70 Pacific Historical Review letter to Rhee with the theme:"We still love you,you s.o.b." Arthur Radford,chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,sug- gested sending General James Van Fleet,a personal friend of Rhee and a favorite of Senate conservatives,to Seoul.Van Fleet's mission would be to make recommendations for a buildup-less than Rhee was demanding,but still substan- tial-of ROK forces.Vice President Richard Nixon thought that,as"a bone to Rhee,"Van Fleet was perfect.Eisenhower concurred,and he approved the plan.6 On April 16,Eisenhower informed Rhee that he was dis- patching Van Fleet to South Korea,and he described the siz- able reinforcement program he had in mind for the ROK military.Upon receiving the news,Rhee was delighted.Sum- moning Briggs,he announced his decision to send repre- sentatives to Geneva,and he asked the ambassador to tell Eisenhower that the president had"assured us a happy Easter in Korea."17 If Eisenhower's commitment to provide military aid bought a South Korean presence at Geneva,it certainly did not buy cooperation.In the statement announcing his deci- sion to send representatives to Geneva,Rhee made it quite clear that he expected no good to come out of this "final time-consuming attempt"to achieve peaceful unification.He called on the United States to join South Korea in "employ- ing other means"to drive the enemy from his country"if and when"the Geneva conference failed.18 American officials,as noted above,were hardly more op- timistic about the chances for success at Geneva.In fact,some joined Rhee in wishing the conference ill.At the Pentagon, top military leaders recognized that a settlement in Korea would almost certainly require the neutralization of the coun- 16.Memorandum of discussion,193rd NSC meeting,April 13,1954,Foreign Relation,1952-1954,XV,1,785-1,788. 17.Briggs to State,April 18,1954,Foreign Relations,1952-1954,XVI, 111-113. 18.In Briggs to State,April 18,1954,ibid.,113-115. This condent downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subpect to JSTOR Terms and Conditions70 Pacific Historical Review letter to Rhee with the theme: "We still love you, you s.o.b." Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sug￾gested sending General James Van Fleet, a personal friend of Rhee and a favorite of Senate conservatives, to Seoul. Van Fleet's mission would be to make recommendations for a buildup-less than Rhee was demanding, but still substan￾tial-of ROK forces. Vice President Richard Nixon thought that, as "a bone to Rhee," Van Fleet was perfect. Eisenhower concurred, and he approved the plan.'6 On April 16, Eisenhower informed Rhee that he was dis￾patching Van Fleet to South Korea, and he described the siz￾able reinforcement program he had in mind for the ROK military. Upon receiving the news, Rhee was delighted. Sum￾moning Briggs, he announced his decision to send repre￾sentatives to Geneva, and he asked the ambassador to tell Eisenhower that the president had "assured us a happy Easter in Korea."'7 If Eisenhower's commitment to provide military aid bought a South Korean presence at Geneva, it certainly did not buy cooperation. In the statement announcing his deci￾sion to send representatives to Geneva, Rhee made it quite clear that he expected no good to come out of this "final time-consuming attempt" to achieve peaceful unification. He called on the United States to join South Korea in "employ￾ing other means" to drive the enemy from his country "if and when" the Geneva conference failed.'8 American officials, as noted above, were hardly more op￾timistic about the chances for success at Geneva. In fact, some joined Rhee in wishing the conference ill. At the Pentagon, top military leaders recognized that a settlement in Korea would almost certainly require the neutralization of the coun- 16. Memorandum of discussion, 193rd NSC meeting, April 13, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, XV, 1,785-1,788. 17. Briggs to State, April 18, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, XVI, 111-113. 18. In Briggs to State, April 18, 1954, ibid., 113-115. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 22:04:10 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions