《国际政治经济学》文献资料（Marxism and Constructivism in Political Economy）International Political Economy in the Age of Open Marxism

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Review of International Political Economy 1:1 Spring 1994 International political economy in the age of open Marxism Andre C.Drainville Assistant Professor,International Political Economy,Laval University ABSTRACT In the last decade or so,transnational historical materialism has fashioned the most ambitious,and perhaps the most politically conscious,expression of critical epistemology in the analysis of global accumulation.It has made an immense contribution to the understanding of the structural power of capital in the world economy,and has been especially important in the analysis of the transnational construction of neo-liberalism,and of the mechanisms by which global imperatives of accumulation have installed themselves as overdetermining principles of political unity. However,though it has claimed the heritage of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis,transnational historical materialism has not seriously addressed questions of political strategy in the world economy,and has not been able to define a political practice adapted to the global social formation that it has defined as its object of analysis. This article proposes both a critical reassessment of the epistemological claims of open Marxism,and an examination of the political strategy it invites. Parochial taxonomies are a curse of intellectual life. Stephen Jay Gould Time's Arrow,Time's Cycle In the last decade or so,the study of international political economy has moved from a peripheral position,'outside the main concerns of any of the established disciplines of politics,economics and international rela- tions'(Tooze,1984:637),to the center stage of social sciences.This passage is clearly inscribed in,and confidently validated by,fashionable academic vernacular.Increasingly,scholars 'do'IPE,faculty members teach,and students learn,the lessons of IPE.The incorporation of the recognizable acronym in the title of a new scientific journal(RIPE,The Review of...)further strengthens the impression that international polit- ical economy has become an acknowledged entity,and that it harbors a coherent intellectual project.At a certain level,that of Gould's tax- CA.C.Drainville 1994 0969-2290 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Review of International Political Economy 1:1 Spring 1994 International political economy in the age of open Marxism Andre C. Drainville Assistant Professor, International Political Economy, Laval University ABSTRACT In the last decade or so, transnational historical materialism has fashioned the most ambitious, and perhaps the most politically conscious, expression of critical epistemology in the analysis of global accumulation. It has made an immense contribution to the understanding of the structural power of capital in the world economy, and has been especially important in the analysis of the transnational construction of neo-liberalism, and of the mechanisms by which global imperatives of accumulation have installed themselves as overdetermining principles of political unity. However, though it has claimed the heritage of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis, transnational historical materialism has not seriously addressed questions of political strategy in the world economy, and has not been able to define a political practice adapted to the global social formation that it has defined as its object of analysis. This article proposes both a critical reassessment of the epistemological claims of open Marxism, and an examination of the political strategy it invites. Parochial taxonomies are a curse of intellectual life. Stephen Jay Gould Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle In the last decade or so, the study of international political economy has moved from a peripheral position, 'outside the main concerns of any of the established disciplines of politics, economics and international relations' (Tooze, 1984: 637), to the center stage of social sciences. This passage is clearly inscribed in, and confidently validated by, fashionable academic vernacular. Increasingly, scholars 'do' IPE, faculty members teach, and students learn, the lessons of IPE. The incorporation of the recognizable acronym in the title of a new scientific journal (RIPE, The Review of. . .) further strengthens the impression that international political economy has become an acknowledged entity, and that it harbors a coherent intellectual project. At a certain level, that of Gould's tax- ( A.C. Drainville 1994 0969-2290 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES onomies,this apparent coherence is misleading.IPE has not risen much above somewhat parochial disputes,where'new'and 'orthodox'IPEs are compared and contrasted(Murphy and Tooze,1991),and the perimeters of schools of analysis and 'islands of theory'are defined (Olson and Groom,1991).At another level,however,where epistemological ques- tions regarding the world economy as an object of analysis are situated, this impression of coherence is appropriate.Indeed,from(complex and neo)realism to the internationalization of capital approach(Palloix,1975; Bina and Yaghmaian,1991)and the postmodern rediscovery of the world economy(Linklater,1990),contemporary analyses share a growing preoc- cupation with the world economy as a separate realm of power,a space unto itself (Drainville,1992). Nowhere is this preoccupation better captured,or more self- consciously cultivated,than in the writings of what Stephen Gill has labeled 'transnational historical materialism'(Gill,1990a:46),that takes as its starting point Robert Cox's invitation to 'stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and ask how that order came about'(Cox, 1981/85).'From Cox's revision of international relations theory,helped along the way by Gramsci's Prison Notebook(Cox,1983),transnational historical materialism has blossomed into a constituted Gramscian school of analysis,an island of theory,where theoretical questions have given way to a quest for Gramscian applications(Tooze,1990),and where Gramsci himself has become a quotable authority on even the most mundane matters,for example,on skepticism towards common sense (Murphy and Tooze,1991:11).Gramscian transnational historical mater- ialism has spawned a fluid network of academics-a 'cluster of scholars working in ways that addresses