Recall that the problem with the idea that indeterminism solves the problem is that if my action is uncaused or random then it seems no more free than if it is determined by prior events. random events are as much out of my control as those that are caused by prior conditions. So denying determinism offers little help However consider determinism again DET)Whatever happens is determined by prior events Chisholm points out that we may deny determinism, i.e. maintain that IND) Some things that happen are not determined by prior events. without maintaining that the exceptions are uncaused or random. We need only claim that some events are not caused by other events. He suggests [In defending freewill] we must not say that every event involved in the act is caused by some other event; and we something else instead. And this something else can only be the agent-the man. (49 any other events, but by e must not say that the act is something that is not caused at all. The possibility that remains, therefore, is this: We should say that at least one of the events that are involved in the act is caused, not by any other events, but by How is this supposed to work? Consider Aristotle's example: ".a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a person. (Physics VIl: 256a6-8). According to Chisholm, the moving of the staff and the hand are both events, events a and-moving event causes the staff-moving event in the ordinary way(Chisholm refers events as transeunt causation). Moreover, there is plausibly a brain event that causes the hand-moving event; again this is ordinary event causation. But, Chisholm maintains, if the action of moving the hand is free, then the brain event that causes the hand-moving event is not caused by another event, but is caused by the person or agent. Chisholm calls such agent causation immanent causation. I cause the neurons in my brain to fire in the way necessary to cause my hand to move. and there is no event which determines the firing of those neurons So, according to Chisholm I act freely in performing an action A iff (iI, rather than some prior event, am the cause of A (or of some event that directly causes A), and (ii) I could have performed an action other than A Incompatibility: If determinism is true I couldnt have performed an action other than A, so I wouldn 't satisfy (ii) Freedom: I am the source of my actions; they are not determined by prior events Many have rejected the idea of agent causation because it appears mysterious and not fully compatible with our conception of the physical universe. For example, as Chisholm himself points out, if the firing of the hand-moving neurons is not agent. As Chisholm explains." the agent himself cannot be said to have undergone any change or produced any other a caused by a prior event, the agent must bring it about that the firing occurs without there being anything happening in th event(such as"an act of will"or the like)which brought [the action]about "(496). This seems to leave agent causation somewhat mysterious, e.g., what distinguishes a case in which there is an agent and a random neural firing, and an agent causing a neural firing? Chisholm answers this question by simply pointing out that there is something mysterious evenRecall that the problem with the idea that indeterminism solves the problem is that if my action is uncaused or random, then it seems no more free than if it is determined by prior events. Random events are as much out of my control as those that are caused by prior conditions. So denying determinism offers little help. However, consider determinism again: DET) Whatever happens is determined by prior events. Chisholm points out that we may deny determinism, i.e. maintain that: IND) Some things that happen are not determined by prior events, without maintaining that the exceptions are uncaused or random. We need only claim that some events are not caused by other events. He suggests [In defending freewill] we must not say that every event involved in the act is caused by some other event; and we must not say that the act is something that is not caused at all. The possibility that remains, therefore, is this: We should say that at least one of the events that are involved in the act is caused, not by any other events, but by something else instead. And this something else can only be the agent­the man. (494) How is this supposed to work? Consider Aristotle's example: "...a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is moved by a person." (Physics VII: 256a6-8). According to Chisholm, the moving of the staff and the hand are both events, and the hand-moving event causes the staff-moving event in the ordinary way (Chisholm refers to the causation between events as transeunt causation). Moreover, there is plausibly a brain event that causes the hand-moving event; again this is ordinary event causation. But, Chisholm maintains, if the action of moving the hand is free, then the brain event that causes the hand-moving event is not caused by another event, but is caused by the person or agent. (Chisholm calls such agent causation immanent causation.) I cause the neurons in my brain to fire in the way necessary to cause my hand to move, and there is no event which determines the firing of those neurons. So, according to Chisholm: I act freely in performing an action A iff (i) I, rather than some prior event, am the cause of A (or of some event that directly causes A), and (ii) I could have performed an action other than A. Incompatibility: If determinism is true I couldn't have performed an action other than A, so I wouldn't satisfy (ii). Freedom: I am the source of my actions; they are not determined by prior events. Objections: Many have rejected the idea of agent causation because it appears mysterious and not fully compatible with our conception of the physical universe. For example, as Chisholm himself points out, if the firing of the hand-moving neurons is not caused by a prior event, the agent must bring it about that the firing occurs without there being anything happening in the agent. As Chisholm explains, "...the agent himself cannot be said to have undergone any change or produced any other event (such as "an act of will" or the like) which brought [the action] about." (496). This seems to leave agent causation somewhat mysterious, e.g., what distinguishes a case in which there is an agent and a random neural firing, and an agent causing a neural firing? Chisholm answers this question by simply pointing out that there is something mysterious even