《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions

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THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS JONATHAN KIRSHNER HE DEBATE in political science about economic sanctions has too often devolved into unhelpful caricatures about whether or not sanctions "work,"and whether they can and will replace the use of force.Endist arguments about the disutility of force and the rise of the trading state are easily dismissed by security specialists who point to nu- aunf merous post-cold war military confrontations and to the paucity of evi- dence in support of the view that sanctions can substitute for force in ad- vancing state objectives.The question of whether sanctions work,however, is a false controversy that has inhibited progress in the understanding of crucial aspects of world politics.Economic coercion will be an increasingly 节 important tool of international statecraft in the coming years,and security specialists need to know not "if they work,"but rather "how they func- tion."This article introduces a microfoundations approach to explain how sanctions function.It argues further that sanctions are neither impotent nor 5 are they a panacea,but rather need to be reconceptualized as a technique of uojoe!f statecraft.The microfoundations approach advances this agenda by con- tributing to our understanding of the conditions under which different tac- tics will represent the most effective policy choices. rey3ueyS] Economic diplomacy will play an increasingly large role in the post-cold war era.Four principal factors contribute to this trend:First,although conflicts between participants in the anti-Soviet alliance are likely to in- 合 crease,they will almost certainly be fought with economic as opposed to papeoluMod military techniques of statecraft.Second,the collapse of communism and the greater number of small,market-sensitive economies in the interna- tional system has increased the number of states that are vulnerable to eco- nomic coercion.Third,many great powers in the system,such as the United States,Germany,and Japan,appear disinclined to use force to re- Jonathan Kirshner is assistant professor of government at Cornell University. For their helpful comments,I thank Tom Christensen,Jim Goldgeier,Peter Katzenstein, Karl Mueller,and two anonymous reviewers for Secrity Studies. SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 (spring 1997):32-64 Published by Frank Cass,London

THE MICROFOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS JONATHAN KIRSHNER T HE DEBATE in political science about economic sanctions has too often devolved into unhelpful caricatures about whether or not sanctions "work," and whether they can and will replace the use of force. Endist arguments about the disutility of force and the rise of the trading state are easily dismissed by security specialists who point to numerous post—cold war military confrontations and to the paucity of evidence in support of the view that sanctions can substitute for force in advancing state objectives. The question of whether sanctions work, however, is a false controversy that has inhibited progress in the understanding of crucial aspects of world politics. Economic coercion will be an increasingly important tool of international statecraft in the coming years, and security specialists need to know not "if they work," but rather "how they function." This article introduces a microfoundations approach to explain how sanctions function. It argues further that sanctions are neither impotent nor are they a panacea, but rather need to be reconceptualized as a technique of statecraft. The microfoundations approach advances this agenda by contributing to our understanding of the conditions under which different tactics will represent the most effective policy choices. Economic diplomacy will play an increasingly large role in the post-cold war era. Four principal factors contribute to this trend: First, although conflicts between participants in the anti-Soviet alliance are likely to increase, they will almost certainly be fought with economic as opposed to military techniques of statecraft. Second, the collapse of communism and the greater number of small, market-sensitive economies in the international system has increased the number of states that are vulnerable to economic coercion. Third, many great powers in the system, such as the United States, Germany, and Japan, appear disinclined to use force to reJonathan Kirshner is assistant professor of government at Cornell University. For their helpful comments, I thank Tom Christensen, Jim Goldgeier, Peter Katzenstein, Karl Mueller, and two anonymous reviewers for Security Studies. SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 (spring 1997): 32-64 Published by Frank Cass, London. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 33 solve many,if not most conflicts.Finally,even in those cases where force is ultimately introduced,the lack of urgency that was associated with many cold war crises means that states are likely to apply economic sanctions as an early method of influence in a conflict.Thus sanctions are often an im- portant intermediate form of statecraft that complement the use of force. Despite some notable advances in the past decade,our understanding of economic sanctions remains limited.One reason for this is that economic sanctions are principally discussed in aggregate terms.Typically,references are made to the sender,the target,and the sanction.This article argues that disaggregating these elements will enhance our understanding of how eco- nomic sanctions work.A microfoundations approach looks not at eco- aunf nomic sanctions in general,but at the differences between various forms of economic statecraft.Instead of considering how those sanctions hurt the target state,this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are af- fected differentially,and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen.2 Further study of these microfoundations will increase the understanding of when and why economic sanctions will be successful.We must take care, however,with the issue of“success'”and“failure'”regarding economic 1.See David Baldwin,Economic Stateorgf (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1985); Klaus Knorr,The Power of Nations (New York:Basic Books,1975);Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J.Schott,and Kimberly Ann Elliot,Economic Sanctions Reconridered,vol.1,History and Current Polisy,vol.2,Supplemental Case Histories,2nd ed.Washington,D.C:Institute for Inter- national Economics,1990);David Leyton-Brown,cd.,The Utility of International Economie Sanctions New York:St.Martin's,1987);Robin Renwick,Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in International Affairs,no.45,1981);Margaret P.Doxey,International Sane- tions in Contemporary Perspective (New York:St.Martin's,1987);and Doxey,Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York:Oxford University Press,1980);M.S.Daoudi and M. S.Dajani,Economic Sanctions:Ideals and Experience (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1983). This is not to say that there has been no disaggregation with regard to the study of eco- nomic sanctions.Although all of these works aggregate targets and senders,some distinc- tions between the forms of sanctions has been considered.Baldwin and Knorr each have separate chapters on aid and trade,although these are primarily in the service of general ar- guments regarding conomic statecraft.Hufbauer,Schott and Elliot distinguish between 'cxport,”“import''and“financial'”sanctions,but the analysis on this issue is limited:see Hirtory and Current Poligy,70-71,also the table on p.106 which notes greater success associ- ated with financial sanctions.In general,all of the studies contain passing references to ideas associated with disaggregation,but pause only momentarily to consider the consequences: see Leyton-Brown,The Utility of International Economic Sanctions,297,Renwick,Economic Sanc- io,37,Doxey,International Sanctions in Conter帅prary Perspectit说，37；Doxey,.Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement,145;Daoudi and Dajani,Economic Sanctions:Ideals and Experience, 164. 2.The sender state can also be disaggregated.This would show how different domestic political structures affect the ability of states to introduce certain types of sanctions.This paper will focus on disaggregating sanctions and targets,which will explain when sanctions will have their greatest chance of success,and not dwell on those factors which lead states to introduce sanctions in the first place

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 3 3 solve many, if not most conflicts. Finally, even in those cases where force is ultimately introduced, the lack of urgency that was associated with many cold war crises means that states are likely to apply economic sanctions as an early method of influence in a conflict. Thus sanctions are often an important intermediate form of statecraft that complement the use of force. Despite some notable advances in the past decade, our understanding of economic sanctions remains limited. One reason for this is that economic sanctions are principally discussed in aggregate terms. Typically, references are made to the sender, the target, and the sanction.1 This article argues that disaggregating these elements will enhance our understanding of how economic sanctions work. A microfoundations approach looks not at economic sanctions in general, but at the differences between various forms of economic statecraft. Instead of considering how those sanctions hurt the target state, this approach emphasizes how groups within the target are affected differentially, and how these consequences change with the form of statecraft chosen.2 Further study of these microfoundations will increase the understanding of when and why economic sanctions will be successful. We must take care, however, with the issue of "success" and "failure" regarding economic 1. See David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, vol. 1, History and Current Policy, vol. 2, Supplemental Case Histories, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990); David Leyton-Brown, ed., The Utility of International Economic Sanctions (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions (Cambridge: Harvard Studies in International Affairs, no. 45, 1981); Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (New York: St. Martin's, 1987); and Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983). This is not to say that there has been no disaggregation with regard to the study of economic sanctions. Although all of these works aggregate targets and senders, some distinctions between the forms of sanctions has been considered. Baldwin and Knorr each have separate chapters on aid and trade, although these are primarily in the service of general arguments regarding economic statecraft. Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot distinguish between "export," "import" and "financial" sanctions, but the analysis on this issue is limited: see History and Current Policy, 70-71, also the table on p. 106 which notes greater success associated with financial sanctions. In general, all of the studies contain passing references to ideas associated with disaggregation, but pause only momentarily to consider the consequences: see Leyton-Brown, The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, 297, Renwick, Economic Sanctions, 37, Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, 37; Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, 145; Daoudi and Dajani, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience, 164. 2. The sender state can also be disaggregated. This would show how different domestic political structures affect the ability of states to introduce certain types of sanctions. This paper will focus on disaggregating sanctions and targets, which will explain when sanctions will have their greatest chance of success, and not dwell on those factors which lead states to introduce sanctions in the first place. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

34 SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 statecraft.This article is an exercise in comparative statics:the influence of changes in specific variables is considered,ceteris paribus.Consequentially, results will not show that certain factors will cause sanctions to work,but rather that the presence or absence of those factors will make success more or less likely.That this must be the case is shown by a consideration of the two principal sets of variables which this analysis holds constant. First,and most importantly,the context of the influence attempt is held constant.Any study of sanctions post-Baldwin's Economic Statecraf cannot ignore three contextual variables in evaluating success and failure.These are ≡ the full range of goals for which sanctions were enacted,the costs and benefits of sanctions compared with other forms of coercion,and the value that the target places on continued defiance.The fill range of goal refers to the fact that a state may initiate sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target,but to communicate its preferences,support allies, deter others from engaging in similar activity,and dissuade the target from S expanding its objectionable activity.Sanctions may also be designed to punish,weaken,distract,or contain the adversary.Thus sanctions may fail to move the target,but may be successful along a number of other dimen- sions,complement other policies,and remain an appropriate policy instru- 5 ment.3 Attention to comparalive costr serves as a reminder that in choosing policy,statesmen must compare the costs,both political and economic,of introducing specific techniques with the benefits of expected outcomes.It must be remembered that the purpose of all forms of statecraft is to rey3ueyS] achieve political objectives.There will be many cases,then,where the costs of the use of force will outweigh the political benefits of achieving the de- sired outcome.In those cases,the use of force can never work.Success, 名 therefore,can only be calculated with regard to costs and benefits,and as compared with other options.Finally,the value the target places on continued defance eliminates the possibility of absolute claims regarding the success and failure of economic sanctions(or,for that matter,other forms of coer- cion).A given sanction(for example,the suspension of $500 million in aid) will be successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others,largely depend- ing on the target's ranking of the value of defiance and the cost of the sanction.Although it can be said that a suspension of $500 million in aid will be less effective than a $1 billion suspension and more effective than a $250 million suspension,ceteris paribus,no absolute claims can be made 3.The question for statecraft is not "will these measures work"(that is,change target behavior)but rather,"is my strategic position improved if I introduce these measures

34 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 statecraft. This article is an exercise in comparative statics: the influence of changes in specific variables is considered, ceteris paribus. Consequentially, results will not show that certain factors will cause sanctions to work, but rather that the presence or absence of those factors will make success more or less likely. That this must be the case is shown by a consideration of the two principal sets of variables which this analysis holds constant. First, and most importantly, the context of the influence attempt is held constant. Any study of sanctions post-Baldwin's Economic Statecraft cannot ignore three contextual variables in evaluating success and failure. These are the full range of goals for which sanctions were enacted, the costs and benefits of sanctions compared with other forms of coercion, and the value that the target places on continued defiance. The. full range of goals refers to the fact that a state may initiate sanctions not simply to compel action on the part of the target, but to communicate its preferences, support allies, deter others from engaging in similar activity, and dissuade the target from expanding its objectionable activity. Sanctions may also be designed to punish, weaken, distract, or contain the adversary. Thus sanctions may fail to move the target, but may be successful along a number of other dimensions, complement other policies, and remain an appropriate policy instrument.3 Attention to comparative costs serves as a reminder that in choosing policy, statesmen must compare the costs, both political and economic, of introducing specific techniques wim the benefits of expected outcomes. It must be remembered that the purpose of all forms of statecraft is to achieve political objectives. There will be many cases, then, where the costs of the use of force will outweigh the political benefits of achieving the desired outcome. In those cases, the use of force can never work. Success, therefore, can only be calculated with regard to costs and benefits, and as compared with other options. Finally, the value the target places on continued defiance eliminates the possibility of absolute claims regarding the success and failure of economic sanctions (or, for that matter, other forms of coercion). A given sanction (for example, the suspension of $500 million in aid) will be successful in some cases and unsuccessful in others, largely depending on the target's ranking of the value of defiance and the cost of the sanction. Although it can be said that a suspension of $500 million in aid will be less effective than a $1 billion suspension and more effective than a $250 million suspension, ceteris paribus, no absolute claims can be made 3. The question for statecraft is not "will these measures 'work'" (that is, change target behavior) but rather, "is my strategic position improved if I introduce these measures." Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 35 about the success of cutting off any particular level of aid.Solely as a con- sequence of the goal of the sanction,there will be cases when a $250 mil- lion suspension will be successful and a $1 billion suspension unsuccessful. A second group of variables is also held constant.There are a number of identities,which have been explored by many scholars but can be associ- ated with the methodology of Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot's study Economi Sanctions Reconsidered.Three principal identities should be noted:those asso- ciated with size,exposure,and cooperation.5 Size simply means that the greater the disparity of power between the sender and the target,the greater the prospects for success.(Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot,for example,use a 5100 10:1 ratio of target/sender GNP as a rule of thumb for potential sanction- ers.)Exposure measures the relative vulnerability of targets:with trade sanctions,this would mean that chances of success are increased the larger the target's ratio of trade/GNP.6 Cooperation refers to the fact that (once again,ceteris paribus),the more states that support the sanctions effort against the target,the greater the likelihood that the target will ultimately capitulate.As with the set of contextual variables,these influences are taken as given in the analysis below.?Together they explain why only relative (or comparative static)as opposed to absolute conclusions can be drawn about 5 the prospects for the success of economic sanctions.They also underscore the need to reconceptualize sanctions as a form of statecraft,just like the Suojoelf use of force.As with force,greater attention needs to be paid to practical questions of tactics,strategy,and contingency,and less on sweeping state- ments of whether statecraft works. reyueyS] 名 4.As one reviewer pointed out,even the apparent truism that a $1 billion suspension will be more "effective"than a $250 million one requires closer scrutiny.The larger sanction might result in a change of government,but the goal of the sanction could be to change the behavior of the existing regime without forcing it from power.In that case,the smaller sanc- tion would be more effective.This argument illustrates two fundamental aspects of the mi- crofoundations approach:the need to differentiate between the force of a sanction and its political consequence,and the difficulty of making noncontextualized claims about the pros- pects for success or failure of a given policy instrument. 5.See also Knorr,Power of Nations,156;P.A.G.van Bergeijk,"Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions,"Kyelos 42,no.3 (1989):385-404,esp.398;and Lisa Martin, "Credibility,Costs,and Institutions:Cooperation on Economic Sanctions,"WVorld Politics 45, no.3 (April 1993):406-32.For comparison of Baldwin and Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot,see Stephanie Lenway,"Between War and Commerce:Economic Sanctions as a Tool of State- craft,"International Organization 42,no.2(spring 1988):397-426. 6.With aid,the target government's exposure can be measured by comparing the assis- tance with overall state revenue. 7.These variables are held constant to enhance the focus of this paper.Complementary paths of inquiry could explore the relationship between these variables and different forms of sanctions.Cooperation,for example,might be more important with trade sanctions than with sanctions involving aid or monetary relations

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 35 about the success of cutting off any particular level of aid.4 Solely as a consequence of the goal of the sanction, there will be cases when a $250 million suspension will be successful and a $1 billion suspension unsuccessful. A second group of variables is also held constant. There are a number of identities, which have been explored by many scholars but can be associated with the methodology of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot's study Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Three principal identities should be noted: those associated with size, exposure, and cooperation.5 Size simply means that the greater the disparity of power between the sender and the target, the greater the prospects for success. (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, for example, use a 10:1 ratio of target/sender GNP as a rule of thumb for potential sanctioners.) Exposure measures the relative vulnerability of targets: with trade sanctions, this would mean that chances of success are increased the larger the target's ratio of trade/GNP.6 Cooperation refers to the fact that (once again, ceteris paribus), the more states that support the sanctions effort against the target, the greater the likelihood that the target will ultimately capitulate. As with the set of contextual variables, these influences are taken as given in the analysis below.7 Together they explain why only relative (or comparative static) as opposed to absolute conclusions can be drawn about the prospects for the success of economic sanctions. They also underscore the need to reconceptualize sanctions as a form of statecraft, just like the use of force. As with force, greater attention needs to be paid to practical questions of tactics, strategy, and contingency, and less on sweeping statements of whether statecraft works. 4. As one reviewer pointed out, even the apparent truism that a $1 billion suspension will be more "effective" than a $250 million one requires closer scrutiny. The larger sanction might result in a change of government, but the goal of the sanction could be to change the behavior of the existing regime without forcing it from power. In that case, the smaller sanction would be more effective. This argument illustrates two fundamental aspects of the microfoundations approach: the need to differentiate between the force of a sanction and its political consequence, and the difficulty of making noncontextualized claims about the prospects for success or failure of a given policy instrument. 5. See also Knorr, Power of Nations, 156; P. A. G. van Bergeijk, "Success and Failure of Economic Sanctions," Kyklos 42, no. 3 (1989): 385-404, esp. 398; and Lisa Martin,4 "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions," World Politics 45, no. 3 (April 1993): 406-32. For comparison of Baldwin and Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, see Stephanie Lenway, "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Statecraft," International Organisation 42, no. 2 (spring 1988): 397-426. 6. With aid, the target government's exposure can be measured by comparing the assistance with overall state revenue. 7. These variables are held constant to enhance the focus of this paper. Complementary paths of inquiry could explore the relationship between these variables and different forms of sanctions. Cooperation, for example, might be more important with trade sanctions than with sanctions involving aid or monetary relations. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

36 SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 This article is organized in three main parts.The first section disaggre- gates economic sanctions,and compares those different forms across a number of common dimensions.The second section explores how those sanctions affect groups differentially in the target country,and explains why this is of fundamental importance for the practice of economic statecraft. The third section considers two sanctions episodes and demonstrates how the microfoundations approach enhances our understanding of the sanc- tions process,and is better able to explain the outcomes than approaches that treat sanctions and targets in an aggregate fashion. 5102 ounf DIFFERENTIATING SANCTIONS CONOMIC SANCTIONS take five general forms:actions which distupt the trade,aid,finance,currency,and assets of the target state.Trade sanc- tions are the most common form of economic statecraft,and as a result the 节 terms are occasionally (and erroneously)treated as synonyms.This type of sanction can be further divided into two categories:export sanctions and import sanctions.The former bans exports to the target state,the latter prohibits imports from the target state.Although there are significant dif- 5 ferences between the two categories that will be addressed in the following uojoeif section,both aim to deprive the target of the gains from trade.8 Aid is also a familiar form of economic diplomacy,which has been em- ployed to advance political goals since as far back as the Peloponnesian war, and has traditionally been used as a mechanism for maintaining alliances. An early example of this is Spanish subsidies to Sweden as a member of the triple alliance of 1699.Aid is the form of economic statecraft most readily 名 practiced as a positive sanction.0 It is also a popular instrument because its papeoluMod inherent fungibility allows it to be employed for a variety of missions,such 8.The broader study of the cconomic statecraft of trade also includes the influence effect of trade,which is outside the scope of this more narrow discussion of economic sanctions. On the influence effect,see Albert O.Hirschman,National Power and the Strutcture of Foreign Trade(1945;Berkeley:University of California Press,1980). 9.George Liska,The New Stafeeraff (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1960),40. Other studies which focus on the politics of aid include Sidney Weintraub,cd.,Economie Coercion and U.S.Foreign Poligy (Boulder.Westview,1982);Desmond McNeil,The Contradictions of Foreign Aid (London:Croom Helm,1981);David Wall,The Charity of Nations (New York: Basic Books,1973);John Montgomery,Foreign Aid in Intermational Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,1967);John Montgomery,The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York:Pracger,1962); Jacob J.Kaplan,The Challenge of Foreign Aid (New York:Pracger,1967). 10.The focus here will be on the negative sanction of the suspension of aid.On positive sanctions,see David Baldwin,"The Power of Positive Sanctions,"World Politics 24,no.1 October1971:19-38

36 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 This article is organized in three main parts. The first section disaggregates economic sanctions, and compares those different forms across a number of common dimensions. The second section explores how those sanctions affect groups differentially in the target country, and explains why this is of fundamental importance for the practice of economic statecraft. The third section considers two sanctions episodes and demonstrates how the micro foundations approach enhances our understanding of the sanctions process, and is better able to explain the outcomes than approaches that treat sanctions and targets in an aggregate fashion. DIFFERENTIATING SANCTIONS E CONOMIC SANCTIONS take five general forms: actions which disrupt the trade, aid, finance, currency, and assets of the target state. Trade sanctions are the most common form of economic statecraft, and as a result the terms are occasionally (and erroneously) treated as synonyms. This type of sanction can be further divided into two categories: export sanctions and import sanctions. The former bans exports to the target state, the latter prohibits imports from the target state. Although there are significant differences between the two categories that will be addressed in the following section, both aim to deprive the target of the gains from trade.8 Aid is also a familiar form of economic diplomacy, which has been employed to advance political goals since as far back as the Peloponnesian war, and has traditionally been used as a mechanism for maintaining alliances. An early example of this is Spanish subsidies to Sweden as a member of the triple alliance of 1699.9 Aid is the form of economic statecraft most readily practiced as a positive sanction.10 It is also a popular instrument because its inherent fungibility allows it to be employed for a variety of missions, such 8. The broader study of the economic statecraft of trade also includes the influence effect of trade, which is outside the scope of this more narrow discussion of economic sanctions. On the influence effect, see Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). 9. George Iiska, The New Statecraft (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 40. Other studies which focus on the politics of aid include Sidney Weintraub, ed., Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boulder Westview, 1982); Desmond McNeil, The Contradictions of Foreign Aid (London: Croom Helm, 1981); David Wall, The Charity of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1973); John Montgomery, Foreign Aid in International Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967); John Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1962); Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967). 10. The focus here will be on the negative sanction of the suspension of aid. On positive sanctions, see David Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," World Politics 24, no. 1 (October 1971): 19-38. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 37 as purchase,where aid is implicitly exchanged for other considerations such as basing rights. The manipulation of international financial relations is a relatively mod- ern tool of state power.Financial sanctions can involve either lending or investment,but both techniques aim to interrupt the flow of resources to the target.As with aid,financial sanctions emerged from the tradition of punishing defectors from alliances.In earlier eras there was little illusion about the separation of economics and politics:France's minister of finance Caillaux stated in 1913 that"I have admitted to quotation only those for- eign loans which assured France political and economic advantages."In more recent times,the political considerations that have continued to shape aunf the direction of financial flows express themselves more subtly.11 Monetary sanctions aim to destabilize the value and stability of the target state's currency.Such actions have real economic effects,including increas- ing inflation and debt burdens and upsetting public and private economic planning.Money's special nature both as a store of personal wealth and a symbol of national sovereignty,also causes the psychological effects of these sanctions to be considerable.Although less common than trade or aid sanctions,monetary sanctions have been used in a considerable number of cases in the twentieth century,often with dramatic consequences.12 The least commonly used form of economic sanction is the seizure of a Suojoelf target's assets.This can take the form of physical property,securities,and bank accounts.These assets can be frozen,which prevents the target from accessing them,or vested,which transfers ownership of the assets from the target to the sender.Such sanctions can complement a strategy designed to weaken an adversaty(for example,in wartime),or provide additional lever- age to a specific influence attempt.3 B papeojuMo 11.Herbert Fcis,Europe:The World's Banker 1870-1914 (1930;New Haven:Yale Univer- sity Press,1964),123(quote).For more on the politics of international financial relations,see Jacob Viner,International Economics(1928;Illinois:Free Press,1951);Feis,The Diplomagy of the Dollar,1965 [1950];Andrew Spindler,The Politics of International Credit (Washington,D.C.: Brookings,1984);Cheryl Payer,The Debf Trap (New York:Monthly Review Press,1974); John Williamson,ed.,IMF Conditionaliry (Washington D.C:Institute for International Eco- nomics,1983). 12.On monetary sanctions in particular and currency politics in general,see Jonathan Kirshner,Currengy and Coergion:The Political Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1995). 13.On this form of economic cocrcion,sce Judd Polk,"Freezing Dollars Against the Axis,"Foreign Afairs 20,no.1 (October 1941):113-30;Karin Lissakers,"Money and Ma- nipulation,"Foreign Poligy,no.44 (fall 1981):107-26;Robert Carswell,"Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experiencc,"Foreign 4fjairs 60,no.2 (winter 1981/82):247-65;F.W.Neate, ed.,"The Carter Freeze,"International Business Lawyer 9,no.3 (1981):93-114

