Googling the WTO:What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions Krzysztof J.Pelc Abstract How does international law affect state behavior?Existing models addressing this issue rest on individual preferences and voter behavior,yet these assumptions are rarely questioned.Do citizens truly react to their governments being taken to court over purported violations?I propose a novel approach to test the prem- ise behind models of international treaty-making,using web-search data.Such data are widely used in epidemiology:in this article I claim that they are also well suited to applications in political economy.Web searches provide a unique proxy for a fun- damental political activity that we otherwise have little sense of:information seek- ing.Information seeking by constituents can be usefully examined as an instance of political mobilization.Applying web-search data to international trade disputes,I pro- vide evidence for the belief that US citizens are concerned about their country being branded a violator of international law,even when they have no direct material stake in the case at hand.This article constitutes a first attempt at utilizing web-search data to test the building blocks of political economy theory. How does international law affect state behavior?A vast and still growing body of work has been looking to domestic politics for an answer.These scholars have looked past traditional international-level factors such as state power,country rep- utation,and reciprocity,focusing instead on the role of constituents and interest groups to explain why countries join international treaties in the first place,and how they behave within treaties subsequently.Such theories rest on a common set of highly specific assumptions about individual behavior.Yet strikingly,these often elaborate premises have been left largely unexamined. The puzzle of why countries would commit to international binding rules in trade,investment,or human rights agreements has led to increasingly rich theoriz- ing.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff believe that countries join trade agree- I thank Marc L.Busch,Stephen Chaudoin,Betsy Levy Paluck,Stuart Soroka,and Erik Voeten,as well as the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.Yanick Touchette provided excel- lent research assistance.I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds de recherche sur la societe et la culture and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.All remain- ing errors are my own. International Organization 67,Summer 2013,pp.629-55 2013 by The IO Foundation. do:10.1017/S0020818313000179
Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions Krzysztof J+ Pelc Abstract How does international law affect state behavior? Existing models addressing this issue rest on individual preferences and voter behavior, yet these assumptions are rarely questioned+ Do citizens truly react to their governments being taken to court over purported violations? I propose a novel approach to test the premise behind models of international treaty-making, using web-search data+ Such data are widely used in epidemiology; in this article I claim that they are also well suited to applications in political economy+ Web searches provide a unique proxy for a fundamental political activity that we otherwise have little sense of: information seeking+ Information seeking by constituents can be usefully examined as an instance of political mobilization+ Applying web-search data to international trade disputes, I provide evidence for the belief that US citizens are concerned about their country being branded a violator of international law, even when they have no direct material stake in the case at hand+ This article constitutes a first attempt at utilizing web-search data to test the building blocks of political economy theory+ How does international law affect state behavior? A vast and still growing body of work has been looking to domestic politics for an answer+ These scholars have looked past traditional international-level factors such as state power, country reputation, and reciprocity, focusing instead on the role of constituents and interest groups to explain why countries join international treaties in the first place, and how they behave within treaties subsequently+ Such theories rest on a common set of highly specific assumptions about individual behavior+ Yet strikingly, these often elaborate premises have been left largely unexamined+ The puzzle of why countries would commit to international binding rules in trade, investment, or human rights agreements has led to increasingly rich theorizing+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff believe that countries join trade agreeI thank Marc L+ Busch, Stephen Chaudoin, Betsy Levy Paluck, Stuart Soroka, and Erik Voeten, as well as the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments+ Yanick Touchette provided excellent research assistance+ I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture and the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council+ All remaining errors are my own+ International Organization 67, Summer 2013, pp+ 629–55 © 2013 by The IO Foundation+ doi:10+10170S0020818313000179
630 International Organization ments in order to credibly convey to voters that economic downturns,when they occur,are not due to leaders'offering distortionary protection to industries.Kono argues that democratic leaders are more likely to offer protection through convo- luted policy instruments,because these are less likely to be seized upon by the opposition.2 Looking at the human rights regime,Simmons and Danner claim that countries ratify the International Criminal Court(ICC)statute as a means of rais- ing expectations among the general populace about the government's will to find peaceful solutions to potential domestic conflicts:"the frustration of these expec- tations by the commission of atrocities is likely to cost the government popular support."3 In all these instances,theoretical claims rest on a common premise:when inter- national legal institutions inform constituents of their governments'violations, these constituents will react by withdrawing political support,whether at the polls or through popular forms of dissent.It is precisely because of the threat of such ex post costs imposed by constituents that leaders make those international com- mitments.As with all audience cost models,4 the credibility of hand tying is built on the expectation of constituents'forceful reaction in the event of broken commitments. But do constituents really care about their governments flouting international agreements?These models'validity rests on this being the case,yet scholars have little way of knowing one way or the other.The premise that constituents would know and care enough to punish their government over the highly technical rul- ings of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization(WTO)can easily appear far-fetched.Thus far,the only means of assessing the soundness of these individual-level assumptions has been through surveys. However surveys do poorly on questions that put high demands on timing,such as the study of repeated events or emerging trends.More importantly,they come up against a consistent problem,which is intimately related to skepticism over the very assumptions in question:typical respondents often know little about the issues they are asked about.High rates of respondent ignorance can bias survey results.5 Further evidence shows that in the absence of prior knowledge,respondents become highly vulnerable to framing effects.Such effects grow even more likely given that these surveys often find it necessary to preface questions with information about the issue at hand.For these reasons,and because the problem of respondent ignorance is so closely linked to the very assumptions being tested,surveys fall short of a satisfactory means to assess an electorate's likely behavior in reaction to its government's (non)compliance with international rules. 1.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002. 2.Kono2006. 3.Simmons and Danner 2010.24. 4.Fearon 1998. 5.Berinsky 2004. 6.See Druckman 2001:and Hiscox 2006
ments in order to credibly convey to voters that economic downturns, when they occur, are not due to leaders’ offering distortionary protection to industries+ 1 Kono argues that democratic leaders are more likely to offer protection through convoluted policy instruments, because these are less likely to be seized upon by the opposition+ 2 Looking at the human rights regime, Simmons and Danner claim that countries ratify the International Criminal Court ~ICC! statute as a means of raising expectations among the general populace about the government’s will to find peaceful solutions to potential domestic conflicts: “the frustration of these expectations by the commission of atrocities is likely to cost the government popular support+”3 In all these instances, theoretical claims rest on a common premise: when international legal institutions inform constituents of their governments’ violations, these constituents will react by withdrawing political support, whether at the polls or through popular forms of dissent+ It is precisely because of the threat of such ex post costs imposed by constituents that leaders make those international commitments+ As with all audience cost models, 4 the credibility of hand tying is built on the expectation of constituents’ forceful reaction in the event of broken commitments+ But do constituents really care about their governments flouting international agreements? These models’ validity rests on this being the case, yet scholars have little way of knowing one way or the other+ The premise that constituents would know and care enough to punish their government over the highly technical rulings of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization ~WTO! can easily appear far-fetched+ Thus far, the only means of assessing the soundness of these individual-level assumptions has been through surveys+ However surveys do poorly on questions that put high demands on timing, such as the study of repeated events or emerging trends+ More importantly, they come up against a consistent problem, which is intimately related to skepticism over the very assumptions in question: typical respondents often know little about the issues they are asked about+ High rates of respondent ignorance can bias survey results+ 5 Further evidence shows that in the absence of prior knowledge, respondents become highly vulnerable to framing effects+ 6 Such effects grow even more likely given that these surveys often find it necessary to preface questions with information about the issue at hand+ For these reasons, and because the problem of respondent ignorance is so closely linked to the very assumptions being tested, surveys fall short of a satisfactory means to assess an electorate’s likely behavior in reaction to its government’s ~non!compliance with international rules+ 1+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ 2+ Kono 2006+ 3+ Simmons and Danner 2010, 24+ 4+ Fearon 1998+ 5+ Berinsky 2004+ 6+ See Druckman 2001; and Hiscox 2006+ 630 International Organization
Googling the WTO 631 To remedy this shortcoming,I turn to a novel approach,relying on search- engine data.Web-search data have recently been fruitfully exploited in public health research to predict outbreaks of diseases ranging from influenza and listeria to chickenpox and kidney stone incidence;and in economic applications,to chart activity such as foreign travel,unemployment claims,and stock price move- ments.?In this article,I claim that web-search data may be of equal value to polit- ical economists,because such data are particularly well adapted to assessing many of the otherwise untestable behavioral assumptions underlying the majority of schol- arly models. I focus on the behavior of individuals with regards to purported violations within trade agreements.By their technical nature,trade agreements constitute a hard test of expectations about constituents'response to noncompliance with inter- national rules.It is more plausible that citizens react forcefully to information about their government's violation of laws against torture than to purported abuse of antidumping provisions.Indeed,the saliency of trade agreements among voters has been thrown in doubt in the past.The other reason for examining trade agree- ments is that one can identify the material interests at stake more easily than in other issue areas,and thus distinguish the reactions of constituents concerned about noncompliance itself,either for normative or for reputational reasons,from the reaction of groups or individuals who stand to gain or lose materially from such noncompliance. The key aspect of web-query data is that it measures not preferences,but behav- ior.Seeking information is a crucial political activity,yet it has been widely over- looked because until recently scholars had little means of observing it.If constituents possess insufficient information to make decisions,rational-actor mod- els predict that they will expend resources trying to gather that information. Yet information seeking is costly:constituents cannot gather and process infi- nite amounts;they must decide what issue to spend scarce resources seeking infor- mation about.It is such scarcity of resources,and the necessary choice it entails, that renders web-search volumes informative from the standpoint of political econ- omy.Web searches related to political events are a form of mobilization on the basis of preferences over those events. I expect that if constituents care about their government being found in breach of international law,as models of treaty making assume,they will expend efforts to seek related information.Using data about Google searches across time and space, I test the effect of the United States being taken to WTO dispute settlement by other WTO members,or its taking another country to dispute settlement,on the volume of WTO-related search terms.The findings provide measured support for assump- 7.See Mohebbi et al.2011;Breyer et al.2011;Askitas and Zimmermann 2009;and Ginsberg et al. 2009. 8.Guisinger 2009. 9.North 1990
To remedy this shortcoming, I turn to a novel approach, relying on searchengine data+ Web-search data have recently been fruitfully exploited in public health research to predict outbreaks of diseases ranging from influenza and listeria to chickenpox and kidney stone incidence; and in economic applications, to chart activity such as foreign travel, unemployment claims, and stock price movements+ 7 In this article, I claim that web-search data may be of equal value to political economists, because such data are particularly well adapted to assessing many of the otherwise untestable behavioral assumptions underlying the majority of scholarly models+ I focus on the behavior of individuals with regards to purported violations within trade agreements+ By their technical nature, trade agreements constitute a hard test of expectations about constituents’ response to noncompliance with international rules+ It is more plausible that citizens react forcefully to information about their government’s violation of laws against torture than to purported abuse of antidumping provisions+ Indeed, the saliency of trade agreements among voters has been thrown in doubt in the past+ 8 The other reason for examining trade agreements is that one can identify the material interests at stake more easily than in other issue areas, and thus distinguish the reactions of constituents concerned about noncompliance itself, either for normative or for reputational reasons, from the reaction of groups or individuals who stand to gain or lose materially from such noncompliance+ The key aspect of web-query data is that it measures not preferences, but behavior+ Seeking information is a crucial political activity, yet it has been widely overlooked because until recently scholars had little means of observing it+ If constituents possess insufficient information to make decisions, rational-actor models predict that they will expend resources trying to gather that information+ 9 Yet information seeking is costly: constituents cannot gather and process infi- nite amounts; they must decide what issue to spend scarce resources seeking information about+ It is such scarcity of resources, and the necessary choice it entails, that renders web-search volumes informative from the standpoint of political economy+ Web searches related to political events are a form of mobilization on the basis of preferences over those events+ I expect that if constituents care about their government being found in breach of international law, as models of treaty making assume, they will expend efforts to seek related information+ Using data about Google searches across time and space, I test the effect of the United States being taken to WTO dispute settlement by other WTO members, or its taking another country to dispute settlement, on the volume of WTO-related search terms+ The findings provide measured support for assump- 7+ See Mohebbi et al+ 2011; Breyer et al+ 2011; Askitas and Zimmermann 2009; and Ginsberg et al+ 2009+ 8+ Guisinger 2009+ 9+ North 1990+ Googling the WTO 631
632 International Organization tions of treaty-making models.I find considerable evidence demonstrating that US constituents react strongly to their country being filed against by seeking WTO- related information.I also examine how material interests figure into the equation, weighing geographical regions by the commercial stake they hold in a given dis- pute,as proxied by employment.I find little evidence that material interests mag- nify the reaction to US filings against trade partners.Yet a material stake does significantly magnify reactions to signals about US violations.This should be cause for concern,since it implies that filing against the United States may"awaken"pre- cisely those groups most likely to oppose swift US compliance. I further consider constituents'reaction to a category of disputes that concern not specific traded goods,but domestic regulation.These "nonmerchandise dis- putes"can have a significant impact on the trade regime,yet they usually pertain to no identifiable trade volume,and generally deal with more abstract legal issues than do merchandise disputes.In another finding that should trouble institutional- ist scholars,I demonstrate that constituents fail to react to their government's pur- ported violations over such abstract issues by seeking related information,which bolsters the view that increasing complexity can play an obfuscating function. To test these beliefs,I begin by taking a simple regression approach,trying to predict the volume of search by looking at the occurrence of disputes.I then reexam- ine my main hypothesis using a method borrowed from financial econometrics. My intuition is that the relation between political events and search volumes for related terms should be analogous to that between stock prices of firms and events that may affect those firms'valuation.This method allows me to effectively ask whether a given event leads to a higher search volume in US states than one would expect had that event not occurred. As a first step in testing the individual-level assumptions underlying political economy models of treaty making using search-engine data,the approach holds important implications for future research.Political scientists know much about the supply side of information-one can measure money spent on television ads, or the number of billboards put up by an electoral campaign-but comparatively less about the demand side of political information,which is likely to be a more telling indicator of behavior.Web-search data may allow us an unprecedented look into an overlooked political activity:information seeking. The Assumptions Underlying Treaty-Making Models The institutional literature's recent focus on the domestic level serves as a solu- tion to an enforcement problem.If institutions such as the WTO have "no bail bondsmen,no blue helmets,no truncheons or tear gas,"how do they hold coun- 10.Kono2006. 11.Belo1996.417
tions of treaty-making models+ I find considerable evidence demonstrating that US constituents react strongly to their country being filed against by seeking WTOrelated information+ I also examine how material interests figure into the equation, weighing geographical regions by the commercial stake they hold in a given dispute, as proxied by employment+ I find little evidence that material interests magnify the reaction to US filings against trade partners+ Yet a material stake does significantly magnify reactions to signals about US violations+ This should be cause for concern, since it implies that filing against the United States may “awaken” precisely those groups most likely to oppose swift US compliance+ I further consider constituents’ reaction to a category of disputes that concern not specific traded goods, but domestic regulation+ These “nonmerchandise disputes” can have a significant impact on the trade regime, yet they usually pertain to no identifiable trade volume, and generally deal with more abstract legal issues than do merchandise disputes+ In another finding that should trouble institutionalist scholars, I demonstrate that constituents fail to react to their government’s purported violations over such abstract issues by seeking related information, which bolsters the view that increasing complexity can play an obfuscating function+ 10 To test these beliefs, I begin by taking a simple regression approach, trying to predict the volume of search by looking at the occurrence of disputes+ I then reexamine my main hypothesis using a method borrowed from financial econometrics+ My intuition is that the relation between political events and search volumes for related terms should be analogous to that between stock prices of firms and events that may affect those firms’ valuation+ This method allows me to effectively ask whether a given event leads to a higher search volume in US states than one would expect had that event not occurred+ As a first step in testing the individual-level assumptions underlying political economy models of treaty making using search-engine data, the approach holds important implications for future research+ Political scientists know much about the supply side of information—one can measure money spent on television ads, or the number of billboards put up by an electoral campaign—but comparatively less about the demand side of political information, which is likely to be a more telling indicator of behavior+ Web-search data may allow us an unprecedented look into an overlooked political activity: information seeking+ The Assumptions Underlying Treaty-Making Models The institutional literature’s recent focus on the domestic level serves as a solution to an enforcement problem+ If institutions such as the WTO have “no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas,”11 how do they hold coun- 10+ Kono 2006+ 11+ Bello 1996, 417+ 632 International Organization
Googling the WTO 633 tries to their commitments?It is generally agreed upon that a key function of the institution in this regard is to provide reliable information about whether or not country behavior is in contravention of its commitments.Who is the intended audi- ence for this information?Traditionally,under the cast of theories that portrayed states as unitary actors,scholars envisioned the audience as other country mem- bers.But another belief has proven dominant in the past two decades,which sees domestic constituents as the intended audience.2 In this telling,the enforcement of governments'commitments flows not as much from the threat of other states'sanctions as it does from a government's own con- stituents.As one observer puts it,these agreements are predicated on "the avail- ability of [domestic]victims of noncompliance as low-cost monitors."13 In the case of trade,protection is distortionary and hampers economic growth.While import-competing industries gain,the median voter loses.Countries signing inter- national trade agreements capitalize on this loss:it is precisely because of the threat of discontented constituents removing a government from office that international trade commitments are credible,and thus beneficial to signatories who are held to Pareto-improving policy changes.As with audience-cost models of any sort,what lends credibility to the commitment is an ex post cost.4 In the case of trade,the expectation is that constituents will react to information about their government offering distortionary protection to interest groups. Since the existence of an ex post cost relies on constituents reacting forcefully to information about breached commitments,these theories hinge on constituents not only noticing,but also caring enough about information concerning breaches by their government to act on their discontent,be it through voting at the polls, withdrawing campaign support,or popular forms of dissent.>It is easy to be skep- tical of this premise.In the face of widespread reports of voter apathy,political igno- rance,and information saturation,should scholars really be constructing models that hinge on constituents acting against leaders on the basis of purported viola- tions of,say,the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosani- tary Measures? Yet this assumption is the lynchpin not only of treaty-making models that ask who joins,16 but also of a number of related questions.In this way,Kono finds 12.See Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002;Kono 2006;Davis 2012;and Pelc 2010 and 2011a. 13.Dai2007,42. 14.See Fearon 1994 and 1998. 15.In fact,a prior individual-level assumption is made,but is it at once more plausible and more widely discussed than the assumption examined here.Namely,voters are thought to be more likely of being informed about policy reversals when these constitute breaches of international commitments than if the government had made the same initial commitments unilaterally,of its own accord.Mans- field,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002.This assumption is plausible since the purpose of institutions is to provide information,and one can point to concrete ways by which institutions do this.As Mansfield, Milner,and Rosendorff(2002,480)put it,"accusations of bad behavior are more newsworthy than are unilateral changes in trade policy." 16.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002
tries to their commitments? It is generally agreed upon that a key function of the institution in this regard is to provide reliable information about whether or not country behavior is in contravention of its commitments+ Who is the intended audience for this information? Traditionally, under the cast of theories that portrayed states as unitary actors, scholars envisioned the audience as other country members+ But another belief has proven dominant in the past two decades, which sees domestic constituents as the intended audience+ 12 In this telling, the enforcement of governments’ commitments flows not as much from the threat of other states’ sanctions as it does from a government’s own constituents+ As one observer puts it, these agreements are predicated on “the availability of @domestic# victims of noncompliance as low-cost monitors+”13 In the case of trade, protection is distortionary and hampers economic growth+ While import-competing industries gain, the median voter loses+ Countries signing international trade agreements capitalize on this loss: it is precisely because of the threat of discontented constituents removing a government from office that international trade commitments are credible, and thus beneficial to signatories who are held to Pareto-improving policy changes+ As with audience-cost models of any sort, what lends credibility to the commitment is an ex post cost+ 14 In the case of trade, the expectation is that constituents will react to information about their government offering distortionary protection to interest groups+ Since the existence of an ex post cost relies on constituents reacting forcefully to information about breached commitments, these theories hinge on constituents not only noticing, but also caring enough about information concerning breaches by their government to act on their discontent, be it through voting at the polls, withdrawing campaign support, or popular forms of dissent+ 15 It is easy to be skeptical of this premise+ In the face of widespread reports of voter apathy, political ignorance, and information saturation, should scholars really be constructing models that hinge on constituents acting against leaders on the basis of purported violations of, say, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures? Yet this assumption is the lynchpin not only of treaty-making models that ask who joins, 16 but also of a number of related questions+ In this way, Kono finds 12+ See Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002; Kono 2006; Davis 2012; and Pelc 2010 and 2011a+ 13+ Dai 2007, 42+ 14+ See Fearon 1994 and 1998+ 15+ In fact, a prior individual-level assumption is made, but is it at once more plausible and more widely discussed than the assumption examined here+ Namely, voters are thought to be more likely of being informed about policy reversals when these constitute breaches of international commitments than if the government had made the same initial commitments unilaterally, of its own accord+ Mans- field, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ This assumption is plausible since the purpose of institutions is to provide information, and one can point to concrete ways by which institutions do this+ As Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff ~2002, 480! put it, “accusations of bad behavior are more newsworthy than are unilateral changes in trade policy+” 16+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ Googling the WTO 633
