and they have perfectly conflicting interests,institutions will not be significant,but this point is obvious.Two issues are more significant:1)the conditions under which relative gains are important;and 2)the role of institutions when dis- tributional issues are significant-that is,when relative gains are at stake. It is important to understand the great variation in the extent to which relative gains matter.The major lesson of the recent debate on relative gains is that their importance is conditional on factors such as the number of major actors in the system and whether military advantage favors offense or defense.8 Duncan Snidal has shown that relative gains are unlikely to have much impact on cooperation if the potential absolute gains from cooperation are substantial, or in any context involving more than two states.A valuable aspect of the relative gains debate is that it has made distributional and bargaining issues 7.See Celeste A.Wallander,"Balance and Institutions in German-Russian Security Relations after the Cold War,"manuscript,Harvard University,1994;Celeste A.Wallander and Robert O.Keohane, "Toward an Institutional Theory of Alliances,"paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association,Chicago,Illinois,February 22-25,1995. 8.See David A.Baldwin,ed.,Neorealism and Neoliberalism:The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press,1993),p.323,especially chapters by Joseph Grieco,Duncan Snidal, Robert Powell,and Robert O.Keohane. 9.Duncan Snidal,"Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,"American Political Science Review,Vol 85,No.3 (September 1991),pp.701-726

International Security 20:1 | 44 implies following policies that do not maximize expected utility for the sake of avoiding terrible outcomes. But if one can secure more information, it may be possible to follow policies that more nearly maximize utility.7 Realist writers from Kautilya on have stressed the significance of information (intelligence); if institutions can provide useful information, realists should see them as significant. The logic of institutionalistheory is directly applicable to security problems as realists define them. Hence, if Mearsheimer meant to offer us a "loophole" through which to escape his criticism-that institutionalist theory is only applicable to non-security issues-we emphatically refuse to avail ourselves of his generosity On the contrary, we hope that, to use Axelrod's phrase, institutionalistheory will gradually "invade" the study of security issues, helping to explain variation in institutional form without denying the validity of many realist insights into power and interests. RELATIVE GAINS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The conclusions we draw from the "relative gains" debate are different from those of Professor Mearsheimer. It is true that when only two states exist and they have perfectly conflicting interests, institutions will not be significant, but this point is obvious. Two issues are more significant: 1) the conditions under which relative gains are important; and 2) the role of institutions when distributional issues are significant-that is, when relative gains are at stake. It is important to understand the great variation in the extent to which relative gains matter. The major lesson of the recent debate on relative gains is that their importance is conditional on factors such as the number of major actors in the system and whether military advantage favors offense or defense.8 Duncan Snidal has shown that relative gains are unlikely to have much impact on cooperation if the potential absolute gains from cooperation are substantial, or in any context involving more than two states.9 A valuable aspect of the relative gains debate is that it has made distributional and bargaining issues 7. See Celeste A. Wallander, "Balance and Institutions in German-Russian Security Relations after the Cold War," manuscript, Harvard University, 1994; Celeste A. Wallander and Robert 0. Keohane, "Toward an Institutional Theory of Alliances," paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 22-25, 1995. 8. See David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 323, especially chapters by Joseph Grieco, Duncan Snidal, Robert Powell, and Robert 0. Keohane. 9. Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and'the Pattern of International Cooperation," American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 701-726

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory 45 more salient than they were in early neoliberal thinking,10 but if the debate becomes one of"whether"relative gains matter,that value will be dissipated. We need instead to ask under what conditions such distributional conflicts are severe. What is the role of institutions when distributional issues are important? Contrary to the assertion that institutionalist theory is irrelevant to distribu- tional issues,we argue that distributional conflict may render institutions more important.To understand this point,it is essential to distinguish between two problems that states face when they attempt to cooperate.They often worry about the potential for others to cheat,as in a Prisoners'Dilemma.But they also face the problem of coordinating their actions on a particular stable cooperative outcome (solving the problem of multiple equilibria,in game- theoretic terminology).Usually more than one cooperative outcome exists.The states involved may not agree on which of these outcomes is preferred,as each has different distributional implications.Disagreement about the specific form of cooperation is the principal barrier to cooperation in such coordination games.Unless some coordinating mechanism exists,states may fail to capture the potential gains from cooperation.Institutions do not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism.However,in complex situations involving many states,international institutions can step in to provide "constructed focal points"that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent. Realists interpret the relative-gains logic as showing that states will not cooperate with one another if each suspects that its potential partners are gaining more from cooperation than it is.However,just as institutions can mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge,so can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation.Liberal theory argues that institutions provide valuable information,and information about the distribu- tion of gains from cooperation may be especially valuable if the relative-gains logic is correct.Institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle dis- tributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over 10.For development of arguments about the relationship between international regimes and distributional problems,see James D.Morrow,"Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information,"International Organization,Vol.48,No.3(Summer 1994),pp.387- 423;and James Fearon,"Cooperation and Bargaining Under Anarchy,"manuscript,University of Chicago,1993. 11.For example,Stephen Krasner has argued that coordination problems can be solved by the unilateral exercise of power by the strongest state.Stephen D.Krasner,"Global Communications and National Power:Life on the Pareto Frontier,"World Politics,Vol.43,No.3 (April 1991), Pp.336-366

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory | 45 more salient than they were in early neoliberal thinking,10 but if the debate becomes one of "whether" relative gains matter, that value will be dissipated. We need instead to ask under what conditions such distributional conflicts are severe. What is the role of institutions when distributional issues are important? Contrary to the assertion that institutionalistheory is irrelevant to distributional issues, we argue that distributional conflict may render institutions more important. To understand this point, it is essential to distinguish between two problems that states face when they attempt to cooperate. They often worry about the potential for others to cheat, as in a Prisoners' Dilemma. But they also face the problem of coordinating their actions on a particular stable cooperative outcome (solving the problem of multiple equilibria, in gametheoretic terminology). Usually more than one cooperative outcome exists. The states involved may not agree on which of these outcomes is preferred, as each has different distributional implications. Disagreement about the specific form of cooperation is the principal barrier to cooperation in such coordination games. Unless some coordinating mechanism exists, states may fail to capture the potential gains from cooperation. Institutions do not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism.11 However, in complex situations involving many states, international institutions can step in to provide "constructed focal points" that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent. Realists interpret the relative-gains logic as showing that states will not cooperate with one another if each suspects that its potential partners are gaining more from cooperation than it is. However, just as institutions can mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so can they alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation. Liberal theory argues that institutions provide valuable information, and information about the distribution of gains from cooperation may be especially valuable if the relative-gains logic is correct. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly divided over 10. For development of arguments about the relationship between international regimes and distributional problems, see James D. Morrow, "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 387- 423; and James Fearon, "Cooperation and Bargaining Under Anarchy," manuscript, University of Chicago, 1993. 11. For example, Stephen Krasner has argued that coordination problems can be solved by the unilateral exercise of power by the strongest state. Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Paireto Frontier," World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-366

International Security 20:1 46 time,for example by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members. In our view the successful functioning of institutions depends heavily on the operation of reciprocity,both specific and diffuse.12 States using strategies of reciprocity are engaged in exchange with one another and so require informa- tion about the value of their exchanges.Institutionalized reciprocity and dis- tributional concerns are simply two sides of the same coin,reflecting the difficulties of cooperating in a system lacking centralized enforcement and pointing to the need for reliable sources of information if states are to achieve gains from cooperation.Far from leading to the conclusion that institutions are not significant in world politics,the relative-gains debate has led us to under- stand yet another pathway through which they substantially influence the course of international relations.A crucial step in the institutionalist research program will be to understand the conditions under which institutions can provide the information necessary to serve as reliable solutions to distribu- tional problems. Empirical Work on the Impact of Institutions We agree with John Mearsheimer that "more empirical work is needed before a final judgment is rendered on the explanatory power of liberal institutional- ism"(p.26).The point of a new theory is to generate testable hypotheses: liberal institutionalism,like any other theory,only has value insofar as it generates propositions that can be tested against real evidence. Institutionalist theory conceptualizes institutions both as independent and dependent variables:"institutions change as a result of human action,and the changes in expectations and process that result can exert profound effects on state behavior."13 Institutional theory has a coherent account of both the crea- tion of institutions and their effects:institutions are created by states because of their anticipated effects on patterns of behavior.Early research by institution- alists focused on institutions as dependent variables,examining the conditions under which they are created.Recent research has sought more systematically 12.Robert O.Keohane,"Reciprocity in International Relations,"International Organization,Vol.40, No.1(Winter1986),pp.1-27. 13.Robert O.Keohane,International Institutions and State Power (Boulder,Colo.:Westview,1989), P.10

International Security 20:1 | 46 time, for example by disclosing information about the military expenditures and capacities of alliance members. In our view the successful functioning of institutions depends heavily on the operation of reciprocity, both specific and diffuse.12 States using strategies of reciprocity are engaged in exchange with one another and so require information about the value of their exchanges. Institutionalized reciprocity and distributional concerns are simply two sides of the same coin, reflecting the difficulties of cooperating in a system lacking centralized enforcement and pointing to the need for reliable sources of information if states are to achieve gains from cooperation. Far from leading to the conclusion that institutions are not significant in world politics, the relative-gains debate has led us to understand yet another pathway through which they substantially influence the course of international relations. A crucial step in the institutionalist research program will be to understand the conditions under which institutions can provide the information necessary to serve as reliable solutions to distributional problems. Empirical Work on the Impact of Institutions We agree with John Mearsheimer that "more empirical work is needed before a final judgment is rendered on the explanatory power of liberal institutionalism" (p. 26). The point of a new theory is to generate testable hypotheses: liberal institutionalism, like any other theory, only has value insofar as it generates propositions that can be tested against real evidence. Institutionalistheory conceptualizes institutions both as independent and dependent variables: "institutions change as a result of human action, and the changes in expectations and process that result can exert profound effects on state behavior."13 Institutional theory has a coherent account of both the creation of institutions and their effects: institutions are created by states because of their anticipated effects on patterns of behavior. Early research by institutionalists focused on institutions as dependent variables, examining the conditions under which they are created. Recent research has sought more systematically 12. Robert 0. Keohane, "Reciprocity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27. 13. Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), p. 10

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory 47 to demonstrate that institutions are sometimes significant for political out- comes,and to determine the conditions under which this is the case.14 In view of this research program,it should be clear that evidence that institutions change in response to underlying conditions is hardly a blow against institutionalist theory.That theory,after all,posits that international institutions are created in response to state interests,and that their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities.The real empirical issue is how to distinguish the effects of underlying conditions from those of the institutions themselves.One result of the interdependence between institutions and underlying forces is that research designed to isolate the impact of insti- tutions is difficult to design and execute.Rarely,if ever,will institutions vary while the "rest of the world"is held constant.Thus finding the ideal quasi- experimental situation to test the impact of institutions is not possible. However,these difficulties do not make it impossible to test the argument that institutions matter,since changes in underlying conditions and in institu- tions are not perfectly correlated.Hence it may be worthwhile to search for instances in which underlying conditions have changed rapidly while institu- tions have remained relatively constant,or where similar structural changes confront regions that have different institutional endowments.Another tactic may be to consider the level of institutional variation itself.The institutionalist perspective leads us to expect patterned variation in the types of institutions states construct,since they anticipate that institutions so constructed will con- strain them.Analysis of institutional form,such as variations in the institution- alization of alliances or in the legalization of the international trading system, should therefore provide valuable evidence for evaluating institutionalist theory. Realism's insistence that institutions have only marginal effects renders its account of institutional creation incomplete and logically unsound,and leaves it without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU,NATO,GATT,and regional trading organi- zations.According to the precepts of realist theory,states act rationally when they construct institutions,although they know that these institutions will have 14.Since institutionalists do not claim that institutions always have a major impact on outcomes, finding weak institutions hardly constitutes a refutation of institutionalist theory.Hence the weakness of the International Energy Agency during the 1979 oil crisis,described by Keohane in After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton:Princeton Univer- sity Press,1984),is hardly the damning evidence that Mearsheimer claims

The Promise of Institutionalist Theory | 47 to demonstrate that institutions are sometimes significant for political outcomes, and to determine the conditions under which this is the case.14 In view of this research program, it should be clear that evidence that institutions change in response to underlying conditions is hardly a blow against institutionalistheory. That theory, after all, posits that international institutions are created in response to state interests, and that their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities. The real empirical issue is how to distinguish the effects of underlying conditions from those of the institutions themselves. One result of the interdependence between institutions and underlying forces is that research designed to isolate the impact of institutions is difficulto design and execute. Rarely, if ever, will institutions vary while the "rest of the world" is held constant. Thus finding the ideal quasiexperimental situation to test the impact of institutions is not possible. However, these difficulties do not make it impossible to test the argument that institutions matter, since changes in underlying conditions and in institutions are not perfectly correlated. Hence it may be worthwhile to search for instances in which underlying conditions have changed rapidly while institutions have remained relatively constant, or where similar structural changes confront regions that have different institutional endowments. Another tactic may be to consider the level of institutional variation itself. The institutionalist perspective leads us to expect patterned variation in the types of institutions states construct, since they anticipate that institutionso constructed will constrain them. Analysis of institutional form, such as variations in the institutionalization of alliances or in the legalization of the international trading system, should therefore provide valuable evidence for evaluating institutionalist theory. Realism's insistence that institutions have only marginal effects renders its account of institutional creation incomplete and logically unsound, and leaves it without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations. According to the precepts of realist theory, states act rationally when they construct institutions, although they know that these institutions will have 14. Since institutionalists do not claim that institutions always have a major impact on outcomes, finding weak institutions hardly constitutes a refutation of institutionalistheory Hence the weakness of the International Energy Agency during the 1979 oil crisis, described by Keohane in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), is hardly the damning evidence that Mearsheimer claims

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