autonomy50 also requires the removal of national regulatory barriers which interfere with the access to national markets. Regulation of market failure doubles up as a market integration issue. I Community law therefore imposes a second, parallel, series of constraints on Member States, which must refrain from applying measures which will lead to over-regulation or multiple burdens which restrict access to foreign markets. Scrutiny under market freedoms article 3 of the Rome Convention. Thus, the conflict rule governing transactions on thf E may apply to any form of mandatory state regulation which is internationally enforceable under articles 5 to 7 of the Rome Convention, includ ing measures implementing Community directives, 2 but does not apply to the choice-facilitating rules which fall within the scope of internal market draws a double divid ing line: it demarcates internationally mandatory regulation from the scope of free choice, while simultaneously ensuring the vertical allocation of competence between Community law, imposing minimum(consumer protection) or maximum standards(market freedoms), and regulation at the lower, Member State level of the garden variety of contract law. If the double line ad mitted ly lacks clarity in some cases, it may be due to fluctuations in the case- law of the European Court of Justice as to the desirable extent of state competition. 53 However, the encounter between the economic dynamics of Community law and the more trad itional private law concerns of the conflict of settle. +Thus, pre-emptive law under market freedoms is not necessarily internationall laws inevitably brings about shifts in trad itional categories, which may also require time mandatory within the trad itional meaning of article 7 of the Rome Convention, whereas national public economic regulation may similarly be disqualified as such and subjected to party choice (mandated as far as national measures are concerned by the Court of Justice in Cassis de Dijon and as far as concerns the Community legislator by funda mental freedoms and proportionality ) see Stefan Grundman, The Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, Oxford EC Law Library, 200 e field of securities regulation, see Niamh Structure of European Contract Law. On similar developments in the 50 Such is the primary function of internal market freedoms under the EU Treaty; see Grundmann,"The Structure of European Contract Law, 510 51 On the fact that the integration issue sometimes eclipses substantive policies, in particularinvestor protection in the field of securities regulation, see Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation See, for example, CJCE C-369/96& C376/96, 23 Novem ber 1999, Arblade; 15 March 2001, Mazzoleni, extending the scrutiny to rules providing for internationally manda tory rules of the forum-host state providing for minimum salary; see also below, under(b ). The scrutinised measures may include rules not traditionally seen as contract law, including rules of public law, see Grundmann, The Structure of European Contract Law See Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC La. In implementing the economic freedoms, the Court of Justice seems to hesitate between a model which fosters state competition, towards a more centralised model, in which EC scrutiny encroaches on cases in which there is no protectionist intent or effect, pre-empting choice of law and restricting party autonomy. Thus, the 1995 Bosman case implements a very expansive reading of the to caty, based on the idea of market access, in which, practically, the very existence of a conflict of laws seems see Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC L 54 On these shifts, see Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, The EU and a Metamorphosis of Private International Law, in Reform and Development ofprivate International Law: Essays in HonourofSir Peter North. OUP. 2002. 111 The allocation of regulatory com petence between the home and host countries in the areas subject to scrutiny under the econom ic freedoms concems points of both public and private law, a given determination of the applicable law may be pre-empted under the home country principle if it gives rise to a multiple burden forautonomy50 also requires the removal of national regulatory barriers which interfere with the access to national markets. Regulation of market failure doubles up as a market integration issue.51 Community law therefore imposes a second, parallel, series of constraints on Member States, which must refrain from applying measures which will lead to over-regulation or multiple burdens which restrict access to foreign markets. Scrutiny under market freedoms may apply to any form of mandatory state regulation which is internationally enforceable under articles 5 to 7 of the Rome Convention, including measures implementing Community directives,52 but does not apply to the choice-facilitating rules which fall within the scope of article 3 of the Rome Convention. Thus, the conflict rule governing transactions on the internal market draws a double dividing line: it demarcates internationally mandatory regulation from the scope of free choice, while simultaneously ensuring the vertical allocation of competence between Community law, imposing minimum (consumer protection) or maximum standards (market freedoms), and regulation at the lower, Member State level, of the garden variety of contract law. If the double line admittedly lacks clarity in some cases, it may be due to fluctuations in the case-law of the European Court of Justice as to the desirable extent of state competition.53 However, the encounter between the economic dynamics of Community law and the more traditional private law concerns of the conflict of laws inevitably brings about shifts in traditional categories, which may also require time to settle.54 Thus, pre-emptive law under market freedoms is not necessarily internationally mandatory within the traditional meaning of article 7 of the Rome Convention, whereas national public economic regulation may similarly be disqualified as such and subjected to party choice.55 (mandated as far as national measures are concerned by the Court of Justice in Cassis de Dijon and as far as concerns the Community legislator by fundamental freedoms and proportionality), see Stefan Grundman, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’. On similar developments in the field of securities regulation, see Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, Oxford EC Law Library, 2002. 50 Such is the primary function of internal market freedoms under the EU Treaty; see Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’, 510. 51 On the fact that the integration issue sometimes eclipses substantive policies, in particular investor protection in the field of securities regulation, see Niamh Moloney, EC Securities Regulation. 52 See, for example, CJCE C-369/96 & C376/96, 23 November 1999, Arblade; 15 March 2001, Mazzoleni, extending the scrutiny to rules providing for internationally mandatory rules of the forum -host state providing for minimum salary; see also below, under (b). The scrutinised measures may include rules not traditionally seen as contract law, including rules of public law; see Grundmann, ‘The Structure of European Contract Law’, 515. 53 See Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law. In implementing the economic freedoms, the Court of Justice seems to hesitate between a model which fosters state competition, towards a more centralised model, in which EC scrutiny encroaches on cases in which there is no protectionist intent or effect, pre-empting choice of law and restricting party autonomy. Thus, the 1995 Bosman case implements a very expansive reading of the Treaty, based on the idea of market access, in which, practically, the very existence of a conflict of laws seems to generate EC competence. On the extent to which it may be necessary to distinguish the different freedoms, see Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law. 54 On these shifts, see Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘The EU and a Metamorphosis of Private International Law’, in Reform and Development of Private International Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Peter North, OUP, 2002, 111. 55 The allocation of regulatory competence between the home and host countries in the areas subject to scrutiny under the economic freedoms concerns points of both public and private law; a given determination of the applicable law may be pre-empted under the home country principle if it gives rise to a multiple burden for