380 International Organization about international regimes stems from deeper epistemological and even ontological differences among observers. International regimes have been defined as social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Accordingly,as is true of any social institution,international regimes limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime's domain.And,as is also true of any social institution, ultimate expression in converging expectations and delimited discretion gives international regimes an intersubjective quality.To this extent,inter- national regimes are akin to language-we may think of them as part of"the language of state action.''2The constituent units of a regime,like speakers of a common language,generally have little difficulty in determining what even an entirely new usage signifies.Should it be technically inappropriate or in- correct,they nevertheless may still"'understand''it-in the dual sense of being able to comprehend it and willing to acquiesce in it.In sum,we know international regimes not simply by some descriptive inventory of their con- crete elements,but by their generative grammar,the underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation and transforma- tion.Likewise,we know deviations from regimes not simply by acts that are undertaken,but by the intentionality and acceptability attributed to those acts in the context of an intersubjective framework of meaning.3 The analytical components of international regimes we take to consist of principles,norms,rules,and procedures.As the content for each of these terms is specified,international regimes diverge from social institutions like language,for we do not normally attribute to language any specific "con- summatory"as opposed to"instrumental"values.4 Insofar as international regimes embody principles about fact,causation,and rectitude,as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded as legitimate,they fall closer to the consummatory end of the spectrum,into the realm of political author- ity.Thus,the formation and transformation of international regimes may be said to represent a concrete manifestation of the internationalization of political authority.5 1 Oran R.Young,"International Regimes:Problems of Concept Formation,"'World Politics 32(April 1980);and Stephen D.Krasner's introduction to this volume. 2 This phrase is taken from Bruce Andrews's application of the linguistic metaphor to the study of foreign policy:"The Language of State Action,"International Interactions 6 (November 1979) 3 Cf.Noam Chomsky,Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (The Hague:Mouton,1964), chap.1. 4 These are derived from the standard Weberian distinction between Wert-and Zweckra- tional.Max Weber,Economy and Society,ed.by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press,1978),pp.24-26. s Discussions of political authority often fuse the very meaning of the concept with one of its specific institutional manifestations,that expressed in super-subordinate relations.But,as demonstrated repeatedly in organization theory and recognized by Weber,authority rests on a form of legitimacy that ultimately can derive only from a community of interests.Chester Bar- nard has carried this line of reasoning the furthest:"Authority is another name for the willing- ness and capacity of individuals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems."The380 International Organization about international regimes stems from deeper epistemological and even ontological differences among observers. International regimes have been defined as social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international re1ations.l Accordingly, as is true of any social institution, international regimes limit the discretion of their constituent units to decide and act on issues that fall within the regime's domain. And, as is also true of any social institution, ultimate expression in converging expectations and delimited discretion gives international regimes an intersubjective quality. To this extent, inter￾national regimes are akin to language-we may think of them as part of "the language of state acti~n."~ The constituent units of a regime, like speakers of a common language, generally have little difficulty in determining what even an entirely new usage signifies. Should it be technically inappropriate or in￾correct, they nevertheless may still "understand" it-in the dual sense of being able to comprehend it and willing to acquiesce in it. In sum, we know international regimes not simply by some descriptive inventory of their con￾crete elements, but by their generative grammar, the underlying principles of order and meaning that shape the manner of their formation and transforma￾tion. Likewise, we know deviations from regimes not simply by acts that are undertaken, but by the intentionality and acceptability attributed to those acts in the context of an intersubjective framework of meaning.3 The analytical components of international regimes we take to consist of principles, norms, rules, and procedures. As the content for each of these terms is specified, international regimes diverge from social institutions like language, for we do not normally attribute to language any specific "con￾summatory" as opposed to ''instrumental" values. Insofar as international regimes embody principles about fact, causation, and rectitude, as well as political rights and obligations that are regarded as legitimate, they fall closer to the consummatory end of the spectrum, into the realm of political author￾ity. Thus, the formation and transformation of international regimes may be said to represent a concrete manifestation of the internationalization of political authority .5 Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," World Politics 32 (April 1980); and Stephen D. Krasner's introduction to this volume. This phrase is taken from Bruce Andrews's application of the linguistic metaphor to the study of foreign policy: "The Language of State Action," International Interactions 6 (November 1979). Cf. Noam Chomsky, Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (The Hague: Mouton, 19641, chap. 1. These are derived from the standard Weberian distinction between Wert- and Zweckra￾tional. Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 24-26. Discussions of political authority often fuse the very meaning of the concept with one of its specific institutional manifestations, that expressed in super-subordinate relations. But, as demonstrated repeatedly in organization theory and recognized by Weber, authority rests on a form of legitimacy that ultimately can derive only from a community of interests. Chester Bar￾nard has canied this line of reasoning the furthest: "Authority is another name for the willing￾ness and capacity of individuals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems." The