some of the questions raised and posed in Gramscian terms'(Gill,1991b:52);introductory and advanced refer- ence manuals(Gill and Law,1988:Gill,1993)as well as original historical analyses(Van der Pijl,1984;Cox,1987;Gill,1990a;Overbeek,1990).It has established some institutional points of convergence (the United Na- tions University,for example [Cox,1991a]),and now an original publica- tion,RIPE,that proposed in its Manifesto to be the voice of the 'invisible college of International Political Economy.' The importance of Gramscian transnational historical materialism does not stem from its emergence as a school of analysis to be put alongside neo-functionalist and world-systems analyses in the picture gallery of IPE.Rather it comes from its position as the most ambitious, and perhaps the most politically conscious,expression of critical epis- temology in the analysis of global accumulation.As an epistemology, Gramscian transnational historical materialism exists as open Marxism in the tradition of Vico,Thompson,Braudel and Gramsci(Gill,1990b: 374);'a Marxism which reasons historically and seeks to explain,as well as to promote,changes in social relations'(Cox,1985:214).In the study of 106 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES onomies, this apparent coherence is misleading. IPE has not risen much above somewhat parochial disputes, where 'new' and 'orthodox' IPEs are compared and contrasted (Murphy and Tooze, 1991), and the perimeters of schools of analysis and 'islands of theory' are defined (Olson and Groom, 1991). At another level, however, where epistemological questions regarding the world economy as an object of analysis are situated, this impression of coherence is appropriate. Indeed, from (complex and neo) realism to the internationalization of capital approach (Palloix, 1975; Bina and Yaghmaian, 1991) and the postmodern rediscovery of the world economy (Linklater, 1990), contemporary analyses share a growing preoccupation with the world economy as a separate realm of power, a space unto itself (Drainville, 1992). Nowhere is this preoccupation better captured, or more selfconsciously cultivated, than in the writings of what Stephen Gill has labeled 'transnational historical materialism' (Gill, 1990a: 46), that takes as its starting point Robert Cox's invitation to 'stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and ask how that order came about' (Cox, 1981/85).' From Cox's revision of international relations theory, helped along the way by Gramsci's Prison Notebook (Cox, 1983), transnational historical materialism has blossomed into a constituted Gramscian school of analysis, an island of theory, where theoretical questions have given way to a quest for Gramscian applications (Tooze, 1990), and where Gramsci himself has become a quotable authority on even the most mundane matters, for example, on skepticism towards common sense (Murphy and Tooze, 1991: 11). Gramscian transnational historical materialism has spawned a fluid network of academics - a 'cluster of scholars working in ways that addresses some of the questions raised and posed in Gramscian terms' (Gill, 1991b: 52); introductory and advanced reference manuals (Gill and Law, 1988: Gill, 1993) as well as original historical analyses (Van der Pijl, 1984; Cox, 1987; Gill, 1990a; Overbeek, 1990). It has established some institutional points of convergence (the United Nations University, for example [Cox, 1991a]), and now an original publication, RIPE, that proposed in its Manifesto to be the voice of the 'invisible college of International Political Economy.' The importance of Gramscian transnational historical materialism does not stem from its emergence as a school of analysis to be put alongside neo-functionalist and world-systems analyses in the picture gallery of IPE. Rather it comes from its position as the most ambitious, and perhaps the most politically conscious, expression of critical epistemology in the analysis of global accumulation. As an epistemology, Gramscian transnational historical materialism exists as open Marxism2 in the tradition of Vico, Thompson, Braudel and Gramsci (Gill, 1990b: 374); 'a Marxism which reasons historically and seeks to explain, as well as to promote, changes in social relations' (Cox, 1985: 214). In the study of 106 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM the world economy,open Marxism proposes to go beyond problem- solving realism (Cox,1985),to rejuvenate and challenge the traditional agenda of IPE (Murphy and Tooze,1991),to move beyond 'marxist fundamentalism,'and to articulate a sweeping general critique of positi- vist,mechanical,and economistic perspectives within Marxism and other traditions'(Gill,1991b:52,75).For the politics of social forces in the world economy,open Marxism counsels a war of position,beginning with 'the long,laborious effort to build new historic blocs within national boundaries'(Cox,1983:174),and directed to the creation of 'alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society and building bridges between workers and other subor- dinate classes'(p.165). These ambitions and this consciousness provide the motivation for this commentary.Thus far,neither the epistemological claims of open Marxism,nor the defensive political posture it counsels,has been the object of critical attention.In view of the importance of open Marxism in theorizing global accumulation in a critical decade of restructuring,this neglect is both surprising and politically dangerous. OPEN MARXISM AND THE STUDY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY Just as Braudel retained from Marx a certain nostalgia for social material- ism,3 open Marxism gives analytical priority to the 'real concrete'of global accumulation:to production as a social venture involving classes as historically bound social forces (Cox,1987:x-xii).The reference to Fernand Braudel,and by association to the broad Marxism of Annales historians'is,of course,not accidental.From Braudel,open Marxism has borrowed images(the nebuleuse to describe political power in the world economy,for example [Cox,1992:30;Braudel,1979b:83]),a certain artisanal approach to historical research(where Braudel 'puts the ship of capitalism to sea',Cox speaks of a 'tool kit of historical investigation [Cox,1987:4]),a concern for synchronicity and longue duree(Gill,1991a: 275-8),and a desire for total,interdisciplinary,history(Cox,1981:Over- beek,1990:17). The Braudelian parentage should not be given too much meaning.It is, after all,shared to a degree by all historical investigation of the world economy,from world system analysis broadly understood(Wallerstein, 1980:53)to the reformist world order model project(Olson and Groom, 1991:202-3).References to Braudel's work do,however,serve as a good point of entry into an analysis of the historicism of open Marxism and of its insistence on global accumulation as the specific social practice of identifiable agents. In the analysis of the world economy,open Marxism eschews mechan- ical structuralism,and proposes to investigate structures as concrete and 107 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM the world economy, open Marxism proposes to go beyond problemsolving realism (Cox, 1985), to rejuvenate and challenge the traditional agenda of IPE (Murphy and Tooze, 1991), to move beyond 'marxist fundamentalism,' and to articulate a sweeping 'general critique of positivist, mechanical, and economistic perspectives within Marxism and other traditions' (Gill, 1991b: 52, 75). For the politics of social forces in the world economy, open Marxism counsels a war of position, beginning with 'the long, laborious effort to build new historic blocs within national boundaries' (Cox, 1983: 174), and directed to the creation of 'alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society and building bridges between workers and other subordinate classes' (p.165). These ambitions and this consciousness provide the motivation for this commentary. Thus far, neither the epistemological claims of open Marxism, nor the defensive political posture it counsels, has been the object of critical attention. In view of the importance of open Marxism in theorizing global accumulation in a critical decade of restructuring, this neglect is both surprising and politically dangerous. OPEN MARXISM AND THE STUDY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY Just as Braudel retained from Marx a certain nostalgia for social materialism,3 open Marxism gives analytical priority to the 'real concrete' of global accumulation: to production as a social venture involving classes as historically bound social forces (Cox, 1987: x-xii). The reference to Fernand Braudel, and by association to the broad Marxism of Annales historians4 is, of course, not accidental. From Braudel, open Marxism has borrowed images (the nebuleuse to describe political power in the world economy, for example [Cox, 1992: 30; Braudel, 1979b: 83]), a certain artisanal approach to historical research (where Braudel 'puts the ship of capitalism to sea', Cox speaks of a 'tool kit of historical investigation' [Cox, 1987: 4]), a concern for synchronicity and longue dure'e (Gill, 1991a: 275-8), and a desire for total, interdisciplinary, history (Cox, 1981: Overbeek, 1990: 17). The Braudelian parentage should not be given too much meaning. It is, after all, shared to a degree by all historical investigation of the world economy, from world system analysis broadly understood (Wallerstein, 1980: 53) to the reformist world order model project (Olson and Groom, 1991: 202-3). References to Braudel's work do, however, serve as a good point of entry into an analysis of the historicism of open Marxism and of its insistence on global accumulation as the specific social practice of identifiable agents. In the analysis of the world economy, open Marxism eschews mechanical structuralism, and proposes to investigate structures as concrete and 107 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES historically specific relationships(Cox,1987:1).A decade and a half after E.P.Thompson's celebrated attack on philosophical Marxism(1978b: 193-401 for example),the specter of Althusserian structural Marxism is raised again,this time in the company of the phantom of Poulantzas (Cox,1981/85:214;Gill,1991b:55).It is an association that even Thompson,in the most polemic passages of The Poverty of Theory,had been too cautious to propose(1978b:196). For open Marxism,agents are bearers of structures.Of course,not all agents bear a similar burden,and not all historical relationships are equally revealing of structures at work.As both Gramsci and Braudel emphasized,some actors occupy a privileged position,which makes their historical practice especially meaningful.For Gramsci,elites are interpreters of structures(Gramsci,1971:335),organizers of society(p.5). Intellectuals come equipped with an 'awareness of [their]own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields'(p.5); and political parties are particularly meaningful points of mobilization.3 For Braudel,world capitalism is an elite process: le capitalisme est un phenomene de superstructure,c'est un phe- nomene de minorite....Chaque fois que l'on considere de facon objective ce que j'appelle le capitalisme actif,on est tres surpris par le nombre restreint des personnes qui sont en jeu. (Braudel,1985:93-4) In Braudel's analysis,the essential mechanisms of capital accumulation are located above the murky and hesitant world of peasant markets.The realm of the Fuggers and the Medicis is le domaine par excellence du capitalisme.Sans [eux],celui-ci est impensable;il s'y loge,il y prospere' (Braudel,1979:8). Similarly,open Marxism conceptualizes global accumulation as a practice of the bourgeoisie,and the world economy as a society of capitalists.Kees Van der Pijl defines class formation in the world econ- omy exclusively in bourgeois terms.It is,of course,a process constrained by the exigencies of reproduction within national social formations,but it exists very much above and beyond the realm of social forces(Van der Pijl,1979).Stephen Gill writes of 'political gods at the center of the system'(Gill,1991b:64).Robert Cox,recalling Polanyi's emphasis on haute finance as the social linchpin of the 100 Years'Peace,speaks of bourgeois conquerants,and of 'those who control the big corporations operating on a world scale'(Cox,1987:358).In this spirit,what Braudel called the 'micro-sociologie des elites'(Braudel,1969:71),and what Gill termed the analysis of the process of elite familiarization and fraterniza- tion,mutual education and,broadly speaking,networking'(Gill,1990a: 122),become most revealing.Through transnational networks of interests 108 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES historically specific relationships (Cox, 1987: 1). A decade and a half after E.P. Thompson's celebrated attack on philosophical Marxism (1978b: 193-401 for example), the specter of Althusserian structural