《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Institutions and International Political Economy）The Magic Bullet. The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization.pdf_大学文库

The Magic Bullet?The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization Michael J.Hiscox Introduction The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA)of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences.It is typically por- trayed as a clever maneuver that,by shifting authority over trade policy from Con- gress to the president,fundamentally altered the nature of the policymaking process and drastically changed the future course of U.S.trade relations.Wedded to high levels of tariff protection for most of its history,the United States began a steady process of tariff reduction after 1934 that helped to transform the international economy. The connection between the RTAA and the shift in policy seems obvious.How else can we explain the sudden swing toward liberalization after 1934 than by refer- ence to the institutional change of 1934?Why else would there be a sudden move- ment away from a seemingly robust protectionist equilibrium?In the political- economy literature,the standard explanation for inefficient protectionism is that the benefits of tariffs are concentrated among producers in import-competing industries, whereas the costs are dispersed among producers in other industries and consumers; so the former find it easier to organize collectively to influence policy to their advan- tage.An escape from this political trap is likely only if some change in the institu- tions that govern policymaking can provide greater political weight to members of the large free-trade bloc. The conventional wisdom on the RTAA relies on two versions of this same claim. The first version focuses on how delegating authority to the president eliminated protectionist logrolling and made more salient the costs of tariffs to consumers that would otherwise have been neglected because they were dispersed across electoral An earlier version of this article was presented at the 93d Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,Washington,D.C.,1997.I thank David Lake,Peter Gourevitch,and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. International Organization 53,4,Autumn 1999,pp.669-698 1999 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization Michael J. Hiscox Introduction The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 has long been heralded as a simple institutional reform with revolutionary consequences. It is typically portrayed as a clever maneuver that, by shifting authority over trade policy from Congress to the president, fundamentally altered the nature of the policymaking process and drastically changed the future course of U.S. trade relations. Wedded to high levels of tariff protection for most of its history, the United States began a steady process of tariff reduction after 1934 that helped to transform the international economy. The connection between the RTAA and the shift in policy seems obvious. How else can we explain the sudden swing toward liberalization after 1934 than by reference to the institutional change of 1934? Why else would there be a sudden movement away from a seemingly robust protectionist equilibrium? In the politicaleconomy literature, the standard explanation for inefficient protectionism is that the benefits of tariffs are concentrated among producers in import-competing industries, whereas the costs are dispersed among producers in other industries and consumers; so the former find it easier to organize collectively to influence policy to their advantage. An escape from this political trap is likely only if some change in the institutions that govern policymaking can provide greater political weight to members of the large free-trade bloc. The conventional wisdom on the RTAA relies on two versions of this same claim. The first version focuses on how delegating authority to the president eliminated protectionist logrolling and made more salient the costs of tariffs to consumers that would otherwise have been neglected because they were dispersed across electoral An earlier version of this article was presented at the 93d Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1997. I thank David Lake, Peter Gourevitch, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Interrzcrtionnl Orgnnizntion 53, 4,Autumn 1999, pp. 669-698 o 1999 by The I0 Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

670 International Organization districts.The second version emphasizes how empowering the president to negoti- ate trade agreements that elicited reciprocal tariff reductions from other nations gen- erated larger gains for,and thus more political support from,export interests.2 I argue that,though these accounts provide sound reasons why the RTAA might have helped to produce more liberal policy outcomes ex post facto,they fail to pro- vide an adequate explanation for just how the institutional innovation was achieved and sustained in the face of protectionist opposition.Instead,a closer examination of the changing nature of the underlying trade policy coalitions,and their relationships with the two parties,makes more sense of the American experience.The RTAA system was instituted by a Democratic majority with a core constituency of interests that favored more liberal trade policies and hoped to make them more resilient to Republican majorities in the future.But it narrowly survived the Republican majori- ties that did follow in the 1940s and 1950s only because growing divisions over the trade issue arose within the Republicans'electoral base.These changes reflected the dramatic,exogenous effects of World War II on U.S.export and import-competing industries as well as longer-term shifts in U.S.comparative advantage and in party constituencies.In this alternative account of the RTAA and U.S.trade liberalization, the historical coincidence of several profound economic and political changes are central to the eventual outcome.As a consequence,the RTAA story offers few if any lessons for trade policy reform in the current system.It does emphasize,how- ever,that since trade liberalization was driven by a particular alignment