398 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Dien Bien Phu the day before the Indochinese phase of the Geneva Conference opened,and the mounting domestic criticism of the war,limited French influence both within and outside this coalition (Devillers and Lacouture,1969:108).Because the British had no viable military threat,their influence was also circumscribed at Geneva.Finally,since the Western-supported State of Vietnam was internally weak and totally dependent on American aid,it could not play a substantive role in the negotia- tions. Because of the diminished influence of the French,British,and South Vietnamese,the preferences and actions of the United States can,without distorting this analysis,be viewed as being tantamount to those of the group.Although differences in prefer- ences among the members of this coalition sometimes threatened its cohesion,and sometimes even restricted the coalition's maneuverability,the members ironed out their differences before the critical stage of the conference,making their disagreements irrelevant for this analysis (Devillers and Lacouture,1969:268). Thus,in this essay,the Western Alliance will be viewed as an American-dominated coalition in which the roles played by other members were secondary. The second important player in this game was the coalition resulting from a Sino-Soviet Alliance.Because of the coincidence of Soviet and Chinese interests,discussed below,and the Soviet desire to cooperate with the Chinese in order to enhance its power by demonstrating this alliance,the Soviets and the Chinese acted as a bloc at Geneva(Randle,1969:141). The final coalition in this game was the single entity,the DRV. Vietminh control over a large portion of Vietnam gave them a measure of autonomy at Geneva.Moreover,as will be discussed below,their preferences differed from those of the Soviets and Chinese and marked the DRV as an independent player in this game. THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES Three alternatives faced the participants at the Geneva Con- ference.The first was a stalemate that would result if the players ThPM rms and Conditions398 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Dien Bien Phu the day before the Indochinese phase of the Geneva Conference opened, and the mounting domestic criticism of the war, limited French influence both within and outside this coalition (Devillers and Lacouture, 1969: 108). Because the British had no viable military threat, their influence was also circumscribed at Geneva. Finally, since the Western-supported State of Vietnam was internally weak and totally dependent on American aid, it could not play a substantive role in the negotia￾tions. Because of the diminished influence of the French, British, and South Vietnamese, the preferences and actions of the United States can, without distorting this analysis, be viewed as being tantamounto those of the group. Although differences in prefer￾ences among the members of this coalition sometimes threatened its cohesion, and sometimes even restricted the coalition's maneuverability, the members ironed out their differences before the critical stage of the conference, making their disagreements irrelevant for this analysis (Devillers and Lacouture, 1969: 268). Thus, in this essay, the Western Alliance will be viewed as an American-dominated coalition in which the roles played by other members were secondary. The second important player in this game was the coalition resulting from a Sino-Soviet Alliance. Because of the coincidence of Soviet and Chinese interests, discussed below, and the Soviet desire to cooperate with the Chinese in order to enhance its power by demonstrating this alliance, the Soviets and the Chinese acted as a bloc at Geneva (Randle, 1969: 141). The final coalition in this game was the single entity, the DRV. Vietminh control over a large portion of Vietnam gave them a measure of autonomy at Geneva. Moreover, as will be discussed below, their preferences differed from those of the Soviets and Chinese and marked the DRV as an independent player in this game. THE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES Three alternatives faced the participants at the Geneva Con￾ference. The first was a stalemate that would result if the players This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions