24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 7. 2001 Freewill ll: Libertarianism I Recap: Compatibilism v Incompatibilism Hard determinism is the view that determinism is true and that because of this freedom is an illusion The libertarian agrees with the hard determinist that freewill is incompatible with determinism, but disagrees about which claim should be ejected. The libertarian holds that we have free will, but this is only because determinism is false-free acts occur and are undetermined. The hard determinist and the libertarian are both incompatibilists Soft determinism, also known as compatibilism, maintains that determinism is true, but also that determinism is compatible with free will. So the compatibilist disagrees with both the libertarian and hard determinist about the compatibility of freewill and determinism. However, the compatibilist and the libertarian agree that we are(sometimes) free; the compatibilist and hard determinist both agree that determinism is true. Here is the picture &nbs p; INC DET FREE Hard Determinist &n bs &e nbsp; Y nbsp: N oft determinist &n bsp; N &e nbsp; Y nbsp, Libertarian: &nbs p Y nbsp: N &e nbsp; Y Compatibilism is appealing, but all the forms we've considered seem to have problems. So we should reconsider the possibility that the incompatibilist is right. And since we've already looked at the hard determinist brand of incompatibilism--that was Holbach--it is time to look at another form of incompatibilism, viz., Libertarianism: we have freewill. and determinism is false Consider again the freewill dilemma( see also pp. 411-12 of the text) 1. If determinism is true. we can never do other than what we do: so we are not free 2. If indeterminism is true, then some events--possibly some actions--are random; but if they are random, we are not their authors So we are not free 3. Either determinism or indeterminism is true 4. Therefore, we never act freely I. Libertarianism A Chisholm and Agent Causation Of our readings, Chisholm and Kane are the representative libertarians. Both buy the basic incompatibilist argument i) If x acts freely in performing action A, then x could have done otherwise ii) If x's performing A is determined, then x could not have done otherwise iii)So, if all acts are determined, then x never acts freely in performing action A dilemma, let's consider how denying determinism might open the possibility of freewilerminism side of the freewill We saw last time that both(i) and (ii) are controversial. So rather than focusing on the det24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 7, 2001 Freewill III: Libertarianism I. Recap: Compatibilism v. Incompatibilism Hard determinism is the view that determinism is true and that because of this freedom is an illusion. The libertarian agrees with the hard determinist that freewill is incompatible with determinism, but disagrees about which claim should be rejected. The libertarian holds that we have free will, but this is only because determinism is false­free acts occur and are undetermined. The hard determinist and the libertarian are both incompatibilists. Soft determinism, also known as compatibilism, maintains that determinism is true, but also that determinism is compatible with free will. So the compatibilist disagrees with both the libertarian and hard determinist about the compatibility of freewill and determinism. However, the compatibilist and the libertarian agree that we are (sometimes) free; the compatibilist and hard determinist both agree that determinism is true. Here is the picture: &nbs p; &n bsp; INC DET FREE Hard Determinist: &n bsp; Y & nbsp; Y & nbsp; N Soft Determinist: &n bsp; N & nbsp; Y & nbsp; Y Libertarian: &nbs p; Y & nbsp; N & nbsp; Y Compatibilism is appealing, but all the forms we've considered seem to have problems. So we should reconsider the possibility that the incompatibilist is right. And since we've already looked at the hard determinist brand of incompatibilism--that was Holbach--it is time to look at another form of incompatibilism, viz., Libertarianism: we have freewill, and determinism is false. Consider again the freewill dilemma (see also pp. 411-12 of the text): 1. If determinism is true, we can never do other than what we do; so we are not free. 2. If indeterminism is true, then some events--possibly some actions--are random; but if they are random, we are not their authors. So we are not free. 3. Either determinism or indeterminism is true. 4. Therefore, we never act freely. II. Libertarianism A. Chisholm and Agent Causation Of our readings, Chisholm and Kane are the representative libertarians. Both buy the basic incompatibilist argument: i) If x acts freely in performing action A, then x could have done otherwise. ii) If x's performing A is determined, then x could not have done otherwise. iii) So, if all acts are determined, then x never acts freely in performing action A. We saw last time that both (i) and (ii) are controversial. So rather than focusing on the determinism side of the freewill dilemma, let's consider how denying determinism might open the possibility of freewill