of societal coalitions in the past,it might well be stymied or reversed by a different alignment in the future.This possibility for change is ruled out by conventional accounts of the RTAA. In the next section I briefly discuss the origins of the RTAA and the evidence that it coincided with a dramatic shift in U.S.trade policy.The third section examines the claim that the reform was essentially a congressional act of self-restraint,aimed at eliminating logrolling in tariff legislation by delegating authority over policy to the president.The fourth section then considers an alternative claim that the reform was a Democratic ploy to swing the political balance in favor of free-trade interests by basing trade policymaking on reciprocal concessions negotiated by the executive branch.I show that neither view fits well with the record of congressional voting on trade bills during the last century.Moreover,both stories neglect important exog- enous changes in party constituencies and societal preferences that had crucial ef- fects on congressional votes to extend the RTAA authority and liberalize trade after 1945.In the fifth section I develop this point in more detail by outlining a simple model of distributive conflict over trade and its manifestation within Congress.The model emphasizes the role of dynamic shifts in the preferences of societal groups, and the positions taken by the parties,in the evolution of U.S.trade policy. 1.Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994. 2.Bailey,Goldstein,and Weingast 1997

670 International Organization districts.' The second version emphasizes how empowering the president to negotiate trade agreements that elicited reciprocal tariff reductions from other nations generated larger gains for, and thus more political support from, export interests2 I argue that, though these accounts provide sound reasons why the RTAA might have helped to produce more liberal policy outcomes ex post facto, they fail to provide an adequate explanation for just how the institutional innovation was achieved and sustained in the face of protectionist opposition. Instead, a closer examination of the changing nature of the underlying trade policy coalitions, and their relationships with the two parties, makes more sense of the American experience. The RTAA system was instituted by a Democratic majority with a core constituency of interests that favored more liberal trade policies and hoped to make them more resilient to Republican majorities in the future. But it narrowly survived the Republican majorities that did follow in the 1940s and 1950s only because growing divisions over the trade issue arose within the Republicans' electoral base. These changes reflected the dramatic, exogenous effects of World War I1 on U.S. export and import-competing industries as well as longer-tern1 shifts in U.S. comparative advantage and in party constituencies. In this alternative account of the RTAA and U.S. trade liberalization, the historical coincidence of several profound economic and political changes are central to the eventual outcome. As a consequence, the RTAA story offers few if any lessons for trade policy reform in the current system. It does emphasize, however, that since trade liberalization was driven by a particular alignment of societal coalitions in the past, it might well be stymied or reversed by a different alignment in the future. This possibility for change is ruled out by conventional accounts of the RTAA. In the next section I briefly discuss the origins of the RTAA and the evidence that it coincided with a dramatic shift in U.S. trade policy. The third section examines the claim that the reform was essentially a congressional act of self-restraint, aimed at eliminating logrolling in tariff legislation by delegating authority over policy to the president. The fourth section then considers an alternative claim that the reform was a Democratic ploy to swing the political balance in favor of free-trade interests by basing trade policymaking on reciprocal concessions negotiated by the executive branch. I show that neither view fits well with the record of congressional voting on trade bills during the last century. Moreover, both stories neglect important exogenous changes in party constituencies and societal preferences that had crucial effects on congressional votes to extend the RTAA authority and liberalize trade after 1945. In the fifth section I develop this point in more detail by outlining a simple model of distributive conflict over trade and its manifestation within Congress. The model emphasizes the role of dynamic shifts in the preferences of societal groups, and the positions taken by the parties, in the evolution of U.S. trade policy. 1. Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994. 2. Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 671 The Magic Bullet:The RTAA and the Death of U.S.(Tariff)Protectionism The immediate origins of the RTAA lie in the elections of 1932 in which the Demo- crats won massive majorities in both the House and Senate and installed Roosevelt in the White House.Trade policy initially took a backseat to the new administration's ambitious domestic plans,and Roosevelt himself backed away from staking out a clear position on the trade issue,but he did appoint Cordell Hull,long-time champion of the free-trade cause in Congress,as his secretary of state.Having reluctantly accepted that unilateral tariff reductions were politically impractical in the midst of recession,Hull began to champion bilateral agreements with trading partners as"the next best method''of reform.3 In 1933 he drafted a bill authorizing the president to negotiate such treaties.That bill became the basis for the RTAA,written as an amend- ment to the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff laws and granting the president authority (for three years)to negotiate alterations of up to 50 percent in the existing import duties.When that initial authority expired in 1937,Congress renewed it and continued to do so in the decades that followed.In later years,the president's author- ity was expanded to cover negotiations over a range of nontariff barriers to trade, although various procedural and monitoring provisions were also introduced to con- strain executive behavior.4 The effects of the RTAA seem profound,at least prima facie.Between 1934 and 1939,twenty-two separate agreements reducing tariffs were negotiated under its au- thority.5 After World War II,extensions of the authority enabled both Democratic and Republican administrations to take a leadership role in negotiating multilateral tariff reductions in successive rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).Figure 1 plots the data on estimated levels of U.S.protection between 1824 and 1994,using standard measures of average ad valorem tariffs (the annual receipts from customs and import duties as a percentage of the annual value of all imports and the value of all dutiable imports).The case for 1934 as the beginning of a radical change in U.S.trade politics appears strong.Estimated tariffs reached peaks during the years of Republican control after the Civil War and between 1922 and 1930,and though the Democrats did lower protection significantly in 1894 and 1913 during their brief stints in power,a steady long-term reversal only began in the 1930s.6 Considerable caution is warranted here,however,in dealing only with these mea- sures of tariff levels.The standard estimates have been defended as a decent overall indicator of protection,?but they have significant weaknesses.One problem is that they can shift as a result of changes in the composition of imports:decreasing,for 3.Hul11948,356. 4.Destler1992,71-76. 5.Tasca 1938. 6.One problem with a straight"institutionalist"interpretation of events here is immediately apparent from Figure 1:in the pre-1934 period,in which the rules of tariff policymaking were essentially constant, policy nevertheless varied substantially.It is very difficult to classify this era as representative of one stable protectionist equilibrium. 7.0ECD1985

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 671 The Magic Bullet: The RTAA and the Death of U.S. (Tariff) Protectionism The immediate origins of the RTAA lie in the elections of 1932 in which the Democrats won massive majorities in both the House and Senate and installed Roosevelt in the White House. Trade policy initially took a backseat to the new administration's ambitious domestic plans, and Roosevelt himself backed away from staking out a clear position on the trade issue, but he did appoint Cordell Hull, long-time champion of the free-trade cause in Congress, as his secretary of state. Having reluctantly accepted that unilateral tariff reductions were politically impractical in the midst of recession, Hull began to champion bilateral agreements with trading partners as "the next best method" of ref~rm.~ In 1933 he drafted a bill authorizing the president to negotiate such treaties. That bill became the basis for the RTAA, written as an amendment to the infamous 1930 Smoot-Hawley tariff laws and granting the president authority (for three years) to negotiate alterations of up to 50 percent in the existing import duties. When that initial authority expired in 1937, Congress renewed it and continued to do so in the decades that followed. In later years, the president's authority was expanded to cover negotiations over a range of nontariff barriers to trade, although various procedural and monitoring provisions were also introduced to constrain executive beha~ior.~ The effects of the RTAA seem profound, at least prima facie. Between 1934 and 1939, twenty-two separate agreements reducing tariffs were negotiated under its auth~rity.~After World War 11, extensions of the authority enabled both Democratic and Republican administrations to take a leadership role in negotiating multilateral tariff reductions in successive rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Figure 1 plots the data on estimated levels of U.S. protection between 1824 and 1994, using standard measures of average ad valorem tariffs (the annual receipts from customs and import duties as a percentage of the annual value of all imports and the value of all dutiable imports). The case for 1934 as the beginning of a radical change in U.S. trade politics appears strong. Estimated tariffs reached peaks during the years of Republican control after the Civil War and between 1922 and 1930, and though the Democrats did lower protection significantly in 1894 and 1913 during their brief stints in power, a steady long-term reversal only began in the 1930~.~ Considerable caution is warranted here, however, in dealing only with these measures of tariff levels. The standard estimates have been defended as a decent overall indicator of pr~tection,~ but they have significant weaknesses. One problem is that they can shift as a result of changes in the composition of imports: decreasing, for 3. Hull 1948,356. 4. Destler 1992, 71-76. 5. Tasca 1938. 6. One problem with a straight "institutionalist" interpretation of events here is immediately apparent from Figure 1: in the pre-1934 period, in which the rules of tariff policymaking were essentially constant, policy nevertheless varied substantially. It is very difficult to classify this era as representative of one stable protectionist equilibrium. 7. OECD 1985

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 673 ing years,and,by 1939,a full quarter of dutiable imports were subject to quantitative limits.12 In the postwar era,of course,the most popular forms of the "new protection- ism,"such as voluntary export restraints(VERs),have severely restricted imports of major items including textiles and clothing,footwear,steel,and automobiles.13 Perhaps most important,the tariff estimates shown in Figure 1 are extremely sen- sitive to import price levels when the actual tariffs imposed are in the form of specific duties rather than ad valorem duties.If import price levels rise,fixed specific duties will yield declining estimates of average ad valorem tariffs.Since roughly two-thirds of dutiable imports to the United States were subject to specific duties in the 1940s, and import prices rose some 81 percent between 1945 and 1955,this represents a glaring problem.Douglas Irwin has calculated that over three-quarters of the decline in estimated tariff levels between 1934 and 1967 can be attributed to the dramatic rise in import prices in