Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1801 1992, P 360)and Gilligan,'s In a Different Voice(1982) became emblematic of this new feminist scholarship. Notwithstanding the limitations of the research on which her work was based, Gilligans discriminatory argument gave anti-feminists ammunition that could cause real harm to women (Faludi, 1992, P. 365). Though Gilligan objected to the use of her work to such ends, the damage had been done as women turned to the revolution from within(Steinem, 1992), eagerly consuming books on building self-esteem, self-help and New Age spirituality thus seriously diminishing the personal is political ethos of second-wave feminism(Evans, 1995; Whelehan, 1995) As already noted, Noddings'(2003) work fits thisfeminine' rather than feministmould, with care rooted in the roles women assume in society For Noddings, rather than a form of virtue, the ethics of care concerns the mutuality of the caring relationship, which embodies a unique way of being responsive to the particular details of the caring situation by one's actions within it. It rests on an emotional -volitional account of ethics that lepends on a spontaneously occurring, sensuous attunement to the events occurring in our surroundings, an interested-affective attitude(as opposed o the detached-objective mode of deontology). For her, the duty of care is not the same as the ethic of care. Care involves being engrossed in a caring relationship, with the one being cared for such that he or she feels cared for, otherwise one is merely acting out of duty or obligation. Noddings claim that such engrossment involves suspending evaluation and being transformed by the other creates significant moral risks for Davion(1993) especially if one becomes locked into supporting immoral goals. For her. we make a moral choice that warrants careful evaluation when we decide to enter into, and remain in, a relationship. There are thus more basic values than care that enable people to maintain integrity in their relation ships and to do good: .. one must be able to maintain deeply held convic ions in order for a caring relationship to be morally good(Davion, 1993 T95≌9 p 163). Importantly for Davion(1993), the process of evaluating ongoing relationships can be seen as an exercise of moral autonomy'(Davion, 1993, P. 163) and ending caring relationships is justified for the sake of one's own well-being and not just out of concern for others. For her, what is missing in Noddings' relational ontology 'is an account of the individuals within caring relations as important in themselves'(Davion, 1993, p. 175) for Noddings(1995), the ideal self isdeveloped in congruence with one's best remembrance of caring and being cared-for'(Noddings, 1995, p. 22), leaving little room for autonomy. Keller(1997), too, notes that care inter- ruts autonomy. Through the obligation to care, it diminishes womens ability to choose their relationships and to end relationships where care is not reciprocated. Koehn (1998) raises concerns that the practices o caring, trusting and empathising can frequently be harmful or manipulative, since there is nothing self-regulating in these practices to prevent this. Thus, making care the core virtue raises problems, as do ethics of care approaches1992, p. 360) and Gilligan’s In a Different Voice (1982) became emblematic of this new feminist scholarship. Notwithstanding the limitations of the research on which her work was based, Gilligan’s discriminatory arguments gave anti-feminists ammunition that ‘could cause real harm to women’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 365). Though Gilligan objected to the use of her work to such ends, the damage had been done as women turned to the ‘revolution from within’ (Steinem, 1992), eagerly consuming books on building self-esteem, self-help and New Age spirituality thus seriously diminishing the personal is political ethos of second-wave feminism (Evans, 1995; Whelehan, 1995). As already noted, Noddings’ (2003) work fits this ‘feminine’ rather than ‘feminist’ mould, with care rooted in the roles women assume in society. For Noddings, rather than a form of virtue, the ethics of care concerns the mutuality of the caring relationship, which embodies a unique way of being responsive to the particular details of the caring situation by one’s actions within it. It rests on an emotional – volitional account of ethics that depends on a spontaneously occurring, sensuous attunement to the events occurring in our surroundings, an interested-affective attitude (as opposed to the detached-objective mode of deontology). For her, the duty of care is not the same as the ethic of care. Care involves being engrossed in a caring relationship, with the one being cared for such that he or she feels cared for, otherwise one is merely acting out of duty or obligation. Noddings’ claim that such engrossment involves suspending evaluation and being transformed by the other creates significant moral risks for Davion (1993), especially if one becomes locked into supporting immoral goals. For her, we make a moral choice that warrants careful evaluation when we decide to enter into, and remain in, a relationship. There are thus more basic values than care that enable people to maintain integrity in their relation￾ships and to do good: ‘ ... one must be able to maintain deeply held convic￾tions in order for a caring relationship to be morally good’ (Davion, 1993, p. 163). Importantly for Davion (1993), ‘the process of evaluating ongoing relationships can be seen as an exercise of moral autonomy’ (Davion, 1993, p. 163) and ending caring relationships is justified for the sake of one’s own well-being and not just out of concern for others. For her, what is missing in Noddings’ relational ontology ‘is an account of the individuals within caring relations as important in themselves’ (Davion, 1993, p. 175): for Noddings (1995), the ideal self is ‘developed in congruence with one’s best remembrance of caring and being cared-for’ (Noddings, 1995, p. 22), leaving little room for autonomy. Keller (1997), too, notes that care inter￾rupts autonomy. Through the obligation to care, it diminishes women’s ability to choose their relationships and to end relationships where care is not reciprocated. Koehn (1998) raises concerns that the practices of caring, trusting and empathising can frequently be harmful or manipulative, since there is nothing self-regulating in these practices to prevent this. Thus, making care the core virtue raises problems, as do ethics of care approaches Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1801 at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from