Economic Coercion 647 for sanctions imposition.Nevertheless,these models agree with the bargaining "folk theorem":in those situations when sanctions are most likely to work,they are least likely to be imposed. Daniel Drezner combines issue indivisibility and the inability to credibly com- mit to explain the imposition of sanctions.6 He presents a complete information model in which the target will make concessions if the sender prefers a deadlock outcome of sanctions imposition to backing down.In the basic version of the model, one should only observe threats or very brief imposition of sanctions.In a refined version of the model,sanctions imposition can be an equilibrium outcome,pro- vided two conditions are met:the demand is indivisible and expectations of future conflict are high.Under conditions of high conflict expectations,both the sender and target fear that any concessions made in the present will leave them in a weak- ened bargaining position in future conflicts,making credible commitments more difficult to achieve.Empirically,the model predicts that when sanctions are actu- ally imposed,the outcome is a sustained deadlock between adversaries.The cases of economic coercion that generate concessions will end at the threat stage and are thus more difficult to observe. Three modeling efforts combine imperfect information and issue indivisibility to explain the rational imposition of sanctions.Alistair Smith,as well as T.Clifton Morgan and Anne Miers,develop one-sided incomplete information models of eco- nomic coercion that lead to similar empirical predictions.17 In both models,the sender does not know whether the target prefers to stand firm or prefers to acqui- esce to the sender's demands rather than suffer the cost of sanctions.The models differ in that Morgan and Miers assume a discrete one-shot game,whereas Smith uses a continuous time approach.The predicted outcomes are similar.For Morgan and Miers,the sender's lack of information about the target's resolve,and the tar- get's incentive to signal a high degree of resolve,can lead to the imposition of sanctions.Morgan and Miers'results predict that the probability of a successful use of economic coercion is greater at the threat stage than at the implementation stage.They conclude:"there are severe selection bias problems with empirical studies that focus only on those cases in which sanctions were applied...sanc- tions strategies may be far more successful than one would conclude from looking only at these cases."18 Smith comes to a similar conclusion-if the target con- cedes,it will do so at the threat stage.He observes:"the length of sanctions will be short.In fact,one may never actually see the sanctions at all.Particularly if it is costly to back down in the face of sanctions,B [the target]may preempt sanc- tions and unilaterally change its policy."These conclusions and empirical pre- dictions are consistent with Drezner's model. 16.Drezner 1999. 17.See Smith 1996;and Morgan and Miers 1999. 18.Morgan and Miers 1999,16. 19.Smith1996,240.Economic Coercion 647 for sanctions imposition. Nevertheless, these models agree with the bargaining "folk theorem": in those situations when sanctions are most likely to work, they are least likely to be imposed. Daniel Drezner combines issue indivisibility and the inability to credibly com￾mit to explain the imposition of sanctions.16 He presents a complete information model in which the target will make concessions if the sender prefers a deadlock outcome of sanctions imposition to backing down. In the basic version of the model, one should only observe threats or very brief imposition of sanctions. In a refined version of the model, sanctions imposition can be an equilibrium outcome, pro￾vided two conditions are met: the demand is indivisible and expectations of future conflict are high. Under conditions of high conflict expectations, both the sender and target fear that any concessions made in the present will leave them in a weak￾ened bargaining position in future conflicts, making credible commitments more difficult to achieve. Empirically, the model predicts that when sanctions are actu￾ally imposed, the outcome is a sustained deadlock between adversaries. The cases of economic coercion that generate concessions will end at the threat stage and are thus more difficult to observe. Three modeling efforts combine imperfect information and issue indivisibility to explain the rational imposition of sanctions. Alistair Smith, as well as T. Clifton Morgan and Anne Miers, develop one-sided incomplete information models of eco￾nomic coercion that lead to similar empirical predictions.'' In both models, the sender does not know whether the target prefers to stand firm or prefers to acqui￾esce to the sender's demands rather than suffer the cost of sanctions. The models differ in that Morgan and Miers assume a discrete one-shot game, whereas Smith uses a continuous time approach. The predicted outcomes are similar. For Morgan and Miers, the sender's lack of information about the target's resolve, and the tar￾get's incentive to signal a high degree of resolve, can lead to the imposition of sanctions. Morgan and Miers' results predict that the probability of a successful use of economic coercion is greater at the threat stage than at the implementation stage. They conclude: "there are severe selection bias problems with empirical studies that focus only on those cases in which sanctions were applied . .. sanc￾tions strategies may be far more successful than one would conclude from looking only at these ca~es."'~ Smith comes to a similar conclusion-if the target con￾cedes, it will do so at the threat stage. He observes: "the length of sanctions will be short. In fact, one may never actually see the sanctions at all. Particularly if it is costly to back down in the face of sanctions, B [the target] may preempt sanc￾tions and unilaterally change its policy." l9 These conclusions and empirical pre￾dictions are consistent with Drezner's model. 16. Drezner 1999. 17. See Smith 1996; and Morgan and Miers 1999. 18. Morgan and Miers 1999, 16. 19. Smith 1996, 240