634 International Organization that more democratic regimes are likely to fall back on more opaque forms of protection,because these are less likely to lead to reactions among constituents, and thus are less likely of being seized upon by the opposition,which looks for messages that can be delivered in a sound bite.7 Examining the point of view of enforcers,Davis demonstrates that countries initiate WTO disputes to credibly con- vey to domestic industries that they are serving their interests.8 Filing thus amounts to pandering to an export-oriented audience.Examples of work resting on similar individual-level assumptions are not limited to trade.A wave of domestic-level theorizing has also taken over the study of human rights treaties,where scholars argue that countries join human rights treaties not so much as a gesture to other states,but rather as a credible signal to their domestic audience.9 There too,the premise is that human rights agreements accrue significance as citizens become more likely to react to reports of violations.The same reasoning has been applied to environmental treaties.European countries'compliance with the 1985 Sulfur Protocol is said to have been due to the electoral leverage of domestic constituen- cies likely to act on information about compliance with the protocol.20 In the face of domestic political apathy,all these models fall apart. Thus far,the only means of knowing whether the underlying individual-level behavioral assumptions are sound has been through surveys.Yet surveys come up against some of the very problems that are grounds for skepticism toward treaty- making models in the first place.The average respondent tends to know little about specifics of the political questions they are asked about-in this case,international rules.1 Low response rates are thus endemic.And as Milner and Tingley point out in work that seeks to improve on the design of these surveys,"forcing a response to a question introduces noise into the analysis."22 Wide variation in polling results for the same issue during the same period speaks to the potential significance of framing in questions'formulation.?3 While one would hope that any potential framing would have a consistent effect across all respon- dents,there is considerable evidence to suggest that less-knowledgeable respon- dents tend to be more vulnerable to framing,24 entailing not only considerable noise in the data,but also biased findings.So in making up for respondents'lack of information,surveys become more vulnerable to another,equally serious problem. By comparison,the method employed in this study is premised precisely on the notion that individuals are not initially likely to have all the necessary infor- 17.Kono2006. 18.Davis2012. 19.Simmons 2000. 20.Dai2007. 21.Berinsky 2004.As a result,surveys often preface questions with facts about the underlying issues,or a series of talking points,potentially magnifying framing effects. 22.Milner and Tingley 2010,22. 23.For a swatch of WTO-related survey results over two decades,see (http://www.americans- world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/data_wto.htm),accessed 28 April 2013. 24.Hiscox 2006
that more democratic regimes are likely to fall back on more opaque forms of protection, because these are less likely to lead to reactions among constituents, and thus are less likely of being seized upon by the opposition, which looks for messages that can be delivered in a sound bite+ 17 Examining the point of view of enforcers, Davis demonstrates that countries initiate WTO disputes to credibly convey to domestic industries that they are serving their interests+ 18 Filing thus amounts to pandering to an export-oriented audience+ Examples of work resting on similar individual-level assumptions are not limited to trade+ A wave of domestic-level theorizing has also taken over the study of human rights treaties, where scholars argue that countries join human rights treaties not so much as a gesture to other states, but rather as a credible signal to their domestic audience+ 19 There too, the premise is that human rights agreements accrue significance as citizens become more likely to react to reports of violations+ The same reasoning has been applied to environmental treaties+ European countries’ compliance with the 1985 Sulfur Protocol is said to have been due to the electoral leverage of domestic constituencies likely to act on information about compliance with the protocol+ 20 In the face of domestic political apathy, all these models fall apart+ Thus far, the only means of knowing whether the underlying individual-level behavioral assumptions are sound has been through surveys+ Yet surveys come up against some of the very problems that are grounds for skepticism toward treatymaking models in the first place+ The average respondent tends to know little about specifics of the political questions they are asked about—in this case, international rules+ 21 Low response rates are thus endemic+ And as Milner and Tingley point out in work that seeks to improve on the design of these surveys, “forcing a response to a question introduces noise into the analysis+”22 Wide variation in polling results for the same issue during the same period speaks to the potential significance of framing in questions’ formulation+ 23 While one would hope that any potential framing would have a consistent effect across all respondents, there is considerable evidence to suggest that less-knowledgeable respondents tend to be more vulnerable to framing, 24 entailing not only considerable noise in the data, but also biased findings+ So in making up for respondents’ lack of information, surveys become more vulnerable to another, equally serious problem+ By comparison, the method employed in this study is premised precisely on the notion that individuals are not initially likely to have all the necessary infor- 17+ Kono 2006+ 18+ Davis 2012+ 19+ Simmons 2000+ 20+ Dai 2007+ 21+ Berinsky 2004+ As a result, surveys often preface questions with facts about the underlying issues, or a series of talking points, potentially magnifying framing effects+ 22+ Milner and Tingley 2010, 22+ 23+ For a swatch of WTO-related survey results over two decades, see ^http:00www+americansworld+org0digest0global_issues0intertrade0data_wto+htm&, accessed 28 April 2013+ 24+ Hiscox 2006+ 634 International Organization
Googling the WTO 635 mation to process signals from an international institution about their government's (non)compliance,but that if they care sufficiently,they will seek that information out. Individuals Seeking Information As an alternative means of testing individual-level behavioral assumptions in domes- tic models of political economy,the novel approach here uses search-engine data. Although such data did not exist until very recently,25 they have already proven invaluable in,among other applications,tracking and predicting outbreaks in pub- lic health.Mohebbi and colleagues show how Google search data can be an ear- lier and equally accurate predictor of flu outbreaks in the United States compared to the data collected by the Center for Disease Control from hospitals around the country on a weekly basis.26 Similar applications have shown web queries to be equally valuable in predicting listeria,chickenpox,and a host of other diseases and medical conditions.27 These epidemiological applications rely on one simple idea.Because more than 90 million Americans search the web for information about medical conditions every year,28 and because data are available on where and when these searches occur,a sudden uptick in the volume of searches relating to a specific condition in a given area may be a first clue of an increase in that condition's occurrence in the area.Similarly,economists have used web queries to predict trends in the volume of unemployment claims because individuals likely to file them are also more likely to seek information on such claims before they file.The main application of web data thus far has consisted of"predicting the present,"29 that is,producing early forecasts of measures that we learn about sub- sequently through traditional means.And while these applications hold great prom- ise for public policy,where obtaining highly detailed,continuous data days or weeks in advance can improve decision making considerably,such gains in time hold less value for analysis.Rather,their true potential from the standpoint of social science research lies in providing measures that are difficult to obtain through other means:in this case,charting the reaction of constituents to information about their country's violation of international law.Search-engine data may thus become as useful to political economy applications as they have already proven themselves to be for epidemiology and economics. 25.Google Insights,the data source used both here and in most of these applications,went online in August 2008.Available at (www.google.com/insights/search),accessed 20 July 2012.In Septem- ber 2012,Google Insights was succeeded by Google Trends.Available at (http://www.google.com /trends/),accessed 1 February 2013. 26.Mohebbi et al.2011. 27.See Breyer et al.2011;Askitas and Zimmermann 2009;Ginsberg et al.2009;and Da,Engel- berg,and Gao 2011. 28.Mohebbi et al.2011. 29.See Choi and Varian 2009 for the article that inspired the term
mation to process signals from an international institution about their government’s ~non!compliance, but that if they care sufficiently, they will seek that information out+ Individuals Seeking Information As an alternative means of testing individual-level behavioral assumptions in domestic models of political economy, the novel approach here uses search-engine data+ Although such data did not exist until very recently, 25 they have already proven invaluable in, among other applications, tracking and predicting outbreaks in public health+ Mohebbi and colleagues show how Google search data can be an earlier and equally accurate predictor of flu outbreaks in the United States compared to the data collected by the Center for Disease Control from hospitals around the country on a weekly basis+ 26 Similar applications have shown web queries to be equally valuable in predicting listeria, chickenpox, and a host of other diseases and medical conditions+ 27 These epidemiological applications rely on one simple idea+ Because more than 90 million Americans search the web for information about medical conditions every year, 28 and because data are available on where and when these searches occur, a sudden uptick in the volume of searches relating to a specific condition in a given area may be a first clue of an increase in that condition’s occurrence in the area+ Similarly, economists have used web queries to predict trends in the volume of unemployment claims because individuals likely to file them are also more likely to seek information on such claims before they file+ The main application of web data thus far has consisted of “predicting the present,”29 that is, producing early forecasts of measures that we learn about subsequently through traditional means+ And while these applications hold great promise for public policy, where obtaining highly detailed, continuous data days or weeks in advance can improve decision making considerably, such gains in time hold less value for analysis+ Rather, their true potential from the standpoint of social science research lies in providing measures that are difficult to obtain through other means: in this case, charting the reaction of constituents to information about their country’s violation of international law+ Search-engine data may thus become as useful to political economy applications as they have already proven themselves to be for epidemiology and economics+ 25+ Google Insights, the data source used both here and in most of these applications, went online in August 2008+ Available at ^www+google+com0insights0search&, accessed 20 July 2012+ In September 2012, Google Insights was succeeded by Google Trends+ Available at ^http:00www+google+com 0trends0&, accessed 1 February 2013+ 26+ Mohebbi et al+ 2011+ 27+ See Breyer et al+ 2011; Askitas and Zimmermann 2009; Ginsberg et al+ 2009; and Da, Engelberg, and Gao 2011+ 28+ Mohebbi et al+ 2011+ 29+ See Choi and Varian 2009 for the article that inspired the term+ Googling the WTO 635
636 International Organization The social science concept that comes closest to what web-search data cap- ture is public attention,or attentiveness,defined as the scarce resources that indi- viduals dedicate toward a political issue.30 Scholars of public attentiveness are adamant about differentiating it from public opinion,which bears repeating in the context of web searches:the data capture not opinion or preferences,but behavior. The heroic homo economicus assumption of perfectly informed individuals is largely obsolete.There has long been a recognition among economists themselves that rationality is bounded by limited information,and limited capacity to process it:in short,a"bottleneck of attention."31 Crucially,however, recent evidence suggests that the means by which individuals make up for the information they lack can usefully be modeled as resting on a premise of rationality. Information-seeking involves a decision:What piece of information must be pursued at the cost of what other bit of information to make a decision?As Simon, the scholar at the origin of attention economics,put it succinctly,"a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that atten- tion efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it."32 In this regard,lab experiments have shown that subjects access more information to make a decision concerning two centrist candidates than two candidates of extreme positions,the implication being that the information- seeking behavior itself has rational underpinnings,in this case because it takes additional information to distinguish choices that are very similar.33 Seeking information involves a trade-off.For instance,national news outlets come at the expense of local news sources,with corresponding implications for political behavior:a recent finding shows how the penetration of the New York Times in local markets was correlated with decreased political participation in local elections.34 Web searches allow one to observe something political scientists have lacked access to until recently:individuals seeking information.Given what one knows about the cost of,and the strategic behavior individuals display in seeking infor- mation,the existence of data on web searches allows one to ask the very question needed to test the assumptions of treaty-making models in the international political economy:do individuals care sufficiently about signals concerning their governments'violations that they react by seeking related information? 30.See Newig 2004;Ripberger 2011;and Jones 1994. 31.Simon1985,302. 32.Simon1971,40-41. 33.Herstein 1981. 34.George and Waldfogel 2006.Kaid(2002)finds that online information seeking among voters, as compared with exposure to the same information through passive media channels such as televi- sion,was associated with significantly greater political activity
The social science concept that comes closest to what web-search data capture is public attention, or attentiveness, defined as the scarce resources that individuals dedicate toward a political issue+ 30 Scholars of public attentiveness are adamant about differentiating it from public opinion, which bears repeating in the context of web searches: the data capture not opinion or preferences, but behavior+ The heroic homo economicus assumption of perfectly informed individuals is largely obsolete+ There has long been a recognition among economists themselves that rationality is bounded by limited information, and limited capacity to process it: in short, a “bottleneck of attention+”31 Crucially, however, recent evidence suggests that the means by which individuals make up for the information they lack can usefully be modeled as resting on a premise of rationality+ Information-seeking involves a decision: What piece of information must be pursued at the cost of what other bit of information to make a decision? As Simon, the scholar at the origin of attention economics, put it succinctly, “a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it+”32 In this regard, lab experiments have shown that subjects access more information to make a decision concerning two centrist candidates than two candidates of extreme positions, the implication being that the informationseeking behavior itself has rational underpinnings, in this case because it takes additional information to distinguish choices that are very similar+ 33 Seeking information involves a trade-off+ For instance, national news outlets come at the expense of local news sources, with corresponding implications for political behavior: a recent finding shows how the penetration of the New York Times in local markets was correlated with decreased political participation in local elections+ 34 Web searches allow one to observe something political scientists have lacked access to until recently: individuals seeking information+ Given what one knows about the cost of, and the strategic behavior individuals display in seeking information, the existence of data on web searches allows one to ask the very question needed to test the assumptions of treaty-making models in the international political economy: do individuals care sufficiently about signals concerning their governments’ violations that they react by seeking related information? 30+ See Newig 2004; Ripberger 2011; and Jones 1994+ 31+ Simon 1985, 302+ 32+ Simon 1971, 40– 41+ 33+ Herstein 1981+ 34+ George and Waldfogel 2006+ Kaid ~2002! finds that online information seeking among voters, as compared with exposure to the same information through passive media channels such as television, was associated with significantly greater political activity+ 636 International Organization
Googling the WTO 637 Expectations:The Case of Trade Violations Treaty-making models in a range of issue areas,from international trade and human rights to the environment,rest on a common set of assumptions about individual behavior.I test these assumptions in the issue area of trade for three reasons.First, trade constitutes a harder test of the models'assumptions:it appears more plausi- ble that constituents will react forcefully to news of a government's violation of human rights agreements,or of an environmental treaty,than a trade agreement. This is because trade agreements tend to be more technical in nature,and because violations of trade agreements have a less immediate impact on the daily life of constituents than water pollution or a regime torturing members of the opposition. Second,trade is contained within a highly coherent regime,with a single multilat- eral organization,the WTO.As a result,the great majority of violation claims will come through a single institution,and there is less need to account for the relative importance of alternative forums.35 By comparison,there are dozens of multilat- eral human rights agreements,varying in their degree of success,membership, and exact issues covered;the environmental regime looks much the same.Finally, trade allows one to separate normative and material objections to noncompliance in a way that would be impractical in other issue areas. The WTO is a decentralized enforcement institution-it does not pursue viola- tions itself,but merely provides information about possible noncompliance,through devices such as Trade Policy Reviews(TPRs),and precise tariff schedules outlin- ing every member's commitments.36 It is up to other members to pursue pur- ported violations of the rules by filing for consultations with the member at issue, the necessary first step to any WTO dispute.Every such filing is immediately made public,to both the WTO membership and domestic audiences.Most cases are set- tled before reaching a verdict,usually with concessions by the defendant.37 Cases that do make it to a verdict exhibit a pro-complainant bias,owing to the selection effect both in the filing of cases and in the escalation to litigation.In other words, because of the costs involved in filing,and the resulting process of selection,a majority of cases filed ostensibly represent some form of actual rule violation. Taken together,this reasoning leads to the following expectations.My first hypothesis is also the simplest.If constituents truly react to signals from the WTO about possible violations by their government,as presumed by treaty-making models such as in Mansfield,Milner and Rosendorff,38 one should be able to observe an increase in the number of WTO-related web searches following such announcements: 35.There is a growing number of regional trade agreements,but for the most part,these delegate dispute settlement to the WTO. 36.Pelc2011b. 37.Busch and Reinhardt 2001. 38.Mansfield,Milner,and Rosendorff 2002
Expectations: The Case of Trade Violations Treaty-making models in a range of issue areas, from international trade and human rights to the environment, rest on a common set of assumptions about individual behavior+ I test these assumptions in the issue area of trade for three reasons+ First, trade constitutes a harder test of the models’ assumptions: it appears more plausible that constituents will react forcefully to news of a government’s violation of human rights agreements, or of an environmental treaty, than a trade agreement+ This is because trade agreements tend to be more technical in nature, and because violations of trade agreements have a less immediate impact on the daily life of constituents than water pollution or a regime torturing members of the opposition+ Second, trade is contained within a highly coherent regime, with a single multilateral organization, the WTO+ As a result, the great majority of violation claims will come through a single institution, and there is less need to account for the relative importance of alternative forums+ 35 By comparison, there are dozens of multilateral human rights agreements, varying in their degree of success, membership, and exact issues covered; the environmental regime looks much the same+ Finally, trade allows one to separate normative and material objections to noncompliance in a way that would be impractical in other issue areas+ The WTO is a decentralized enforcement institution—it does not pursue violations itself, but merely provides information about possible noncompliance, through devices such as Trade Policy Reviews ~TPRs!, and precise tariff schedules outlining every member’s commitments+ 36 It is up to other members to pursue purported violations of the rules by filing for consultations with the member at issue, the necessary first step to any WTO dispute+ Every such filing is immediately made public, to both the WTO membership and domestic audiences+ Most cases are settled before reaching a verdict, usually with concessions by the defendant+ 37 Cases that do make it to a verdict exhibit a pro-complainant bias, owing to the selection effect both in the filing of cases and in the escalation to litigation+ In other words, because of the costs involved in filing, and the resulting process of selection, a majority of cases filed ostensibly represent some form of actual rule violation+ Taken together, this reasoning leads to the following expectations+ My first hypothesis is also the simplest+ If constituents truly react to signals from the WTO about possible violations by their government, as presumed by treaty-making models such as in Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 38 one should be able to observe an increase in the number of WTO-related web searches following such announcements: 35+ There is a growing number of regional trade agreements, but for the most part, these delegate dispute settlement to the WTO+ 36+ Pelc 2011b+ 37+ Busch and Reinhardt 2001+ 38+ Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002+ Googling the WTO 637
638 International Organization HI:Time periods during which the United States is accused by another country of fouting WTO commitments should be associated with a increase in WTO-related searches over the same period. Second,if dispute filing functions as a credible signal to export-oriented groups, as per Davis,39 then the presence of a material stake,denoted by employment asso- ciated with the products at issue in a dispute,should have an observable effect on web searches associated with filings.This leads to my second hypothesis: H2:The US filing against a trade parmner should be associated with a relatively greater increase in web searches in those geographical areas where there exists a material interest in the dispute in question. Third,if governments have an incentive to choose obfuscatory forms of protec- tion as a way to avoid adverse reactions by constituents,as per Kono's claims,40 then one should be able to observe lesser reactions to highly technical disputes about domestic legislation.Similarly,scholars know from research on public agenda setting that more complexity drives down salience,and that abstract issues are less likely to raise public attentiveness than more concrete ones.4 The disputes most representative of such complex and abstract issues are nonmerchandise dis- putes,which concern issues of domestic legislation and legal principle,rather than specific barriers on a given product.The effects of such nonmerchandise disputes are both more diffuse,and harder to measure.Accordingly,my third expectation is the following: H3:Initiation of disputes over nonmerchandise issues should lead to a lesser increase in WTO-related searches than the initiation of disputes concerning iden- tifable products. Together,these three hypotheses represent some of the assumptions underlying institutional models in political economy that ask a range of questions about who joins,and when;who complies;what form noncompliance takes in the alterna- tive;and who enforces in those events. Research Design I test the hypotheses using data about web queries in time and space.Specifi- cally,the unit of analysis is the amount of queries for a given term in Google's 39.Davis 2012 40.Kono2006. 41.See Soroka 2002;and Yagade and Dozier 1990
H1: Time periods during which the United States is accused by another country of flouting WTO commitments should be associated with a increase in WTO-related searches over the same period+ Second, if dispute filing functions as a credible signal to export-oriented groups, as per Davis, 39 then the presence of a material stake, denoted by employment associated with the products at issue in a dispute, should have an observable effect on web searches associated with filings+ This leads to my second hypothesis: H2: The US filing against a trade partner should be associated with a relatively greater increase in web searches in those geographical areas where there exists a material interest in the dispute in question+ Third, if governments have an incentive to choose obfuscatory forms of protection as a way to avoid adverse reactions by constituents, as per Kono’s claims, 40 then one should be able to observe lesser reactions to highly technical disputes about domestic legislation+ Similarly, scholars know from research on public agenda setting that more complexity drives down salience, and that abstract issues are less likely to raise public attentiveness than more concrete ones+ 41 The disputes most representative of such complex and abstract issues are nonmerchandise disputes, which concern issues of domestic legislation and legal principle, rather than specific barriers on a given product+ The effects of such nonmerchandise disputes are both more diffuse, and harder to measure+ Accordingly, my third expectation is the following: H3: Initiation of disputes over nonmerchandise issues should lead to a lesser increase in WTO-related searches than the initiation of disputes concerning identifiable products+ Together, these three hypotheses represent some of the assumptions underlying institutional models in political economy that ask a range of questions about who joins, and when; who complies; what form noncompliance takes in the alternative; and who enforces in those events+ Research Design I test the hypotheses using data about web queries in time and space+ Specifi- cally, the unit of analysis is the amount of queries for a given term in Google’s 39+ Davis 2012+ 40+ Kono 2006+ 41+ See Soroka 2002; and Yagade and Dozier 1990+ 638 International Organization
