Zagare GENEVA CONFERENCE 1954 397 to negotiate a settlement with the Vietminh.The pressures came from three directions:the French left,the Soviet Union,and the Vietminh themselves. In France,dissatisfaction with the war was growing,and the lack of domestic support made it difficult for the Laniel govern- ment to continue its policy of seeking a military solution to the conflict in Indochina.In the Soviet Union,where the new collec- tive leadership dominated by Premier Georgi Malenkov was pursuing a policy of detente with the West,calls for a settlement made it difficult for the French to resist negotiations without risking a serious propaganda defeat (Randle,1969:18).Finally, "peace feelers"from the Vietminh intensified the forces that seemed to be compelling the French to negotiate. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAME Before 1953,the Franco-Vietminh war was essentially a two- person game.Each side received military aid from its allies,but for the most part the United States,Great Britain,the Soviet Union,and China played passive roles.The prospect of a nego- tiated settlement,however,brought about a more active in- volvement by these other powers. As the game progressed,the players began to cluster into three distinct coalitions:the Western Alliance;the Sino-Soviet bloc; and the single-member coalition,the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the DRV or Vietminh).The nature and composition of each of these coalitions make it possible to consider each one as a unit in the game that followed. The first important cluster of nations,the Western Alliance, was the coalition that the United States led and dominated and included France,Great Britain,and the quasi-independent State of Vietnam (SVN).American domination rested on the limited ability of the other alliance members to influence the outcome of the negotiations.As Randle (1969:126)has noted,"only the United States...was in a position to make the concessions that could permit a settlement at Geneva."The continuing deteriora- tion of the French military position,symbolized by their defeat at ThPMZagare / GENEVA CONFERENCE 1954 397 to negotiate a settlement with the Vietminh. The pressures came from three directions: the French left, the Soviet Union, and the Vietminh themselves. In France, dissatisfaction with the war was growing, and the lack of domestic support made it difficult for the Laniel govern￾ment to continue its policy of seeking a military solution to the conflict in Indochina. In the Soviet Union, where the new collec￾tive leadership dominated by Premier Georgi Malenkov was pursuing a policy of detente with the West, calls for a settlement made it difficult for the French to resist negotiations without risking a serious propaganda defeat (Randle, 1969: 18). Finally, "peace feelers" from the Vietminh intensified the forces that seemed to be compelling the French to negotiate. THE STR UCTURE OF THE GA ME Before 1953, the Franco-Vietminh war was essentially atwo￾person game. Each side received military aid from its allies, but for the most part the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China played passive roles. The prospect of a nego￾tiated settlement, however, brought about a more active in￾volvement by these other powers. As the game progressed, the players began to cluster into three distinct coalitions: the Western Alliance; the Sino-Soviet bloc; and the single-member coalition, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the DRV or Vietminh). The nature and composition of each of these coalitions make it possible to consider each one as a unit in the game that followed. The first important cluster of nations, the Western Alliance, was the coalition that the United States led and dominated and included France, Great Britain, and the quasi-independent State of Vietnam (SVN). American domination rested on the limited ability of the other alliance members to influence the outcome of the negotiations. As Randle (1969: 126) has noted, "only the United States ... was in a position to make the concessions that could permit a settlement at Geneva." The continuing deteriora￾tion of the French military position, symbolized by their defeat at This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions