396 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Plane Column (pursue a2) (pursue a3) a1 1 Row --pursue 92 2 83 3 Figure 3:Reduced Outcome Matrix Given Plane's False Announcement az."If Plane acts consistently with his announcement and also chooses to "pursue az,"the(manipulated)sophisticated outcome is az,which is a better outcome for Plane than the (unmani- pulated)sophisticated outcome as.Thus,Plane has an incentive tacitly to deceive the other players in this game. It is important to note that the (manipulated)sophisticated outcome induced by Plane's tacit deception is not stable with respect to Plane's true preference order.By choosing his strategy "pursue a,"Plan could induce al as the (manipulated)sophisti- cated outcome which he prefers to the tacit outcome.How- ever,Plane's choice of this strategy is inconsistent with his announced preference order.Since the other players can read- ily observe this inconsistency,Plane's action reveals his decep- tion to them.Depending on the value Plane associates with his most-preferred alternative,it may or may not be rational for Plane to reveal his deception and risk the loss of his future credibility. The Geneva Conference Game The structure of the game just discussed is strikingly similar to that of a game played at the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954.That game began to crystallize in late 1953.By the fall of that year,the Franco-Vietminh War was stalemated and pres- sures began to mount on the French government of Joseph Laniel 品2品226w396 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY Plane Column (pursue a2) (pursue a3) a, 1 / Row - - pursue _a2 2 a3 3 Figure 3: Reduced Outcome Matrix Given Plane's False Announcement a2." If Plane acts consistently with his announcement and also chooses to "pursue a2," the (manipulated) sophisticated outcome is a2, which is a better outcome for Plane than the (unmani￾pulated) sophisticated outcome a3. Thus, Plane has an incentive tacitly to deceive the other players in this game. It is important to note that the (manipulated) sophisticated outcome induced by Plane's tacit deception is not stable with respect to Plane's true preference order. By choosing his strategy "pursue a," Plan could induce ai as the (manipulated) sophisti￾cated outcome which he prefers to the tacit outcome. How￾ever, Plane's choice of this strategy is inconsistent with his announced preference order. Since the other players can read￾ily observe this inconsistency, Plane's action reveals his decep￾tion to them. Depending on the value Plane associates with his most-preferred alternative, it may or may not be rational for Plane to reveal his deception and risk the loss of his future credibility. The Geneva Conference Game The structure of the game just discussed is strikingly similar to that of a game played at the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954. That game began to crystallize in late 1953. By the fall of that year, the Franco-Vietminh War was stalemated and pres￾sures began to mount on the French government of Joseph Laniel This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:58:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions