Threats,Assurances,and the Last Chance for Peace 125 new documents from China-Mao's Korean War telegrams to Stalin,Zhou Enlai,and Chinese military commanders in the field-that force a reassess- ment of both positions in the Truman-MacArthur debate.5 A reconsideration of Mao's Korean War strategy in light of these documents and recent work by Chinese scholars reveals new lessons about American coercive diplomacy in Korea.6 The controversy over the "lessons of Korea"has affected American civil- military relations throughout the postwar era.For example,in Vietnam the military evoked MacArthur's lessons about Korea,arguing against civilian interference in bombing operations,while the Johnson administration drew Truman's lessons,strictly controlling American bombing in the North so as not to threaten the Chinese border.The Korean War case has also given rise to a rich literature on deterrence and limited war.Scholars clarify the Truman- MacArthur debate by restating it in terms of the two central concepts of deterrence theory:reassurance,and credibility of threat.Viewing the Novem- ber disaster as a failure of deterrence,these scholars point to a deficiency of one or both elements in American coercive diplomacy.8 5.The documents are bound in a collection of Mao's manuscripts entitled Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao (The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since The Founding of the Nation),Vols.I-III, September 1949-December 1952(Beijing:Central Documents Publishing House,1987 and 1990). The collection,containing classified documents,is highly restricted in the PRC.Copies are currently available in the West at Harvard University's Yenching Library,among other locations. Three of the documents are translated in their entirety in the appendix(pp.151-154). 6.See Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai,"China's Decision to Enter the Korean War:History Revis- ited,China Ouarterly,No.121 (March 1990),pp.94-115;and Chen Jian,"The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War,"Working Paper of the Cold War History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.Hao and Zhai rely heavily on leaders memoirs,open Chinese sources,and not-for-attribution interviews to piece together their his- tory.In this article,I supply supporting documentary evidence for their account,and offer a fuller analysis of Mao's grand strategy after initial entry into Korea and its implications for bilateral coercive diplomacy,which were not major focuses of their study.Chen Jian analyzes primary and secondary sources to explain Sino-Soviet relations during the crisis. 7.For an excellent discussion of the impact of the lessons of Korea on decision-making in the Vietnam War,see Yuen Foong Khong,Analogies At War:Korea,Munich,Dien Bien Phu,and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965(Princeton,N.J.:Princeton University Press,1992),ch.5,esp.pp.141- 145.Khong cites William Bundy,assistant secretary of state for Far-Eastern affairs under Presi- dent Johnson,who argued that,in 1964-1965,airfields in northernmost Vietnam were not attacked because of the lessons of November 1950.Bundy wrote:"If the Chinese came to think the United States was out to destroy North Vietnam,would not the situation be essentially similar to MacArthur's advance to the top of North Korea fourteen years before?"Also see Mark Clodfelter,The Limits of Air Power:The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York:Free Press, 1989),chap.3. 8.For political science and deterrence theory works that treat the Korean crisis,see George and This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThreats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace | 125 new documents from China-Mao's Korean War telegrams to Stalin, Zhou Enlai, and Chinese military commanders in the field-that force a reassess￾ment of both positions in the Truman-MacArthur debate.5 A reconsideration of Mao's Korean War strategy in light of these documents and recent work by Chinese scholars reveals new lessons about American coercive diplomacy in Korea.6 The controversy over the "lessons of Korea" has affected American civil￾military relations throughout the postwar era. For example, in Vietnam the military evoked MacArthur's lessons about Korea, arguing against civilian interference in bombing operations, while the Johnson administration drew Truman's lessons, strictly controlling American bombing in the North so as not to threaten the Chinese border.7 The Korean War case has also given rise to a rich literature on deterrence and limited war. Scholars clarify the Truman￾MacArthur debate by restating it in terms of the two central concepts of deterrence theory: reassurance, and credibility of threat. Viewing the Novem￾ber disaster as a failure of deterrence, these scholars point to a deficiency of one or both elements in American coercive diplomacy.8 5. The documents are bound in a collection of Mao's manuscripts entitled Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao (The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since The Founding of the Nation), Vols. I-Ill, September 1949-December 1952 (Beijing: Central Documents Publishing House, 1987 and 1990). The collection, containing classified documents, is highly restricted in the PRC. Copies are currently available in the West at Harvard University's Yenching Library, among other locations. Three of the documents are translated in their entirety in the appendix (pp. 151-154). 6. See Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revis￾ited," China Quarterly, No. 121 (March 1990), pp. 94-115; and Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," Working Paper of the Cold War History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Hao and Zhai rely heavily on leaders' memoirs, open Chinese sources, and not-for-attribution interviews to piece together their his￾tory. In this article, I supply supporting documentary evidence for their account, and offer a fuller analysis of Mao's grand strategy after initial entry into Korea and its implications for bilateral coercive diplomacy, which were not major focuses of their study. Chen Jian analyzes primary and secondary sources to explain Sino-Soviet relations during the crisis. 7. For an excellent discussion of the impact of the lessons of Korea on decision-making in the Vietnam War, see Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies At War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), ch. 5, esp. pp. 141- 145. Khong cites William Bundy, assistant secretary of state for Far-Eastern affairs under Presi￾dent Johnson, who argued that, in 1964-1965, airfields in northernmost Vietnam were not attacked because of the lessons of November 1950. Bundy wrote: "If the Chinese came to think the United States was out to destroy North Vietnam, would not the situation be essentially similar to MacArthur's advance to the top of North Korea fourteen years before?" Also see Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), chap. 3. 8. For political science and deterrence theory works that treat the Korean crisis, see George and This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:05:01 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions