《国际政治经济学》文献资料（International Political Economy and National Security）The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion

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The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion Daniel W.Drezner Economic coercion-defined here as the threat or act by a sender government or governments to disrupt economic exchange with the target state,unless the target acquiesces to an articulated demand-is an increasingly prominent tool of state- craft.The United Nations (UN)Security Council voted for economic sanctions twelve times in the past decade;between 1945 and 1990,the UN had only em- ployed sanctions twice.2 Excluding the UN cases,the estimated use of sanctions in the 1990s increased by 22 percent over the previous decade.3 Sanctions are costly as well as prominent.According to one estimate,the price of sanctions to the United States is $18 billion annually in lost exports,hardly a paltry sum.The damage from sanctions to the targeted state can be devastating,as the case of Iraq made clear. To analysts,the policymaker's reliance on sanctions is puzzling;the scholarly assessment of sanctions is that they fail to yield significant concessions.There is a long and distinguished line of authors who argue that sanctions do not work.6 This negative assessment has hardened since the end of the Cold War.Gary A previous version of this article was presented at the 4th meeting of the European Consortium on Political Research's Standing Group on International Relations,Canterbury,UK,September 2001.A Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship provided crucial support during the draft- ing of this article.Elizabeth DeSombre,Alex Downs,A.Cooper Drury,Charles Glaser,Michael His- cox,Seth Jones,Nikolay Marinov,John Mearsheimer,Emerson Niou,Bob Pape,Duncan Snidal,and Han Dorussen provided valuable comments and suggestions.I am particularly grateful to Kimberly Elliott for making her data accessible to me.Michael Cohen's assistance was invaluable during the drafting process.The usual caveat applies. 1.In the interest of style,I will use the terms economic coercion,economic statecraft,and eco- nomic sanctions interchangeably,but they are distinct categories.On the differences,see Baldwin 1985. 2.Cortright and Lopez 2000. 3.Institute for International Economics 2001. 4.Hufbauer et al.1997. 5.See Buck,Gallant,and Nossal 1998;and Garfield 1999. 6.See Galtung 1967;Knorr 1975;Bienen and Gilpin 1980;von Amerongen 1980;Lindsay 1986; Doxey 1987;Pape 1997;and Haass 1997. International Organization 57,Summer 2003,pp.643-659 2003 by The IO Foundation. D0L:10.1017/S0020818303573052

The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion Daniel W. Drezner Economic coercion-defined here as the threat or act by a sender government or governments to disrupt economic exchange with the target state, unless the target acquiesces to an articulated demand-is an increasingly prominent tool of statecraft.' The United Nations (UN) Security Council voted for economic sanctions twelve times in the past decade; between 1945 and 1990, the UN had only employed sanctions twice.2 Excluding the UN cases, the estimated use of sanctions in the 1990s increased by 22 percent over the previous de~ade.~ Sanctions are costly as well as prominent. According to one estimate, the price of sanctions to the United States is $18 billion annually in lost exports, hardly a paltry sum.4 The damage from sanctions to the targeted state can be devastating, as the case of Iraq made clear.5 To analysts, the policymaker's reliance on sanctions is puzzling; the scholarly assessment of sanctions is that they fail to yield significant concessions. There is a long and distinguished line of authors who argue that sanctions do not work.6 This negative assessment has hardened since the end of the Cold War. Gary A previous version of this article was presented at the 4th meeting of the European Consortium on Political Research's Standing Group on International Relations, Canterbury, UK, September 2001. A Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship provided crucial support during the drafting of this article. Elizabeth DeSombre, Alex Downs, A. Cooper Drury, Charles Glaser, Michael Hiscox, Seth Jones, Nikolay Marinov, John Mearsheimer, Emerson Niou, Bob Pape, Duncan Snidal, and Han Dorussen provided valuable comments and suggestions. I am particularly grateful to Kimberly Elliott for making her data accessible to me. Michael Cohen's assistance was invaluable during the drafting process. The usual caveat applies. 1. In the interest of style, I will use the terms economic coercion, economic statecraft, and economic sanctions interchangeably, but they are distinct categories. On the differences, see Baldwin 1985. 2. Cortright and Lopez 2000. 3. Institute for International Economics 2001. 4. Hufbauer et al. 1997. 5. See Buck, Gallant, and Nossal 1998; and Garfield 1999. 6. See Galtung 1967; Knorr 1975; Bienen and Gilpin 1980; von Amerongen 1980; Lindsay 1986; Doxey 1987; Pape 1997; and Haass 1997. International Organization 57, Summer 2003, pp. 643-659 O 2003 by The I0 Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818303573052

