10 The Journal of American-East Asian Relations were determined not to allow the American withdrawal from Vietnam. The Albanians,he continued,believed that"the tempest of world revo- lution is in Asia.The storm of Asian revolution is in Vietnam.If war ends,it is terrible."The former Sovietleader Vladimir I.Lenin,Mao added, told us that when bandits deliver an ultimatum to"either be killed or surrender your pistol and car,you must surrender your pistol and car. Later,you may eradicate the bandits and retrieve your pistol and car." Similarly,after the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet government encoun- tered both internal and external threats.In order to avoid a two-front war,Lenin advocated that Russia cede territory,pay indemnities,and sign a humiliating peace treaty.It turned out that Russia did not have to cede territory or pay indemnities:"The peace treaty was just a piece of waster paper."Mao added"although we compromised with Jiang Jieshi twice,in the end,weren't we the winners?"28 With this in mind,it is not difficult to understand why Mao advo- cated reconciliation with the United States,but he continued to mouth high-sounding revolutionary words.Obviously,this is unlike what Mao had told Nixon-firing"empty cannons."It was a true reflection of Mao's psyche.At Mao's insistence,Zhou Enlai,in his political report to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973,stated clearly from the very begin- ning Lenin's theory of imperialism and proletarian revolution,insisting that the"[Revolutionary]epoch has not changed.The basic principles of Leninism are not out-dated.They are still the guiding principles of our epoch."Meanwhile,Zhou's report emphasized Mao's views on the international situation,declaring the"main feature of the current inter- national situation is great chaos under Heaven.The rising wind fore- tells the coming storm."It continued,"U.S.-Soviet scramble for supremacy is the key.Every day they talk about disarmament,but every day they move their armies.The aim is to contend for supremacy.They collude while struggling.Collusion is for even fiercer contention.Contention is absolute and long-term.Collusion is relative and temporary."29 The Struggle against Zhou Enlai at the Politburo Meetings(November- December 1973) Whether Mao Zedong's view on U.S.-Soviet relations fitted to reality or not,his strategic design of"alliance with the U.S.to deter the Soviets" "a horizontal line,"and "a big terrain"(yi da pian)was impossible to come to fruition.Mao was disheartened to see the frequent U.S.-Soviet summits and the subsequent signing of treaties.During Kissinger's sixth 28.Li Danhui,ed.,Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng (China and the Indochina War)(Hong Kong,2000),50. 29."Report at the 10th Congress of the CCP,"Renmin Ribao,1 Sept.1973.10 The Journal of American–East Asian Relations were determined not to allow the American withdrawal from Vietnam. The Albanians, he continued, believed that “the tempest of world revo￾lution is in Asia. The storm of Asian revolution is in Vietnam. If war ends, it is terrible.” The former Soviet leader Vladimir I. Lenin, Mao added, told us that when bandits deliver an ultimatum to “either be killed or surrender your pistol and car, you must surrender your pistol and car. Later, you may eradicate the bandits and retrieve your pistol and car.” Similarly, after the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet government encoun￾tered both internal and external threats. In order to avoid a two-front war, Lenin advocated that Russia cede territory, pay indemnities, and sign a humiliating peace treaty. It turned out that Russia did not have to cede territory or pay indemnities: “The peace treaty was just a piece of waster paper.” Mao added “although we compromised with Jiang Jieshi twice, in the end, weren’t we the winners?”28 With this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why Mao advo￾cated reconciliation with the United States, but he continued to mouth high-sounding revolutionary words. Obviously, this is unlike what Mao had told Nixon—firing “empty cannons.” It was a true reflection of Mao’s psyche. At Mao’s insistence, Zhou Enlai, in his political report to the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, stated clearly from the very begin￾ning Lenin’s theory of imperialism and proletarian revolution, insisting that the “[Revolutionary] epoch has not changed. The basic principles of Leninism are not out-dated. They are still the guiding principles of our epoch.” Meanwhile, Zhou’s report emphasized Mao’s views on the international situation, declaring the “main feature of the current inter￾national situation is great chaos under Heaven. The rising wind fore￾tells the coming storm.” It continued, “U.S.-Soviet scramble for supremacy is the key. Every day they talk about disarmament, but every day they move their armies. The aim is to contend for supremacy. They collude while struggling. Collusion is for even fiercer contention. Contention is absolute and long-term. Collusion is relative and temporary.”29 The Struggle against Zhou Enlai at the Politburo Meetings (November– December 1973) Whether Mao Zedong’s view on U.S.-Soviet relations fitted to reality or not, his strategic design of “alliance with the U.S. to deter the Soviets,” “a horizontal line,” and “a big terrain” (yi da pian) was impossible to come to fruition. Mao was disheartened to see the frequent U.S.-Soviet summits and the subsequent signing of treaties. During Kissinger’s sixth 28. Li Danhui, ed., Zhongguo yu Yinduzhina zhanzheng (China and the Indochina War) (Hong Kong, 2000), 50. 29. “Report at the 10th Congress of the CCP,” Renmin Ribao, 1 Sept. 1973