426 International Organization a whole.Historically,however,open trade has been the exception rather than the rule. Studies of the political economy of trade often attribute variations in trade pref- erences to the distributional implications of overseas commerce.Despite the eco- nomic benefits that a given country would accrue from open trade,some individuals suffer economic harm as a result.If these individuals form a politically potent constituency,they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole.If, on the other hand,the individuals who derive welfare gains from trade are partic- ularly influential,then an open trade regime is likely to take hold.Recent research indicates that,in democratic countries,constituency opinion on trade plays a cen- tral role in influencing the policy positions of public officials.2 There are two principle ways of assessing the distributional consequences of trade.First,the factor endowments approach emphasizes that,in a given country, trade benefits those individuals who own factors of production that are in abun- dant supply relative to the remainder of the world,and harms owners of factors that are in scarce supply.In countries such as the United States,which has a skilled labor force,free trade benefits highly skilled workers and harms less skilled work- ers.Second,the specific factors approach predicts that an individual's attitudes toward trade will reflect characteristics of the industry in which he or she works. People employed in industries that depend on overseas markets should be more supportive of open trade than people working in industries that face considerable competition from imports. A small but growing number of studies have evaluated the strength of these explanations for trade policy preferences.We extend this body of research using two representative national surveys of Americans and more comprehensive mea- sures of industries and occupations than previous studies had available to them.In addition,we link the study of trade preferences to the more extensive body of theory and empirical research on how self-interest enters into the formation of domestic economic policy preferences. Substantial research in other economic policy domains has demonstrated that self-interest rarely shapes the formation of policy opinions because people have a difficult time understanding the connection between personal economic well- being and government policy.By mounting the most thorough individual-level examination to date of the effects of industry and skill on individual trade prefer- ences,we seek to determine whether trade is,indeed,one of those rare exceptions in which personal experiences are successfully politicized.Alternatively,if atti- tudes about trade are formed in a manner similar to attitudes about domestic eco- nomic domains such as unemployment,then trade policy preferences will be based on how people believe a policy affects the country collectively rather than on nar- rowly defined self-interest.Importantly,the analysis of aggregate-level data-the 2.See Fordham and McKeown 2003;and Kono 2008.a whole+ Historically, however, open trade has been the exception rather than the rule+ Studies of the political economy of trade often attribute variations in trade pref￾erences to the distributional implications of overseas commerce+ Despite the eco￾nomic benefits that a given country would accrue from open trade, some individuals suffer economic harm as a result+ If these individuals form a politically potent constituency, they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole+ If, on the other hand, the individuals who derive welfare gains from trade are partic￾ularly influential, then an open trade regime is likely to take hold+ Recent research indicates that, in democratic countries, constituency opinion on trade plays a cen￾tral role in influencing the policy positions of public officials+ 2 There are two principle ways of assessing the distributional consequences of trade+ First, the factor endowments approach emphasizes that, in a given country, trade benefits those individuals who own factors of production that are in abun￾dant supply relative to the remainder of the world, and harms owners of factors that are in scarce supply+ In countries such as the United States, which has a skilled labor force, free trade benefits highly skilled workers and harms less skilled work￾ers+ Second, the specific factors approach predicts that an individual’s attitudes toward trade will reflect characteristics of the industry in which he or she works+ People employed in industries that depend on overseas markets should be more supportive of open trade than people working in industries that face considerable competition from imports+ A small but growing number of studies have evaluated the strength of these explanations for trade policy preferences+ We extend this body of research using two representative national surveys of Americans and more comprehensive mea￾sures of industries and occupations than previous studies had available to them+ In addition, we link the study of trade preferences to the more extensive body of theory and empirical research on how self-interest enters into the formation of domestic economic policy preferences+ Substantial research in other economic policy domains has demonstrated that self-interest rarely shapes the formation of policy opinions because people have a difficult time understanding the connection between personal economic well￾being and government policy+ By mounting the most thorough individual-level examination to date of the effects of industry and skill on individual trade prefer￾ences, we seek to determine whether trade is, indeed, one of those rare exceptions in which personal experiences are successfully politicized+ Alternatively, if atti￾tudes about trade are formed in a manner similar to attitudes about domestic eco￾nomic domains such as unemployment, then trade policy preferences will be based on how people believe a policy affects the country collectively rather than on nar￾rowly defined self-interest+ Importantly, the analysis of aggregate-level data—the 2+ See Fordham and McKeown 2003; and Kono 2008+ 426 International Organization