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 3 7 as purchase, where aid is implicitly exchanged for other considerations such as basing rights. The manipulation of international financial relations is a relatively modern tool of state power. Financial sanctions can involve either lending or investment, but both techniques aim to interrupt the flow of resources to the target. As with aid, financial sanctions emerged from the tradition of punishing defectors from alliances. In earlier eras there was little illusion about the separation of economics and politics: France's minister of finance Caillaux stated in 1913 that "I have admitted to quotation only those foreign loans which assured France political and economic advantages." In more recent times, the political considerations that have continued to shape the direction of financial flows express themselves more subtly.11 Monetary sanctions aim to destabilize the value and stability of the target state's currency. Such actions have real economic effects, including increasing inflation and debt burdens and upsetting public and private economic planning. Money's special nature both as a store of personal wealth and a symbol of national sovereignty, also causes the psychological effects of these sanctions to be considerable. Although less common than trade or aid sanctions, monetary sanctions have been used in a considerable number of cases in the twentieth century, often with dramatic consequences.12 The least commonly used form of economic sanction is the seizure of a target's assets. This can take the form of physical property, securities, and bank accounts. These assets can be frozen, which prevents the target from accessing them, or vested, which transfers ownership of the assets from the target to the sender. Such sanctions can complement a strategy designed to weaken an adversary (for example, in wartime), or provide additional leverage to a specific influence attempt.13 11. Herbert Feis, Europe: The World's Banker 1870-1914 (1930; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 123 (quote). For more on the politics of international financial relations, see Jacob Viner, International Economics (1928; Illinois: Free Press, 1951); Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar, 1965 [1950]; Andrew Spindler, The Politics of International Credit (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984); Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); John Williamson, ed., IMF Conditionality (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983). 12. On monetary sanctions in particular and currency politics in general, see Jonathan Kirshner, Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 13. On this form of economic coercion, see Judd Polk, "Freezing Dollars Against the Axis," Foreign Affairs 20, no. 1 (October 1941): 113-30; Karin Lissakers, "Money and Manipulation," Foreign Policy, no. 44 (fall 1981): 107-26; Robert Carswell, "Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience," Foreign Affairs 60, no. 2 (winter 1981/82): 247-65; F. W. Neate, ed., "The Carter Freeze," International Business Lawyer 9, no. 3 (1981): 93-114. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

38 SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 Differentiating economic sanctions is essential because each type of sanction has distinct characteristics.Circumstances associated with a given influence attempt will dictate which specific characteristics an instrument of coercion must have for the effort to have a chance of working.Similarly, attributes inherent in each sanction type will,in a number of settings,pre- clude the possibility that a given technique could be successfully intro- duced.Thus,a sensitivity to the differences between economic sanctions is necessary to understand why and when they work,or how they can be op- timally introduced.Three important attributes of instruments of coercion that explain their economic impact are speed,publicity,and robustness. Speed refers to the fact that different types of sanctions have different lag times between the time that they are enacted and the time that they are felt by the target.If the goal of the sanction is to resolve a crisis or cripple a 寸 specific military operation of an adversary,only sanctions which are felt relatively quickly will have any chance of success.Sanctions which impose their bite swiftly,however,might lose their teeth over time.Monetary sanc- tions offer an excellent example of this:the most successful monetary sanctions-those that completely demonetize the target economy-can be swift and effective.If demonetization is not successful in the short run, however,it will probably not be effective in the end,as the target will re- construct its payments system.Such a sanction reaches its maximum weight relatively early and then becomes easier to bear.Trade sanctions,on the other hand,take some time before they are felt(as several months'worth of goods may be en route),but when successfully applied,such sanctions should increase their burden slowly over time.Asset,aid,and financial sanctions fall somewhere in between:they represent an immediate contrac- tion of the set of resources available to the target,but are not fully felt until B the target's unaffected assets become depleted. peojuMo Because different sanctions work at different speeds,it cannot be said, for example,that trade sanctions work while financial sanctions do not work.The relative utility of the instruments depends on the needs of each particular case.Stopping loans and freezing assets may prevent a target from financing a military operation:an operation which might otherwise be successfully completed before trade sanctions even took effect.On the other hand,trade sanctions may be the only possible way to dislodge a state from successfully annexed territory. Sanctions also differ with regard to their publicity.Publicity is important because,at different times,it can either be essential for or incompatible with success.Secrecy often has its benefits.One of the classic problems with economic sanctions is the well-known rally-around-the-flag effect

38 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 Differentiating economic sanctions is essential because each type of sanction has distinct characteristics. Circumstances associated with a given influence attempt will dictate which specific characteristics an instrument of coercion must have for the effort to have a chance of working. Similarly, attributes inherent in each sanction type will, in a number of settings, preclude the possibility that a given technique could be successfully introduced. Thus, a sensitivity to the differences between economic sanctions is necessary to understand why and when they work, or how they can be optimally introduced. Three important attributes of instruments of coercion that explain their economic impact are speed, publicity, and robustness. Speed refers to the fact that different types of sanctions have different lag times between the time that they are enacted and the time that they are felt by the target. If the goal of the sanction is to resolve a crisis or cripple a specific military operation of an adversary, only sanctions which are felt relatively quickly will have any chance of success. Sanctions which impose their bite swiftly, however, might lose their teeth over time. Monetary sanctions offer an excellent example of this: the most successful monetary sanctions—those that completely demonetize the target economy—can be swift and effective. If demonetization is not successful in the short run, however, it will probably not be effective in the end, as the target will reconstruct its payments system. Such a sanction reaches its maximum weight relatively early and then becomes easier to bear. Trade sanctions, on the other hand, take some time before they are felt (as several months' worth of goods may be en route), but when successfully applied, such sanctions should increase their burden slowly over time. Asset, aid, and financial sanctions fall somewhere in between: they represent an immediate contraction of the set of resources available to the target, but are not fully felt until the target's unaffected assets become depleted. Because different sanctions work at different speeds, it cannot be said, for example, that trade sanctions work while financial sanctions do not work. The relative utility of the instruments depends on the needs of each particular case. Stopping loans and freezing assets may prevent a target from financing a military operation: an operation which might otherwise be successfully completed before trade sanctions even took effect. On the other hand, trade sanctions may be the only possible way to dislodge a state from successfully annexed territory. Sanctions also differ with regard to their publicity. Publicity is important because, at different times, it can either be essential for or incompatible with success. Secrecy often has its benefits. One of the classic problems with economic sanctions is the well-known rally-around-the-flag effect, Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 39 where nationalism motivates citizens to support the home government from outside interference.It can also make compliance more difficult due to "loss of face"both nationally and internationally.14 This effect can not only undercut sanctions,but can strengthen the target government by pro- viding an excuse for other failed policies.Private sanctions can also be used against states with which the sender wants to maintain essentially friendly relations over the long run.On the other hand,in some settings publicity will be an important component of the sanctions effort.Publicity makes it easier to facilitate cooperation from other states.It is also essential for sig- 景 naling-either to other states,or to provide support for opposition groups within the target state. In practice,there are several levels of publicity.There are at least four distinct audiences that a sanctioner may wish to address,or,alternately,to keep in the dark:constituencies within its own borders,the general popula- tion of the target state,elites in the target government,and third parties. There may be instances where the optimal sanction is one of which the tar- get is completely unaware.At other times,it may be crucial that central governments are able to communicate with each other without the knowl- edge of their own citizens. Since sending governments always have the option of declaring their ac- tions,the key to differentiating sanctions in this area is evaluating the extent to which each has an essential public component.At one extreme,mone- tary sanctions have the least essentially public quality,5 while trade sanc- reyuey tions tend to have the most.Given the dominance of private actors in trade,such sanctions must be legislated and made public for them to be enacted.Similar legal necessities can be found in the case of asset seizure. 6 Aid and finance fall somewhere in the middle:although most aid is legis- lated publicly,aid flows can be delayed and covert aid suspended very dis- papeol creetly.Given the close relationship between a government's monetary in- stitutions and large private banks,informal financial boycotts are at least UMOC feasible,which is not the case with trade. Variations across the dimension of robustness is a crucial determinant of when different types of sanctions will be more or less appropriate for a given situation.Robustness refers to how the power of sanctions is affected by actions taken by private actors,as well as the defenses of the target 14.See for example Baldwin,Economic Statecraf,108. 15.Monetary power can be exercised quite privately.It requires no legislation-in fact, many in the home country might not even notice what's going on.If it were so inclined,the home country would not even have to tell the target government that it was the source of their monetary trouble

The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions 39 where nationalism motivates citizens to support the home government from outside interference. It can also make compliance more difficult due to "loss of face" both nationally and internationally.14 This effect can not only undercut sanctions, but can strengthen the target government by providing an excuse for other failed policies. Private sanctions can also be used against states with which the sender wants to maintain essentially friendly relations over the long run. On the other hand, in some settings publicity will be an important component of the sanctions effort. Publicity makes it easier to facilitate cooperation from other states. It is also essential for signaling—either to other states, or to provide support for opposition groups within the target state. In practice, there are several levels of publicity. There are at least four distinct audiences that a sanctioner may wish to address, or, alternately, to keep in the dark: constituencies within its own borders, the general population of the target state, elites in the target government, and third parties. There may be instances where the optimal sanction is one of which the target is completely unaware. At other times, it may be crucial that central governments are able to communicate with each other without the knowledge of their own citizens. Since sending governments always have the option of declaring their actions, the key to differentiating sanctions in this area is evaluating the extent to which each has an essential public component. At one extreme, monetary sanctions have the least essentially public quality,15 while trade sanctions tend to have the most. Given the dominance of private actors in trade, such sanctions must be legislated and made public for them to be enacted. Similar legal necessities can be found in the case of asset seizure. Aid and finance fall somewhere in the middle: although most aid is legislated publicly, aid flows can be delayed and covert aid suspended very discreedy. Given the close relationship between a government's monetary institutions and large private banks, informal financial boycotts are at least feasible, which is not the case with trade. Variations across the dimension of robustness is a crucial determinant of when different types of sanctions will be more or less appropriate for a given situation. Robustness refers to how the power of sanctions is affected by actions taken by private actors, as well as the defenses of the target 14. See for example Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 108. 15. Monetary power can be exercised quite privately. It requires no legislation—in fact, many in the home country might not even notice what's going on. If it were so inclined, the home country would not even have to tell the target government that it was the source of their monetary trouble. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

40 SECURITY STUDIES 6,no.3 state.16 Actions taken by private actors represent the "market"response to sanctions:will the sanctions provide opportunities for profit that under- mine their intended effect?It is also logical to assume that the target will take whatever steps it can to circumvent the sanctions.Once again,the specific constellation of variables in each case will privilege some tech- niques of statecraft while impoverishing others.This can be seen with monetary sanctions.Private market forces can react to pressure on the tar- get currency by(wittingly or unwittingly)bandwagoning with or balancing against that pressure,depending on whether the depreciation is perceived as undervaluing the currency or signaling the start of a new decline.These forces will often determine whether the weight of monetary sanctions will aunf be intensified or mitigated.This will depend on a number of variables:the scale of the pressure relative to the normal trading volume of the currency, the reputation of the currency,and macroeconomic status of the target economy.Thus,some senders will find monetary sanctions highly robust while others would expect their initial effect to dissipate rapidly.7 What is 前 important is that this is not a random occurrence:particularly vulnerable(or 白 insulated)targets should be identifiable beforehand. The problem of robustness is often the weak link in trade sanctions;in fact it is often held out as the principal reason why economic sanctions do not work.This problem exists because there is profit in circumventing trade sanctions,and private networks which will divert and direct trade through third parties will spring up spontaneously owing to natural market forces.Geography and the composition of trade will be important determi- rey3ueqs] nants here:for example,it is particularly challenging to senders when highly uniform goods such as commodities are involved.18 Financial sanctions are also vulnerable to circumvention from this 合 source,because the profit motive exists in this case as well:when one agent pulls out,another will be tempted to replace him.Circumvention is not as easy as in the trade case,however,because it is harder to divide up a large loan amongst hundreds of faceless agents.Hence the private violators of sanctions are more likely to have to stand up and be counted,and therefore the potential for surveillance and control is greater. With sanctions aimed at aid and assets,there is no logical private re- sponse.Robustness here centers on the ability of the target to replace the 16.It does not include the response of other states.It was assumed above that the level of cooperation and the probability of success is positively correlated,ceteris paribus. 17.Sec Kirshner,Curengy and Coercion,chap.2,"The Viability of Monetary Power." 18.Sce,for example,Thomas D.Willet and Mehrdad Jalaighajar,"U.S.Trade Strategy and National Security,"Cato Journal3,no.3 (winter 1983/84):723-24

40 SECURITY STUDIES 6, no. 3 state.16 Actions taken by private actors represent the "market" response to sanctions: will the sanctions provide opportunities for profit that undermine their intended effect? It is also logical to assume that the target will take whatever steps it can to circumvent the sanctions. Once again, the specific constellation of variables in each case will privilege some techniques of statecraft while impoverishing others. This can be seen with monetary sanctions. Private market forces can react to pressure on the target currency by (wittingly or unwittingly) bandwagoning with or balancing against that pressure, depending on whether the depreciation is perceived as undervaluing the currency or signaling the start of a new decline. These forces will often determine whether the weight of monetary sanctions will be intensified or mitigated. This will depend on a number of variables: the scale of the pressure relative to the normal trading volume of the currency, the reputation of the currency, and macroeconomic status of the target economy. Thus, some senders will find monetary sanctions highly robust while others would expect their initial effect to dissipate rapidly.17 What is important is that this is not a random occurrence: particularly vulnerable (or insulated) targets should be identifiable beforehand. The problem of robustness is often the weak link in trade sanctions; in fact it is often held out as the principal reason why economic sanctions do not work. This problem exists because there is profit in circumventing trade sanctions, and private networks which will divert and direct trade through third parties will spring up spontaneously owing to natural market forces. Geography and the composition of trade will be important determinants here: for example, it is particularly challenging to senders when highly uniform goods such as commodities are involved.18 Financial sanctions are also vulnerable to circumvention from this source, because the profit motive exists in this case as well: when one agent pulls out, another will be tempted to replace him. Circumvention is not as easy as in the trade case, however, because it is harder to divide up a large loan amongst hundreds of faceless agents. Hence the private violators of sanctions are more likely to have to stand up and be counted, and therefore the potential for surveillance and control is greater. With sanctions aimed at aid and assets, there is no logical private response. Robustness here centers on the ability of the target to replace the 16. It does not include the response of other states. It was assumed above that the level of cooperation and the probability of success is positively correlated, ceteris paribus. 17. See Kirshner, Currency and Coercion, chap. 2, "The Viability of Monetary Power." 18. See, for example, Thomas D. Willet and Mehrdad Jalaighajar, "U.S. Trade Strategy and National Security," Cato Journals, no. 3 (winter 1983/84): 723-24. Downloaded by [Shanghai Jiaotong University] at 02:27 24 June 2013

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