litigious than Americas. The hurdles that a european firm must clear to persuade the european Commission to press an anti-dumping case are much higher than those faced by an American firm That does not mean Europeans are less protectionist; simply that the tactics are different There may be political pressure in Europe to enforce rulings the wto has already made against America, notably in the case about America's foreign-sales corporation tax a tax break given to American exporters. The Wto has ruled that the american tax break was an illegal export subsidy and given the Europeans permission to levy up to $4 billion in retaliatory tariffs. So far they have held off, waiting for America's Congress to rewrite the offending parts of the tax code. But it is far from clear that such a change will actually be passed. the chances are that the dispute will rumble on, and pressure in Europe for retaliatory tariffs may rise Americans, for their part increasingly view Europe's regulatory requirements-ostensibly designed to protect consumers or the environment -as a form of protectionism through the back door. One example is the continuing row over genetically modified crops. America has threatened to appeal to the wto over the moratorium the Europeans have imposed on approving GM crops. American producers reckon that even assuming the moratorium is lifted Europe's new labelling requirements for gm products are too onerous and protectionist a potentially even bigger fight looms over Europes proposed regulations on chemicals, which require manufacturers and users of chemicals to give extensive information on the health and environmental effects of all their products. Here, too, Americans smell European protectionism After Cancun Set beside the huge importance of the transatlantic trade relationship each of these issues is an irritant rather than a threat. There is little risk that transatlantic trade will be engulfed by a wave of protectionism, even if the dollar plummets. But at a time when economies are alread fragile, such trade spats add unwelcome political tensions. More important after the collapse of last week's WTo ministerial talks in Cancun, they make it even less likely that the doha round of global trade talks can be revived The Doha round launched soon after the September 11th attacks, has ambitious goals, geared particularly to helping poor countries. Dubbed a development round, it aims to free up farm trade, long the sacred cow of global protectionism; slash remaining tariffs on industrial goods and liberalise trade in services. the potential benefits for the global economy and especially for poor countries, would be considerable. According to the World bank a successful Doha round could raise poor countries' income by $350 billion a year and lift 144m more people out of poverty These gains are now in serious jeopardy. Last week,'s ministerial summit in Cancun -which was supposed to mark the mid-point of the round-collapsed in disarray on September 14th, with rich and poor countries unable to agree about the scope and ambition of the doha round. poor countries, particularly African ones, refused to extend the negotiations into new areas, and accused the rich countries of refusing to make serious efforts to dismantle their egregious farm subsidies. Negotiations are to continue in Geneva but the official deadline for finishing the talks-December 31st 2004-now looks certain to be missed At first sight, that should not matter too much. Experience shows that trade rounds always draglitigious than America's. The hurdles that a European firm must clear to persuade the European Commission to press an anti-dumping case are much higher than those faced by an American firm. That does not mean Europeans are less protectionist; simply that the tactics are different. There may be political pressure in Europe to enforce rulings the WTO has already made against America, notably in the case about America's foreign-sales corporation tax, a tax break given to American exporters. The WTO has ruled that the American tax break was an illegal export subsidy and given the Europeans permission to levy up to $4 billion in retaliatory tariffs. So far they have held off, waiting for America's Congress to rewrite the offending parts of the tax code. But it is far from clear that such a change will actually be passed. The chances are that the dispute will rumble on, and pressure in Europe for retaliatory tariffs may rise. Americans, for their part, increasingly view Europe's regulatory requirements—ostensibly designed to protect consumers or the environment—as a form of protectionism through the back door. One example is the continuing row over genetically modified crops. America has threatened to appeal to the WTO over the moratorium the Europeans have imposed on approving GM crops. American producers reckon that even assuming the moratorium is lifted, Europe's new labelling requirements for GM products are too onerous and protectionist. A potentially even bigger fight looms over Europe's proposed regulations on chemicals, which require manufacturers and users of chemicals to give extensive information on the health and environmental effects of all their products. Here, too, Americans smell European protectionism. After Cancun Set beside the huge importance of the transatlantic trade relationship, each of these issues is an irritant rather than a threat. There is little risk that transatlantic trade will be engulfed by a wave of protectionism, even if the dollar plummets. But at a time when economies are already fragile, such trade spats add unwelcome political tensions. More important, after the collapse of last week's WTO ministerial talks in Cancun, they make it even less likely that the Doha round of global trade talks can be revived. The Doha round, launched soon after the September 11th attacks, has ambitious goals, geared particularly to helping poor countries. Dubbed a development round, it aims to free up farm trade, long the sacred cow of global protectionism; slash remaining tariffs on industrial goods; and liberalise trade in services. The potential benefits for the global economy, and especially for poor countries, would be considerable. According to the World Bank, a successful Doha round could raise poor countries' income by $350 billion a year and lift 144m more people out of poverty by 2015. These gains are now in serious jeopardy. Last week's ministerial summit in Cancun—which was supposed to mark the mid-point of the round—collapsed in disarray on September 14th, with rich and poor countries unable to agree about the scope and ambition of the Doha round. Poor countries, particularly African ones, refused to extend the negotiations into new areas, and accused the rich countries of refusing to make serious efforts to dismantle their egregious farm subsidies. Negotiations are to continue in Geneva, but the official deadline for finishing the talks—December 31st 2004—now looks certain to be missed. At first sight, that should not matter too much. Experience shows that trade rounds always drag