1800 Me/ Gray complete with principles and rules of discourse, as does feminist writer Koehn(1998), his appeal lies in his attempt to devise an inclusive form of ethics-reliant on procedural processes within democratic institutional structures-wherein all people everywhere can participate. However, fem- inists are critical of Habermas's heavy reliance on rational principles, pro- cedural processes and unquestioning faith in democracy(Meehan, 1995 They advance a completely different theory and it is to this feminist ethics of care that we now turn Ethics of care Feminist ethics of care There are two main strands to the feminist ethics of care as it has been intro- duced to social work. One emanates from psychology, starting with the work of developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan, and the other from the influence of political scientists Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen Gilligan's(1982) groundbreaking work on gender diferences in moral development has been influential in the development of the feminist ethics of care. Gilligan discerned that while men tended to be more rational, women tended to be more emotionally connected and nurturing Her care rspective involved seeing ourselves as connected to others within a web of relationships such that our sense of self becomes closely tied to others responsiveness to us and our responsiveness to others. Maintaining these relations of care is a key focus of the ethics of care, which, says Davion (1993), is epitomised in Noddings(1984) injunction to always meet the other as one caring(see below) Gilligan's research emerged at the time of what Faludi(1992) has called a backlash' against feminism in which one of its key progenitors, Betty 5望9 Friedan, author of the seminal The Feminist Mystique (1963), played a pivotal role. In her eagerly awaited The Second Stage(1981), Friedan appeared to renege on her earlier commitments andwalked right into the New Right's"pro-family"semantics trap..REferring women,s movement.. as"the feminist reaction".[she elevates the "relational "Beta mode and other distinctively "feminine "traits'(Faludi 1992, p. 358). Faludi(1992) notes how terms like women,s ways "womens special nature'and 'feminine caring entered into popular works in the 1980s, as did attacks onequal opportunity feminists'criticised for encouraging women to 'devalue caring work(Faludi, 1992, p. 359) However. Faludi claims that most feminist scholars had 'set out to investi gate the origins of mens and women,s differences, not to glorify them (Faludi, 1992, P. 359). In so doing, ' they hoped to find in women's"differ ence"a more humane model for public life'(Faludi, 1992, P. 359). But difference began to'defuse the feminist campaign for equality'(Faludi,complete with principles and rules of discourse, as does feminist writer Koehn (1998), his appeal lies in his attempt to devise an inclusive form of ethics—reliant on procedural processes within democratic institutional structures—wherein all people everywhere can participate. However, fem￾inists are critical of Habermas’s heavy reliance on rational principles, pro￾cedural processes and unquestioning faith in democracy (Meehan, 1995). They advance a completely different theory and it is to this feminist ethics of care that we now turn. Ethics of care Feminist ethics of care There are two main strands to the feminist ethics of care as it has been intro￾duced to social work. One emanates from psychology, starting with the work of developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan, and the other from the influence of political scientists Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen. Gilligan’s (1982) groundbreaking work on gender differences in moral development has been influential in the development of the feminist ethics of care. Gilligan discerned that while men tended to be more rational, women tended to be more emotionally connected and nurturing. Her care perspective involved seeing ourselves as connected to others within a web of relationships such that our sense of self becomes closely tied to others’ responsiveness to us and our responsiveness to others. Maintaining these relations of care is a key focus of the ethics of care, which, says Davion (1993), is epitomised in Noddings’ (1984) injunction to always meet the other as one caring (see below). Gilligan’s research emerged at the time of what Faludi (1992) has called a ‘backlash’ against feminism in which one of its key progenitors, Betty Friedan, author of the seminal The Feminist Mystique (1963), played a pivotal role. In her eagerly awaited The Second Stage (1981), Friedan appeared to renege on her earlier commitments and ‘walked right into the New Right’s “pro-family” semantics trap ... [R]eferring to the women’s movement ... as “the feminist reaction” ... [she elevates] the “relational” Beta mode and other distinctively “feminine” traits’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 358). Faludi (1992) notes how terms like ‘women’s ways’, ‘women’s special nature’ and ‘feminine caring’ entered into popular works in the 1980s, as did attacks on ‘equal opportunity feminists’ criticised for encouraging women to ‘devalue caring work’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 359). However, Faludi claims that most feminist scholars had ‘set out to investi￾gate the origins of men’s and women’s differences, not to glorify them’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 359). In so doing, ‘they hoped to find in women’s “differ￾ence” a more humane model for public life’ (Faludi, 1992, p. 359). But ‘difference’ began to ‘defuse the feminist campaign for equality’ (Faludi, 1800 Mel Gray at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from