about event causation: what distinguishes an event a followed by an event B, and an event a causing event B? [Can you find any differences between the two sorts of cases? Are they equally mysterious? But others find this response unconvincing. How, for example, does pointing to the agent as cause explain the event if there is nothing that the agent does to bring it about? B. Kane and Indeterministic Causatio Robert Kane is sympathetic to Chisholm's libertarianism, but unsympathetic to agent causation. Kane begins by pointing out that freedom does not require each an every free action to be an exception to determinism, for actions that are determined by our freely formed characters are themselves free. For example, if I am a good person and always choose to do the right thing, my choices are free as long as my having developed a good character wasn't entirely determined, but was something I am responsible for. So for Kane, our focus should be on the potential freedom of"character building acts-or what he calls"self-forming actions"(SFA's, p 505 Kane maintains that in moments of inner conflict when we are torn between two courses of action the tension within us creates a neural indeterminacy. Faced with such a conflict, my brain could take either of two different paths, and prior states of the brain don, t determine which path it will take. However, suppose I decide to take one course of action or another. If my brain proceeds down the path leading to that course of action, it can be said that i caused it to do so (so the resulting actions are not random ) Nonetheless, it is also the case that I wasn ' t determined to take that course because it was indeterminate that my brain would proceed in that way Kane's argument depends crucially on the premise that It may be the case that a causes B, even if a does not determine b le offers a number of examples to support this premise: suppose a man slams his fist on a glass table in an argument. It is indeterminate whether the force of the blow will break the table. however if he breaks the table it would be correct to say that he is responsible for breaking the table, and that he caused the table to break. So the slam of the fist caused the table to break even if it did not determine that the table would break The analogy with agency would seem to work as follows. Let's use a famous case described by Jean Paul Sartre: a young man during wwll is torn between joining the resistance, or staying home with his ailing mother. In a case of such inner conflict it is indeterminate whether his brain will take path P Goin) or path P*(stay home). Suppose he decides to join. If he does then pursue that choice and undertake to join then his decision caused him to do so, even if it was indeterminate whether his brain would proceed down P. As a result, his actions are not random they are caused but indeterminate So on Kane's view I act freely iff my action is either a free self forming action, or it is the product of a character that was formed by free self forming actions I act freely in performing a selfforming action A iff i)I could have performed an action other than A, i.e., my choosing a was not determined by prior events ii)I decided to perform A iii)My decision to perform a caused me to perform(or undertake to perform)A Indeterminacy: If determinism is true I couldn, t have chosen an action other than A, so I wouldn ' t satisfy (i). Freedom: My decision in favor of A caused me to perform(or undertake to perform)Aabout event causation: what distinguishes an event A followed by an event B, and an event A causing event B? [Can you find any differences between the two sorts of cases? Are they equally mysterious?] But others find this response unconvincing. How, for example, does pointing to the agent as cause explain the event if there is nothing that the agent does to bring it about? B. Kane and Indeterministic Causation Robert Kane is sympathetic to Chisholm's libertarianism, but unsympathetic to agent causation. Kane begins by pointing out that freedom does not require each an every free action to be an exception to determinism, for actions that are determined by our freely formed characters are themselves free. For example, if I am a good person and always choose to do the right thing, my choices are free as long as my having developed a good character wasn't entirely determined, but was something I am responsible for. So for Kane, our focus should be on the potential freedom of "character building" acts­or what he calls "self-forming actions" (SFA's, p. 505). Kane maintains that in moments of inner conflict when we are torn between two courses of action, the tension within us creates a neural indeterminacy. Faced with such a conflict, my brain could take either of two different paths, and prior states of the brain don't determine which path it will take. However, suppose I decide to take one course of action or another. If my brain proceeds down the path leading to that course of action, it can be said that I caused it to do so (so the resulting actions are not random ). Nonetheless, it is also the case that I wasn't determined to take that course because it was indeterminate that my brain would proceed in that way. Kane's argument depends crucially on the premise that: It may be the case that A causes B, even if A does not determine B. He offers a number of examples to support this premise: suppose a man slams his fist on a glass table in an argument. It is indeterminate whether the force of the blow will break the table. However, if he breaks the table it would be correct to say that he is responsible for breaking the table, and that he caused the table to break. So the slam of the fist caused the table to break even if it did not determine that the table would break. The analogy with agency would seem to work as follows. Let's use a famous case described by Jean Paul Sartre: a young man during WWII is torn between joining the resistance, or staying home with his ailing mother. In a case of such inner conflict it is indeterminate whether his brain will take path P (join) or path P* (stay home). Suppose he decides to join. If he does then pursue that choice and undertake to join, then his decision caused him to do so, even if it was indeterminate whether his brain would proceed down P. As a result, his actions are not random: they are caused but indeterminate. So, on Kane's view: I act freely iff my action is either a free self-forming action, or it is the product of a character that was formed by free self-forming actions. I act freely in performing a self-forming action A iff i) I could have performed an action other than A, i.e., my choosing A was not determined by prior events; ii) I decided to perform A; iii) My decision to perform A caused me to perform (or undertake to perform) A. Indeterminacy: If determinism is true I couldn't have chosen an action other than A, so I wouldn't satisfy (i). Freedom: My decision in favor of A caused me to perform (or undertake to perform) A