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members of that society. E.g., one version of cultural relativism could be stated this way Action X is morally wrong for agent A, who is a member of society S iff the moral code in S entails that A should not doⅩ So, does it follow from the fact of deep-seated moral disagreements that moral relativism is true? Pretty clearly it doesn 't follow. But even if there is no knock-down argument from moral conflict to moral relativism, the question is, what is the best way to understand widespread moral disagreement? Let's begin with some worrisome consequences of relativism Cross-Cultural Criticism. Often we want to call some foreign custom or practice morally objectionable. But can we, if we are relatioⅤists? Intra-Cultural Criticism. According to the relativist, there's a simple test for deciding what's right and wrong. Just consult the standards of your society; for all"right"and"wrong"mean in your mouth are right and wrong-according-to-those standards. But normally we admit that our moral code is not perfect. On what basis can the relativist say this? Intra-cultural Conflict: In every culture, there are disagreements about what counts as right or wrong. It is misleading to suggest that there is such a thing as"the standards of your society since societies are complex and evolving. At best relativist would have to pick some subset of values that members of the society endorse( which members? The dominant ones?), but why those as opposed to the others? Moral Progress. How can there be moral progress if right means right-according to-our-existing moral code? Moral progress happens when someone says, our existing moral code falls short of the moral truth, hence it needs to be adjusted Again, is this compatible with relativism? Now, interesting as these objections are, a convinced relativist could try to bite the bullet. That is, maybe we shouldn 't engage in moral criticism; and maybe our highly touted moral progress is just so much self-congratulation. But are there deeper problems with relativism? Some suggest that relativism is somehow incoherent, that it undermine itself. Toleration an Absolute/Objective Value? Suppose, as the relativist suggests, that it's arrogant and absurd to criticize another culture's values. This appears to lead the relativist into a contradiction, for it seems that they are offering the rule of toleration as non-relative moral rule. One cannot both say that there are no objective moral values and that toleration is one Disappearance of Disagreement. Suppose we return to the usual relativist idea that we are not to criticize other culture's values; we should"agree to disagree"and leave them to their own perspectives. Problem is, if relativism is true then we don't disagree. Consider a series of conversations: "Im hungry. Well, I disagree. I'm not hungry. Still, I respect your right to your different perspective. "What different perspective? We're not disagreeing at all! Taking Morality Seriously. Remember, what started us off is that there is disagreement and we feel troubled by it. The relativist says, you needn't feel troubled; just treat morality like a different kind of etiquette, albeit a kind people take much more seriously. But that's in a way the problem. How can we take it so seriously if moral ity is just a matter of conventional ules of conduct that we happen to have made up for ourselves? Perhaps we should take a second look at moral objectivism. The worry was that objectivism is going to lead to moral skepticism, and that skepticism is going to lead to paralysis and inaction. But maybe that was too quick. The original impetus for relativism is the dramatic moral disagreement that we seemed to find between various cultures. But perhapsmembers of that society. E.g., one version of cultural relativism could be stated this way: Action X is morally wrong for agent A, who is a member of society S iff the moral code in S entails that A should not do X. So, does it follow from the fact of deep-seated moral disagreements that moral relativism is true? Pretty clearly it doesn't follow. But even if there is no knock-down argument from moral conflict to moral relativism, the question is, what is the best way to understand widespread moral disagreement? Let's begin with some worrisome consequences of relativism. Cross-Cultural Criticism. Often we want to call some foreign custom or practice morally objectionable. But can we, if we are relativists? Intra-Cultural Criticism. According to the relativist, there's a simple test for deciding what's right and wrong. Just consult the standards of your society; for all "right" and "wrong" mean in your mouth are right and wrong-according-to-those￾standards. But normally we admit that our moral code is not perfect. On what basis can the relativist say this? Intra-cultural Conflict: In every culture, there are disagreements about what counts as right or wrong. It is misleading to suggest that there is such a thing as "the standards of your society", since societies are complex and evolving. At best a relativist would have to pick some subset of values that members of the society endorse (which members? The dominant ones?), but why those as opposed to the others? Moral Progress. How can there be moral progress if right means right-according to-our-existing moral code? Moral progress happens when someone says, our existing moral code falls short of the moral truth; hence it needs to be adjusted. Again, is this compatible with relativism? Now, interesting as these objections are, a convinced relativist could try to bite the bullet. That is, maybe we shouldn't engage in moral criticism; and maybe our highly touted moral progress is just so much self-congratulation. But are there deeper problems with relativism? Some suggest that relativism is somehow incoherent, that it undermine itself: Toleration an Absolute/Objective Value? Suppose, as the relativist suggests, that it's arrogant and absurd to criticize another culture's values. This appears to lead the relativist into a contradiction, for it seems that they are offering the rule of toleration as non-relative moral rule. One cannot both say that there are no objective moral values and that toleration is one. Disappearance of Disagreement. Suppose we return to the usual relativist idea that we are not to criticize other culture's values; we should "agree to disagree" and leave them to their own perspectives. Problem is, if relativism is true then we don't disagree. Consider a series of conversations: "I'm hungry." "Well, I disagree. I'm not hungry. Still, I respect your right to your different perspective." What different perspective? We're not disagreeing at all! Taking Morality Seriously. Remember, what started us off is that there is disagreement and we feel troubled by it. The relativist says, you needn't feel troubled; just treat morality like a different kind of etiquette, albeit a kind people take much more seriously. But that's in a way the problem. How can we take it so seriously if morality is just a matter of conventional rules of conduct that we happen to have made up for ourselves? Perhaps we should take a second look at moral objectivism. The worry was that objectivism is going to lead to moral skepticism, and that skepticism is going to lead to paralysis and inaction. But maybe that was too quick. The original impetus for relativism is the dramatic moral disagreement that we seemed to find between various cultures. But perhaps
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