Marxism is raised again, this time in the company of the phantom of Poulantzas (Cox, 1981/85: 214; Gill, 1991b: 55). It is an association that even Thompson, in the most polemic passages of The Poverty of Theory, had been too cautious to propose (1978b: 196). For open Marxism, agents are bearers of structures. Of course, not all agents bear a similar burden, and not all historical relationships are equally revealing of structures at work. As both Gramsci and Braudel emphasized, some actors occupy a privileged position, which makes their historical practice especially meaningful. For Gramsci, elites are interpreters of structures (Gramsci, 1971: 335), organizers of society (p. 5). Intellectuals come equipped with an 'awareness of [their] own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields' (p. 5); and political parties are particularly meaningful points of mobilization.5 For Braudel, world capitalism is an elite process: le capitalisme est un phenomene de superstructure, c'est un phenomene de minorite.... Chaque fois que l'on considere de facon objective ce que j'appelle le capitalisme actif, on est tres surpris par le nombre restreint des personnes qui sont en jeu. (Braudel, 1985: 93-4) In Braudel's analysis, the essential mechanisms of capital accumulation are located above the murky and hesitant world of peasant markets. The realm of the Fuggers and the Medicis is 'le domaine par excellence du capitalisme. Sans [eux], celui-ci est impensable; il s'y loge, il y prospere' (Braudel, 1979: 8). Similarly, open Marxism conceptualizes global accumulation as a practice of the bourgeoisie, and the world economy as a society of capitalists. Kees Van der Pijl defines class formation in the world economy exclusively in bourgeois terms. It is, of course, a process constrained by the exigencies of reproduction within national social formations, but it exists very much above and beyond the realm of social forces (Van der Pijl, 1979). Stephen Gill writes of 'political gods at the center of the system' (Gill, 1991b: 64). Robert Cox, recalling Polanyi's emphasis on haute finance as the social linchpin of the 100 Years' Peace, speaks of bourgeois conquerants, and of 'those who control the big corporations operating on a world scale' (Cox, 1987: 358). In this spirit, what Braudel called the 'micro-sociologie des elites' (Braudel, 1969: 71), and what Gill termed the analysis of the 'process of elite familiarization and fraternization, mutual education and, broadly speaking, networking' (Gill, 1990a: 122), become most revealing. Through transnational networks of interests 108 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM and identities(Gill,1991a:296),the exigencies and possibilities of capital accumulation on a global scale are exposed. For open Marxism,elite cybernetics is useful in revealing the essential history made behind the backs of key actors.It also exposes the active making of history.Indeed,in the writings of open Marxism,transna- tional elites not only share a particularly meaningful position in the structures of accumulation,they are also structurally literate.They read structural dynamics,constraints and imperatives,and invent fitting political projects.The assumption of elite literacy takes as its starting point Gramsci's notion of intellectuals as 'an organic category of every fundamental social group'equipped with a special function of cohesion (Gramsci,1971:15).For Stephen Gill,international organizations fulfil the function of organic intellectuals of the world economy:'the TC's [Trilateral Commission]perspective to a large extent reflects the interests and world-view of the more dynamic and internationally mobile forms of capital,as well as the interests of the liberal "internationalist"elements within the state bureaucracies of the major capitalist states'(Gill,1986: 212).Again:'trilateralism can be defined as the project of developing an organic...alliance between the major capitalist states,with the aim of promoting...a stable form of world order which is congenial to their dominant interests'(Gill,1990a:1).Global elites are'vanguard forces'of internationalization (Gill et al.,1992:10).Similarly,for Cox the 'transna- tional managerial class'is not only the contemporary expression of bourgeois conquerants,it also a class 'both in itself and for itself'(Cox, 1985:234). Particularly revealing of the significance given by open Marxism to the structural literacy of elites is the idea of 'comprehensive concepts of control'developed at the University of Amsterdam,an institutional center of transnational historical materialism (Burnham,1991:87).De- fined by Henk Overbeek as ..coherent formulations of the 'general interest'which transcends narrowly defined fractional interests and which combine mutually compatible strategies in the field of labour relations,socio- economic policy and foreign policy on the basis of a class compromise. (Overbeek,1990:26,178) Concepts of controls are hegemonical strategies reflecting an organic sense of direction.In the postwar period,two such transcendent for- mulas have shaped the parameters of accumulation.First,the Keynesian concept of control,articulated in institutions such as the US Council on Foreign Relations,and projected onto western Europe from the American Fordist heartland(Van der Pijl,1989:9-13).Second,after the crisis of the mid-1970s,a neo-liberal concept of control emerged to guide global 109 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM and identities (Gill, 1991a: 296), the exigencies and possibilities of capital accumulation on a global scale are exposed. For open Marxism, elite cybernetics is useful in revealing the essential history made behind the backs of key actors. It also exposes the active making of history. Indeed, in the writings of open Marxism, transnational elites not only share a particularly meaningful position in the structures of accumulation, they are also structurally literate. They read structural dynamics, constraints and imperatives, and invent fitting political projects. The assumption of elite literacy takes as its starting point Gramsci's notion of intellectuals as 'an organic category of every fundamental social group' equipped with a special function of cohesion (Gramsci, 1971: 15). For Stephen Gill, international organizations fulfil the function of organic intellectuals of the world economy: 'the TC's [Trilateral Commission] perspective to a large extent reflects the interests and world-view of the more dynamic and internationally mobile forms of capital, as well as the interests of the liberal "internationalist" elements within the state bureaucracies of the major capitalist states' (Gill, 1986: 212). Again: 'trilateralism can be defined as the project of developing an organic . . . alliance between the major capitalist states, with the aim of promoting ... a stable form of world order which is congenial to their dominant interests' (Gill, 1990a: 1). Global elites are 'vanguard forces' of internationalization (Gill et al., 1992: 10). Similarly, for Cox the 'transnational managerial class' is not only the contemporary expression of bourgeois conque6rants, it also a class 'both in itself and for itself' (Cox, 1985: 234). Particularly revealing of the significance given by open Marxism to the structural literacy of elites is the idea of 'comprehensive concepts of control' developed at the University of Amsterdam, an institutional center of transnational historical materialism (Burnham, 1991: 87). Defined by Henk Overbeek as ... coherent formulations of the 'general interest' which transcends narrowly defined fractional interests and which combine mutually compatible strategies in the field of labour relations, socioeconomic policy and foreign policy on the basis of a class compromise. (Overbeek, 1990: 26, 178) Concepts of controls are hegemonical strategies reflecting an organic sense of direction. In the postwar period, two such transcendent formulas have shaped the parameters of accumulation. First, the Keynesian concept of control, articulated in institutions such as the US Council on Foreign Relations, and projected onto western Europe from the American Fordist heartland (Van der Pijl, 1989: 9-13). Second, after the crisis of the mid-1970s, a neo-liberal concept of control emerged to guide global 109 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES restructuring;a concept of control centered on an idealized notion of the market,'in which progress is defined in terms of the subordination of labor to capital,and the state role is limited to a Lockean night watch'(p. 30).Neo-liberalism was first applied in Pinochet's Chile,and then in the United States,through Volcker's Federal Reserve Bank,and then in the rest of the world (p.30).Both Keynesianism and neo-liberalism con- structed a general interest our of the particular interest of the more innovative and rapidly expanding fractions of capital-money capital in the case of neo-liberalism(p.30).Both reflect a political dynamic centered on structurally cognizant global elites. Much like the crisis of the postwar order brought Braudel's interest in the longue duree('a l'abris des accidents,des conjonctures,des ruptures (1969:72])to the forefront of historical analysis,s the juncture of restruc- turing in the 1980s has increased the relevance of open Marxism's preoccupation with the world economy as a planned and organized process(Gill,1986:215),and of its attempt to discover universal norms shaping civil society on behalf of dominant fractions of capital(Cox, 1983:172).Institutionally oriented modes of analysis have not uncovered any coherence in the ruins of the postwar order,and propose little more than a reinvention of acquired concepts(speaking of post-Fordism,post- Cold War and post-Bretton Woods).Open Marxism,more fluid and more critically preoccupied with power,as it is constituted differently in different historical periods,and therefore better able to move beyond the understanding of class politics as a strictly national phenomenon(Wal- lerstein,1980:61),has been able to rise above the disorder of the moment of restructuring to capture the transnational nature of the contemporary recomposition of political power.When Paul Volcker spoke of 'an excep- tionally clear recognition [that]we are going to have to move to much closer coordination and cooperation'(quoted in Gill,1990a:121),and the BIS noted retrospectively that[in]many countries,explaining monetary policy decisions in terms of external constraints has been helpful in securing public acceptance',(BIS,Annual Report 1992:124),open Marx- ism was well equipped to look beyond the mandatory expression of solidarity at the closing of a G7meeting,and the BIS's self-laudation,and discern in this discourse indications of a real shift in power relationships. Furthermore,the sense of purpose of open Marxism,and its supple, somewhat craftsman-like,approach to historical research has allowed it to garner insights from a wide assortment of sources(published docu- ments of public and private international organizations,political dis- courses,interviews,daily newspapers,specialized journals),and to put a remarkable variety of intellectual traditions(critical sociology,liberal economics,social history)to the task of conceptualizing transnational power.Stephen Gill's claim that'the Gramscian approach can be said to be more comprehensive since it allows for a more consistent theorization 110 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES restructuring; a concept of control centered on an idealized notion of the market, 'in which progress is defined in terms of the subordination of labor to capital, and the state role is limited to a Lockean night watch' (p. 30). Neo-liberalism was first applied in Pinochet's Chile, and then in the United States, through Volcker's Federal Reserve Bank, and then in the rest of the world (p. 30). Both Keynesianism and neo-liberalism constructed a general interest our of the particular interest of the more innovative and rapidly expanding fractions of capital - money capital in the case of neo-liberalism (p. 30). Both reflect a political dynamic centered on structurally cognizant global elites. Much like the crisis of the postwar order brought Braudel's interest in the longue duree ('a l'abris des accidents, des conjonctures, des ruptures' [1969:72]) to the forefront of historical analysis,6 the juncture of restructuring in the 1980s has increased the relevance of open Marxism's preoccupation with the world economy as a planned and organized process (Gill, 1986: 215), and of its attempt to discover universal norms shaping civil society on behalf of dominant fractions of capital (Cox, 1983: 172). Institutionally oriented modes of analysis have not uncovered any coherence in the ruins of the postwar order, and propose little more than a reinvention of acquired concepts (speaking of post-Fordism, postCold War and post-Bretton Woods). Open Marxism, more fluid and more critically preoccupied with power, as it is constituted differently in different historical periods, and therefore better able to move beyond the understanding of class politics as a strictly national phenomenon (Wallerstein, 1980: 61), has been able to rise above the disorder of the moment of restructuring to capture the transnational nature of the contemporary recomposition of political power. When Paul Volcker spoke of 'an exceptionally clear recognition [that] we are going to have to move to much closer coordination and cooperation' (quoted in Gill, 1990a: 121), and the BIS noted retrospectively that '[in] many countries, explaining monetary policy decisions in terms of external constraints has been helpful in securing public acceptance', (BIS, Annual Report 1992: 124), open Marxism was well equipped to look beyond the mandatory expression of solidarity at the closing of a G7 meeting, and the BIS's self-laudation, and discern in this discourse indications of a real shift in power relationships. Furthermore, the sense of purpose of open Marxism, and its supple, somewhat craftsman-like, approach to historical research has allowed it to garner insights from a wide assortment of sources (published documents of public and private international organizations, political discourses, interviews, daily newspapers, specialized journals), and to put a remarkable variety of intellectual traditions (critical sociology, liberal economics, social history) to the task of conceptualizing transnational power. Stephen Gill's claim that 'the Gramscian approach can be said to be more comprehensive since it allows for a more consistent theorization 110 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM and explanation of changes in the contemporary global political econ- omy'(Gill,1990a:230),is accurate in this respect. However,the analytical litheness of open Marxism comes at a certain price,in terms of both the material picture it paints,and the politics it counsels.As a framework for the study of the present moment,the writings of open Marxism base their fluid analysis of the transnational construction of neo-liberalism on a problematic understanding of classes and fractions of classes in the world economy.Moreover,open Marxism's theorization of the articulation between accumulation and politics in the world economy is underdeveloped,and leads to an exaggerated view of the coherence of neo-liberalism.The politics of open Marxism,con- strained by assumptions of an organic unity of global elites,and the political cogency of transnational concepts of control,leaves few pos- sibilities for political organization. Neo-liberalism and transnational capital In open Marxism,political multilateralism is an extrapolation of eco- nomic multilateralism(Cox,1991a:13-14),and restructuring is under- stood as the continuation in the world of political strategy of the exigencies of capital,as read and understood by global elites.The neo- liberal concept of control is presented as the global political project of transnationalized money capital (Van der Pijl,1988,1989;Overbeek, 1990).Just as Fordism had organized the subordination of banking and rentier capital to productive capital,neo-liberalism installs the long-term interest of transnational money-capital as the general interest of capital (Carroll,1989).In the same vein,Gill speaks of neo-constitutionalism ('the move towards the construction of legal and constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability')as the legal framework of transnationalized fractions of capital(Gill,1992). Fraction-specific analyses on accumulation are as old as Marx's distinc- tions between the Bourbons and the Orleanistes in the French Legislative Assembly(Marx,1977),and as familiar as turn-of-the-century populist assaults on the power of 'international gang[s]of financial ghouls and nations-scuttlers'(Bottomley,1926).In the first instance,they always present a problem of historical investigation (Burnham,1991;Clarke, 1978).Fractions of capital-what Adam Smith called the 'different branches of the general stock of capital'(Smith,1924:250-93)-do not exist in general,and their analysis always needs to take concrete histor- ical junctures into account.In particular,it must distinguish between cliques of capital,united by a conjuncturally contingent support for particular policies(monetarism,for example);a fraction of capital,whose common material interests are incorporated in a multilayered strategy on 111 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM and explanation of changes in the contemporary global political economy' (Gill, 1990a: 230), is accurate in this respect. However, the analytical litheness of open Marxism comes at a certain price, in terms of both the material picture it paints, and the politics it counsels. As a framework for the study of the present moment, the writings of open Marxism base their fluid analysis of the transnational construction of neo-liberalism on a problematic understanding of classes and fractions of classes in the world economy. Moreover, open Marxism's theorization of the articulation between accumulation and politics in the world economy is underdeveloped, and leads to an exaggerated view of the coherence of neo-liberalism. The politics of open Marxism, constrained by assumptions of an organic unity of global elites, and the political cogency of transnational concepts of control, leaves few possibilities for political organization. Neo-liberalism and transnational capital In open Marxism, political multilateralism is an extrapolation of economic multilateralism (Cox, 1991a: 13-14), and restructuring is understood as the continuation in the world of political strategy of the exigencies of capital, as read and understood by global elites. The neoliberal concept of control is presented as the global political project of transnationalized money capital (Van der Pijl, 1988, 1989; Overbeek, 1990). Just as Fordism had organized the subordination of banking and rentier capital to productive capital, neo-liberalism installs the long-term interest of transnational money-capital as the general interest of capital (Carroll, 1989). In the same vein, Gill speaks of neo-constitutionalism ('the move towards the construction of legal and constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability') as the legal framework of transnationalized fractions of capital (Gill, 1992). Fraction-specific analyses on accumulation are as old as Marx's distinctions between the Bourbons and the Orl6anistes in the French Legislative Assembly (Marx, 1977), and as familiar as turn-of-the-century populist assaults on the power of 'international gang[s] of financial ghouls and nations-scuttlers' (Bottomley, 1926). In the first instance, they always present a problem of historical investigation (Burnham, 1991; Clarke, 1978). Fractions of capital - what Adam Smith called the 'different branches of the general stock of capital' (Smith, 1924: 250-93) - do not exist in general, and their analysis always needs to take concrete historical junctures into account. In particular, it must distinguish between cliques of capital, united by a conjuncturally contingent support for particular policies (monetarism, for example); a fraction of capital, whose common material interests are incorporated in a multilayered strategy on 111 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES the basis of which social compromises are struck and different notions of the general interest are contested;and a genuine collective capital,an historic bloc tied by broad material interests nurtured by a regime of regulation and expressed in particular instances and in different state policies.? From the outset,the writings of open Marxism were badly equipped to distinguish between cliques and fractions of capital.As we saw,Cox's starting point is an experiential,historically contingent definition of classes and fractions of classes: [classes]are historical realities produced by collective experience. They originated in production in previous history but transcended the specific activity of production to become human aggregates, collective ways of feeling and of acting. (Cox,1987:18) This historicism makes fractions of classes very difficult beasts to cap- ture.Kees Van der Pijl,for example,who centers his analysis of neo- liberalism on the political interest of transnationalized money capital, variously identifies fractions with references to investment strategies ('American portfolio capital',1979:5),position in the accumulation process('finance capital',p.5),business structures('the Dresdner Bank group,Thyssen',p.10),relationship with wagelabor(p.11)and political affiliations('ruling coalitions'and political parties as stands-in for frac- tions,pp.11-12).In the end,Van der Pijl has to settle for a very uncertain understanding of fractions as'ideal-type frames of references ..van- tage points from which historically specific...strategies...were developed'(1984:9).When combined with a Braudelian elite-centered micro-sociology,this fractionalization of capital on the basis of political vantage points runs the risk of overemphasizing the cohesion of a fraction on the basis of political alliances and shared institutional points of contact.This risk is evident in the way in which open Marxism has conceptualized international organizations and private transnational bodies,new political forms accompanying the internationalization of states and political authority.While states in national social formations are conceptualized as sites of class struggles(Cox,1987:19)in a manner reminiscent of Poulantzas's understanding of state as l'economique condense'(Poulantzas,1971:46),transnational political structures appear to open Marxism as an institutional manifestation of the unity of transna- tional fraction of capital (Gill,1991b for example),the voice of the transnational bloc of neo-liberal forcs leading the restructuring process, across a wide range of countries'(Gill et al.,1992:24),and a seat for the vanguard of the ruling class (Van der Pijl,1989:30). Open Marxism proposes that transnational structures of political au- thority 'represent'capital in the broad,Poulantzasian,sense of the term 112 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ARTICLES the basis of which social compromises are struck and different notions of the general interest are contested; and a genuine collective capital, an historic bloc tied by broad material interests nurtured by a regime of regulation and expressed in particular instances and in different state policies.7 From the outset, the writings of open Marxism were badly equipped to distinguish between cliques and fractions of capital. As we saw, Cox's starting point is an experiential, historically contingent definition of classes and fractions of classes: [classes] are historical realities produced by collective experience. They originated in production in previous history but transcended the specific activity of production to become human aggregates, collective ways of feeling and of acting. (Cox, 1987: 18) This historicism makes fractions of classes very difficult beasts to capture. Kees Van der Pijl, for example, who centers his analysis of neoliberalism on the political interest of transnationalized money capital, variously identifies fractions with references to investment strategies ('American portfolio capital', 1979: 5), position in the accumulation process ('finance capital', p. 5), business structures ('the Dresdner Bank group', 'Thyssen', p. 10), relationship with wage labor (p. 11) and political affiliations ('ruling coalitions' and political parties as stands-in for fractions, pp. 11-12). In the end, Van der Pijl has to settle for a very uncertain understanding of fractions as 'ideal-type frames of references . . . vantage points from which historically specific ... strategies ... were developed' (1984: 9). When combined with a Braudelian elite-centered micro-sociology, this fractionalization of capital on the basis of political vantage points runs the risk of overemphasizing the cohesion of a fraction on the basis of political alliances and shared institutional points of contact. This risk is evident in the way in which open Marxism has conceptualized international organizations and private transnational bodies, new political forms accompanying the internationalization of states and political authority. While states in national social formations are conceptualized as sites of class struggles (Cox, 1987: 19) in a manner reminiscent of Poulantzas's understanding of state as 'l'economique condense' (Poulantzas, 1971: 46), transnational political structures appear to open Marxism as an institutional manifestation of the unity of transnational fraction of capital (Gill, 1991b for example), the voice of the 'transnational bloc of neo-liberal forcs leading the restructuring process, across a wide range of countries' (Gill et al., 1992: 24), and a seat for the vanguard of the ruling class (Van der Pijl, 1989: 30). Open Marxism proposes that transnational structures of political authority 'represent' capital in the broad, Poulantzasian, sense of the term. 112 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM That is to say,they not only speak on behalf of dominant factions,but also assist in the construction of the long-term interest of capital by providing a relatively autonomous 'reading'of the conditions of accumulation.This is what J.Marcus Fleming of the International Monetary Fund called the IMF's 'system of guidance'(Fleming,1975:276).In this spirit,open Marxism gives much meaning to great concords such as the Plaza and Louvres Agreements of the mid-1980s,which are seen as an expression of a politically constructed general interest (Gill and Law,1988:177-8). Episodes like Thatcherism are captured unambiguously as national manifestations of global strategies(Overbeek,1990:141-75).In the East and the West,restructuring is 'global perestroika',a revolution from above (Cox,1992:26). Yet,the process whereby systems of guidance and codes of discipline are constructed,the critical 'reading'on which so much depends,is not at all problematized in open Marxism.Rather,the political picture pre- sented by open Marxism reflects Christian Palloix's analysis of the unity of the circuits of social capital in the world economy(Van der Pijl,1989; Palloix,1975).Just as Palloix wrote of states as national landing points for international reproduction(Palloix,1977:198),open Marxism speaks of transnational strategies'applied'and 'translated'nationally(Van der Pijl, 1989:4,7),and of national politics as'contained'within parameters set by an elite reading of the conditions of accumulation(Gill et al.,1992:16). In the end,open Marxism is the political companion that Cox had sought(Cox,1981a:73)to the CEREM's study of the transnationalization of monetary and financial circuits(Michalet,1979).The political unity of transnational fractions of capital is taken as a given,and structural literacy ('clairvoyance'in Gramsci's terminology,[1971:113],and 'highly developed consciousness'for Gill [1900a:89])as the glue holding trans- national capital together.The internationalization of the state(Cox,1985: 230-3),and of political authority (Gill and Law,1988:90-1),are repres- ented as literal political expressions of the globalization of production and finance(Gill et al.,1992:8),and the unproblematized 'sociological corollary to the internationalization of capital'(Gill,1990a:37).In this context,states are but 'conduits between world-economy trends and the domestic economy...agencies to promote the carrying out of tasks they had no part in deciding'with the unambiguous task of adapting national economies to 'the perceived exigencies of the world economy'(Cox, 1991b:337). The distinction between cliques and fractions of capital can only serve as a starting point to historical analysis,having little consequence itself. However,the failure to distinguish from the start between structurally rooted fraction of capital and political cliques and alliances,is revealing of open Marxism's apriorism.The transnational unity of a neo-liberal 113 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon,01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE AGE OF OPEN MARXISM That is to say, they not only speak on behalf of dominant factions, but also assist in the construction of the long-term interest of capital by providing a relatively autonomous 'reading' of the conditions of accumulation. This is what J. Marcus Fleming of the International Monetary Fund called the IMF's 'system of guidance' (Fleming, 1975: 276). In this spirit, open Marxism gives much meaning to great concords such as the Plaza and Louvres Agreements of the mid-1980s, which are seen as an expression of a politically constructed general interest (Gill and Law, 1988: 177-8). Episodes like Thatcherism are captured unambiguously as national manifestations of global strategies (Overbeek, 1990: 141-75). In the East and the West, restructuring is 'global perestroika', a revolution from above (Cox, 1992: 26). Yet, the process whereby systems of guidance and codes of discipline are constructed, the critical 'reading' on which so much depends, is not at all problematized in open Marxism. Rather, the political picture presented by open Marxism reflects Christian Palloix's analysis of the unity of the circuits of social capital in the world economy (Van der Pijl, 1989; Palloix, 1975). Just as Palloix wrote of states as national landing points for international reproduction (Palloix, 1977: 198), open Marxism speaks of transnational strategies 'applied' and 'translated' nationally (Van der Pijl, 1989: 4,7), and of national politics as 'contained' within parameters set by an elite reading of the conditions of accumulation (Gill et al., 1992: 16). In the end, open Marxism is the political companion that Cox had sought (Cox, 1981a: 73) to the CEREM's study of the transnationalization of monetary and financial circuits (Michalet, 1979).8 The political unity of transnational fractions of capital is taken as a given, and structural literacy ('clairvoyance' in Gramsci's terminology, [1971: 113], and 'highly developed consciousness' for Gill [1900a: 89]) as the glue holding transnational capital together. The internationalization of the state (Cox, 1985: 230-3), and of political authority (Gill and Law, 1988: 90-1), are represented as literal political expressions of the globalization of production and finance (Gill et al., 1992: 8), and the unproblematized 'sociological corollary to the internationalization of capital' (Gill, 1990a: 37). In this context, states are but 'conduits between world-economy trends and the domestic economy . .. agencies to promote the carrying out of tasks they had no part in deciding' with the unambiguous task of adapting national economies to 'the perceived exigencies of the world economy' (Cox, 1991b: 337). The distinction between cliques and fractions of capital can only serve as a starting point to historical analysis, having little consequence itself. However, the failure to distinguish from the start between structurally rooted fraction of capital and political cliques and alliances, is revealing of open Marxism's apriorism. The transnational unity of a neo-liberal 113 This content downloaded from 202.120.14.129 on Mon, 01 Feb 2016 23:51:55 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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