the postwar period-only the remaining one-quarter of the esti- mated drop in tariffs was actually caused by changes in policy.14 The common story told about a radical change in trade policy after 1934 thus needs to be drastically amended. Even after taking such qualifications into account,the 1930s and 1940s still appear to be a turning point of sorts in U.S.trade politics.Trade policy did shift in a more liberal direction,and the change broadly coincided with the passage of the RTAA. What happened?Without doing too much damage to the subtleties,we can distin- guish two major "magic bullet"theses in the literature:(1)members of Congress recognized that the existing rules produced sub-optimal results because of logrolling and chose to delegate authority to the executive branch to ensure more efficient policies;and(2)leaders of the Democratic party,hoping to make trade liberalization more lasting,chose to base it on reciprocal concessions that would solidify support from export interests.Each of these broad claims warrants scrutiny. The RTAA as a Solution to Logrolling The most common view that has emerged in all the various accounts of the RTAA is that the delegation of authority it entailed was the result of members of Congress recognizing that logrolling in the passage of tariff legislation produced highly protec- tionist outcomes in which all were left worse off.15 Tariff setting in a legislature is regarded as a classic case of"distributive politics"in the famous Lowi typology.16 Tariff benefits can be doled out to import-competing producers in one area without 12.Diebold1941.19. 13.Bhagwati 1988. 14.Irwin 1996.He develops an econometric model of the estimated average tariff rate from 1865 to 1973,then uses parameter estimates to distinguish the effects of import price inflation and changes in commercial policy.Notice that just as the price inflation of the 1940s and 1950s leads to a vast overstate- ment of tariff reductions in those years,the price deflation during the Depression years of the early 1930s leads to an overstatement of the tariff increase in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. 15.See Baldwin 1985;Goldstein 1988;and Destler 1992. 16.L0wi1979,690

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 673 ing years, and, by 1939, a full quarter of dutiable imports were subject to quantitative limits.12 In the postwar era, of course, the most popular forms of the "new protectionism," such as voluntary export restraints (VERs), have severely restricted imports of major items including textiles and clothing, footwear, steel, and automobiles.13 Perhaps most important, the tariff estimates shown in Figure 1 are extremely sensitive to import price levels when the actual tariffs imposed are in the form of specific duties rather than ad valorem duties. If import price levels rise, fixed specific duties will yield declining estimates of average ad valorem tariffs. Since roughly two-thirds of dutiable imports to the United States were subject to specific duties in the 1940s, and import prices rose some 81 percent between 1945 and 1955, this represents a glaring problem. Douglas Irwin has calculated that over three-quarters of the decline in estimated tariff levels betwe& 1934 and 1967 can be attributed to the dramatic rise in import prices in the postwar period-only the remaining one-quarter of the estimated drop in tariffs was actually caused by changes in policy.14 The common story told about a radical change in trade policy after 1934 thus needs to be drastically amended. Even after taking such qualifications into account, the 1930s and 1940s still appear to be a turning point of sorts in U.S. trade politics. Trade policy did shift in a more liberal direction, and the change broadly coincided with the passage of the RTAA. What happened? Without doing too much damage to the subtleties, we can distinguish two major "magic bullet" theses in the literature: (1) members of Congress recognized that the existing rules produced sub-optimal results because of logrolling and chose to delegate authority to the executive branch to ensure more efficient policies; and (2) leaders of the Democratic party, hoping to make trade liberalization more lasting, chose to base it on reciprocal concessions that would solidify support from export interests. Each of these broad claims warrants scrutiny. The RTAA as a Solution to Logrolling The most common view that has emerged in all the various accounts of the RTAA is that the delegation of authority it entailed was the result of members of Congress recognizing that logrolling in the passage of tariff legislation produced highly protectionist outcomes in which all were left worse off.15 Tariff setting in a legislature is regarded as a classic case of "distributive politics" in the famous Lowi typology.16 Tariff benefits can be doled out to import-competing producers in one area without 12. Diebold 1941, 19. 13. Bhagwati 1988. 14. Irwin 1996. He develops an econometric model of the estimated average tariff rate from 1865 to 1973, then uses parameter estimates to distinguish the effects of import price inflation and changes in commercial policy. Notice that just as the price inflation of the 1940s and 1950s leads to a vast overstatement of tariff reductions in those years, the price deflation during the Depression years of the early 1930s leads to an overstatement of the tariff increase in the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. 15. See Baldwin 1985; Goldstein 1988; and Destler 1992. 16. Lowi 1979,690

674 International Organization hindering the benefits conferred to producers in other areas,and the costs of these measures are born generally by all consumers.In such cases,legislatures are ex- pected to generate a high degree of unanimity in the form of a universal logroll.17 Each member of the legislature will propose generous protective measures for indus- tries in his or her own district without accounting for the costs they impose on con- sumers elsewhere.To gain support for these measures,each member will vote in favor of similar measures proposed by other legislators.If members can vote indefi- nitely on a sequence of such proposals,a universal logroll is supported as an equilib- rium by each legislator's belief that a vote against another's proposal would induce others to retaliate by offering an amendment to withdraw protection from the defec- tor's district.18 The result of such unchecked logrolling is that district-specific ben- efits(in this case,protective measures)are oversupplied:the costs to consumers are such that all legislators are worse off than they were before the bill was passed. This lesson was brought home to Congress,so the argument goes,by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 in which logrolling appeared to run wild.20 Congress supposedly resolved to mend its ways and delegate control of policy to an agent who would act more responsibly:the president.Having a national constituency,the presi- dent is expected to internalize the negative (cross-district)externalities to consumers when setting tariff rates and adopt lower,more efficient,levels of protection.The most sophisticated version of this argument is provided by Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran.21 They develop a model of the delegation of trade policymaking authority in which Congress can choose between full delegation,partial delegation (which imposes a congressional veto on the president's proposal),and zero delega- tion.In the absence of partisan considerations,they expect legislators will prefer the more efficient outcomes provided by full delegation to the president.If the president is expected to be partisan in setting tariffs,however,favoring legislators in the presi- dent's own party over others,full delegation is only expected when the president's party has majority control since,under divided government,the congressional major- ity has an incentive to constrain the president.It fits,according to this view,that the RTAA provided full delegation to the president under unified Democratic govern- ment in the 1930s,allowing for rapid trade liberalization,and that greater restraints on presidential tariff cutting were imposed in later years under divided rule. How convincing is this anti-logrolling story?A debilitating weakness in this ac- count of the RTAA,as Karen Schneitz has pointed out,is that the congressional voting records indicate precious little learning on the part of legislators.Among members of Congress voting on both bills,almost all those who voted for Smoot- Hawley in 1930 voted against the RTAA in 1934:225 representatives voted on both bills in the House,for instance,and only 9 of these changed their views in the liberal 17.Weingast 1979. 18.Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994,605. 19.Weingast,Shepsle,and Johnsen 1981. 20.The Senate alone made 1,253 amendments to the original House bill,and duties on over twenty thousand items were altered.Pastor 1980,77-78. 21.Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994

674 International Organization hindering the benefits conferred to producers in other areas, and the costs of these measures are born generally by all consumers. In such cases, legislatures are expected to generate a high degree of unanimity in the form of a universal logroll.17 Each member of the legislature will propose generous protective measures for industries in his or her own district without accounting for the costs they impose on consumers elsewhere. To gain support for these measures, each member will vote in favor of similar measures proposed by other legislators. If members can vote indefinitely on a sequence of such proposals, a universal logroll is supported as an equilibrium by each legislator's belief that a vote against another's proposal would induce others to retaliate by offering an amendment to withdraw protection from the defector's district.18 The result of such unchecked logrolling is that district-specific benefits (in this case, protective measures) are oversupplied: the costs to consumers are such that all legislators are worse off than they were before the bill was passed.19 This lesson was brought home to Congress, so the argument goes, by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 in which logrolling appeared to run wild.20 Congress supposedly resolved to mend its ways and delegate control of policy to an agent who would act more responsibly: the president. Having a national constituency, the president is expected to internalize the negative (cross-district) externalities to consumers when setting tariff rates and adopt lower, more efficient, levels of protection. The most sophisticated version of this argument is provided by Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Hall~ran.~~ They develop a model of the delegation of trade policymaking authority in which Congress can choose between full delegation, partial delegation (which imposes a congressional veto on the president's proposal), and zero delegation. In the absence of partisan considerations, they expect legislators will prefer the more efficient outcomes provided by full delegation to the president. If the president is expected to be partisan in setting tariffs, however, favoring legislators in the president's own party over others, full delegation is only expected when the president's party has majority control since, under divided government, the congressional majority has an incentive to constrain the president. It fits, according to this view, that the RTAA provided full delegation to the president under unified Democratic government in the 1930s, allowing for rapid trade liberalization, and that greater restraints on presidential tariff cutting were imposed in later years under divided rule. How convincing is this anti-logrolling story? A debilitating weakness in this account of the RTAA, as Karen Schneitz has pointed out, is that the congressional voting records indicate precious little learning on the part of legislators. Among members of Congress voting on both bills, almost all those who voted for SmootHawley in 1930 voted against the RTAA in 1934: 225 representatives voted on both bills in the House, for instance, and only 9 of these changed their views in the liberal 17. Weingast 1979. 18. Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994,605. 19. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981. 20. The Senate alone made 1,253 amendments to the original House bill, and duties on over twenty thousand items were altered. Pastor 1980,77-78. 21. Lohmann and O'Halloran 1994

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 675 direction.22 The vote on the RTAA in 1934 was just as partisan as the vote on Smoot- Hawley,with the Republicans sticking to their historical platform favoring high tar- iffs:Republicans voted 111-12 and 30-5 against the bill in the House and Senate, respectively,whereas Democrats voted 279-4 and 51-7 for the bill.Clearly,with a few more Republican legislators around to cast votes in 1934 or 1937,and a few less Democrats,the historic reform would have been quickly scuttled.Table 1 shows the votes on legislation extending the president's authority to negotiate trade agreements between 1937 and 1974.23 It seems clear that there was no general shift away from protectionism and in favor of liberalizing delegation in the years immediately following the 1930 debacle,as the simple learning thesis would imply,but rather a far more gradual evolution of party positions in which both became more internally divided on the matter.24(I will return to this point later in the article.) The Lohmann-O'Halloran model can do little better than the cruder form of the anti-logrolling argument on this score.It does anticipate that some level of partisan- ship in presidential tariff setting(a parameter)can result in partisan voting contests over delegation,as occurred in the 1934 RTAA vote and votes on extensions of negotiating authority in the 1930s and 1940s.But votes extending the president's authority over trade policy have grown increasingly less partisan over time as signifi- cant divisions have appeared in each party on the issue.The Lohmann-O'Halloran model cannot account for this trend because it demands that all members of the same party cast identical votes when it comes to delegation.The model also contains no theory of presidential partisanship in tariff-setting,it should be noted,and allows for no other source of congressional partisanship on the trade issue:a remarkable oversight given the historical conflict between Democrats and Republicans over the tariff. The overall evidence for the Lohmann-O'Halloran model from just the post-1934 record of delegation and policy change is far from convincing.True,there are several examples that seem to fit with their prediction that greater delegation should be associated with unified governments than with divided ones:the Republican Con- gresses of the late 1940s shortened the period of delegation to the Democratic presi- dent (Truman),for instance,and imposed "peril point"provisions that prohibited tariff reductions that threatened "serious injury"to domestic industries.In 1974 a Democratic Congress imposed a new congressional veto on trade agreements negoti- ated by the Republican president (Nixon).But there are also counter-examples:in 1951,for instance,a Democratic Congress revived the peril-point constraint and imposed it on their own president.In 1953 and 1954 Republican Congresses required an enormous amount of arm twisting before they were willing to grant the Eisen- hower administration a renewal of bargaining authority and refused to extend it for 22.Schneitz1994,128-32. 23.Appendix I provides a longer list of votes on trade legislation between 1890 and 1994,including bills after 1974 that,while granting new extensions of authority to the president,included a host of other measures 24.See Watson 1956:and Hiscox 1997

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 675 direction.22 The vote on the RTAA in 1934 was just as partisan as the vote on SmootHawley, with the Republicans sticking to their historical platform favoring high tariffs: Republicans voted 111-12 and 30-5 against the bill in the House and Senate, respectively, whereas Democrats voted 2794 and 51-7 for the bill. Clearly, with a few more Republican legislators around to cast votes in 1934 or 1937, and a few less Democrats, the historic reform would have been quickly scuttled. Table 1 shows the votes on legislation extending the president's authority to negotiate trade agreements between 1937 and 1974.23 It seems clear that there was no general shift away from protectionism and in favor of liberalizing delegation in the years immediately following the 1930 debacle, as the simple learning thesis would imply, but rather a far more gradual evolution of party positions in which both became'more internally divided on the matter.24 (I will return to this point later in the article.) The Lohmann-O'Halloran model can do little better than the cruder form of the anti-logrolling argument on this score. It does anticipate that some level of partisanship in presidential tariff setting (a parameter) can result in partisan voting contests over delegation, as occurred in the 1934 RTAA vote and votes on extensions of negotiating authority in the 1930s and 1940s. But votes extending the president's authority over trade policy have grown increasingly less partisan over time as significant divisions have appeared in each party on the issue. The Lohmann-O'Halloran model cannot account for this trend because it demands that all members of the same party cast identical votes when it comes to delegation. The model also contains no theory of presidential partisanship in tariff-setting, it should be noted, and ,allows for no other source of congressional partisanship on the trade issue: a remarkable oversight given the historical conflict between Democrats and Republicans over the tariff. The overall evidence for the Lohmann-O'Halloran model from just the post-1934 record of delegation and policy change is far from convincing. True, there are several examples that seem to fit with their prediction that greater delegation should be associated with unified governments than with divided ones: the Republican Congresses of the late 1940s shortened the period of delegation to the Democratic president (Truman), for instance, and imposed "peril point" provisions that prohibited tariff reductions that threatened "serious injury" to domestic industries. In 1974 a Democratic Congress imposed a new congressional veto on trade agreements negotiated by the Republican president (Nixon). But there are also counter-examples: in 1951, for instance, a Democratic Congress revived the peril-point constraint and imposed it on their own president. In 1953 and 1954 Republican Congresses required an enormous amount of arm twisting before they were willing to grant the Eisenhower administration a renewal of bargaining authority and refused to extend it for 22. Schneitz 1994, 128-32. 23. Appendix I provides a longer list of votes on trade legislation between 1890 and 1994, including bills after 1974 that, while granting new extensions of authority to the president, included a host of other measures. 24. See Watson 1956; and Hiscox 1997

676 International Organization TABLE 1.Congressional votes on trade legislation,1934-74 Senate House Legislation Party Yeas Nays Yeas Nays 1934 RTAA Dem 51 279 12 Rep 7 30 4 111 1937 RTAA extension Dem 56 286 11 3 years Rep 1 公 3 87 1940 RTAA extension Dem 41 212 3 years Rep 0 % 146 1943 RTAA extension Dem 195 2 years Rep 0 20 145 52 1945 RTAA extension Dem 4 205 3 years Rep 2 140 1948 RTAA extension Dem 7 16 142 I year Rep 47 21 1949 RTAA extension Dem 47 234 56 2 years Rep 18 63 1951 RTAA extension Dem 39 (voice vote) 2 years Rep 51 0 1953 RTAA extension Dem (voice vote) 184 11 I year Rep 180 1954 RTAA extension Dem 46 1 year Rep 4 9 25157 1955 RTAA extension Dem 6 190 3 3 years Rep 0 8 113 1958 RTAA extension Dem 4 185 40 4 years Rep 134 1962 Trade Expansion Act(5-year authority) Dem 0 215 Rep 23 14 9 1974 Trade Reform Act(5-year authority) Dem 47 115 124 Rep 38 1 163 19 Introduced the controversial "peril point"provision favored by Republicans (and opposed by Tru- man in the 1948 campaign)prohibiting tariff reductions that threatened"serious injury"to domestic industries. more than one year at a time.25 By contrast,in 1955 new Democratic majorities in Congress readily voted the Republican president three years of authority.26 There are other empirical and theoretical problems with the anti-logrolling view.It is not at all clear that universalistic(or even partisan)logrolls have been an otherwise 25.Pastor 1980 26.When it comes to evaluating whether divided government has had positive effects on levels of protection,Lohmann and O'Halloran are hamstrung by reliance on tariff data,and have failed to control for the timing of conclusions to GATT rounds,which often arrive only after many years of bargaining by different administrations.As luck would have it,the most important multiyear rounds of negotiation that reduced tariff rates,the Dillon (1960-61),Kennedy (1962-68),and Tokyo Rounds (1974-79),all hap- pened to conclude in periods of unified government-though the delegation decisions that allowed U.S. participation in two of these cases (Dillon and Tokyo)were made under divided government

676 International Organization TABLE 1. Congressional votes on trade legislation, 1934-74 Senate House Legislation Party Yeas Nays Yeas Nays 1934 RTAA Dem 5 1 5 279 12 Rep 7 30 4 111 1937 RTAA extension Dem 56 8 286 11 3 years 1 15 3 87 1940 RTAA extension Dem Rp 41 15 212 20 3 years Rep 0 30 5 146 1943 RTAA extension Dem 4 1 8 195 11 2 years Rep 0 20 145 52 1945 RTAA extension Dem 44 7 205 12 3 years Rep 15 21 33 140 1948 RTAA extensiona Dem 23 17 16 142 1 year Rep 47 1 218 5 1949 RTAA extension Dem 47 1 234 6 2 years Rep 15 18 84 63 1951 RTAA extension Dem 39 3 (voice vote) 2 years Rep 5 1 0 1953 RTAA extension Dem (voice vote) 184 11 1 year Rep 180 25 1954 RTAA extension Dem 46 1 156 15 1 year Rep 42 4 133 47 1955 RTAA extension Dem 40 6 190 3 8 3 years Rep 40 8 113 80 1958 RTAA extension Dem 41 6 185 40 4 years Rep 37 11 134 60 1962 Trade Expansion Act (5-year authority) Dem 61 0 215 36 Rep 23 14 85 91 1974 Trade Reform Act (5-year authority) Dem 47 4 115 124 Rep 3 8 1 163 19 aIntroduced the controversial "peril point" provision favored by Republicans (and opposed by Truman in the 1948 campaign) prohibiting tariff reductions that threatened "serious injury" to domestic industries. more than one year at a time.25 By contrast, in 1955 new Democratic majorities in Congress readily voted the Republican president three years of authority.26 There are other empirical and theoretical problems with the anti-logrolling view. It is not at all clear that universalistic (or even partisan) logrolls have been an otherwise 25. Pastor 1980. 26. When it comes to evaluating whether divided government has had positive effects on levels of protection, Lohmann and O'Halloran are hamstrung by reliance on tariff data, and have failed to control for the timing of conclusions to GATT rounds, which often arrive only after many years of bargaining by different administrations. As luck would have it, the most important multiyear rounds of negotiation that reduced tariff rates, the Dillon (1960-611, Kennedy (1962-68), and Tokyo Rounds (1974-79), all happened to conclude in periods of unified government-though the delegation decisions that allowed U.S. participation in two of these cases (Dillon and Tokyo) were made under divided government

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 677 unsolvable problem for tariff legislation in the United States (or elsewhere).Previous protectionist bills in the United States,including Smoot-Hawley,were not passed with the unanimity that one would expect if logrolling was the driving force:the votes for Smoot-Hawley were 49-47 and 245-175 in the Senate and House,respec- tively (see Table Al in the appendix).27 Moreover,the thesis is unable to'explain those cases in which liberalizing bills were passed by legislatures in the absence of delegation.In the United States the major acts passed by the Democrats when in control of government before 1934(the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 and the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913)stand out in this regard.Examples abound in the histories of liberal democracies.28 In addition,the notion that any president,by dint of having a larger constituency, must be less protectionist than the median member of Congress,is hopelessly ahis- torical.Throughout the ninety-six years of the party's existence before 1950,a long list of Republican presidents came out clearly for high tariffs in election cam- paigns,backed the most protectionist of Republican tariff bills in Congress,and even had to veto tariff reductions pushed by congressional Democrats.Indeed,the fact that the presidency was not inherently less protectionist was foremost in the minds of Democrats at the time of the RTAA's passage.Aggrieved at the way Republican presidents had perverted Wilson's beloved Tariff Commission in the 1920s,the Democrats'official party platform in 1928 and 1932 emphasized the need to end "the Executive dominion which has destroyed the usefulness of the present Commission."In 1932 Democratic majorities voted to transfer to Congress the authority to act on the commission's findings,a step that Hoover quickly ve- toed.29 Thus,the anti-logrolling story lacks an explanation not only for partisanship on the trade issue in Congress but also for partisanship on trade in the White House and for changes in party positions on trade over time. 27.This is also true in voting on tariff legislation in many Western democracies over the last two centuries.Votes on trade legislation in the British Parliament throughout the nineteenth century and up to the 1930s,for instance,and in Australian state and federal Parliaments from the 1880s,have demonstrated strong partisanship-often favoring free trade-rather than universal protectionist accommodation.Hiscox 1997. 28.It should not be a mystery as to why.In parliamentary systems,a majority party (or coalition)that forms a government can typically impose strict control over the policy agenda.Even in the U.S.system, studies indicate that majority party leaders exercise considerable control in Congress,and there are good reasons to believe that,if so inclined,they could take steps to head off an undesirable tariff logroll without delegating to the executive branch.Cox and McCubbins 1993. 29.The Wilson administration had experimented with institutional change in 1916 by establishing the Tariff Commission.Chaired by presidential appointees,the commission was charged with the task of gathering information and making recommendations for adjustments in tariff rates(that could be acted on by the president or Congress)on a more "scientific"basis.This step proved vulnerable to Republican manipulation when they won back control in 1920:Harding simply installed protectionist-leaning chairmen to the commission and altered the criteria applied in the commission's recommendations so that it reflected the party's trade platform(tariffs were aimed at equalizing the costs of production between local and foreign producers).Pastor 1980,83

Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 677 unsolvable problem for tariff legislation in the United States (or elsewhere). Previous protectionist bills in the United States, including Smoot-Hawley, were not passed with the unanimity that one would expect if logrolling was the driving force: the votes for Smoot-Hawley were 4947 and 245-175 in the Senate and House, respectively (see Table A1 in the appendi~).~' Moreover, the thesis is unable to explain those cases in which liberalizing bills were passed by legislatures in the absence of delegation. In the United States the major acts passed by the Democrats when in control of government before 1934 (the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 and the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913) stand out in this regard. Examples abound in the histories of liberal demo~racies.~~ In addition, the notion that any president, by dint of having a larger constituency, must be less protectionist than the median member of Congress, is hopelessly ahistorical. Throughout the ninety-six years of the party's existence before 1950, a long list of Republican presidents came out clearly for high tariffs in election campaigns, backed the most protectionist of Republican tariff bills in Congress, and even had to veto tariff reductions pushed by congressional Democrats. Indeed, the fact that the presidency was not inherently less protectionist was foremost in the minds of Democrats at the time of the RTAA's passage. Aggrieved at the way Republican presidents had perverted Wilson's beloved Tariff Commission in the 1920s, the Democrats' official party platform in 1928 and 1932 emphasized the need to end "the Executive dominion which has destroyed the usefulness of the present Commission." In 1932 Democratic majorities voted to transfer to Congress the authority to act on the commission's findings, a step that Hoover quickly vetoed.29 Thus, the anti-logrolling story lacks an explanation not only for partisanship on the trade issue in Congress but also for partisanship on trade in the White House and for changes in party positions on trade over time. 27. This is also true in voting on tariff legislation in many Western democracies over the last two centuries. Votes on trade legislation in the British Parliament throughout the nineteenth century and up to the 1930s, for instance, and in Australian state and federal Parliaments from the 1880s, have demonstrated strong partisanship-often favoring free trade-rather than universal protectionist accommodation. Hiscox 1997. 28. It should not be a mystery as to why. In parliamentary systems, a majority party (or coalition) that forms a government can typically impose strict control over the policy agenda. Even in the U.S. system, studies indicate that majority party leaders exercise considerable control in Congress, and there are good reasons to believe that, if so inclined, they could take steps to head off an undesirable tariff logroll without delegating to the executive branch. Cox and McCubbins 1993. 29. The Wilson administration had experimented with institutional change in 1916 by establishing the Tariff Commission. Chaired by presidential appointees, the commission was charged with the task of gathering information and making recommendations for adjustments in tariff rates (that could be acted on by the president or Congress) on a more "scientific" basis. This step proved vulnerable to Republican manipulation when they won back control in 1920: Harding simply installed protectionist-leaning chairmen to the commission and altered the criteria applied in the commission's recommendations so that it reflected the party's trade platform (tariffs were aimed at equalizing the costs of production between local and foreign producers). Pastor 1980, 83