Kane's view seems to have an advantage over Chisholm's because it does not postulate agent causation: my decision( a datable event, presumably) was the cause of my actions(via neural pathways) Objections: How are we to understand the decision to perform A, e.g., the decision to join the resistance? By hypothesis, the decision was the cause of the(self-forming)action, but was the decision itself free? If in order to perform A freely, I have to freely decide to perform A, then does this generate an infinite regress? But if I didn,'t decide to perform a freely, then in what sense are my choice to join and my resulting actions free? i It isn't exactly clear what Kane's view is. In particular, how does he understand the effect of my decision on the probabilities of the outcomes? If my action is free, must my decision have had an effect on the probabilities? How significant an effect? Note that in the case of the glass table, it would seem that the probability of the table's breaking at the moment in question is close to o if the man does not strike it, and is close to l if he strikes it with enough force; this significant change in the probabilities may be a basis for saying that the man caused the table to break. However, it would seem that on the picture Kane sets up, each neural pathway has(approximately )a.5 chance of dominating(it is their competition that supposedly gives rise to the indeterminacy ). In such cases it is unclear that the agent's decision can be said to cause the result. (If a bubble has a 50/50 chance of bursting at a given moment, whether or not I touch it, and I touch it and it bursts, can I be said to cause it to burst i What is the mechanism by which the agent's decision is having an impact on the probabilities of the different neural pathways and resulting courses of action? Is the agent's decision itself a neural event? Kane suggests When neuroscientists described the choice] in physio-chemical terms, all they would get are indeterministic process is also, experientially considered, the agent,'s effort of will-something agent is doing. (510/ ' t chaotic processes with probabilistic outcomes. In short, if described from a physical perspective alone, free will looks like chance. But the physical description is not the only one to be considered The indetermin chaotic But it is surely difficult to understand how one and the same thing can at the same time be an indeterministic chaotic physical process and my effort of will Where do we stand? Do you think that either Hard Determinism, Compatibilism, or Libertarianism offers a viable positionKane's view seems to have an advantage over Chisholm's because it does not postulate agent causation: my decision (a datable event, presumably) was the cause of my actions (via neural pathways). Objections: ï How are we to understand the decision to perform A, e.g., the decision to join the resistance? By hypothesis, the decision was the cause of the (self-forming) action, but was the decision itself free? If in order to perform A freely, I have to freely decide to perform A, then does this generate an infinite regress? But if I didn't decide to perform A freely, then in what sense are my choice to join and my resulting actions free? ï It isn't exactly clear what Kane's view is. In particular, how does he understand the effect of my decision on the probabilities of the outcomes? If my action is free, must my decision have had an effect on the probabilities? How significant an effect? Note that in the case of the glass table, it would seem that the probability of the table's breaking at the moment in question is close to 0 if the man does not strike it, and is close to 1 if he strikes it with enough force; this significant change in the probabilities may be a basis for saying that the man caused the table to break. However, it would seem that on the picture Kane sets up, each neural pathway has (approximately) a .5 chance of dominating (it is their competition that supposedly gives rise to the indeterminacy). In such cases it is unclear that the agent's decision can be said to cause the result. (If a bubble has a 50/50 chance of bursting at a given moment, whether or not I touch it, and I touch it and it bursts, can I be said to cause it to burst?) ï What is the mechanism by which the agent's decision is having an impact on the probabilities of the different neural pathways and resulting courses of action? Is the agent's decision itself a neural event? Kane suggests, When neuroscientists described [the choice] in physio-chemical terms, all they would get are indeterministic chaotic processes with probabilistic outcomes. In short, if described from a physical perspective alone, free will looks like chance. But the physical description is not the only one to be considered. The indeterministic chaotic process is also, experientially considered, the agent's effort of will­something agent is doing. (510) But it is surely difficult to understand how one and the same thing can at the same time be an indeterministic chaotic physical process and my effort of will. Where do we stand? Do you think that either Hard Determinism, Compatibilism, or Libertarianism offers a viable position?