on much longer than planned Doha' s predecessor, the Uruguay round, took eight years to complete, rather than the three originally scheduled But this time is different. The wto, an organisation already short on credibility, has been dealt a body blow. Moreover, the Europeans, under pressure from an appreciating euro, will find it harder to sell more farm ade environment in which the talks take place is likely to become increasingly hostile to freer reform at home. Poor countries, worried about China, will become even more leery about lowering their own barriers. America, with its growing trade deficit will find it ever harder to argue for free trade. And the president's fast-track negotiating authority-under which Congress can approve but not alter trade agreements -runs out in 2007. If the mood in Congress turns against trade liberalisation, the authority may not be renewed These risks are not lost on Mr Bush's trade team. They are one reason why Bob Zoellick America's top trade man is a strong proponent of competitive liberalisation". America is simultaneously negotiating global, regional and bilateral trade deals because the momentum has to be kept going. Engaging Congress in new trade deals, he says, stems the slippage towards protectionism Underlining his point, President Bush has just signed free-trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. In the past year, the Bush team has initiated bilateral trade deals with all the Central American countries and five countries in southern Africa, as well as morocco and Australia. It has also promised to start trade talks with Bahrain and the Dominican Republic. More are likely to follow. After the failure of the Cancun talks, Mr Zoellick said that america would now push on the bilateral and regional route Bilateral trade deals, particularly with small countries are much easier to get through Congress than multilateral ones. But success at bilateral trade deals coupled with a lack of progress on the doha round would gradually create a different kind of global integration From an economic perspective, a spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements is much less desirable than progress towards multilateral free trade. Moreover, America's choice of bilateral free-trade partners so far suggests politics plays as much of a role as economics in defining the administrations agenda Already free-traders argue that america is interested more in economic " coalitions of the the Bush team has worked harder than many others to make progress on the Doha roulf eo willing" than in global free trade. Jagdish Bhagwati, an economist at Columbia University and vocal free-trader, says America's behaviour is that of a selfish hegemon. The countrys appetite for bilateral deals, he claims, is undermining the global trading system. That is unfair, because Certainly the Americans share some of the blame for the collapse at Cancun. Their unwillingness to offer poor African countries more concessions on cotton was particularly unhelpful. But poor countries' intransigence was just as much of a problem Whoever bears the responsibility though, bilateral trade deals are no substitute for progress towards multilateral free trade On current trends depressingly it seems that the global trade system is heading for second-best. Copyright C 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reservedon much longer than planned. Doha's predecessor, the Uruguay round, took eight years to complete, rather than the three originally scheduled. But this time is different. The WTO, an organisation already short on credibility, has been dealt a body blow. Moreover, the environment in which the talks take place is likely to become increasingly hostile to freer trade. Europeans, under pressure from an appreciating euro, will find it harder to sell more farm reform at home. Poor countries, worried about China, will become even more leery about lowering their own barriers. America, with its growing trade deficit, will find it ever harder to argue for free trade. And the president's fast-track negotiating authority—under which Congress can approve but not alter trade agreements—runs out in 2007. If the mood in Congress turns against trade liberalisation, the authority may not be renewed. These risks are not lost on Mr Bush's trade team. They are one reason why Bob Zoellick, America's top trade man, is a strong proponent of “competitive liberalisation”. America is simultaneously negotiating global, regional and bilateral trade deals because the momentum has to be kept going. Engaging Congress in new trade deals, he says, stems the slippage towards protectionism. Underlining his point, President Bush has just signed free-trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. In the past year, the Bush team has initiated bilateral trade deals with all the Central American countries and five countries in southern Africa, as well as Morocco and Australia. It has also promised to start trade talks with Bahrain and the Dominican Republic. More are likely to follow. After the failure of the Cancun talks, Mr Zoellick said that America would now push on the bilateral and regional route. Bilateral trade deals, particularly with small countries, are much easier to get through Congress than multilateral ones. But success at bilateral trade deals coupled with a lack of progress on the Doha round would gradually create a different kind of global integration. From an economic perspective, a spaghetti bowl of bilateral trade agreements is much less desirable than progress towards multilateral free trade. Moreover, America's choice of bilateral free-trade partners so far suggests politics plays as much of a role as economics in defining the administration's agenda. Already free-traders argue that America is interested more in economic “coalitions of the willing” than in global free trade. Jagdish Bhagwati, an economist at Columbia University and a vocal free-trader, says America's behaviour is that of a selfish hegemon. The country's appetite for bilateral deals, he claims, is undermining the global trading system. That is unfair, because the Bush team has worked harder than many others to make progress on the Doha round. Certainly the Americans share some of the blame for the collapse at Cancun. Their unwillingness to offer poor African countries more concessions on cotton was particularly unhelpful. But poor countries' intransigence was just as much of a problem. Whoever bears the responsibility, though, bilateral trade deals are no substitute for progress towards multilateral free trade. On current trends, depressingly, it seems that the global trade system is heading for second-best. Copyright © 2004 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved