Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1799 The important difference in this form of thinking about ethics is that virtue ethics, following Aristotle's(1954)philosophy, provides a natura- listic account of morality as something that inheres in our human nature rather than in abstract principles. However, one of the sticking points for those who are sceptical about virtue ethics is how virtues are defined. Aristotle believed that virtues could be discerned by looking at the character traits of the virtuous person or from observing what is needed for human flourishing For Aristotle, there was a direct connec tion between following virtues and human well-being. By attributing mor ality to human nature, rather than to differences between men and women. virtue ethics enables feminists to focus on fundamental human interests and needs. This fits well with social work 's view of itself as a profession, which helps people achieve their full potential by actualising their innate capacities However, Aristotle's naturalistic philosophy went beyond the individual to discerning the kind of society needed for human flourishing. This, too, fits well with social work's approach to human rights and social justice. These concerns are very different from those of non-natural ethics, like Kant's deontology, which ' depict ethics as something transcendentally pure and uncontaminated by the world of human desires'(Phoca and Wright, 1999, P. 124 ). However, when ethics are removed from this 'objec tive'level, they become closer to psychology or sociology or even biology, g which can be problematic for feminists. For example, by grounding ethics in feminine characteristics, as Noddings(2003)and others have done, femin ists depict relationships, empathy, care and so on as ' women's special virtues. As Phoca and Wright (1999)note, there is a danger in seeing women as innately supportive, non-competitive nurturers'(Phoca and Wright, 1999, P. 125)as this can all too easily lead to them being disregarded and feminist ethics once again being marginalised. Feminist virtue ethicists hus advocate a broader focus on character, disposition and the myriad T95≌9 factors needed for human flourishing Several writers have written about virtue ethics in relation to social work (Rhodes, 1986; Morelock, 1997; McBeath and Webb, 2002; Hugman, 2005; van den Bersselaar, 2005: Clark, 2006: Lovat and Gray, 2008). Some believe that virtue ethics can be enriched through an understanding of virtue as 8 developed through communication and dialogue. Seeing ethics and moral ity as culturally contingent, Rhodes(1986) was one of the first social work writers on virtue ethics to suggest the need for a dialogical process to reach shared understanding. More recently, writers have highlighted the rel- evance of habermas' s communicative action and discourse ethics to social work(Houston, 2003: Hugman, 2005; Gray and Lovat, 2007; Hayes and Houston, 2007: Lovat and Gray, 2008). They see in Habermas the means with which to achieve a balanced perspective on ethics that accords with Rhodes(1986)early emphasis on dialogue and shared under- standing. While Habermas offers a fairly structured rational approachThe important difference in this form of thinking about ethics is that virtue ethics, following Aristotle’s (1954) philosophy, provides a natura￾listic account of morality as something that inheres in our human nature rather than in abstract principles. However, one of the sticking points for those who are sceptical about virtue ethics is how virtues are defined. Aristotle believed that virtues could be discerned by looking at the character traits of the virtuous person or from observing what is needed for human flourishing. For Aristotle, there was a direct connec￾tion between following virtues and human well-being. By attributing mor￾ality to human nature, rather than to differences between men and women, virtue ethics enables feminists to focus on fundamental human interests and needs. This fits well with social work’s view of itself as a profession, which helps people achieve their full potential by actualising their innate capacities. However, Aristotle’s naturalistic philosophy went beyond the individual to discerning the kind of society needed for human flourishing. This, too, fits well with social work’s approach to human rights and social justice. These concerns are very different from those of non-natural ethics, like Kant’s deontology, which ‘depict ethics as something transcendentally pure and uncontaminated by the world of human desires’ (Phoca and Wright, 1999, p. 124). However, when ethics are removed from this ‘objec￾tive’ level, they become closer to psychology or sociology or even biology, which can be problematic for feminists. For example, by grounding ethics in ‘feminine’ characteristics, as Noddings (2003) and others have done, femin￾ists depict relationships, empathy, care and so on as ‘women’s special virtues’. As Phoca and Wright (1999) note, there is a danger in seeing women as ‘innately supportive, non-competitive nurturers’ (Phoca and Wright, 1999, p. 125) as this can all too easily lead to them being disregarded and feminist ethics once again being marginalised. Feminist virtue ethicists thus advocate a broader focus on character, disposition and the myriad factors needed for human flourishing. Several writers have written about virtue ethics in relation to social work (Rhodes, 1986; Morelock, 1997; McBeath and Webb, 2002; Hugman, 2005; van den Bersselaar, 2005; Clark, 2006; Lovat and Gray, 2008). Some believe that virtue ethics can be enriched through an understanding of virtue as developed through communication and dialogue. Seeing ethics and moral￾ity as culturally contingent, Rhodes (1986) was one of the first social work writers on virtue ethics to suggest the need for a dialogical process to reach shared understanding. More recently, writers have highlighted the rel￾evance of Habermas’s communicative action and discourse ethics to social work (Houston, 2003; Hugman, 2005; Gray and Lovat, 2007; Hayes and Houston, 2007; Lovat and Gray, 2008). They see in Habermas the means with which to achieve a balanced perspective on ethics that accords with Rhodes’ (1986) early emphasis on dialogue and shared under￾standing. While Habermas offers a fairly structured rational approach Moral Sources and Emergent Ethical Theories in Social Work 1799 at Fudan university on January 6, 2011 bjsw.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from