DENNETT'S COMMENTS o Dennett (1987)sums up the issue: Searle's view then, comes to this: take a material object(any material object) that does not have the power of causing mental phenomena; you cannot turn it in to an object that does have the power of producing mental phenomena simply by programming it--reorganizing the conditiona dependencies of transitions between its states Dennett' s view is the opposite: programming " is precisely what could give something a mind. But Dennett claims that in fact it is " empirically unlikely that the right sorts of programs can be run on anything but organic, human brains (325-6)DENNETT’S COMMENTS  Dennett (1987) sums up the issue: “Searle's view, then, comes to this: take a material object (any material object) that does not have the power of causing mental phenomena; you cannot turn it in to an object that does have the power of producing mental phenomena simply by programming it—reorganizing the conditional dependencies of transitions between its states.” Dennett's view is the opposite: programming “is precisely what could give something a mind”. But Dennett claims that in fact it is “empirically unlikely that the right sorts of programs can be run on anything but organic, human brains” (325–6)