9.(b) Ensuring the full extent ofeconomic freedoms. Indeed, harmonisation of Member State legislation designed to remedy market failure does not preclude regulatory competition entirely, as national legislators are often free to adopt measures more stringent than those required by Community directives. 6 Here, however, the application of more stringent national measures to cross-border situations justifies scrutiny under fundamental freedoms, in order to avoid reconstitution of regulatory barriers. Such scrutiny has given rise to the well known distribution of Member State regulatory authority under Keck and its progeny, in the form of mutual recognition. The home country may apply its regulation in relation to the product itself, whereas host country law prevails as far as selling arrangements are concerned57A similar division can be found, for example, in the field of financial service where the host country may impose rules of conduct, while the service itself is shaped through prudential and supervisory requirements according to home country provisions Interestingly, such a design gives rise to the formulation of a new generation of choice of law rules. which raise familiar issues of characterisation and definition of connecting factors. 59 Designed to prevent discrimination in the form of a double regulatory burden imposed on goods or services entering a foreign market, the new rules pre-empt divergent national conflicts solutions, and apply whatever the nature of the measures involved(public/private mand atory/default).60 Products and services may thus enter foreign markets freely, without being deprived of their original competitive ad vantage. At the same time, citizen preferences are maintained as host states are free to look for the most efficient marketing arrangements Here again, the shifts in trad itional categories become apparent: in exercising supervisory the importer, for example, whether or not it is technically a nationally imperative rule under article 7. Moreover, under the home country principle, according to which domestic consumers benefit from goods and services shaped by foreign regulation, national measures reinforcing the minimum requirements of directives lose their mandatory character, since those consumers will always be able to opt out of the scope of domestic regulation if they prefer a foreign offer. At the same time, regulatory competition among states may well extend to public 56 This is far from being true in all cases, however, particularly as far as information rules are concemed see, for example, the 1993 Investment Serv ices Directive or the new 2002 Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services directive See jukka snell. Goods and Services in EC Law 58 An altemative approach is present in the 2002 Financial Distance Marketing Directive and the E Commerce Directive (2000/31). The latter prov ides for the law of the Member State from which the service is provided and allocates authority and jurisdiction to ensure compliance to the Member State of the suppliers see Michael Wildespin Xavier Lewis, 'Les relations entre le droit communautaire et les regles de conflit fo 3. home. However, it does not indicate that it does not provide rules of private international law. On this ambig lois, I Rev crit DIP 299(2002); Corcoran& Hart, The Regulation of Cross-Border Financial Services in the EU Intemal Market 8 Colum Eur L 221 at 246 59 As in more trad itionalcases, these are not without difficulty, and require reflection upon the specific aims of division of regulatory competences(on the two possible readings of the Treaty on this point- the one decentralised and anti-protectionist, the other a more intrusive 'economic freedom'reading-see Jukka Snell, foods and Services in EC Law). For instance, the 1995 Alpine Investments case(C-384/93, ECR 1-1 141)shows that the very notion of ' selling arrangements as distinct from product rules may be difficult; it has thus been proposed to sub-distinguish static and dynamic selling arrangements(see Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law, 94. For a different, interesting example of the formulation of a conflict of laws rule relating to takeovers, on cross-border bids, see Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, 836 On these controversial occult conflict rules, see among a bundant literature the recent study by Michael Wildespin Xavier Lewis, 'Les relations entre le droit communautaireet les regles de conflit de lois9. (b) Ensuring the full extent of economic freedoms. Indeed, harmonisation of Member State legislation designed to remedy market failure does not preclude regulatory competition entirely, as national legislators are often free to adopt measures more stringent than those required by Community directives.56 Here, however, the application of more stringent national measures to cross-border situations justifies scrutiny under fundamental freedoms, in order to avoid reconstitution of regulatory barriers. Such scrutiny has given rise to the well￾known distribution of Member State regulatory authority under Keck and its progeny, in the form of mutual recognition. The home country may apply its regulation in relation to the product itself, whereas host country law prevails as far as selling arrangements are concerned.57 A similar division can be found, for example, in the field of financial services, where the host country may impose rules of conduct, while the service itself is shaped through prudential and supervisory requirements according to home country provisions.58 Interestingly, such a design gives rise to the formulation of a new generation of choice of law rules, which raise familiar issues of characterisation and definition of connecting factors.59 Designed to prevent discrimination in the form of a double regulatory burden imposed on goods or services entering a foreign market, the new rules pre-empt divergent national conflicts solutions, and apply whatever the nature of the measures involved (public/private; mandatory/default).60 Products and services may thus enter foreign markets freely, without being deprived of their original competitive advantage. At the same time, citizen preferences are maintained as host states are free to look for the most efficient marketing arrangements. Here again, the shifts in traditional categories become apparent: in exercising supervisory the importer, for example, whether or not it is technically a nationally imperative rule under article 7. Moreover, under the home country principle, according to which domestic consumers benefit from goods and services shaped by foreign regulation, national measures reinforcing the minimum requirements of directives lose their mandatory character, since those consumers will always be able to opt out of the scope of domestic regulation if they prefer a foreign offer. At the same time, regulatory competition among states may well extend to public goods. 56 This is far from being true in all cases, however, particularly as far as information rules are concerned; see, for example, the 1993 Investment Services Directive or the new 2002 Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services Directive. 57 See Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law. 58 An alternative approach is present in the 2002 Financial Distance Marketing Directive and the E￾Commerce Directive (2000/31). The latter provides for the law of the Member State from which the service is provided and allocates authority and jurisdiction to ensure compliance to the Member State of the suppliers’ home. However, it does not indicate that it does not provide rules of private international law. On this ambiguity, see Michael Wildespin & Xavier Lewis, ‘Les relations entre le droit communautaire et les règles de conflit de lois’, 1 Rev crit DIP 299 (2002); Corcoran & Hart, ‘The Regulation of Cross-Border Financial Services in the EU Internal Market’ 8 Colum J Eur L 221 at 246. 59 As in more traditional cases, these are not without difficulty, and require reflection upon the specific aims of division of regulatory competences (on the two possible readings of the Treaty on this point - the one decentralised and anti-protectionist, the other a more intrusive ‘economic freedom’ reading - see Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law). For instance, the 1995 Alpine Investments case (C-384/93, ECR I-1141) shows that the very notion of ‘selling arrangements’ as distinct from product rules may be difficult; it has t hus been proposed to sub-distinguish static and dynamic selling arrangements (see Jukka Snell, Goods and Services in EC Law, 94. For a different, interesting example of the formulation of a conflict of laws rule relating to takeovers, on cross-border bids, see Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, 836. 60 On these controversial ‘occult’ conflict rules, see among abundant literature the recent study by Michael Wildespin & Xavier Lewis, ‘Les relations entre le droit communautaire et les règles de conflit de lois’