as a basic explanation for China's problems. have to contend with the preceding 80 or 90 years of But what about the political impact of imperialism?Here imperialism's effects.At the most,it would seem,the we have to deal with Isaacs'two points about direct foreign compradore class was able to delay the revolution by ten of support for reactionary forces on the Chinese scene and the the one hundred or so years it required to come to fruition. distortion of normal political evolution by the fostering of a To the extent,then,that the Isaacs book can represent compradore class. what Mr.Peck means by a "revolutionary Marxist" With respect to the first point,research turns up a familiar interpretation of the effect of imperialism on China,the mixed picture.It is true that the Powers in the 1860s initiated results of this brief survey of the relevant literature suggest a "cooperative policy"toward the dynasty,which they that Peck is directing us into a blind alley when he calls for thought would reform itself and thus establish the peace analysis of modern Chinese history to be carried out in this necessary to the full development of the China trade which vein.If the debate over the basic causes of China's modern was the Powers'main goal;that the Powers provided technical difficulties is to have two sides,the external-causation side of assistance to the self-strengtheners,who used their new the argument will be ill served by adopting the five Isaacs arsenals and weapons to suppress domestic rebellions;and that propositions as the basis of its position.With no disrespect to some foreign mercenaries participated in the campaign against Mr.Isaacs'superb book,it appears that in the light of more the Taipings.25 But it is clear that these factors were far from recent research his interpretation of imperialism's effects is decisive for the survival of the dynasty to 1911.The forces of simplistic and misdirected. rebellion must have been weak indeed if the essentially A more tenable-although not revolutionary Marxist-view peripheral foreign role was sufficient to tip the balance toward of the effects of imperialism on China,it seems to me,is that their suppression.In any case,the dynasty did fall and was it wrought a profound change in the Chinese national psyche. succeeded by Yuan Shih-k'ai and then the warlords.Here In this view,the primary result of imperialism was the rise of again,despite the fact of some foreign loans and some foreign Chinese nationalism and the consequent revolution which was meddling,and despite the inviting coincidence between certain carried out as a succession of transformations aimed at ridding spheres of influence and certain warlords,the foreign role was China of foreign encroachment.What was important, essentially peripheral.All the evidence so far on this still according to this interpretation,was not the actual social and ill-researched period is that the Powers deplored rather than economic impact of imperialism,which was relatively slight, favored warlordism because of its harmful impact on trade; but the fact that the Chinese themselves believed in the that after the Nishihara Loans they gave no substantial severity of this impact,9 and the further fact that the Chinese financial support to the Peking government or individual were deeply humiliated by the unequal treaties and the racism warlords;and that they were wary of backing any specific of the citizens of the Powers.In the nineteenth century, warlord for fear that he might soon fall out of power.26 In Chinese diplomats believed they were manipulating the short,although the Powers did little to end warlordism,it foreigners by granting privileges that would make the would be entirely too superficial to regard their presence as its foreigners grateful to the Empire.But as imperialism grew cause.In conclusion,then,however high-handed and more extensive,it created in China a new concept of illegitimate the direct political interventions of imperialism in sovereignty and a ncw emotion of nationalism, which China before the 1930s,on a balanced view their effects would stressed the extirpation of foreign privilege and the have to be judged inessential to the outcome or even to the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese body politic.China timing of revolution in China.27 must strengthen herself to win back sovereignty:such was the Issacs'final point-the distorting impact of imperialism on view of successive waves of reformers and revolutionaries from China's political evolution-is harder to evaluate.For one the self-strengtheners through the communists.31 If the thing,it requires us to assume that China would have taken the necessary national strength could only be earned at the "normal"(European)course of bourgeois revolution against expense of the traditional social and political order,the price feudalism,an assumption which is hard to accept in view of had ultimately to be paid.In this way,China's national the fact that the Chinese bourgeoisie,weak as it was,seems to conservatism was shaken by the excesses of imperialism,and have developed to the extent that it did largly because of the revolution replaced restoration as the goal of the political elite. foreign impact.Furthermore,a proper evaluation of the It was a process that could only be understood as a response to general issue of the class nature of successive regimes and the impact of imperialism,but to imperialism's psychological, political forces in modern China would require more cultural and intellectual impact rather than to its social and knowledge than we yet have about,for example,which social economic impact. classes supported the Nanking government and how important This view of imperialism's effects has ambiguous this support was to its strength.But in the absence of this sort implications for the larger issue of the reasons for China's and of knowledge there are at least shreds of evidence that caution Japan's different experiences in the last century.There skepticism towards the argument that reactionary regimes remains the possibility,suggested by Peck,32 that the (Manchus,warlords and the KMT)were founded on the psychological,cultural and intellectual impact of imperialism support of a compradore class created by imperialism.If the on China was heavier that it was on Japan.But if we ask why treaty port economy was as small a proportion of the total it was heavier,we are likely to assign considerable importance economy as we have argued above,it is hard to see how any in our answer to the different Chinese and Japanese treaty port class-compradore,boureoisie or proletariat-could perceptions of imperialism,and to their different readiness to have had a controlling impact on the outcome or timing of the adopt the idea of nationalism and to transform themselves Chinese revolution.28 Even if we concede the dubious point politically and technologically.We are,in short,likely to be that the strength of the Nationalist Government of 1927-1937 led back to that stress on internal causes which Mr.Peck was based primarily or largely on compradore support,we still wishes to avoid,despite the fact that we assign no less 6as a basic explanation for China's problems. Hut what about the political impact of imperialism? Here we have to deal with Isaacs' two points about direct foreign support for reactionary forces on the Chinese scene and the distortion of normal political evolution by the fostering of a compradore class. With respect to the first point, research turns up a familiar mixed picture. It is true that the Powers in the 1860s initiated a "cooperative policy" toward the dynasty, which they thought would reform itself and thus establish the peace necessary to the full development of the China trade which was the Powers' main goal; that the Powers provided technical assistance to the self-strengtheners, who used their new arsenals and weapons to suppress domestic rebellions; and that some foreign mercenaries participated in the campaign against the Taipings.25 But it is clear that these factors were far from decisive for the survival of the dynasty to 1911. The forces of rebellion must have been weak indeed if the essentially peripheral foreign role was sufficient to tip the balance toward their suppression. In any case, the dynasty did fall and was succeeded by Yuan Shih-k'ai and then the warlords. Here again, despite the fact of some foreign loans and some foreign meddling, and despite the inviting coincidence between certain spheres of influence and certain warlords, the foreign role was essentially peripheral. All the evidence so far on this still ill-researched period is that the Powers deplored rather than favored warlord ism because of its harmful impact on trade; that after the Nishihara Loans they gave no substantial financial support to the Peking government or individual warlords; and that they were wary of backing any specific warlord for fear that he might soon fdl out of power. 26 In short, although the Powers did little "" end warlord ism, it would be entirely too superficial to regard their presence as its cause. In conclusion, then, however high-handed and illegitimate the direct political interventions of imperialism in China before the 1930s, on a balanced view their effects would have to be judged inessential to the outcome or even to the timing of revolution in China. 27 Issacs' final point-the distorting impact of imperialism on China's political evolution-is harder to evaluate. For one thing, it requires us to assume that China would have taken the "normal" (European) course of bourgeois revolution against feudalism, an assumption which is hard to accept in view of the fact that the Chinese bourgeoisie, weak as it was, seems to have developed to the extent that it did largly because of the foreign impact. Furthermore, a proper evaluation of the general issue of the class nature of successive regimes and political forces in modern China would require more knowledge than we yet have about, for example, which social classes supported the Nanking government and how important this support was to its strength. But in the absence of this sort of knowledge there are at least shreds of evidence that caution skepticism towards the argument that reactionary regimes (Manchus, warlords and the KMT) were founded on the support of a compradore class created by imperialism. If the treaty port economy was as small a proportion of the total economy as we have argued above, it is hard to see how any treaty port c1ass-compradore, boureoisie or proletariat-could have had a controlling impact on the outcome or timing of the Chinese revolution. 28 Even if we concede the dubious point that the strength of the Nationalist Government of 1927-1937 was based primarily or largely on compradore support, we still have to contend with the preceding 80 or 90 years of imperialism's effects. At the most, it would seem, the compradore class was able to delay the revolution by ten of the one hundred or so years it required to come to fruition. To the extent, then, that the Isaacs book can represent what Mr. Peck means by a "revolutionary Marxist" interpretation of the effect of imperialism on China, the results of this brief survey of the relevant literature suggest that Peck is directing us into a blind alley when he calls for analysis of modern Chinese history to be carried out in this vein. If the debate over the basic causes of China's modern difficulties is to have two sides, the external-causation side of the argume nt will be ill served by adopting the five Isaacs propositions as the basis of its position. With no disrespect to Mr. Isaacs' superb book, it appears that in the light of more recent research his interpretation of imperialism's effects is simplistic and misdirected. A more tenable-although not revolutionary Marxist-view of the effects of imperialism on China, it seems to me, is that it wrought a profound change in the Chinese national psyche. In this view, the primary result of imperialism was the rise of Chinese nationalism and the consequent revolution which was carried out as a succession of transformations aimed at ridding China of foreign encroachment. What was important, according to this interpretation, was not the actual social and economic impact of imperialism, which was relatively slight, but the fact that the Chinese themselves believed in the severity of this impact,29 and the further fact that the Chinese were deeply humiliated by the unequal treaties and the racism of the citizens of the Powers. In the nineteenth century, Chinese diplomats believed they were manipulating the foreigners by granting privileges that would make the foreigners grateful to the Empire. But as imperialism grew more extensive, it created in China a new concept of sovereignty and a new emotion of nationalism,3O which stressed the extirpation of foreign privilege and the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese body politic. China must strengthen herself to win back sovereignty: such was the view of successive waves of reformers and revolutionaries from the self-strengtheners through the communists. 31 If the necessary national strength could only be earned .at the expense of the traditional social and political order, the price had ultimately to be paid. In this way, China's national conservatism was shaken by the excesses of imperialism, and revolution replaced restoration as the goal of the political elite. It was a process that could only be understood as a response to the impact of imperialism, but to imperialism's psychological, cultural and intellectual impact rather than to its social and economic impact. This view of imperialism's effects has ambiguous implications for the larger issue of the reasons for China's and Japan's different experiences in the last century. There remains the possibility, suggested by Peck, 32 that the psychological, cultural and intellectual impact of imperialism on China was heavier that it was on Japan. But if we ask why it was heavier, we are likely to assign considerable importance in our answer to the different Chinese and Japanese perceptions of imperialism, and to their different readiness to adopt the idea of nationalism and to transform themselves politically and technologically. We are, in short, likely to be led back to that stress on internal causes which Mr. Peck wishes to avoid, despite the fact that we assign no less 6