International Security 17:1 126 While studies of American strategy in Korea often disagree on whether American policy was too soft or too tough,many agree on what constituted the last chance for peace.Several authors argue that escalation of the Korean conflict could have been avoided even after American troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7,1950,seized the North Korean cities of Pyongyang and Wonsan in mid-October,and briefly engaged Chinese detachments north of those cities from October 25 through November 7.9 Analysts of the war have therefore paid great attention to American policy in the period between November 7,when the Chinese disengaged from American forces,and No- vember 24,when MacArthur began the massive drive toward the Yalu. During this period,they suggest,some mixture of reassuring buffers and sobering threats might still have dissuaded the Chinese from a major offen- sive against American troops.10 Smoke,Deterrence and American Foreign Policy,ch.7;Walter Zelman,"Chinese Intervention in the Korean War:A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence,"UCLA Security Studies Project,No.11(1967) Morton H.Halperin,Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York:Wiley,1963),ch.3;Osgood, Limited War,ch.8;Thomas C.Schelling,Arms and Influence(New Haven:Yale University Press, 1966),pp.53-55 and passim;Robert Jervis,Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1976),p.46 and passim;Lebow,Between Peace and War, pp.172-184 and passim;John Orme,"Deterrence Failures:A Second Look,"International Security, Vol.11,No.4(Spring 1987),pp.109-112;and Paul K.Huth,Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven:Yale University Press,1988),pp.139-148. 9.See,for example,George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.222-231."Even as late as the second or third week in November,Washington had the opportunity to take steps to reduce Peking's incentives to engage in a major war by modifying the U.S.war objectives and restricting military operations.The final 'point of no return'for U.S.policy was not passed until shortly before the Chinese launched their all-out offensive."Allen Whiting argues that "while China crossed the Yalu on October 15th,she did not cross the Rubicon until November 26th."Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,p.118.See also Halperin,Limited War,pp.50-53;Zelman, "Chinese Intervention,"p.27;Orme,"Deterrence Failures,"p.110;Kalicki,Pattern of Sino- American Crises,p.63;Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang,China under Threat:The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press,1980),pp.53-58.Gurtov and Hwang view China's late October engagements as a "warning shot"designed to deter American escalation.Lebow,Between Peace and War,pp.178-179,also portrays Chinese intervention in late October and early November as part of a deterrence strategy designed to avoid escalation. These positions are undercut by the new documentary evidence from China. 10.For discussions of the potential effectiveness of a buffer in this period,see Whiting,China Crosses the Yalu,pp.155,160-162 and passim;William Whitney Stueck,Jr.,The Road to Confron- tation:American Foreign Policy Toward China and Korea,1947-1950(Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press,1981),p.251;George and Smoke,Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,pp.222- 231;Zelman,"Chinese Intervention,"p.26;Orme,"Deterrence Failures,"pp.109-110;Schelling, Arms and Influence,pp.54-55;Kalicki,Pattern of Sino-American Crises,pp.57-64.Kalicki discusses "the all-important buffer,"but believes that MacArthur's initial late October thrusts north of the neck of Korea "eliminated"this buffer.Still,he argues that the two weeks between Chinese disengagement and MacArthur's final drive north allowed time for the Americans to pull back This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Security 17:1 | 126 While studies of American strategy in Korea often disagree on whether American policy was too soft or too tough, many agree on what constituted the last chance for peace. Several authors argue that escalation of the Korean conflict could have been avoided even after American troops crossed the 38th parallel on October 7, 1950, seized the North Korean cities of Pyongyang and Wonsan in mid-October, and briefly engaged Chinese detachments north of those cities from October 25 through November 7.9 Analysts of the war have therefore paid great attention to American policy in the period between November 7, when the Chinese disengaged from American forces, and No￾vember 24, when MacArthur began the massive drive toward the Yalu. During this period, they suggest, some mixture of reassuring buffers and sobering threats might still have dissuaded the Chinese from a major offen￾sive against American troops.10 Smoke, Deterrence and American Foreign Policy, ch. 7; Walter Zelman, "Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: A Bilateral Failure of Deterrence," UCLA Security Studies Project, No. 11 (1967); Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley, 1963), ch. 3; Osgood, Limited War, ch. 8; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 53-55 and passim; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 46 and passim; Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 172-184 and passim; John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Spring 1987), pp. 109-112; and Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 139-148. 9. See, for example, George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 222-231. "Even as late as the second or third week in November, Washington had the opportunity to take steps to reduce Peking's incentives to engage in a major war by modifying the U.S. war objectives and restricting military operations. The final 'point of no return' for U.S. policy was not passed until shortly before the Chinese launched their all-out offensive." Allen Whiting argues that, "while China crossed the Yalu on October 15th, she did not cross the Rubicon until November 26th." Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 118. See also Halperin, Limited War, pp. 50-53; Zelman, "Chinese Intervention," p. 27; Orme, "Deterrence Failures," p. 110; Kalicki, Pattern of Sino￾American Crises, p. 63; Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 53-58. Gurtov and Hwang view China's late October engagements as a "warning shot" designed to deter American escalation. Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 178-179, also portrays Chinese intervention in late October and early November as part of a deterrence strategy designed to avoid escalation. These positions are undercut by the new documentary evidence from China. 10. For discussions of the potential effectiveness of a buffer in this period, see Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 155, 160-162 and passim; William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confron￾tation: American Foreign Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 251; George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 222- 231; Zelman, "Chinese Intervention," p. 26; Orme, "Deterrence Failures," pp. 109-110; Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 54-55; Kalicki, Pattern of Sino-American Crises, pp. 57-64. Kalicki discusses "the all-important buffer," but believes that MacArthur's initial late October thrusts north of the neck of Korea "eliminated" this buffer. Still, he argues that the two weeks between Chinese disengagement and MacArthur's final drive north allowed time for the Americans to pull back This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions