there is less disagreement than might seem Explaining Away. Remember society's customs are a function of more than their values. Their factual and religious beliefs. as well as their circumstances matter too Survival Values: So at least some apparent differences in values can be explained away. But we can also make a positive argument: cultures must have some values in common, namely the ones without which a society would not be able to sustain itself. However: moral objectivism has some of its own problems Moral skepticism: If our own cultural norms may well be deeply misguided, where do we begin to think about morality? How can we ever be sure we are tracking the moral truth? And if we can' t be sure we re tracking the moral truth, on what basis could we begin to criticize others? It might seem that moral objectivism, then, provides no better basis for criticism than moral relatioⅤism "Queerness"of moral"facts " Physical facts are relatively straightforward we know what it is for something to have weight, mass, color, etc. But sorts of things are"moral facts"? How does one detect a moral fact? If we live in a physical universe, is there any room in it for moral facts? So: what can we learn from the fact of moral variation between cultures? First, some of what we call right and wrong laws against murder. But second, this is compatible with there being large areas of our moral lives in which there are an might not be a matter of objective moral truth, but just a matter of local custom, more along the lines of traffic laws th genuine moral laws universal truths about how to conduct ourselves Questions to think about 1)What about the moral disagreements? Aren't there areas of moral life that cannot be understood relativistically (i.e,on the model of etiquette), but in which there is still disagreement? How should we think of, e.g., disagr nts over vegetarianism, religious toleration, sexism, homophobia, abortion? Is there an objective moral truth in these domains or not? How can we determine whether it is an objective domain or not? And if it is, how do we find the answer? 2)Is it possible to draw a clear distinction between facts and values? E.g., in describing something as"beef"or"pork"or even more generally"meat", isn 't one representing it from a particular evaluative viewpoint(e.g, from the point of view of a non-vegetarian)? In saying, " That's beef, " is one making a"purely factual claim? In saying, " That's a slice of dead cow, is one making a"purely"factual claim? What about, "Thats a lie, or"He's a bigot"?there is less disagreement than might seem. Explaining Away. Remember society's customs are a function of more than their values. Their factual and religious beliefs, as well as their circumstances, matter too. Survival Values: So at least some apparent differences in values can be explained away. But we can also make a positive argument: cultures must have some values in common, namely the ones without which a society would not be able to sustain itself. However: moral objectivism has some of its own problems: Moral skepticism: If our own cultural norms may well be deeply misguided, where do we begin to think about morality? How can we ever be sure we are tracking the moral truth? And if we can't be sure we're tracking the moral truth, on what basis could we begin to criticize others? It might seem that moral objectivism, then, provides no better basis for criticism than moral relativism. "Queerness" of moral "facts": Physical facts are relatively straightforward: we know what it is for something to have weight, mass, color, etc. But sorts of things are "moral facts"? How does one detect a moral fact? If we live in a physical universe, is there any room in it for moral facts? So: what can we learn from the fact of moral variation between cultures? First, some of what we call right and wrong might not be a matter of objective moral truth, but just a matter of local custom, more along the lines of traffic laws than laws against murder. But second, this is compatible with there being large areas of our moral lives in which there are genuine moral laws; universal truths about how to conduct ourselves. Questions to think about: 1) What about the moral disagreements? Aren't there areas of moral life that cannot be understood relativistically (i.e., on the model of etiquette), but in which there is still disagreement? How should we think of, e.g., disagreements over vegetarianism, religious toleration, sexism, homophobia, abortion? Is there an objective moral truth in these domains or not? How can we determine whether it is an objective domain or not? And if it is, how do we find the answer? 2) Is it possible to draw a clear distinction between facts and values? E.g., in describing something as "beef" or "pork" or even more generally "meat", isn't one representing it from a particular evaluative viewpoint (e.g., from the point of view of a non-vegetarian)? In saying, "That's beef," is one making a "purely" factual claim? In saying, "That's a slice of dead cow," is one making a "purely" factual claim? What about, "That's a lie," or "He's a bigot"?