644 International Organization Hufbauer,Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott survey the use of sanctions from 1900 to 1990 and declare a success rate of 34 percent;for sanctions imposed after 1973,the success rate falls to 24 percent.7Robert Pape argues that Hufbauer, Schott,and Elliott are far too generous;his critical reassessment of their data con- cludes that only 5 percent of sanctions attempts succeed.s These assessments have affected the trajectory of this literature.Recent work focuses on explaining the duration of sanctions instead of analyzing their utility.The assumption underly- ing these studies is that sanctions are an important indicator of domestic and/or symbolic politics,but inconsequential as a tool of statecraft. Game-theoretic approaches to studying economic sanctions argue that because of strategic interaction,one should observe most of the failures but miss most of the successes.The imposition of sanctions represents a deadweight loss of utility for both the sender and target,in the form of disrupted economic exchange.There- fore,the actors have an incentive to reach an agreement before imposition.If the sender prefers the status quo to imposing sanctions,then there should be no coer- cion attempt.If the target prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions,it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions.The difficulty of observing threats that never need to be executed,particularly threats made behind closed doors,raises the possibility that selection bias has seriously affected empir- ical studies of economic statecraft.If this is true,then the sanctions literature has grossly underestimated the utility of economic diplomacy. To test the selection effects argument,the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented.If these cases exist in signifi- cant quantity and have an appreciably higher success rate than cases in which sanctions are imposed,it strengthens the argument that selection bias has ad- versely affected the trajectory of research about sanctions,underestimating the role of strategic interaction.However,locating these cases is an empirical challenge, because of the difficulty in identifying sanctions events that end at the threat stage. Has there been a failure to appreciate the strategic interaction underlying the use of economic coercion?Is there significant selection bias?The answer to both questions is yes.This article argues that the most promising vein of data to test for selection bias involves sanctions employed in the pursuit of economic or reg- ulatory goals,because of the ability to observe threats.A statistical analysis of these cases strongly suggests that selection effects are present,and that models of economic statecraft emphasizing strategic interaction hold more promise as a com- prehensive explanation of economic statecraft.The data shows that a significant number of coercion attempts end at the threat stage,before sanctions are imposed. These cases yield significantly larger concessions when compared to instances in which sanctions are imposed. 7.Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott 1990. 8.Pape1997. 9.See Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000;Dorussen and Mo 2001;and McGillivray and Stam 2001

644 International Organization Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott survey the use of sanctions from 1900 to 1990 and declare a success rate of 34 percent; for sanctions imposed after 1973, the success rate falls to 24 percent.' Robert Pape argues that Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott are far too generous; his critical reassessment of their data concludes that only 5 percent of sanctions attempts succeed.' These assessments have affected the trajectory of this literature. Recent work focuses on explaining the duration of sanctions instead of analyzing their utility.' he assumption underlying these studies is that sanctions are an important indicator of domestic and/or symbolic politics, but inconsequential as a tool of statecraft. Game-theoretic approaches to studying economic sanctions argue that because of strategic interaction, one should observe most of the failures but miss most of the successes. The imposition of sanctions represents a deadweight loss of utility for both the sender and target, in the form of disrupted economic exchange. Therefore, the actors have an incentive to reach an agreement before imposition. If the sender prefers the status quo to imposing sanctions, then there should be no coercion attempt. If the target prefers conceding to incurring the cost of sanctions, it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions. The difficulty of observing threats that never need to be executed, particularly threats made behind closed doors, raises the possibility that selection bias has seriously affected empirical studies of economic statecraft. If this is true, then the sanctions literature has grossly underestimated the utility of economic diplomacy. To test the selection effects argument, the crucial cases to study are those in which coercion is threatened but not implemented. If these cases exist in significant quantity and have an appreciably higher success rate than cases in which sanctions are imposed, it strengthens the argument that selection bias has adversely affected the trajectory of research about sanctions, underestimating the role of strategic interaction. However, locating these cases is an empirical challenge, because of the difficulty in identifying sanctions events that end at the threat stage. Has there been a failure to appreciate the strategic interaction underlying the use of economic coercion? Is there significant selection bias? The answer to both questions is yes. This article argues that the most promising vein of data to test for selection bias involves sanctions employed in the pursuit of economic or regulatory goals, because of the ability to observe threats. A statistical analysis of these cases strongly suggests that selection effects are present, and that models of economic statecraft emphasizing strategic interaction hold more promise as a comprehensive explanation of economic statecraft. The data shows that a significant number of coercion attempts end at the threat stage, before sanctions are imposed. These cases yield significantly larger concessions when compared to instances in which sanctions are imposed. 7. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990. 8. Pape 1997. 9. See Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Dorussen and Mo 2001; and McGillivray and Stam 2001

Economic Coercion 645 These findings have significant implications for policy and theory.They strongly suggest that the current consensus among pundits and policymakers about the fu- tility of sanctions is misplaced.10 Economic coercion is a more useful tool than the conventional wisdom believes.The ramifications for scholarship are also im- portant.At a minimum,the empirical focus of the sanctions literature needs to move beyond an exclusive reliance on the Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott data.Only 4.4 percent of the observations in their data set consist of sanctions that were threat- ened but not implemented.Significant research should be devoted to detecting and coding instances when sanctions were threatened but not imposed. This article is divided into five sections.The next section reviews the game- theoretic literature on economic statecraft to elaborate the underpinnings of the re- lationship between strategic interaction and selection effects.The third section discusses the data on U.S.sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals to see if it is suitable for testing the strategic interaction argument.The fourth section provides a statistical analysis of three different sets of this data;the pattern of sanc- tions outcomes supports the presence of selection effects and strategic interaction. The final section considers the implications of these findings for policy and theory. Strategic Interaction in Economic Coercion Most theories of coercion posit a similar model of action,as seen in Figure 1.The sender threatens to interrupt the status quo and block a stream of economic ex- change with the target unless the sanctioned country acquiesces to a specific de- mand made by the sender.If the target complies,sanctions are not imposed.If the target stands firm,the sender faces a choice between backing down or carrying out its threat and imposing sanctions.Sanctions impose costs on both the target and sender relative to the status quo by disrupting economic exchange.There are differences within the individual modeling efforts,but this is the basic narrative.2 Game-theoretic models of coercion that treat the sender and target as rational unitary actors share a common prediction:successful instances of economic coer- cion are much more likely to end at the threat stage than the imposition stage. This insight is hardly original to the study of economic coercion;it comes from the economics literature on bargaining.3 An agreement before implementation avoids the deadweight cost of the sanctions imposition for both the target and sender. It is,therefore,a more"efficient"outcome for rational utility maximizers.4 Under 10.For an example of how high up the policy food chain this belief exists,see Cheney 1999. 11.Elliott acknowledges that with regard to episodes of threatened sanctions,"there are many that we have missed."E-mail correspondence with the author,21 August 2001. 12.Some models end with the target making the final decision of backing down to sanctions or standing firm. 13.Rubinstein 1982 14.Eaton and Engers 1999,411

Economic Coercion 645 These findings have significant implications for policy and theory. They strongly suggest that the current consensus among pundits and policymakers about the futility of sanctions is misplaced.10 Economic coercion is a more useful tool than the conventional wisdom believes. The ramifications for scholarship are also important. At a minimum, the empirical focus of the sanctions literature needs to move beyond an exclusive reliance on the Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott data. Only 4.4 percent of the observations in their data set consist of sanctions that were threatened but not implemented.'' Significant research should be devoted to detecting and coding instances when sanctions were threatened but not imposed. This article is divided into five sections. The next section reviews the gametheoretic literature on economic statecraft to elaborate the underpinnings of the relationship between strategic interaction and selection effects. The third section discusses the data on U.S. sanctions in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals to see if it is suitable for testing the strategic interaction argument. The fourth section provides a statistical analysis of three different sets of this data; the pattern of sanctions outcomes supports the presence of selection effects and strategic interaction. The final section considers the implications of these findings for policy and theory. Strategic Interaction in Economic Coercion Most theories of coercion posit a similar model of action, as seen in Figure 1. The sender threatens to interrupt the status quo and block a stream of economic exchange with the target unless the sanctioned country acquiesces to a specific demand made by the sender. If the target complies, sanctions are not imposed. If the target stands firm, the sender faces a choice between backing down or carrying out its threat and imposing sanctions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target and sender relative to the status quo by disrupting economic exchange. There are differences within the individual modeling efforts, but this is the basic narrative.I2 Game-theoretic models of coercion that treat the sender and target as rational unitary actors share a common prediction: successful instances of economic coercion are much more likely to end at the threat stage than the imposition stage. This insight is hardly original to the study of economic coercion; it comes from the economics literature on bargaining.'' An agreement before implementation avoids the deadweight cost of the sanctions imposition for both the target and sender. It is, therefore, a more "efficient" outcome for rational utility maximizer^.'^ Under 10. For an example of how high up the policy food chain this belief exists, see Cheney 1999. 11. Elliott acknowledges that with regard to episodes of threatened sanctions, "there are many that we have missed." E-mail correspondence with the author, 21 August 2001. 12. Some models end with the target making the final decision of backing down to sanctions or standing firm. 13. Rubinstein 1982. 14. Eaton and Engers 1999, 41 1

Economic Coercion 647 for sanctions imposition.Nevertheless,these models agree with the bargaining "folk theorem":in those situations when sanctions are most likely to work,they are least likely to be imposed. Daniel Drezner combines issue indivisibility and the inability to credibly com- mit to explain the imposition of sanctions.6 He presents a complete information model in which the target will make concessions if the sender prefers a deadlock outcome of sanctions imposition to backing down.In the basic version of the model, one should only observe threats or very brief imposition of sanctions.In a refined version of the model,sanctions imposition can be an equilibrium outcome,pro- vided two conditions are met:the demand is indivisible and expectations of future conflict are high.Under conditions of high conflict expectations,both the sender and target fear that any concessions made in the present will leave them in a weak- ened bargaining position in future conflicts,making credible commitments more difficult to achieve.Empirically,the model predicts that when sanctions are actu- ally imposed,the outcome is a sustained deadlock between adversaries.The cases of economic coercion that generate concessions will end at the threat stage and are thus more difficult to observe. Three modeling efforts combine imperfect information and issue indivisibility to explain the rational imposition of sanctions.Alistair Smith,as well as T.Clifton Morgan and Anne Miers,develop one-sided incomplete information models of eco- nomic coercion that lead to similar empirical predictions.17 In both models,the sender does not know whether the target prefers to stand firm or prefers to acqui- esce to the sender's demands rather than suffer the cost of sanctions.The models differ in that Morgan and Miers assume a discrete one-shot game,whereas Smith uses a continuous time approach.The predicted outcomes are similar.For Morgan and Miers,the sender's lack of information about the target's resolve,and the tar- get's incentive to signal a high degree of resolve,can lead to the imposition of sanctions.Morgan and Miers'results predict that the probability of a successful use of economic coercion is greater at the threat stage than at the implementation stage.They conclude:"there are severe selection bias problems with empirical studies that focus only on those cases in which sanctions were applied...sanc- tions strategies may be far more successful than one would conclude from looking only at these cases."18 Smith comes to a similar conclusion-if the target con- cedes,it will do so at the threat stage.He observes:"the length of sanctions will be short.In fact,one may never actually see the sanctions at all.Particularly if it is costly to back down in the face of sanctions,B [the target]may preempt sanc- tions and unilaterally change its policy."These conclusions and empirical pre- dictions are consistent with Drezner's model. 16.Drezner 1999. 17.See Smith 1996;and Morgan and Miers 1999. 18.Morgan and Miers 1999,16. 19.Smith1996,240

Economic Coercion 647 for sanctions imposition. Nevertheless, these models agree with the bargaining "folk theorem": in those situations when sanctions are most likely to work, they are least likely to be imposed. Daniel Drezner combines issue indivisibility and the inability to credibly commit to explain the imposition of sanctions.16 He presents a complete information model in which the target will make concessions if the sender prefers a deadlock outcome of sanctions imposition to backing down. In the basic version of the model, one should only observe threats or very brief imposition of sanctions. In a refined version of the model, sanctions imposition can be an equilibrium outcome, provided two conditions are met: the demand is indivisible and expectations of future conflict are high. Under conditions of high conflict expectations, both the sender and target fear that any concessions made in the present will leave them in a weakened bargaining position in future conflicts, making credible commitments more difficult to achieve. Empirically, the model predicts that when sanctions are actually imposed, the outcome is a sustained deadlock between adversaries. The cases of economic coercion that generate concessions will end at the threat stage and are thus more difficult to observe. Three modeling efforts combine imperfect information and issue indivisibility to explain the rational imposition of sanctions. Alistair Smith, as well as T. Clifton Morgan and Anne Miers, develop one-sided incomplete information models of economic coercion that lead to similar empirical predictions.'' In both models, the sender does not know whether the target prefers to stand firm or prefers to acquiesce to the sender's demands rather than suffer the cost of sanctions. The models differ in that Morgan and Miers assume a discrete one-shot game, whereas Smith uses a continuous time approach. The predicted outcomes are similar. For Morgan and Miers, the sender's lack of information about the target's resolve, and the target's incentive to signal a high degree of resolve, can lead to the imposition of sanctions. Morgan and Miers' results predict that the probability of a successful use of economic coercion is greater at the threat stage than at the implementation stage. They conclude: "there are severe selection bias problems with empirical studies that focus only on those cases in which sanctions were applied . .. sanctions strategies may be far more successful than one would conclude from looking only at these ca~es."'~ Smith comes to a similar conclusion-if the target concedes, it will do so at the threat stage. He observes: "the length of sanctions will be short. In fact, one may never actually see the sanctions at all. Particularly if it is costly to back down in the face of sanctions, B [the target] may preempt sanctions and unilaterally change its policy." l9 These conclusions and empirical predictions are consistent with Drezner's model. 16. Drezner 1999. 17. See Smith 1996; and Morgan and Miers 1999. 18. Morgan and Miers 1999, 16. 19. Smith 1996, 240

648 International Organization Dean Lacy and Emerson Niou create a model with incomplete information on both sides:the sender does not know how resolute the target state is,and the tar- get does not know whether the sender state is resolute.Similar to Smith and Mor- gan and Miers,these authors also assume issue indivisibility.Lacy and Niou's conclusions are identical to these other approaches: Empirical studies that examine cases only in which sanctions were imposed systematically omit a class of cases that represent successful sanctions,though the sanctions were threatened but not imposed.Examining cases of only im- posed sanctions generates a serious selection bias in empirical research on sanctions.20 To reiterate,these models provide different explanations for why one should ob- serve the imposition of sanctions,but provide the same explanation for why most successful uses of economic coercion should end before sanctions are imposed.A target that prefers conceding to deadlock and believes that the sender will carry out its threat will acquiesce before imposition to avoid incurring the cost of sanc- tions.Because all of these models rely on the same game structure,they share a similar empirical prediction:sanctions should yield more concessions at the threat stage than at the implementation stage.The robustness of this prediction to the different assumptions about the distribution of information is quite striking. This prediction also stands in marked contrast to alternative theories of economic sanctions.The assumption that sanctions are generally ineffective has given greater purchase to approaches that stress domestic or symbolic reasons for employing sanctions.Kim Richard Nossal argues that economic statecraft is used according to the logic of appropriateness,as a form of punishment rather than an attempt at coercion.21 Scholars emphasizing domestic politics argue that sanctions are im- posed even if the sanctioning government expects them to fail,to satiate public pressure for action in a crisis or to direct benefits towards rent-seeking coali- tions.22 These theories assume that for sanctions to have any utility to the sender, they must be imposed. Testing for Selection Bias To determine the validity of the selection effect argument,it is necessary to focus on events when sanctions are threatened but not imposed.23 The existence of a 20.Lacy and Niou 2000,18-19. 21.Nossal 1989. 22.See Drury 1998;Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988 and 1992;and Hiscox 2000. 23.Nooruddin 2002 tests for selection bias in the Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott data using a cen- sored probit model,but his methodology has two significant flaws.First,his model of sanctions impo- sition does not have a threat stage.Second,his dependent variable conflates sanctions success with the duration of imposition,which leaves the empirical results extremely sensitive to outlier cases in which sanctions have been imposed indefinitely,such as the U.S.embargoes against Cuba or North Korea

648 International Organization Dean Lacy and Emerson Niou create a model with incomplete information on both sides: the sender does not know how resolute the target state is, and the target does not know whether the sender state is resolute. Similar to Smith and Morgan and Miers, these authors also assume issue indivisibility. Lacy and Niou's conclusions are identical to these other approaches: Empirical studies that examine cases only in which sanctions were imposed systematically omit a class of cases that represent successful sanctions, though the sanctions were threatened but not imposed. Examining cases of only imposed sanctions generates a serious selection bias in empirical research on sanctions.20 To reiterate, these models provide different explanations for why one should observe the imposition of sanctions, but provide the same explanation for why most successful uses of economic coercion should end before sanctions are imposed. A target that prefers conceding to deadlock and believes that the sender will carry out its threat will acquiesce before imposition to avoid incurring the cost of sanctions. Because all of these models rely on the same game structure, they share a similar empirical prediction: sanctions should yield more concessions at the threat stage than at the implementation stage. The robustness of this prediction to the different assumptions about the distribution of information is quite striking. This prediction also stands in marked contrast to alternative theories of economic sanctions. The assumption that sanctions are generally ineffective has given greater purchase to approaches that stress domestic or symbolic reasons for employing sanctions. Kim Richard Nossal argues that economic statecraft is used according to the logic of appropriateness, as a form of punishment rather than an attempt at c~ercion.~' Scholars emphasizing domestic politics argue that sanctions are imposed even if the sanctioning government expects them to fail, to satiate public pressure for action in a crisis or to direct benefits towards rent-seeking coalition~.~~ These theories assume that for sanctions to have any utility to the sender, they must be imposed. Testing for Selection Bias To determine the validity of the selection effect argument, it is necessary to focus on events when sanctions are threatened but not imposed.23 The existence of a 20. Lacy and Niou 2000, 18-19. 21. Nossal 1989. 22. See Drury 1998; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988 and 1992; and Hiscox 2000. 23. Nooruddin 2002 tests for selection bias in the Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott data using a censored probit model, but his methodology has two significant flaws. First, his model of sanctions imposition does not have a threat stage. Second, his dependent variable conflates sanctions success with the duration of imposition, which leaves the empirical results extremely sensitive to outlier cases in which sanctions have been imposed indefinitely, such as the U.S. embargoes against Cuba or North Korea

Economic Coercion 649 large cache of these events would support the logic of strategic interaction.If those cases yield significant concessions from the target,this logic would be further bol- stered.If these cases do not generate a higher success rate,the selection effects argument would be falsified,giving more credence to existing explanations of sanc- tions behavior. For sanctions in pursuit of security goals,identifying the existence of coercion episodes that end at the threat stage is a difficult task.Coercion episodes that end before sanctions implementation may be too brief to generate much official docu- mentation.What documents do exist about these incidents are likely to be classi- fied.Both the sender and target governments have an incentive to keep such episodes secret.The targets prefer not to publicize the events because they do not want to make their acquiescence known to either domestic or international audiences.The senders prefer secrecy to preserve their victory or conceal their decision to back down.In many cases,the sender wishes to avoid embarrassing long-standing allies.Not surprisingly,Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott document only five24 cases-out of 116-that end at the threat stage.25 The traditional data source on sanctions is of little help;the answer may lie in using nontraditional sources of data.Economic coercion employed in the pursuit of economic or regulatory goals could prove useful in evaluating these theories. Over the past three decades,the United States has used sanctions as a means to force other countries into reducing trade barriers,respecting core labor standards, and protecting the environment.Scholars have already collected these observa- tions and coded whether they generated significant concessions from the target. These cases have not been previously used to evaluate theories of economic coer- cion.However,they are an ideal testing ground for selection bias,because the cases are isomorphic in their game structure to the sanctions cases collected in Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott:the sender country threatens to disrupt some eco- nomic exchange unless the target country changes its policy in a particular issue area. A significant number of scholars define economic coercion to include any in- stance when a government uses the threat to disrupt economic exchange to achieve 24.The five cases are:League of Nations v.Yugoslavia(1921),League of Nations v.Greece (1925) USSR v.Romania (1963),United States v.South Korea(1975),and United States v.El Salvador(1987). It is worth observing that Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott 1990 code four of these five cases as complete successes,a much higher success rate than for the overall data set.This is consistent with the selection effects argument. 25.A comparison of Drezner 1999 and the Institute for International Economics (IIE)2001 data on sanctions events of the past decade is revealing in their differences regarding Russia's use of economic statecraft.IIE records five cases of Russia imposing sanctions against other countries.Drezner,look- ing at the same time period,records thirty-nine separate Russian uses or threats of economic sanc- tions.The success rate of these cases in Drezner is 59 percent.In contrast,the cases identified by IIE record a success rate of only 40 percent.These contrasting results are consistent with a selection ef- fects argument

Economic Coercion 649 large cache of these events would support the logic of strategic interaction. If those cases yield significant concessions from the target, this logic would be further bolstered. If these cases do not generate a higher success rate, the selection effects argument would be falsified, giving more credence to existing explanations of sanctions behavior. For sanctions in pursuit of security goals, identifying the existence of coercion episodes that end at the threat stage is a difficult task. Coercion episodes that end before sanctions implementation may be too brief to generate much official documentation. What documents do exist about these incidents are likely to be classified. Both the sender and target governments have an incentive to keep such episodes secret. The targets prefer not to publicize the events because they do not want to make their acquiescence known to either domestic or international audiences. The senders prefer secrecy to preserve their victory or conceal their decision to back down. In many cases, the sender wishes to avoid embarrassing long-standing allies. Not surprisingly, Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott document only five24 cases-out of 116-that end at the threat stage.25 The traditional data source on sanctions is of little help; the answer may lie in using nontraditional sources of data. Economic coercion employed in the pursuit of economic or regulatory goals could prove useful in evaluating these theories. Over the past three decades, the United States has used sanctions as a means to force other countries into reducing trade barriers, respecting core labor standards, and protecting the environment. Scholars have already collected these observations and coded whether they generated significant concessions from the target. These cases have not been previously used to evaluate theories of economic coercion. However, they are an ideal testing ground for selection bias, because the cases are isomorphic in their game structure to the sanctions cases collected in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott: the sender country threatens to disrupt some economic exchange unless the target country changes its policy in a particular issue area. A significant number of scholars define economic coercion to include any instance when a government uses the threat to disrupt economic exchange to achieve 24. The five cases are: League of Nations v. Yugoslavia (1921), League of Nations v. Greece (1925), USSR v. Romania (1963), United States v. South Korea (1975), and United States v. El Salvador (1987). It is worth observing that Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990 code four of these five cases as complete successes, a much higher success rate than for the overall data set. This is consistent with the selection effects argument. 25. A comparison of Drezner 1999 and the Institute for International Economics (IIE) 2001 data on sanctions events of the past decade is revealing in their differences regarding Russia's use of economic statecraft. IIE records five cases of Russia imposing sanctions against other countries. Drezner, looking at the same time period, records thirty-nine separate Russian uses or threats of economic sanctions. The success rate of these cases in Drezner is 59 percent. In contrast, the cases identified by IIE record a success rate of only 40 percent. These contrasting results are consistent with a selection effects argument

650 International Organization a desired end.26 As David Baldwin notes:"Setting economic sanctions in the con- text of choice...requires that they be defined in terms of means rather than ends. As tools of foreign policy,they are presumably available to policy- makers for a variety of purposes and not restricted to particular foreign policy goals."27 However,some scholars argue that sanctions used in the pursuit of"low poli- tics"(economic and regulatory disputes)are different from sanctions used in the pursuit of"high politics"(security and political disputes).28 There are three ratio- nales given for this segmentation.First,the option of military force is not on the table in matters of low politics.Second,sanctions should be more effective in low-politics cases because the stakes are lower.Third,states care only about wealth maximization when sanctions are used in low-politics disputes,whereas high- politics cases involve broader security concerns,drastically lowering the chances for sanctions success.If these arguments are valid,then treating the low-politics cases as part of the sanctions universe would be problematic,as theorists would be asked to explain conceptually distinct phenomena.However,on review,these objections do not hold up to careful scrutiny.29 The prospect of military force is the most serious objection.If sanctions for high-politics cases are used as a signal for the use of force,and military force is not an option in low-politics cases,the question is raised of whether the bargain- ing process for low politics is fundamentally different.However,there are reasons to doubt that the prospect of military statecraft is relevant.First,military coercion does not have a significant effect on high-politics sanctions.At least six economet- ric tests of sanctions success include the threat of military statecraft or the mili- tary balance of power as a causal variable.None of these studies find the threat or use of force to be a significant contributing factor in generating concessions from the target.30 One study finds military statecraft to be statistically significant,but negatively correlated with sanctions success.31 These results are consistent with the theoretical argument that economic coercion acts as a foreign policy substitute for military coercion,rather than a complement.32 If the threat of force has no effect on sanctions outcomes,and policymakers view economic statecraft as a sub- 26.See Eaton and Engers 1992;Morgan and Schwebach 1997;Baldwin 1999/2000;and Drezner 2001. 27.Baldwin1999/2000,82. 28.Pape1997,95-97. 29.This does not mean that high politics are similar to low politics in every dimension.However, with regard to how the threat of economic coercion is employed,I am arguing that the similarities are what matter. 30.See Lam 1990;Dehejia and Wood 1992;Elliott and Uimonen 1993;Morgan and Schwebach 1997;Drezner 1999:and Hart 2000. 31.Elliott and Uimonen 1993. 32.Morgan,Palmer,and Miers 2000

650 International Organization a desired end.26 As David Baldwin notes: "Setting economic sanctions in the context of choice . . . requires that they be defined in terms of means rather than ends. As tools of foreign policy, they are presumably available to policymakers for a variety of purposes and not restricted to particular foreign policy goals." 27 However, some scholars argue that sanctions used in the pursuit of "low politics" (economic and regulatory disputes) are different from sanctions used in the pursuit of "high politics" (security and political dispute^).'^ There are three rationales given for this segmentation. First, the option of military force is not on the table in matters of low politics. Second, sanctions should be more effective in low-politics cases because the stakes are lower. Third, states care only about wealth maximization when sanctions are used in low-politics disputes, whereas highpolitics cases involve broader security concerns, drastically lowering the chances for sanctions success. If these arguments are valid, then treating the low-politics cases as part of the sanctions universe would be problematic, as theorists would be asked to explain conceptually distinct phenomena. However, on review, these objections do not hold up to careful ~crutiny.'~ The prospect of military force is the most serious objection. If sanctions for high-politics cases are used as a signal for the use of force, and military force is not an option in low-politics cases, the question is raised of whether the bargaining process for low politics is fundamentally different. However, there are reasons to doubt that the prospect of military statecraft is relevant. First, military coercion does not have a significant effect on high-politics sanctions. At least six econometric tests of sanctions success include the threat of military statecraft or the military balance of power as a causal variable. None of these studies find the threat or use of force to be a significant contributing factor in generating concessions from the target." One study finds military statecraft to be statistically significant, but negatively correlated with sanctions suc~ess.~' These results are consistent with the theoretical argument that economic coercion acts as a foreign policy substitute for military coercion, rather than a complement.32 If the threat of force has no effect on sanctions outcomes, and policymakers view economic statecraft as a sub- 26. See Eaton and Engers 1992; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Baldwin 1999/2000; and Drezner 200 1. 27. Baldwin 1999/2000, 82. 28. Pape 1997, 95-97. 29. This does not mean that high politics are similar to low politics in every dimension. However, with regard to how the threat of economic coercion is employed, I am arguing that the similarities are what matter. 30. See Lam 1990; Dehejia and Wood 1992; Elliott and Uimonen 1993; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Drezner 1999; and Hart 2000. 31. Elliott and Uimonen 1993. 32. Morgan, Palmer, and Miers 2000

Economic Coercion 651 stitute for military statecraft,then the conceptual distinction between the high- politics and low-politics cases falls apart.33 The other two objections-high-politics cases involve greater stakes and more zero-sum bargaining-can be challenged on substantive and conceptual grounds. Certainly,demands regarding territorial disputes are more important than regula- tions governing tuna drift nets.However,demands of that magnitude are a rare phenomenon even within the category of "high politics."A majority of the cases in Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott consist of the sender requesting "modest changes" in target policy.34 Furthermore,this criticism underestimates the demands that are made in matters of low politics.Asking states to alter their domestic laws or regulations is an intrinsically political demand,equivalent to asking nation-states to alter their human rights regime or other internal political arrangements.35 These demands violate Westphalian sovereignty-the exclusion of external ac- tors from domestic authority structures-and as such,represent a significant po- litical demand.36 The final criticism is that because states care only about wealth maximization in low-politics disputes,they will respond more readily to sanctions than in high- politics disputes.37 The premise behind this critique-that states care only about absolute gains in disputes over economic or regulatory issues-does not rest on solid conceptual footing.Some prominent international relations theorists argue that states care about their relative economic position as much as wealth maximi- zation.38 At a minimum,the history of the Section 301 mechanism indicates that the United States strengthens and uses this sanctions mechanism when it wants to maximize its relative position vis-a-vis its economic rivals.39 It should also be noted that for the purposes of this study,the latter two objec- tions are conceptually irrelevant.Assume for the moment that the objections are 33.As to whether military statecraft is not an option in low-politics cases,history provides several counterexamples.Great Britain used its naval power in its trade war with the Hanseatic League during the fifteenth century:in the seventeenth century,Great Britain used force again to advance commercial interests against the Netherlands.See Conybeare 1987,105,133.In the nineteenth century,the United States used the threat of naval power to successfully compel Japan into opening its market to Ameri- can goods.Iraq invaded Kuwait because of conflicts over oil prices and debt repayment.In 1995,a Canadian naval vessel fired at and seized a Spanish trawler to gain the upper hand in a dispute over fishing rights.See DeSombre 2000,5.Force may not be used in most modern economic disputes,but that does not preclude the possibility of its use. 34.Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott 1990,84-85. 35.It is not surprising that in response to U.S.economic coercion regarding China's lax enforce- ment of intellectual property rights,Beijing invoked sovereignty language very similar to its response to American criticisms and threats about China's human rights situation.See Chien-Hale 1997. 36.Krasner 1999.At least some of the low-politics cases are identical to the high-politics cases. Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliott include U.S.demands for a target state to improve its human rights re- gime.Given that in 1988,Congress expanded its definition of human rights to include core labor stan- dards,the distinction between the high politics of human rights and the low politics of labor regulation has disappeared. 37.Pape1997,96. 38.See Waltz 1979;Grieco 1990;Gowa 1994;Mastanduno 1998;and Skalnes 2000. 39.See Goldstein 1993:Bayard and Elliott 1994:and Noland 1997

Economic Coercion 651 stitute for military statecraft, then the conceptual distinction between the highpolitics and low-politics cases falls apart.33 The other two objections-high-politics cases involve greater stakes and more zero-sum bargaining-can be challenged on substantive and conceptual grounds. Certainly, demands regarding territorial disputes are more important than regulations governing tuna drift nets. However, demands of that magnitude are a rare phenomenon even within the category of "high politics." A majority of the cases in Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott consist of the sender requesting "modest changes" in target Furthermore, this criticism underestimates the demands that are made in matters of low politics. Asking states to alter their domestic laws or regulations is an intrinsically political demand, equivalent to asking nation-states to alter their human rights regime or other internal political arrangement^.^^ These demands violate Westphalian sovereignty-the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures-and as such, represent a significant political demand.36 The final criticism is that because states care only about wealth maximization in low-politics disputes, they will respond more readily to sanctions than in highpolitics disputes.37 The premise behind this critique-that states care only about absolute gains in disputes over economic or regulatory issues-does not rest on solid conceptual footing. Some prominent international relations theorists argue that states care about their relative economic position as much as wealth maximi- ~ation.~' At a minimum, the history of the Section 301 mechanism indicates that the United States strengthens and uses this sanctions mechanism when it wants to maximize its relative position vis-a-vis its economic rivals.39 It should also be noted that for the purposes of this study, the latter two objections are conceptually irrelevant. Assume for the moment that the objections are 33. As to whether military statecraft is not an option in low-politics cases, history provides several counterexamples. Great Britain used its naval power in its trade war with the Hanseatic League during the fifteenth century; in the seventeenth century, Great Britain used force again to advance commercial interests against the Netherlands. See Conybeare 1987, 105, 133. In the nineteenth century, the United States used the threat of naval power to successfully compel Japan into opening its market to American goods. Iraq invaded Kuwait because of conflicts over oil prices and debt repayment. In 1995, a Canadian naval vessel fired at and seized a Spanish trawler to gain the upper hand in a dispute over fishing rights. See DeSombre 2000, 5. Force may not be used in most modern economic disputes, but that does not preclude the possibility of its use. 34. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990, 84-85. 35. It is not surprising that in response to U.S. economic coercion regarding China's lax enforcement of intellectual property rights, Beijing invoked sovereignty language very similar to its response to American criticisms and threats about China's human rights situation. See Chien-Hale 1997. 36. Krasner 1999. At least some of the low-politics cases are identical to the high-politics cases. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott include U.S. demands for a target state to improve its human rights regime. Given that in 1988, Congress expanded its definition of human rights to include core labor standards, the distinction between the high politics of human rights and the low politics of labor regulation has disappeared. 37. Pape 1997, 96. 38. See Waltz 1979; Grieco 1990; Gowa 1994; Mastanduno 1998; and Skilnes 2000. 39. See Goldstein 1993; Bayard and Elliott 1994; and Noland 1997

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